The CENTCOM Playbook for Iran?: Gen. Joseph Votel

that IRGC does.

I'm host Michael Allen with Beacon Global Strategies.

Today I'm joined by General Joseph Votel, a former commander of US Cent-Con. General Votel has also served as the commander of US Special Operations Command. General Votel joins us today for discussion on the rapidly developing conflict in the Middle East including the state of hostilities, Iran's blocking of the streets of Hormuz, and the possibility of a Special Operations raid into Iran to recover the 400 kilograms

of highly enriched uranium. Please stay with us as we speak with General Joe Votel.

General Joe Votel, welcome to NetSec matters.

Michael, it's great to be with you. Well, we're honored to have you. You're going to be well qualified, not only it's a forced-art general, but as a former commander of Special Operations Command to discuss plans, at least as claiming the newspapers to possibly do a special ops raid

to recover the so-called 400 kilograms of HU. We obviously want to talk to you as a former Cent-Con commander about the straits of Hormuz, but let's just start generally, you much to have seen quite a few war plans

through the years, not only our own, but also maybe what these railies were always thinking about doing.

Tell us a little bit about what you think so far of the way the war has been prosecuted against the Iranians.

“And my view on this is I think from a military standpoint, I think at least what we've seen”

over the last 11 or 12 days, I think kind of our strikes, large from the air, from maritime resources here, I think have been pretty effective. I think that's been well orchestrated. I think there's been a high degree of collaboration between the United States and the Israeli Defense Forces, I think that's a relationship that has continued to move forward

militarily in terms of our collaboration cooperation with them. And that seems to be from the terrorist standpoint, seems to be going pretty well as we're executing this. I think what we've seen from the Iranians, I think is about what I would have expected

“I think it's important to appreciate from their perspective that this is this is existential.”

That's exactly how they are looking at it and they are going to lash out and in as many different ways as they can. There's no doubt that the military capacity has been diminished, but there are still remain some missiles and certainly these drones that are going to continue to be a factor in the war as it as a moves forward.

So I think I initially good work here, but the more to be done, I think we're engaged with a country here who is feeling an existential threat to them and will respond that way. I've read a bit about a division of labor between these railings in the United States on targeting, not only geographically, but also and I'm interested to see if you can help us understand this. The United States is apparently hitting more of the military infrastructure where as I've read

the Israelis or bombing runways, they're doing a lot of regime change type targets from police stations all the way through the IRGC. And we're also hunting missiles which understand it's time consuming and I'd love to understand more about that. But tell us if you can, what you understand to be the division of labor between the Israelis in the United States.

“Yeah, I think what I've observed here is kind of in line with what you have outlined. I think”

certainly the initial Israeli attacks were really focused on the civil leadership and disrupting that clearly trying to paralyze command and control and leadership at the very tops of the top of the nation, making it difficult for them to respond or to orchestrating kind of response in terms of so they are very much doing that. I think the Israelis have a different view, perhaps have a different view on this war. Then we have certainly they have been

and drone attacks and have now for some time. So I think they look at this much differently.

And so the perhaps the public acceptance of going after civil targets

“may be greater in Israel than it actually might be in the United States. And the United States I think”

as as less as you know I traditionally I think really been focused on kind of taking away the war fighting, war making capabilities of of the regime. And I think that's been very clear from what's been communicated to us. Certainly it is a department of defense every briefing that we've seen so far, the three or four that we've seen has really emphasized the focus on military targeting.

So I think that's where the I think that's where the division of labor has been. And as you

point out I think there's also been some geographic division of that although that probably is is dissipating a little bit more now as we get into the later parts of the campaign and there's we're going after targets in a variety of different areas. Help us understand a little bit about Israel's defense doctrine and why they need to go after

“the ballistic missiles. I think they have a number in mind that if Iran gets close to it it's”

threatening to them. And then if you could help us understand obviously the missiles in their launch

resort laying out somewhere and playing side it sounds like they go back and forth in and out of hiding

and that I keep reading work having to quote hunt them. I assume that means some electronic signature they give off and it's easier said than done. Yeah yeah those are great questions. I mean I think you know Israel's concerned about the missiles I think is one that's you know it's fairly straight forward here. I mean they are extraordinarily vulnerable to missile attacks. This is a threat that they deal with on a regular basis certainly from from Hezbollah in the past and

actually in in the present from from Hezbollah and and and then most recently from Iran and the Houthis as we've seen over the last couple years. So this is a this is the whole idea behind the creation of the of the iron dome defense and other layers of air defense capabilities they put in. These can these can wreak havoc on a small nation like like Israel and cause lots of casualties. So they are very very concerned about removing that capability not not not even to

mention the fact that they that you know the missiles are a primary way that primary you know platform that a nuclear weapon would likely be delivered to to Israel in any place else in the region.

“So the missiles take out a very unique focus for them and that's why I think we see them paint”

you know high a high degree of attention to making sure we take that capability down. On the on the hunt for these things you know and I guess the way I think about this and I kind of think about it in the way that I think about going after terrorist organizations that the missile missiles missile launching it's it's a system and we have to look at it like a system there are you know places where they're manufactured there are places where they're stored

there are places where they are moved into launcher locations you know there are places that they kind of scoop scoop back to there are command and control nodes that that that support them there is a sensor network that provides the ironian speedback on how effective these missiles are. So in order to take that hole you know take that down you have really have to go after the whole system a uh affiliated with that and so I do think you see a lot of our targeting is is is focused on

that you know they certainly we are making use of all of our intelligence you know means to together information you know the measures intelligence, masant, uh say Gandalf everything else there that we're that we're using to do this but I also would just add that you know a lot of this I think is is good analysis work by our by our intelligence professionals I mean oh I think we are probably tracking every place we see a launch come from whether it's from a missile or a drone

I think that becomes a mark on a map and and that becomes another I that give another point in the in the network that we are trying to not only diagram but disrupt and uh out of that I think we're

the amount of exposure time to have so very much like we would do with the with a terrorist now work we're trying to understand as much as we can about how how these how these uh all these missiles and and drones are being employed so that we can begin to take that network apart um of course that also includes removing command and control nodes making them much more difficult for them to uh to do that it removes the includes removing leaders who are going to make decisions about these things

but I I also think one of the things that may be complicating this now is that there may be more

of at this first plan for how these are being launched uh much more you know provincially here

“a without necessarily direct direction from from Tehran so I think that that makes the challenge”

that just a little bit more difficult as we as we contend of this but I think the way I would encourage people to think about this is like a system and we're trying to put together the pieces we're trying to gather all the information we're using I'm sure we're using things like artificial intelligence to help us predict and look at locations or this I mean we did the same thing with improvised explosive devices and in Iraq and in Afghanistan you know you know a couple

decades ago trying to understand this and trying to understand the patterns are associated with

what they're doing so we can predict and be ready to to go after the whole system that supports

lots of these missiles and drones fascinating does that mean because these missiles and launchers give off some signatures that they're comparatively easier to hunt down than drones I mean drones

“seem more hideable yeah yeah I think that's true I mean you know and if you've seen some of the”

reporting on this I mean some of the new channels if showed you know the mentions of these launchers and missiles associated and these are huge these are huge pieces of equipment you know they approach the size of semi-truck so that you can't just hide it done very easily they have to kind of be exposed I mean I guess missiles could be fired from subsurface you know at it's and stuff like that but in most cases what we do see these is having to move to some type of firing position where

they are exposed they're large they can't be identified of course all these things give off some signal that can potentially be intercepted and of course we have the exquisite intelligence capabilities are allow us to allow us to pick that up but yeah I think that that is a big difference I think between the missiles and what we're seeing with the shot heads and the the flexibility that is associated with moving uh moving drones around and and launching those and a with a much lower

signature than certainly than the missiles have so in the White House in the Department of War say one of the objectives of this operation is of course to degrade or eliminate the ability of the Iranians to project force it certainly means missiles but it may not mean drones right it it's at the best

“way to think about it no I I think it I think it means all all forms of threat that they can do I think”

it's missiles I think it's drones I think it's proxies it's certainly a nuclear weapons capability I mean I what I the way I kind of interpret that is is that we are we are trying to take away Iran's ability really to employ any of their military capabilities that I've just kind of outlined there beyond beyond their own borders so that they aren't a threat to their neighbors and not a threat to the to the region there's certainly not a threat to the United States so I think that it's I think

that it's much more inclusive in terms of the different things we are going after so tell us this is probably a good point to get time to raise the timeline given that we're talking about how long it takes to take out a lot of these military assets and nuclear assets we here two to three more weeks we've already been going something like a week and a half for ten days dissolved this sound about right I mean I know political appointees sometimes have a different schedule than the military

would which is working a target list tell us a little bit about how we should think about the duration of of of of this conflict well I guess the way that I think about it I mean I think there's been there's certainly been a lot of damage done to the Iranian military capabilities here in the first first week first ten days you know I think we all have heard the chairman you know talk

about the 80 to 90 percent reduction in the number of missile launches and you know it's slightly

below that 80 percent of of drone launches you know which this is significant I think that stuff

we just see but I think what's going to take more time is going to be hunting down the remnants

“of capabilities that the regime has that they're disposal I mean I think part of the challenge”

we have right now is is that a lot of a lot of the big things have been to have now been destroyed or attacked or taken off the taking off the battlefield so to speak and now we are trying to get after the remnants of is the rest of the of the of the drones that are easily hidden in our continuing to be launched you know the remnants of a missile capability are out there that are not maybe not as plentiful certainly in terms of launchers or ability to launch

as they as they once were but still if they have launched can can can cause some problems as we've

seen in the last couple days as they continue to hit US embassies or you know other other targets particularly in the golf so you know this I think will take it will take a little bit longer

“on to the stop this this I think this phase always is you know in terms of the timing of this”

I mean I I think this is you know in my estimation to have some confidence that we have removed this I think it's measured certainly in weeks to months of doing that I know that there are some different estimates that are coming out of this I'm just my own estimate is that I think this

phase has to last a little bit has to last a little bit longer to make sure the week that we do

and of course that this is being complicated by things that we're seeing in the straight support moves right now and where we've got a very serious threat to you know commercial shipping and you know potentially to some of our maritime assets that might be in the might be in the golf so these kinds of things can can delay it I mean we're we're engaged in it now and we've got to you kind of

“got to see it through so I mean I I think in order to do what we need to do here against the”

objectives that I've heard I think we're it's weeks to months here yeah I consider being a attention between the White House wanting to get something over faster to get oil prices back in line and the uniform military saying well if you want us to be effective here we've got it we've got to get through this list okay well I think that that helps a lot let me um ask you about munitions we read all the time about profound shortages we have and a lot the the congress has done

a lot of late to try and speed this up the administration is seized of of this talk to us a little bit about it feels like we have now air superiority or air supremacy as they say so we're able to stop using standoff weapons which are expensive and drop dumber bombs if you will onto targets is that true and that seems encouraging and then the defensive piece is the one that seems to be really acute we only have so many interceptors and they're so hard and so expensive

to build is that an accurate short hand yeah I think that's I think that's right I mean I think one of the one of the early you know military objectives between the between the Americans and the Israelis has been the creation of air superiority over over Iran so that we can operate with for more intense purposes with impunity where we need to to conduct the operations we have and what this has allowed us to do is to get our to get our aircraft much closer into into the

areas of our targeting so that we can make use of a much more plentiful gravity you know gravity driven bombs that we have which we have thousands in our in our inventory and so we have a much more plentiful supply of of those the the more exquisite standoff weapons that we've saw in the early early days of this of course are much more expensive there there are much longer lead times in terms of this and there's a much more finite quantity of those and the use of those and this fight

is you know it's a well necessary also you know there is that there is a cost to it meaning that we their magazines are become become depleted our ability to stockpile for other contingencies or to maintain readiness in other areas is affected in terms of this so those are those are much more expensive they were going to much more sophisticated and they're much much longer in terms of the lead times to develop though so yeah there there's some munition math here that I think

we certainly I think the Department of Defense is paying attention to but certainly having air

I think is also been important and in what air spirit is also done is as loud as to get other systems in there be 52 is for example dropping the 2000 pounders these are of course as you can imagine very very devastating weapons when they you know when they hit the ground so that you know that's

an example of what what air superiority has has done for us but you do highlight I think the critical

the critical piece and there's there's not a lot of great reporting on this right now and I know there's a lot of concern and that is the interceptors you know not just our ability to intercept it we have with our patriots and thads and other systems we have out there but those of our

“partners across the region I think you have to remember that many of our countries partner countries”

in the golf the golf air countries also have similar U.S. systems that basically drawn the same interceptors and they are being attacked so it is putting a strain on theirs I would imagine that we in going into this I think there's you know been reporting that you know chip the chairman highlighted the potential risk associated with munitions going into this so you know in order to offset that I would imagine we husband a lot of our a lot of our resources from you know

not just in theater but out of theater to make sure we had what we needed to you know for hopefully as long as we need to continue to defend ourselves but again these are everybody is using these now there's a huge demand on them so it's likely that we're going to we could have some challenges there if this persists the good news is is that you know missile strikes and drone strikes are from from the Iranians are down somewhere you know in the range of 80 to 90 percent so

the bad news is they're still coming through and we still have to be prepared only one of those has to hit a vulnerable target to create a create a real problem for us or for our partners so

you know we've got to be ready we've almost always got to be 100 percent in the in the defense of

aspect of it so making sure we had the interceptors you know available and distributed

“where our systems are I think is is going to be a key consideration going forward”

we're going to take a quick break and we'll be right back with more of our discussion with General Joe Votel. Beacon Global Strategies is the premier national security advisory firm Beacon works side by side with leading companies to help them understand national security policy geopolitical risk global technology policy and federal procurement trends. Beacon's insight gives business leaders the decision advantage founded in 2013. Beacon develops and supports the

execution of bespoke strategies to mitigate business risk drive growth and navigate a complex geopolitical environment with a bipartisan team and decades of experience speak and provides a global perspective to help clients tackle their toughest challenges. Before we go over to Hormuz, let's talk a little bit about the vulnerability of U.S. forces and diplomatic facilities in the region.

I mean, we have an enormous attack surface. I mean, we're first maybe just to explain to someone who's

not immersed in Middle East national security geopolitics. Why is the United States in so many

“different places? Cutter by rain, Kuwait, UAE, Saudi, Iraq. I think we're out of Syria now, but Jordan”

is well. That's a big presence. Well, you know, and you think back about it, I guess what we have seen in our interests to have relations and partnerships with these different countries across the Gulf and then the Middle East and of course, in most of these locations, we do have some important national security interests that we are keen to keen to protect and the way that the design of our security apparatus across the Middle East has been to kind of anchor our

different capabilities in different countries. So if you go to Kuwait, for example, you will see that that really that's kind of the headquarters and really where we were we muster most of our U.S. Army capabilities. Although we add them, of course, things like bad batteries and patriot batteries spread across the region, but our big logistics hub is kind of located in in Kuwait and some of that is a legacy from Gaza storm and some of it is a legacy from 2003, you know, operations

in Iraq, but that's kind of where the Army has, you know, Bahrain has been for a long time, the host to the United States Navy, the fifth leaked. And so they have the port facilities,

that front cutter, you know, has become the home for the, you know, the forward, the forward

“sent-con headquarters as well as our, as our air capacity, our U.D air base. They have, you know,”

as part of our long-term defense arrangements. So now they built literally everything that we operate from for us because there was a shared concern about this. And then other countries like the UAE, why we don't, you know, the Marines have had some, some presence there in the past, but there are a couple of air bases, there are some excellent ports that we make use of in that country. And then you've got, so, you know, that kind of accounts for kind of the majority of our military

capacity and where it, where it fed down, where it beds down and where it operates from across the region. And of course, we have interest in other areas, Iraq. We, you know, we've been, we've had a long-term relationship, you know, and now especially since the campaign against ISIS to continue to stay partnered with the Iraqi security forces to make sure that they can keep a lid on the terrorist out there. That's, that's in our interest. It's not a huge commitment of people, but it's an

“important one that that serves our purposes. So we do keep people on, on bases and, for example,”

on Baghdad. And then, of course, the whole region, we've got these, you know, diplomatic locations that we have, we maintain embassies. And these, of course, are very vulnerable. So, and then on top of that, layer on the, you know, our commercial interest across the region. You know, we have very deep commercial interest across the region. So you have American business represented in a variety of other things that, you know, smack of America across the region. So yes, as you suggest,

the surface is very large. Our capabilities to protect all that are always challenged. So we always

have to prioritize those things that are most critical to us. And, and, and likely, that means to some of these art always protected. So I guess it's a combination, then, of, our geostrategic interest in the region, our bilateral relationships and, and training and other, um, that's, that's right. Yeah, that's right. Yeah, I've said, said much, much, much cleaner. No, no, I've, I've learned it from you here. Um, let's go to the Straits of Formus. I assume you weren't a bit surprised to hear

that the Iranians before not only striking some ships, but declaring it effectively close. This has been Roman numeral one in their playbook for a long time, right? Yeah, that's right. And, I mean, this is a, a vulnerable location. They could, they clearly recognize a significance of this, you know, 20% of the global LNG goes through here, you know, 15 to 20 million barrels of oil

“of crude oil or oil products go through here every day that are absolutely essential for a number”

of nations, particularly some in the Asia, including China, for their, for their economy. So it's a,

it's a critical location, and it's shut down really is a, is a, is a pain point that, uh, that we,

we can't ignore. And, uh, and, uh, and, of course, when you look at the Straits of Formus, I, having sailed through that a couple of times on U.S. naval vessels. I'm not a, a, a marinur, you know, a naval officer, but even I as an army officer can appreciate the significance of that. I mean, that this had its most vulnerable point. It's 25 miles wide, but the, but the main traffic pattern through which ships move is only to, you know, the traffic de-confliction scheme there is

only two miles wide. That is really, really limited. And, of course, when you enter into it, you literally, either coming in or going out, you literally make a 90 degree turn in order to do that. And, the advantage is to the attacker. Um, um, you know, you're exposed to sure-based systems, your exposed to mines. Uh, it's, it's very easy to, uh, to, uh, have an effect there. So yeah, I, I, I exactly expected what we're overseeing right now. It seems that President Trump, of course,

would like the Navy to be escorting oil tankers through sooner rather than later. It's I understand the Navy's position to- it's- it's- you sure we can do this mission, but we need a two or three more weeks of prosecuting targets, especially drones. Because if we just rushed into this mission now, we would be quite vulnerable going through, as you say, this, um, you know, two mile wide channel in a 20 mile, um, neck of water. I mean, does that sound right? I mean, essentially, we've got

the assets there, right? I mean, they're doing other things, but the Navy ships are there. It's really

I think the, you know, my position- where I still in- in a position to have some, you know, advice

on this would be that, you know, it's easier to address the remnants of these capabilities that Iranians have, uh, without the additional burden of having to, uh, at the same time, escort ships

“through the straight to harm moves and do everything that is necessary to do that. So I think it”

really becomes a priority issue here for, um, the U.S. military, and I think what's- what's probably being communicated or what's being discussed now is where are the priorities and how do we balance these things going going forward? Can we do both? We probably can to some extent, but there is there are risks that come along with that, uh, taking some resources away from what we're trying

to do to address, uh, the remnants of missiles and drones will come at the cost of perhaps additional

attacks that we have to deal with. So, you know, this is, uh, really comes down to a, you know, a choice of what- what your priorities are. I think everyone can appreciate, uh, the impact on, on the economy and oil prices and, uh, the concern of more and more tankers and ships being tied up in the golf waiting to get out and then get back in so we can continue the flow of, of resources in here. But, you know, there are some- there are some fairly significant military considerations

that have to be taken at this time. And by the way, now that there are reports that, uh, that there are mines in the- in the- in the straights arm moves, this becomes an even more

“difficult challenge. I mean, it isn't the surprise that they're using mines. I think we”

clearly expected that, but now we have to deploy systems in there to make sure that, you know,

we have- we have confidence that our ships and those were escorting, we maybe escorting aren't kind of be vulnerable to the mines in the water. And those- those as we've seen in the past are our- our easy ways to- to really cause some problems for us. Tell us about the mines. I think I have some prehistoric memory from a movie of the floating mine. But I'm reading that there are underwater mines and it's- they're pretty sophisticated. And it's easier said than done to sweep

them up or find them. Is that about right? I- I think that's the way that I look at. I mean, I- I'm not an expert on all the mine technology year, but certainly the- the Iranians have paid a lot of attention to this. Uh, and, you know, there are certainly mines that we've seen the past that are, you know, pretty much surface laid that can be, you know, visually identified, but we also know that there are some that that operate below the surface, you know, are magnetically

driven and, uh, have the ability to detect, uh, threats as they are objective as they're- as are passing through. So they, uh, you know, can- can be even more effectively. Things that, of course, these- these things were attacking ships at the- perhaps the most vulnerable points of the ship. And, uh, and, uh, and of course, you know, once you have a hole on the side of one of these tankers or a ship going through, you've got a- you've got a real problem. Now, not on- you just have a ship

“that's disabled, but you- have- you have- you have to get it out of that. You have to come on”

more resources to recover it, to rescue it, to get it out of the area. So, I mean, the mines, I think, uh, you know, present a very, very significant, uh, threat to us and, of course, the sophistication of these things. We haven't dealt with them like we're dealing with drones or we've dealt with IDs in the past. So, you know, we're likely to learn a lot more about how just how sophisticated these are as we continue to prosecute this. And it sounds like President Trump is trying to preempt

this in part by blowing up ships that he believes would be used to put them out there, but it really sends up a warning sign and I bet everyone slows down tremendously. They're thinking on going through. Yeah, I- I- I- I think that's right. I mean, I- I've serviced in reports of the U.S. going, sent- I'm going after a mind-lanesh ships and that's- that's good. That's could be expected. We should be doing that, but, you know, there's lots of ways that these things can- can be deployed.

They are- they are not easily, but relatively easily deployed. Uh, and the only takes a couple to really cause a cause concerns for shipping through a such a narrow confined location. Talk to us about the military requirements around the military escort through or moves. Is it- is there air force cover a combat air patrol above? Is it a destroyer? Is it several ships? Is it- how many- how many would you escort at one time? Like, it- give us some sense of how it

would work? Well, is that- I think there's a variety of different ways this could be done. I mean, it could be that we- that we grouped together, you know, a number of- a number of tankers, a number of ships were asked according into- into a convoy, and then we, you know,

through the- through the straits of our moves to a point where they can then begin to navigate on their own. Uh, and it could be that we, you know, we set up kind of stationary, um, you know, stationary security, you know, outposts, so to speak, uh, so that ships can actually move through that as, uh,

“as well. Um, so I think there's a variety of different ways that- that this can be done.”

But I do think, I mean, when I think about this, I mean, this is a- this is a- this is a security operation, and so not only does it involve security on the surface, uh, but it doesn't involve, you know, providing, uh, some level of air cover, um, you know, certainly the direction of intelligence resources that might be used one place into- into this area to make sure that we are monitoring, uh, you know, communications, other- collection means here. So we know how the- uh, Iranians are thinking about this.

We know how they are- uh, paired to- to respond, um, and we've got, uh, you know, resources that are dedicated at that. So again, I think- I think that- the way I've kind of been talking about is this is, you know, escorting tankers through the straight arm moves is an operation in and of itself, just like going after missiles and drones. And so we have to make sure the military will make sure that it has all the capabilities, all the capacity that needs to accomplish that mission

to the very best of its ability. Um, so, you know, again, these- these are trade-offs and

they'll have to be some prioritization. And certainly, the President may say, hey, what's most important

“to us right now is getting these ships out of here. And, and then, I think you'll see a- you'll see”

a shift in what the Navy and what sent comm is doing to- to make sure that we have, you know, provided of the level of security so that we can move groups of these ships through or we can, you know, I'll post it in such a way that ships can move with some confidence to, you know, to get out of the golf. Gotcha. All right, that's so interesting. Let's move to the 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. This is the- we haven't talked about enough products. This is an harder- I left

this at the end to- just to keep our listeners on the- on the- on edge of their seats. So,

we're aware of the Iranians having enriched 400 kilograms of uranium to 60 percent, so highly enriched

uranium. We believed at one point coming out of June that it was in the extremely deep tunnels of

“Esfahan. I think we assumed, or maybe there was some intelligence that suggested it was all there”

together, and that it was buried very deeply. And it would be hard for the Iranians to get to it, it was sort of beyond our ability to- to further blow it up. There had been reports of late and it just sort of gradually slipped back into the media coverage over the last few months that, well, you know what? Maybe it's not buried, so deep. And a lot of people that have looked at open source imagery have noticed that there've been, you know, dirt being moved around

this particular location. So now the New York Times reports in light of this. This was of course Sunday. The United States and Israel have discussed a special operation-style raid to go to Esfahan, at least Esfahan, either figure out a way to neutralize the HU or take it outright. Now, that's a couple of tons, I think. So this seems- then I'm no military man, but this seems really hard to do. It almost seems like you'd need a thousand troops to set up a perimeter

earth-moving equipment. Some heavy lift to get it at there. You know, you were the had a special operations command. What would you have said if someone had brought you this idea? Well, I mean, certainly it's a significant problem, Mary's kind of highlighted it pretty well.

No, so I think the first thing that I would kind of- just a couple of points I would make about this

first and foremost. I can support and appreciate that we probably know- well, maybe we don't know everything about the condition of this highly enriched uranium, but based on what we did last summer and what our intelligence community has likely done over the ensuing months here in conjunction with the Israelis, we probably- we probably know more now about the condition of the potential condition of that. So I- I give a lot of credit to the intelligence community and why we may not know

everything. We probably don't as impossible of people on the ground or sensors on the ground

this is probably not perfect, but probably better or now than it was last summer after we

“after we did the strikes. I think that's an important thing to appreciate. We haven't just been-”

we haven't forgot about it now. I said we're worried about it again. I would imagine there's been a continuous assessment of the effects that we had against this and what the- what the conditions

are under which these materials remain in- in Iran. I think the second point that I would

make is that the United States Special Operations Command and I won't get into a whole lot of details and does possess very unique capabilities to deal with missions of, you know, of a strategic nature that would include, you know, this matter right here. Obviously this isn't the first time we've been concerned about, you know, dirty weapons or things that are, you know, can have an- have an outside effect, you know, weapons of mass destruction. And so, you know, this is- this is

not something we're thinking about for the first time. And so we have capabilities. We have people that are trained that are equipped to operate in, you know, in deeply buried underground

situations in the event that we have to go do something. So there is- there is capability

in terms of- of- of doing this. And it's- it's something that is- I think routinely trained and that we routinely pay attention to. So we should have confidence in- in- in our ability to do some of these things if it's- if it's order. I think that- I think the- of course the conditions here are- I think the big unknown. How- how deep is this? How much- how extensive is the damage that has been rendered by our, uh, by our previous strikes and what we've done just in the last 10

or 11 days against these locations? That certainly will pose an issue. But again, like we talk about the straight to our moves and operational like this. This is a big commitment. This isn't- we're not just sending a- small special operating overnight with a few helicopters and, um, uh, to go in and do this. This- this would be a significant operation. So, you know, we would have to come in. We would have- we'd- if we were doing this during the- while we were still trying to address some

of the current, uh, you know, current situations. Again, this would be up- we'd have to prioritize this and we have to dedicate the resources to it and there would be an offset with other things

“that we are- we are doing. But we, you know, essentially you have to create air superior to the”

location. You have to get people and equipment into that location. You have to secure that from the ground side. So, there would have to be a security force, um, you would have to make sure you had a lifeline to sustain them. These are intensive operations. Uh, these are very hard on people operating in this environment. So, you would have to have enough forces to be able to sustain yourself and continue to move forward, uh, as you- as you begin to work in this underground environment,

uh, and then, of course, you have to have the means to collect and evacuate these hazardous materials. Um, you know, as you as you point it out, there is a lot of effort, you know, for discussion purposes, about a thousand pounds of, you know, of 60% highly enriched uranium, which is what we're most concerned about. But there's other uranium, uh, there as well that we had had to be concerned about. Those, these are, you know, these aren't easily transported out.

We would have to be able to get them to a location, get them on some type of conveyance, um, whether that's a helicopter and, you know, you very quickly overcome the, uh, overcome the allowable cargo load of helicopters with what these types of materials. So, could we get it on a fixed-ling aircraft and again, that involves a lot more. So, this I think is a- is a- is a pretty sophisticated operation to do. Is it impossible? No, it's not, but it takes a lot of planning.

It takes a lot of resources, and whether we do it now, or whether we do it when, at some point in the future, when we have, uh, we have declared, uh, you know, kind of an into our objectives, and the, uh, regime is the remnants of the regime is not in a position to,

uh, to respond to this, and we can basically go in and dominate an area for as long as we need to,

but perhaps bring in some of the international community, I, A, E, A, who has, you know, kind of, you know, global cognizants for these types of, uh, of activities, uh, as part of this, you know,

“it could be a consideration. Um, so the timing of this, I think is, is important, but I certainly”

understand the imperative here. Nobody wants to leave these in, uh, hands of what is going to be a weekend, a weekend regime, or a weekend government, and, uh, that's likely going to experience

are always of some concerns. I understand the concern with this, but this is a big operation.

Big operation. So, if the president of the United States looked at you and said, general,

“what are the, what's the likelihood of success of this operation? What, what would your answer be?”

Um, I, I'm, what I would highlight is, is first of all, the scope of the operations that with, with, with time, um, and with the right resources, I think we have, you know, certainly a greater than 50% chance of, of being successful with this. And again, if we can, we can get people on the ground, I'm pretty confident in our problem solvers to figure out ways to address this. But again, we, we can't look at this like something that we're going to be able to go in and do in a

day or so. It's, this is a, this will take some time. Well, how to do in my estimation.

Well, more than a day, it's, so we would have to hold this territory. You think for a few days to do all this. I think we would need to be prepared to, maybe we would, we would get in and we'd find we'd have, you know, kind of strategic, you know, kind of, uh, strategic success. It is much more accessible than it is, but I don't know that we know that. So we have to be prepared for the worst case situation, which would be keeping troops on the ground for, you know, for a, you know,

for an extended period of time. And I, and I'd want to be prepared for that. I wouldn't want to think we can get in and do this quickly and discover, though, this is a much harder problem. Because then, then, then we, then we do it. We get on a much more risk with this. So I think in

“these types of operations, you have to plan for the worst case situation that you may encounter.”

And then, my view, this would be an extended operation on the ground. We have to secure ourselves. And we have to plan for the evacuation of, of this material, which will not be easy, or easy to, to transport. Yeah, it's, I'd be worth me looking at a map to see how close, uh, and it. And it's really, yeah, yeah, yeah. These are, these aren't, these aren't along the coast. These are well inside the country. So not only do we have to project combat power in there, but we have to

maintain kind of a line of communication to them, uh, and, you know, be prepared to sustain that for some period of time. I know the Pentagon has said come has planners for this type of thing, but any idea at, was this, is this 2000 troops we're talking about for three, three or four days? Uh, I mean, I, I think this, yeah, did, yeah, I, I would, I would say that it's, you know, a certain sizeable number of troops that go all involved in this, probably, you know, in the thousands

that would be involved in some aspect of this on the air on the ground at the site, you know, supporting this. So I think it's a significant significant operation. Of course, again, I think it is, it's, you know, days to maybe a low number of weeks, uh, for us to, to do this, based on what we know and what we don't know for this. So I don't, you know, hopefully it would be much quicker, but I think, again, yeah, in my view, I would be thinking about worst case scenarios

to make sure that we were able to accomplish the mission and overcome the inevitable obstacles that we are going to confront on the ground. No, this has been helpful because, um, yeah, you, you've painted a picture of just how much logistics and force this would require. Well, general, as we begin to wrap up, um, you, of course, have got a tremendous amount of expertise in the region,

and I think what we hear the most probably is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a fierce

guardian of the regime. Many think it's the power behind the throne, especially as we move into a new supreme leader. Tell us a little bit about them as your foe when you were the commander of said calm. I mean, how professional and sophisticated are they, are they 10 feet tall, or, you know, the United States of America can deal with them? Well, they're, they're not 10 feet tall, but the, but I think, you know, one thing that, uh, I think military leaders learn over the,

“of course, of their careers is that you have to respect your adversary and you have to give them credit”

for, uh, for being professional, for being capable, for, um, for a dedication to their mission. So, um, you know, they're, uh, they're not 10 feet tall. They can be dealt with as we've seen, uh, certainly, you know, they're, they're the proxies, which they have, uh, which you have created over a long period of time, and pretty much a decimated and several locations. So, you know, they, they can be, they can be defeated, and as we've seen just in the last 10 days, we can,

certainly bring our, our assets to bear, but as we're being reminded every day, they're still fighting. Their kill chain is still in place despite all of this, uh, and they're able to launch drones

of our, of our, of our enemies, our adversaries. And when we don't do that, then we are setting ourselves

“up for, um, for a, for a failure. I think it's important for people to appreciate that, you know,”

the, uh, the IRGC, that this connection between, uh, the clerical leadership and the security leadership and the form of the, of the IRGC is a very deep one. Uh, and, uh, in many ways, these leaders of the IRGC are, are all bought in. They are true believers in the revolution. They have been committed to it, uh, and their, uh, their authority has been, uh, derived from the close relationship

that they have kept with the clerical leadership, uh, the previous, uh, supreme leader, certainly,

and, uh, and, um, perhaps in the future, the, the, the, you know, the, the, the, the new one, as well. So, they derived their authority, they derived their strength from that. The, the IRGC is the center of gravity here. And, uh, as long as they remain in place and although there's been a, layers of leadership that have been removed from this, um, they are, they, there are some depths of this organization that they have people that can step up and apparently are doing so

“at this. And they have had plans in place for this for a long time. And I think we're beginning”

to see these plans be executed, perhaps in a more decentralized way than we might have expected,

but nonetheless, uh, is, is being, so we have to, we have to respect the, the IRGC and, and the level of, um, you know, I hesitate to use word professionalism, but in many ways, they, they do represent a professional ethic, maybe not one that we aspire to, but certainly one that, uh, that I think represents their capabilities. So we have to, we have to respect that. And I think, um, you know, they are going to be very important for this new leader. I, you know, vote tells view on the

regime here is this has been a regime that has been in decline for a number of years. They have lost some of their legitimacy. Certainly the things that happen with the protests just a couple months ago, you know, we're another, another example of how the regime is, is going down. This new supreme leader is not the last supreme leader, but he is the supreme leader. He's not as strong. He doesn't have the religious vulnerabilities. He doesn't have, uh, all the leadership characteristics

yet of his father, uh, which, which means that he will be much more dependent upon the military leadership and the military leadership in the form of the IRGC will exert their influence. So in many ways, they become actually more, uh, more influential on, uh, and the current government, uh, and as they, and their legitimacy has been called into, into question here with

“protests and other things here. So, you know, I, I think it's a very dangerous time, uh,”

worse right here and we have to pay attention to what the IRGC, uh, does. Whether of pragmatic military leader emerges from this is yet to be seen, uh, somebody that we could potentially deal with that understands the situation. Um, I think it's yet to be seen, uh, and for that purpose of that reason, I think we have to really take them very, very seriously. General, thank you, that was a tour to force. Thank you so much for joining net-sec matters. Thanks, uh,

Thanks, Michael. Great to be with you. That was General Jovo Tell. I'm Michael Allen. Please join us next week for another episode of "NATSEC Matters." "NATSEC Matters" is produced by Steve Dorsey with a Citizens from Ashley Barry. "NATSEC Matters" is a production of beacon global strategies. [BLANK_AUDIO]