Supreme Court Oral Arguments
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A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court. <br/> * Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov <br/> * Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information.<br/> * Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available as soon as oyez.org publishes the transcript).<br/> Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument
Recent Episodes
20 episodes[24-935] Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock
Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2026. Petitioner: Flower Foods, Inc., et al.Respondent: Angelo Brock. Advocates: Traci L. Lovitt (for the Petitioners) Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners—the defendants, collectively known as “Flowers”—produce and sell packaged baked goods throughout the United States. Flowers utilizes a “direct-store-delivery” system, contracting with individuals it classifies as independent distributors who purchase the rights to distribute its products within specific geographic territories. In 2016, Angelo Brock, operating as Brock, Inc., signed a “Distributor Agreement” with Flowers Baking Co. of Denver, LLC (“Flowers Denver”) to distribute products in parts of Colorado. This agreement, along with a “Personal Guaranty” Brock signed, included a mandatory Arbitration Agreement stipulating that disputes must be resolved under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Under this arrangement, Brock, Inc. placed orders for products, most of which were produced by Flowers bakeries located out of state, specifically to fill those orders. Flowers shipped the goods to a warehouse in Denver. Brock picked up the products at the warehouse, loaded them onto his own vehicle, and delivered them to his customers—various retail stores located only within Colorado. Brock himself did not cross state lines while making these deliveries. The business relationship soured, and Brock filed a lawsuit alleging Flowers misclassified its distributors as independent contractors to systematically underpay them, asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Colorado labor law. Brock filed his putative class and collective action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Flowers moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ agreement, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that Brock falls within the FAA’s § 1 exemption for transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision. Question Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce—but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders—“transportation workers” “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the exemption in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act?
[25-5] Noem, Sec. of Homeland v. Al Otro Lado
Noem v. Al Otro Lado Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2026. Petitioner: Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security.Respondent: Al Otro Lado, a California Corporation. Advocates: Vivek Suri (for the Petitioners) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented a “metering” policy at ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border to manage asserted capacity constraints. CBP officers stationed at the physical boundary line turned away asylum seekers lacking valid travel documents, preventing them from stepping onto U.S. soil to undergo mandatory inspection and processing. These officials instructed migrants to return to Mexico and wait for future processing opportunities, often without providing specific appointment times, forcing numerous asylum seekers to endure prolonged delays in Mexican border towns where they faced significant safety risks. While these asylum seekers waited, the federal government promulgated the “Asylum Transit Rule” in 2019, which generally rendered noncitizens ineligible for asylum if they traveled through a third country without first seeking protection there. This regulatory change prejudiced individuals previously turned away under the metering policy because, had CBP processed them upon their initial arrival, the Transit Rule would not have applied to their claims. Al Otro Lado, a legal aid organization, joined thirteen individual asylum seekers to file a class-action lawsuit challenging the metering policy and seeking to prevent the government from applying the Transit Rule to those who attempted to enter before its enactment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California declared the metering policy unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and permanently enjoined the government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to class members . The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the policy unlawfully withheld mandatory agency action, but narrowed the injunction to prevent the district court from forcing the government to unilaterally reopen past asylum denials. Question Does a noncitizen who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border “arrive[] in the United States” within the meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act?
[25-6] Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc.
Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2026. Petitioner: Thomas Keathley.Respondent: Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) William M. Jay (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Thomas Keathley filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in December 2019. In August 2021, while his bankruptcy case was ongoing, Keathley was in a motor vehicle collision with David Fowler, a truck driver employed by Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. (BAC). Keathley hired a personal injury attorney the next day and subsequently filed a personal injury lawsuit against BAC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in December 2021, alleging negligence and vicarious liability. Keathley, however, failed to disclose this new personal injury lawsuit as a potential asset to the bankruptcy court. He submitted multiple amended bankruptcy plans in March 2022 and June 2022, none of which mentioned the pending lawsuit. The bankruptcy court confirmed Keathley’s modified plan in July 2022, unaware of the personal injury claim. Keathley only amended his bankruptcy schedule to include the lawsuit after BAC moved to dismiss the personal injury case. BAC moved for summary judgment in the personal injury suit, arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Keathley’s claim because he failed to disclose it during his bankruptcy proceeding. The district court granted BAC’s motion, dismissing the lawsuit, and subsequently denied Keathley's motion for reconsideration. Keathley then appealed both of those decisions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decisions. Question May the doctrine of judicial estoppel be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a potential motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in fact acted in bad faith?
[24-1260] Watson v. RNC
Watson v. Republican National Committee Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 23, 2026. Petitioner: Michael Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State.Respondent: Republican National Committee, et al. Advocates: Scott G. Stewart (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) D. John Sauer (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Federal statutes designate the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the uniform day for electing members of Congress and appointing presidential electors. While Mississippi requires voters to cast absentee ballots by this federal deadline, the state legislature amended its election code in 2020 to permit the counting of mail-in ballots received up to five business days after Election Day, provided they are postmarked by that Tuesday. This “postmark rule” allows validly cast votes delayed by mail service to be included in the final tally, a practice currently utilized by approximately thirty states. In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, and individual voters filed suit against Mississippi Secretary of State Michael Watson and county election officials. The plaintiffs argued that the federal statutes establishing a singular “election” day preempt Mississippi’s five-day receipt window, contending that an election is not legally concluded until officials actually receive the ballots. They sought to invalidate the state statute and enjoin officials from counting any absentee ballots received after federal Election Day. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state officials, ruling that the state law did not conflict with federal statutes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that federal law preempts the Mississippi statute because ballots must be both cast and received by Election Day. Question Do the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day?
[24-1238] Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 4, 2026. Petitioner: Shawn Montgomery.Respondent: Caribe Transport II, LLC. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the Respondents) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when his tractor-trailer, stopped on the shoulder of an Illinois highway, was struck by another truck. The other driver, Yosniel Varela-Mojena, was employed by the motor carrier Caribe Transport II, LLC (“Caribe”). C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (“Robinson”), a freight broker, had arranged for Caribe to haul the shipment. Robinson and Caribe operated under an agreement stating that Caribe was an independent contractor and retained exclusive control over its personnel and the manner of its performance. Montgomery sued the driver and Caribe, and also sued the broker, Robinson. His claims against Robinson alleged that the broker was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence, arguing Caribe was Robinson’s agent. Montgomery also claimed Robinson had negligently hired the driver and the carrier. The district court granted judgment to Robinson on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Caribe was an independent contractor, which defeated the vicarious liability claim, and that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempted the state-law negligent hiring claim. Question Does 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver?
[24-1063] Hunter v. United States
Hunter v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2026. Petitioner: Munson P. Hunter.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Munson P. Hunter, III pleaded guilty to committing wire fraud affecting a financial institution and to aiding and abetting. A federal district court sentenced him to 51 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. A specific condition of that supervised release requires Hunter to take any mental health medication prescribed by his physician. Hunter challenged his sentence at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing the medication condition infringed on his due process liberty interests and that the written judgment improperly included the “aiding and abetting” reference. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal regarding the medication condition, finding it was barred by an appeal waiver in Hunter's plea agreement, and affirmed the judgment, noting that the “aiding and abetting” charge was indeed part of the count to which Hunter pleaded guilty. Question 1. Does an appeal waiver bar all claims except for ineffective assistance of counsel or a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum? 2. Does such a waiver become ineffective if the sentencing judge later tells the defendant they can appeal, and the government fails to object?
[24-1234] United States v. Hemani
United States v. Hemani Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2026. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Ali Danial Hemani. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner) Erin E. Murphy (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A grand jury indicted Ali Danial Hemani in February 2023 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), a federal law prohibiting firearm possession by an “unlawful user of…a controlled substance.” The indictment alleged that in August 2022, Hemani knowingly possessed a Glock 19 9mm pistol while being an unlawful user of controlled substances. The government specified that Hemani allegedly used marijuana, promethazine, and cocaine. The pistol was located in the closet of Hemani’s parents’ home. Crucially, the prosecution did not allege that Hemani was intoxicated or using a controlled substance at the precise time he possessed the firearm. The government’s case rested on his status as a regular drug user, not on simultaneous use and possession. Hemani filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing the law was unconstitutional as applied to him. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that a binding regional precedent (United States v. Connelly) rendered the law’s application to Hemani unconstitutional. Question Does a federal law that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” violate the respondent’s Second Amendment right to bear arms?
[25-95] Pung v. Isabella County
Pung v. Isabella County Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2026. Petitioner: Michael Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Scott Pung.Respondent: sabella County, Michigan. Advocates: Philip L. Ellison (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Matthew T. Nelson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves a dispute over the foreclosure and sale of the Pung property in Isabella County, Michigan, following the death of its owner, Timothy Scott Pung, in 2004. The property had a Principal Residence Exemption (PRE) from local school taxes. In 2010, the township tax assessor, Patricia DePriest, retroactively denied the PRE for the years 2007-2009, asserting a new owner must file an affidavit. Although the Michigan Tax Tribunal overturned this decision in 2012, holding the PRE remained valid for the estate, DePriest subsequently revoked the PRE for the 2012 tax year based on the same unfiled-affidavit rationale. This denial created an unpaid tax bill of $2,241.93. The County Treasurer, Steven Pickens, initiated foreclosure proceedings for this delinquency. After a final judgment of foreclosure, the property sold at a public auction for $76,008. Isabella County and Pickens retained the entire $76,008 from the sale, refusing to return the surplus proceeds above the tax debt to Michael Pung, the estate's representative. Michael Pung sued, alleging this retention of the surplus violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court granted Pung summary judgment on the Takings Clause claim, ruling he was entitled to the surplus proceeds (the sale price minus the tax debt), but not to the greater loss in equity based on the property’s fair market value. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on all claims, including the amount of compensation awarded. Question 1. When the government takes property for tax debt, does the Fifth Amendment require compensation based on the property’s true fair market value, or only on the lower amount it sold for at a tax foreclosure auction? 2. Does the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause prohibit the government from seizing and keeping a property worth far more than the small tax debt owed on it?
[24-783] Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel
Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2026. Petitioner: Enbridge Energy, LP.Respondent: Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan. Advocates: John J. Bursch (for the Petitioners) Ann M. Sherman (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Enbridge Energy, LP, owns and operates Line 5, an oil pipeline that transports petroleum products through Wisconsin and Michigan before terminating in Ontario, Canada. Since 1953, Line 5 has run across the bottomlands of the Straits of Mackinac under an easement granted by the State of Michigan, which owns the submerged lands. In recent years, concerns over Line 5’s safety and environmental impact led to increased scrutiny and legal challenges regarding the pipeline’s continued operation, including questions about Michigan’s regulatory authority and the potential preemption of state law by federal pipeline laws and international treaties. On June 27, 2019, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel filed a lawsuit in Michigan state court, seeking to enjoin Enbridge from operating Line 5 in the Straits. The Attorney General alleged violations of the public-trust doctrine, common-law public nuisance, and the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. Both parties filed dispositive motions, with Enbridge asserting, in part, that federal law preempted Michigan’s claims. Separate but closely related litigation followed when Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued an easement-revocation notice in November 2020 and filed her own state-court suit against Enbridge. After engaging in nearly two years of state-court proceedings in the Attorney General’s case, Enbridge removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan in December 2021, arguing federal-question jurisdiction. The district court rejected the Attorney General’s motion to remand, holding that removal was proper either under statutory timing rules or equitable exceptions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding Enbridge’s removal was untimely and that statutory deadlines for removal are mandatory and immune to equitable exceptions, and ordered the case remanded to Michigan state court. Question Do district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)?
[24-699] Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2026. Petitioner: Exxon Mobil Corporation.Respondent: Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. Advocates: Morgan L. Ratner (for the Petitioner) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Jules L. Lobel (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves Exxon Mobil Corporation’s claim to property confiscated by the Cuban government decades ago. Exxon, through its predecessor Standard Oil Company, owned several subsidiaries in Cuba, including Esso Standard Oil, S.A. (Essosa), which operated oil and gas assets like a refinery, product terminals, and over 100 service stations. In 1960, following Fidel Castro’s rise to power, the Cuban government confiscated these assets without providing compensation. The assets were subsequently transferred to Cuban state-owned enterprises, including Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET), the state oil company, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Cuba) (CIMEX), a conglomerate. In 1969, the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) certified Standard Oil's loss at over $71 million, plus interest, due to the confiscation. In 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, also known as the Helms-Burton Act, which created a private right of action in Title III for U.S. nationals to sue any “person” who “traffics in” their confiscated property, explicitly defining “person” to include an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. Although every President suspended this right of action until May 2, 2019, President Donald Trump’s administration then allowed the suspension to lapse, and Exxon filed its lawsuit that same day. Exxon’s complaint names the Cuban instrumentalities CIMEX, CUPET, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Panama) as defendants, alleging they continue to traffic in the confiscated property through commercial activities such as refining oil and operating service stations that process remittances and sell imported goods. The Cuban defendants moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court held that the Helms-Burton Act did not independently abrogate foreign sovereign immunity and that the FSIA’s expropriation exception did not apply, but found that the commercial-activity exception was met for CIMEX. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed that the Helms-Burton Act did not displace the FSIA and that the expropriation exception was inapplicable, but vacated the ruling on the commercial-activity exception and remanded for further jurisdictional discovery. Question Does the Helms-Burton Act abrogate foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, even if the parties do not satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?
[24-983] Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises
Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2026. Petitioner: Havana Docks Corporation.Respondent: Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., et al. Advocates: Richard D. Klingler (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The dispute centers on property in the Port of Havana now known as the Havana Cruise Port Terminal. In the early 20th century, the Cuban Government granted a 50-year concession to a predecessor of Havana Docks Corporation (Havana Docks) to build and operate piers and terminal facilities at the port. This concession, a usufructuary right, was extended to 99 years in 1920, with a scheduled expiration date in 2004. Havana Docks, a company organized under the laws of Delaware and determined to be a U.S. national, acquired the concession in 1928. In 1960, shortly after Fidel Castro came to power, the Cuban Government confiscated the concession, expropriating Havana Docks’ property and assets at the Port of Havana without compensation. Subsequently, Havana Docks filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified a loss of over $9 million stemming from the confiscation. After Title III of the Helms-Burton Act became fully effective in May 2019, Havana Docks sued several cruise lines, including Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises S.A. Co., for “trafficking” in the confiscated port property when their ships used the Havana Cruise Port Terminal from 2016 to 2019. The district court initially issued judgments totaling over $100 million against the four cruise lines. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under the Helms-Burton Act. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgments related to the 2016-2019 conduct, holding that Havana Docks’ limited property interest, the 99-year concession, would have expired in 2004, meaning the cruise lines did not traffic in the confiscated property during that period. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Havana Docks’ separate claims against Carnival for alleged trafficking between 1996 and 2001. Question Is the legal right to sue under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act tied to the confiscated property claim or the hypothetical, unexpired duration of the original property interest?
[25A312] Trump v. Cook
Trump v. Cook Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2026. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.Respondent: Lisa D. Cook, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Applicants) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question None
[23-1209] M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund
M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 20, 2026. Petitioner: M & K Employee Solutions, LLC.Respondent: Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund. Advocates: Michael E. Kenneally, Jr. (for the Petitioners) John E. Roberts (for the Respondent) Kevin J. Barber (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) M&K Employee Solutions operated three facilities that participated in the IAM National Pension Fund, a retirement plan jointly funded by multiple employers whose workers were represented by the International Association of Machinists union. In late 2017, the Fund’s actuary valued the plan’s unfunded obligations at about $448 million. Shortly after, in January 2018, the actuary met with the Fund’s trustees and decided to change key financial assumptions used to calculate how much departing employers owed the Fund. Most importantly, they lowered the assumed investment return rate from 7.5% to 6.5%, a change that would significantly increase the bills for employers leaving the plan. M&K had already begun pulling out of the Fund when two of its facilities stopped participating in 2017. When M&K completely withdrew in 2018, the Fund calculated what M&K owed based on financial data from December 31, 2017, but used the new assumptions adopted in January 2018. This resulted in a withdrawal liability bill of over $6 million. Ohio Magnetics, another company in the Fund, faced a similar situation when it withdrew in mid-2018 and received a bill for about $447,000 calculated the same way. Both companies challenged their bills through arbitration and won, with arbitrators ruling the Fund could not use assumptions created after the December 31, 2017 measurement date. The Fund then sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to overturn these arbitration decisions. The district court sided with the Fund, ruling that actuaries could adopt new assumptions after the measurement date as long as they were based on information available at that time. The court remanded the cases to the arbitrators for reconsideration. Both employers appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Question When a pension plan calculates how much a departing employer owes “as of the end of the plan year,” must the plan use the financial assumptions it had already adopted by that date, or can it use new assumptions created after that date if they are based on information that was available at year-end?
[24-1046] Wolford v. Lopez
Wolford v. Lopez Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 20, 2026. Petitioner: Jason Wolford.Respondent: Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General of Hawaii. Advocates: Alan A. Beck (for the Petitioners) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2023, Hawaii and California enacted new laws, Act 52 and Senate Bill 2, respectively, that significantly restrict the public carry of firearms. Both laws prohibit individuals with carry permits from bringing firearms into numerous specified “sensitive places.” Hawaii’s list includes fifteen categories, such as bars, restaurants serving alcohol, parks, beaches, and banks. California’s list is broader, covering more than two dozen types of property, including hospitals, public transit, playgrounds, libraries, museums, places of worship, and casinos. Both states also changed the default rule for private property open to the public, generally banning firearms unless the property owner expressly permits them. Hawaii allows owners to consent verbally, in writing, or via a posted sign. California’s rule is stricter, permitting consent only through the posting of a specific, state-mandated sign. Plaintiffs in both states include individuals who hold concealed-carry permits and various gun-rights organizations. They filed lawsuits alleging that these new restrictions violate their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Plaintiffs in both actions sued their respective state attorneys general, and federal district courts issued preliminary injunctions blocking enforcement of many of the new provisions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases, affirming the injunctions in part but reversing them in large part. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling allowed many of the challenged restrictions to remain in effect but agreed with the district courts that the states could not, for example, ban firearms in banks or hospitals. Question Does a law that makes it a crime for a licensed concealed carry permit holder to bring a handgun onto private property open to the public—such as a store or restaurant—unless the property owner gives “express authorization” violate the Second Amendment?
[24-1021] Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp.
Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2026. Petitioner: Cedric Galette.Respondent: New Jersey Transit Corporation. Advocates: Michael Zuckerman (for New Jersey Transit Corp., et al. (Respondent in No. 24-1021, Petitioners in No. 24-1113)) Michael B. Kimberly (for Galette and Colt, et al. (Petitioner in 24-1021, Respondents in 24-1113)) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2018, Cedric Galette was a passenger in a vehicle stopped on Market Street in Philadelphia when it was struck by a vehicle operated by the New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit). Galette suffered physical injuries as a result of the collision and brought a negligence lawsuit in Pennsylvania state court against both the vehicle’s driver, Julie McCrey, and NJ Transit. NJ Transit responded by asserting that it was an arm of the State of New Jersey, and therefore immune from private suit in Pennsylvania under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. The trial court denied NJ Transit’s motion to dismiss, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that NJ Transit is not an arm of New Jersey. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, holding that NJ Transit qualifies as an arm of the state and is therefore immune under the doctrine of interstate sovereign immunity. Question Is the New Jersey Transit Corporation an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposes?
[24-43] West Virginia v. B.P.J.
West Virginia v. B.P.J. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2026. Petitioner: West Virginia, et al.Respondent: B. P. J., By Her Next Friend and Mother, Heather Jackson. Advocates: Michael R. Williams (for the Petitioners) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Joshua A. Block (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) B.P.J. is a transgender girl who has identified as female since the third grade. At the onset of puberty, B.P.J. began taking puberty blockers and estrogen for medical treatment of gender dysphoria, effectively halting male pubertal development and aligning her physical characteristics with those of cisgender girls. Since her social transition, B.P.J. has consistently lived as a girl at school and participated on girls’ athletic teams. In 2021, West Virginia enacted the “Save Women’s Sports Act,” which requires public school and collegiate sports teams to be designated based on “biological sex” and excludes individuals identified as male at birth from participating on female teams. This law, by its design and effect, prevented B.P.J. from continuing to compete on her school’s girls’ cross-country and track teams. Shortly after the Act took effect, B.P.J., through her mother, sued the West Virginia State Board of Education and other state and county education officials, as well as the West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission. She alleged that excluding her from girls’ sports violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. The State of West Virginia intervened to defend the law. Initially, the district court granted B.P.J. a preliminary injunction, allowing her to participate on girls’ teams pending litigation. However, at summary judgment, the district court reversed course and upheld the law, concluding that the classification on the basis of “biological sex” was substantially related to the important government interest in ensuring fairness and opportunity in girls’ athletics. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied B.P.J.’s cross-motion, holding that the exclusion of B.P.J. from girls’ sports did not violate the Constitution or Title IX. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. It held that application of the law to B.P.J. violated Title IX and that factual disputes precluded summary judgment against her equal protection claim. Question Does Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause prohibit a state from assigning students to girls’ and boys’ sports teams based on their biological sex as determined at birth?
[24-38] Little v. Hecox
Little v. Hecox Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2026. Petitioner: Bradley Little, Governor of Idaho, et al.Respondent: Lindsay Hecox, et al. Advocates: Alan M. Hurst (for the Petitioners) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Kathleen R. Hartnett (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2020, Idaho enacted the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, which categorically barred transgender girls and women from participating on female athletic teams in public schools—from elementary school through college. Prior to the law’s passage, Idaho’s high school athletic association and the NCAA allowed transgender women to compete on women’s teams after a year of hormone therapy. At the time, there were no known instances of transgender girls competing in Idaho athletics under those existing rules. Nonetheless, Idaho lawmakers passed the Act, citing concerns about “fairness” and biological differences attributed to testosterone and other factors. The law allowed any individual to challenge a female athlete’s gender, triggering a mandatory medical verification process that could include analysis of reproductive anatomy, genetic make-up, or testosterone levels. Cisgender women, including those perceived as more masculine, could also be subjected to these checks. Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman and student at Boise State University who wished to join the women’s cross-country team, filed suit alongside a cisgender high school athlete known as Jane Doe. They alleged that the Act violated their constitutional rights, including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hecox had undergone hormone therapy, significantly lowering her testosterone levels, but was still categorically excluded under the law. The district court granted a preliminary injunction blocking the law in August 2020, finding it likely unconstitutional. After several rounds of appeal and remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the injunction as applied to Hecox but remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the scope of the injunction, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Labrador v. Poe. Question May a state, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, categorically require sports participants to compete based on their biological sex, rather than gender identity?
[24-813] Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana
Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 12, 2026. Petitioner: Chevron USA Incorporated.Respondent: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Aaron Z. Roper (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in 2013, several Louisiana coastal parishes—including Plaquemines Parish and Cameron Parish—filed lawsuits in state court against a consortium of oil and gas companies such as BP America Production Company, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Shell Oil Company, and others. The parishes, joined by Louisiana state agencies and officials, alleged the companies had violated Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (SLCRMA), which requires certain activities within the state’s designated “coastal zone” to comply with an environmental permitting system. Specifically, the parishes claimed the companies engaged in oil and gas exploration, production, and transportation in various “Operational Areas” along the Louisiana coast without securing the proper permits or by violating the conditions of the permits they did have. The complaints further alleged that pre-1980 activities (before SLCRMA’s effective date) were not “lawfully commenced,” and thus not exempt under the Act’s grandfather clause. The parishes seek wide-ranging remedies, including damages and restoration of affected coastal lands. The events at issue span decades, with the oil companies’ challenged operations beginning prior to SLCRMA and, in some cases, dating back to World War II. During the war, some defendant companies operated under federal government contracts to refine petroleum products for the war effort, and they argue that some of the crude oil produced in the disputed areas was used to fulfill those contracts. The parishes' claims, however, focus on whether the companies’ activities in the coastal zone were environmentally compliant under Louisiana law, regardless of any federal wartime contracts or regulations. After the initial filing in state court, the oil companies have tried multiple times to remove these cases to federal court, invoking various theories of federal jurisdiction, including the federal officer removal statute, based on their World War II-era federal contracts. Each time, the district courts ruled against removal and remanded the cases to state court, concluding that the oil companies did not meet the statutory requirements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the remand orders, and the companies now seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Question Can an oil company being sued in state court for its World War II-era oil production move its case to federal court simply because the oil was produced to meet federal government contracts for wartime fuel—even if the contract did not specifically direct how to produce the oil?
[24-345] FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd.
FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 10, 2025. Petitioner: FS Credit Opportunities Corp.Respondent: Saba Capital Master Fund, Ltd. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners and BlackRock Respondents supporting the Petitioners) Max E. Schulman (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Paul D. Clement (for the Saba Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Investment funds organized as closed-end mutual funds under Maryland law adopted “control share provisions” that stripped voting rights from shareholders who owned 10% or more of a fund’s shares. These provisions were adopted in response to activist investor Saba Capital, which had been acquiring large positions in underperforming closed-end funds with the goal of unlocking shareholder value through various strategies, including electing new directors and advocating for share buybacks. Saba Capital sued sixteen closed-end funds in June 2023, seeking rescission of these control share provisions. Saba argued that the provisions violated Section 18(i) of the Investment Company Act (ICA), which requires that “every share of stock shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every other outstanding stock.” Saba brought its lawsuit under Section 47(b) of the ICA, relying on Second Circuit precedent that recognized an implied private right of action for parties seeking to rescind contracts that violate the ICA. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Saba against eleven of the funds (five were dismissed due to forum selection clauses requiring suit in Maryland). The district court held that the control share provisions violated the ICA’s equal voting rights mandate and ordered their rescission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision in a summary order. Question Does Section 47(b) of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (b), create an implied private right of action?
[24-872] Hamm v. Smith
Hamm v. Smith Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 10, 2025. Petitioner: John Q. Hamm, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections.Respondent: Joseph Clifton Smith. Advocates: Robert M. Overing (for the Petitioner) Harry Graver (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Joseph Clifton Smith was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Alabama. Years later, Smith filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking to overturn his death sentence on grounds that he is intellectually disabled and therefore cannot be executed under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The central issue in Smith’s case involved determining whether he met the three-prong test for intellectual disability: significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, significant deficits in adaptive behavior, and manifestation of these qualities before age 18. Smith's IQ testing revealed multiple scores—72, 74, 75, 74, and 78—that fell within or near the range associated with intellectual disability when accounting for standard error of measurement. His experts testified that four of his five scores were consistent with mild intellectual disability, while the state’s expert, Dr. King, argued that Smith’s multiple scores placed him in the borderline range just above intellectual disability. After extensive evidentiary hearings featuring competing expert testimony about both Smith’s IQ scores and his adaptive functioning deficits, the district court found Smith intellectually disabled. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted Smith’s habeas petition and vacated his death sentence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case, asking the Eleventh Circuit to clarify whether its ruling relied solely on the lower end of Smith's IQ score range or on a holistic analysis of all evidence. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit explained that its reasoning was based on a holistic analysis. Question When a capital defendant has taken multiple IQ tests with varying results, how should courts evaluate the cumulative effect of those scores to determine whether the defendant has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning under Atkins v. Virginia?