The Post-Iran War Prognosis Is Deeply Unsettling

sub-basement of the Ministry of Snark in Washington, D.C. and from other undisclosed locations

across America and around the world. Hello and welcome Deep State radio, I am David Orozco, you're host and we are joined today by three friends and experts to talk about, well you can guess what we're going to talk about. One holly daggers is the Lubitsky Family Senior Fellow in the Washington Institute's

Viterbi program on Iran and US policy, Harry today holly. I'm living, I guess, as we say in Persia. Living. Well, okay, living is good.

I also joined by our friend Aaron David Miller who is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace, focusing on US foreign policy, Harry during today, Aaron. I'm doing great, I'm concerned about the future of the American Republic, but other than that things are fine.

“Okay, well, I think that is something to be concerned about and continuing this bleak”

outlook. We have Max Boot, who is a historian and biographer, bestselling author and foreign policy analyst. I just shuttered to ask, how are you doing today, Max? Well, I'm okay, David, but I'm jealous of Aaron's Wolverine propaganda, thinking I should

have brought my cow hat or something to counteract the Michigan banners that, or do you

see? Oh wow. Oh, wow. I see all that Wolverines and the Americans. Being married to a Wolverine, a reluctant Wolverine, they're celebrating this week because

Ohio State had a sex scandal instead of Michigan. That's true. Right.

“Although Sean Ward just cut a plea deal, apparently, for real time, I think.”

Oh, God. God. All right, well, let me shift to the news. And you know, today we have the president of the United States who's on again, off again. He was asked today, and this was kind of a classic by the Fox News person.

He said it is referring to the war. You said it's an excursion, and you said it's a war, so which is it? And Trump says, well, it's both. It's an excursion that will keep us out of war for them, it's war, for us it's turned out to be easier than we thought.

This is in keeping with his theme of comments today, all of which are designed to keep markets down. He's very concerned about them. And to make it look like this is going to be over any minute. He told Axios, there's just nothing left to bomb.

But Holly, I was sent from the Gulf, from friends in the Gulf, some Iranian statements. And one of the Iranian statements said, we'll tell you when this war is over, and said something to the effect of, you know, it's not going to be over until the United States meets our conditions, and the same is true with other states in the region. Now, needless to say, some of this is bluster, but of course, you know, it's an axiom

of war that one person can start it, but at that point they lose control over what happens next, and there's several parties here who have to agree to end it, one of which is the Iranians. So how much stocks should we put in Iranian promises to keep things going? Well, David, I think you raised a valid point. The reports are saying this is called Operation Madman. And I think that they were banking on a few things happening, and they were really

“thinking that President Trump would blink first. That's why you saw there were these”

to tax across the broader Middle East, unprecedented tax, especially on Arab states, Persian Gulf. I think that they were banking on maybe some of those allies calling up Washington and saying there should be a ceasefire. I think they probably assumed there would be American casualties which we had at least, I believe, seven, and over 140 American soldiers injured. And I think that they also were banking on the Strait of Hormos being closed and the oil

to go for a ceasefire. So far, obviously, this hasn't happened, but the Islamic Republic

still in power. Yes, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hamani was decapitated on February 28th, and his son is now Arab-parent though. I jokingly say he's now gone into occultation because we haven't heard or seen him. But very much, they are still functioning as a regime.

“And so I think they really are, while they are in a fight for their survival, I think”

what we're seeing so far is that the idea that Trump, I think, probably assumed that this was going to be a Venezuelan scenario hasn't been panning out. Yeah, no, clearly. I have to say personally, I love it when they refer to the Venezuelan scenario as though that we're actually a scenario. They went in and they took some people out, but you know, and they're getting some oil, but beyond that, it remains an open question as to what's

going to happen next in Venezuela. Aaron, not only the Iranians get to determine when this is over, but it seems the U.S. and the Israelis are not aligned by when this is over. What's your view on who gets to end it and when? Right. I mean, I don't put me down to as undecided on this one. Chris, of all, I don't remember Max might David you might, I only remember a conflict in recent decades, a major military conflict where the United

States partnered with an ally, more on that later, and demonstrated in an extraordinary deployment of military force. I don't think there has been an operation in which the U.S.

“partnered with any of its allies. I mean, would you have to go back to the fight against fascism”

during the Second World War? That partnership, the paradox, is that partnership occurs at a

time, which is of incredible high intensity and integration occurs at a time when the

when Israel's image in the United States, in my judgment, for any number of reasons, is at an all-time low. That's an interesting paradox. And sandwiched in between is the reality that I worked in every administration, Jimmy Carter, who was 43, I throw in Obama and Biden too. No American president has ever had a kind of lever he drew from his really prime minister as Donald Trump has over Benjamin Netanyahu. When Donald Trump reaches the conclusion that

this war will end, and at some point it will week to three weeks down the road. Benjamin Netanyahu, wherever the Israelis are in their own set of requirements and needs, will comply for one simple

reason. The most important thing in Benjamin Netanyahu's world in 2026 is not Lebanon, it's not Gaza,

it is not even Iran, it's winning reelection, either when the government comes to term in 2026 in October, or I would argue given the successes the Israelis have had to date, probably June or July. Donald Trump cannot elect Benjamin Netanyahu, but unless he actively campaigns for him, or worse, suggest that there is somehow daylight between the U.S. and Israel, Netanyahu's chances for reelection will diminish. So, I'm probably stating this too strongly,

but when Donald Trump says, "Jump," on this one, Benjamin Netanyahu will say, "How high?"

“To stay up to date on all the news that you need to know, there's no better place than right here”

on the DSR network, and there's no better way to enjoy the DSR network than by becoming a member. Members enjoying ad-free listening experience, access to our discord community, exclusive content, early episode access, and more. Use code DSR26 for 25% off discount on sign up at the DSRNetworkin.com. That's code DSR26 at the DSRNetworkin.com/buy. Thank you, and enjoy the show. Okay, so Max, just pick up on that. Let's assume that that's true. Trump at some point in the next

couple of weeks. For reasons, a little bit of kin, perhaps, what Aaron is saying about Netanyahu,

excursion, a successful excursion, everything's destroyed. There are no more missiles, you know,

we're not worried about anything, and he'll try to spin it as a success. Of course, the Ron can mess that up by continuing to attack allies in the region or blocking what's going on in the straits, but do you think there's a case that Trump can make to the American people which will

“actually be persuasive to anybody that any aspect of this was a success? Sure, I mean, I think you're”

going to see once the actual kinetic fighting ends. I think you're going to see a war of messages with both the Iranians and the Americans claiming to have won the war. The question of who is right,

I think will be very hard to sort out initially. It might take years to figure out who's claim

is more persuasive. I mean, on Trump's side, he's going to be able to say very truthfully, we destroyed most of their navy. We destroyed most of their missile force. We destroyed probably a lot of other, a lot of other stuff in Iran. And so therefore, we set back the Iranians X number of years in terms of using their military capacity to threaten their neighbors. And I think he'll have some, you know, he'll have a credible case to make on those grounds, although I think there's

a big question mark as to whether or not he will secure the more than 900 pounds of enriched uranium, which is in Iran, and that's going to be a big question mark as to how successful this is if that enriched uranium is still sitting around waiting to be potentially weaponized someday.

“On the other side, I think the Iranians will make the case, and I think I don't think they're going to”

whenever, you know, the war will end when Trump basically says, we've won, we're going to stop fighting.

But I think the Iranians will still probably mount, at least some symbolic attacks, release the dare so after that, just to make clear that they have not been defeated and they can continue fighting. And so I think the Iranians will be able to make the case that with all the might of the United States or right against them as, you know, as Holly suggested, they were able to do a regime transition to maintain regime continuity. They've been able to essentially close the

state of Hormuz. There was an eye-popping story in the Wall Street Journal that they saying that Iran has actually increased. That's oil exports since the war began showing that they can get their oil out and nobody else can through the, through the state of Hormuz. And so they can say we successfully resisted, you know, the great Satan's aggression. That will be the case that the Iranians will make. And, you know, who's right? Well, they both have elements of truth and credibility,

but it remains to be sorted out. I think down the line, you know, if a year or two down the line, the Iranian regime falls apart or is overthrown, then obviously Trump will be vindicated to some extent. If on the other hand, if a year or two down the line, the new Iatola, most of the Hamani, if he, if he manages to stay alive and be in power and see if he then rushes ahead and manages to weaponize highly that highly enriched uranium, which could still be sitting on Iranian

Iranian soil. Obviously, the Iranians will be right in claiming victory. So I think, you know, the outcome remains very much marketed, but one thing we can say for sure is it's definitely not, you know, the K-Quark, that Trump expected. It's not this one-sided war where he drops if you brought bombs on the Iranians capitulate. I don't know if he was seriously expecting that, but if he was, obviously, that's not what's happening. I don't think any serious analysts

“would have imagined. That's what would happen. Yeah, well, you know, one of the things that strikes”

me is that we've been in an adversarial position with Iran for 47 years and throughout that period there's been discussions about going to war with Iran and every administration, all those that are in ticked off there, have all decided not to go to war with Iran because it's so complicated. But Holly, you know, when, you know, in the week before we did this, as you recall, the president said we're going to do this for regime change. Then he said we're going to do this to end the nuclear

program. Then he said we're going to do this to end their missile program. Then, you know, he said may there or implied that, you know, it might be, you know, for regional stability and, you know,

done in Iran, but I don't know. Do you think we're closer or not to regime change? Do you think

the nuclear program is over? Do you think the missile program is over or are something setback, but maybe there's more resolve? What's your verdict on Trump and his checklist? I think at this juncture, I think we can all agree that they haven't taken out things and it's entirety, at least from the reports we're seeing. I mean, Max noted like, we don't know where the kilograms of enriched uranium is. We're not entirely sure how far they've been able to

destroy the ballistic missiles capabilities, but on the part of the Iranian people, you were just

“highlighting. And we have to remember that there was an unprecedented massacre in January that prompted”

these movements of assets to the region. And then there was this chat about regime change and placing the Supreme Leader we heard just the other week. And now we have a harmony junior supposedly in power. And unfortunately, it's created and even more repressive atmosphere on the ground. And

the regime has always been repressive. It's been in many Iranians say they feel at hostage by this

held hostage by this regime for 47 years or that they've been a war with its people for 47 years. But when you look at the commentary from Iranian officials, they're threatening people for going even entertaining the idea of protesting at this moment. They're saying that they're going to be killed that they have their commanders with their fingers

“on the trigger. They're threatening the diaspora with transnational repression. They're calling”

their parents and relatives up in Iran and saying, "Tell your children an American be silent."

And their assets are going to be freeze. And so, I mean, in this moment, what worries me more than

anything is what happens if this regime actually does survive, all of this, what happens to those people that have only been wanting and aching for freedom for a long time and have been involved in these anti-aging cyclical protest over the years. And I just worry about their future because they're really stuck between a rock and a hard place because the economic and socio-political situation on the ground is so bad, so dire. And I worry about that and what that will look like,

especially in this moment of indecisiveness by the president. So, Aaron, let's assume that Trump blows the whistle at some point in the next two to three weeks.

“Is the region more or less stable after this is over?”

You know, in the wake of October 7, well, let me start by saying this, when Putin invaded Ukraine, I was told international relations would be fundamentally transformed. When COVID hit, I was told that life as we know it would fundamentally be changed. The enemy was October 7. The region was going to be fundamentally transformed. Now, it's the largest single deployment of American missile and naval assets since Iraq war.

Transformations of a positive nature rarely ever apply to this complicated, broken, angry, and dysfunctional region. I think I'd have to take a piece by piece, David, because I don't think there is a sweeping generalization that encapsulates the entire region. Assuming the Lebanese step-up, and the president and commander of the LAF, gets over the concern about sectarian strife in civil war, which is a legitimate concern.

His role as vice-like gripped over Lebanon could be somehow moderated, ameliorated, although these rallies seem to be wanting to carve out a cordon, sanitarian southern Lebanon, which is going to add delegitimize to Lebanese government's efforts to deal with his ball-up. Gaza must control its 47% of an area twice the size of the district of Columbia. It remains the preeminent actor, Palestinian actor, only threatened by the clans and

criminal gangs and the idea, but by no alternative governing Palestinian structure, the Gulf States will grow increasingly dependent on the United States, but geography is destiny. Their proximity means vulnerability. They're going to have to have some kind of

maybe Netanyahu will be re-elected and with a different Israeli government,

“but no transformation there, even if not Tally Bennett replaces Benjamin Netanyahu,”

and America under this president. For the next three years, my judgment like a modern day goal of her wandering around in a world region that we don't really understand, tied up by powers, large and small, who's interests are not our own, and burdened by our own illusions. I don't expect much in the way of transformation from the remaining several years

of the Trump administration. You know, tell me, tell me I'm wrong here,

create a better transformative ending to this conflict that makes the Middle East. I mean, we were told for years that if you eliminate Iran, it is a bad and evil regime, and it is. But if you eliminated Iran so many opportunities with emerge, Israeli Saudi normalization, the end of Amas, the end of his Bala, and you know something how he can comment on this, democratization in Iran is only going to play to the worst instincts of the authoritarian

in every single Arab country, including Turkey, not an Arab country. They'll be looking in their rear view mirror, the Emirates, the Saudis, the Qataris, the Kuwaitis, the Turks, if in fact the embers of democracy start to glow in Iran, the goal states are going to be have very mixed feelings about how to control that. So no, I don't see transformation. But I don't see transformation.

So that's it, I'm just not how to feel. I'm an Arab woman. I'll shop if I point to age. Let's record. Well, let me say if I can coax Max and to see catastrophe, but uh, and obviously I'm not trying to get there. But um, the the, it does seem like we've underscored for Iran that having nuclear weapons could have spared them all of this. We've given them incentive to get nuclear weapons. Uh, we have ratcheted up the tensions between Iran and neighboring states

in a way that we have never seen it before and even the statements they've made today.

You know, our our sort of expressing that all of these these these countries they've attacked have complicity in in the U.S. effort and and so that could be a source of greater tension. Um, you know, the Israelis have been attacking throughout the region throughout the past couple of years more aggressively and independently. Um, there is a potential for unrest one way or another in Iran could be, um, an uprising. People's uprising could also be a civil war. Does that doesn't

“the region seem more dangerous to you after this is over? Or am I being overly blink?”

I think the odds are that the region will be even more destabilized, uh, than it was before. Now, it's possible that you could eventually reach a new equilibrium. I mean, obviously the best case scenario is if, uh, as a result of the pummeling that the Iranian regime is currently taking. If you do see a successful uprising and an overthrow of the clerical regime and a replacement not within, you know, IRGC likeocracy, but with a pro Western liberal democracy, but that's that's

a hope that's a dream. That's not that doesn't seem like a terribly realistic prospect at this point.

“That's a that's a very long shot chance. I think the odds are that we're going to wind up with”

is sort of a version of Saddam Hussein's regime after defeat in the 1991 Gulf War where

stay in power. Still sufficient to repress popular protest and still a threat to the U.S.,

which we felt necessitated continuing American military presence on the Middle East. And of course, remember, the Middle East has been kind of an American military coagmire since the 1970s, since the Arab oil embargo, since the Iranian hostage crisis, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We seem to get more and more mired into it. And after, you know, the Iraq and Afghanistan turned into

“forever wars, I think there was a general desire by partisan design American politics to pivot”

out of the Middle East. President Obama promised the, a Pacific pivot, Trump promised kind of a domestic

pivot, you know, to focus on the carnage on the alleged carnage on the American home front.

And instead, we're going to another war of choice, another war of regime change, another quagmire, and the Middle East. And it sure doesn't seem like we're getting out of it any time soon. And so it seems like we're just getting, keep getting trapped in the Middle East quicksand of trying to deal essentially with the destabilizing consequences of our previous interventions, which were meant to fix all the problems in the Middle East. But instead created new problems.

“And I think that's kind of the pattern we've seen for, you know, many decades. And it seems”

likely to continue. Yeah, you know, we all view this through our own lands. I remember sitting on the bed in the maternity ward when my youngest daughter was born 35 years ago, watching the beginning of the Gulf War on the TV. And it's been going on ever since. And I remember after going into Iraq in 2003, writing an article, I think for the Washington Post, if I recall correctly. And once I talked about the Gulf Wars, and then we were, you know, they look back on this like the

30 years' war, you know, that this was the second, but there will probably be more. And there were

a bunch of people who said, oh, that's very pessimistic. But it seems like this is just something

“that goes on and on. But, you know, I think, you know, each of us have touched upon some potential,”

you know, worry subsite points of this. Let me go around one last time with it trying to be a little bit more positive. I don't want to do wish casting. You know, I don't want to ask you what he thinks next Ali and have you say, Jeffersonian democracy in Tehran, because I don't think that's going to happen. What's the best plausible scenario in your mind for where this takes us? Why is it plausible? I just don't see positive in it outcome right now, other than wish castings,

what you just said, because I find it frustrating because Iranians have been wanting change for a long time. And Western governments have been ignoring that call dismissing anti-regime protests over the years and saying they're not going anywhere. We've had prominent incidents like Lobel-Lori and Argus Muhammadi and others call for a democratic transition. And we've ignored it. We've decided we're going to do diplomacy. We're going to keep trying to make a deal.

And this is a situation we're in and I just don't see this. I would say we call it a paper lion, but it's also a battered lion that's only going to lash out and it's people if it makes it out. And I just keep thinking about that. And it worries me because even before this war, the rhetoric of the Islamic Republic was very much copy and paste of the Bashar al-Assad regime. And I noted some of that earlier that that's some of the commentary that's coming out right now

during the war. And I just see that the Iranian people are going to be suffering more than anything. And I just can't see a positive that must have a harmony as supreme leader or even let's imagine IRGC commander that some people have been entertaining come out of this leading the country because even even if I'm friendly or faced the regime somehow popped out in this

A systemic mismanagement, corruption, repression. I worry about the environmental situation that

“in the fall there were real worries that Iran would run out of water. There's an environmental”

crisis about to happen when this war ends. And I don't think they have the capabilities to do deal with that. And that means you might end up with a refugee crisis some years down the road. And with this regime in power, still assuming the army proxy still thinking about ballistic missiles, that means there's going to be a continuation of some sort of max pressure or another

mowing of the lawn. So I just see the situation getting worse and worse for the Iranian people.

By the way, the way we would make that into a headline in 2026 as you would say pressure

“maxing with two exes. That's that's how we sort of weave it into the vernacular at the moment.”

Okay, Erin, you seem a little bleak. Best plausible out. I don't, you know, Iran's specific. I don't see it because to run around you need access to oil, money and guns. And frankly right now, there's only one force that is capable of centralizing control over oil money and guns. I'll defer to Holly on what the Iranian opposition looks like. Their capacity. Look, the broader issue is, and it pertains to the Arab world, but it also

pertains to Iran. How does the Arab world get out of its authoritarian trip?

“We lived for the last 50 years with two kinds of authoritarian.”

There were the acquiescent authoritarian, the one we did business with. Those would be the mobarics, the banalies, the Abdel La Salas and Yemen.

Then there were the adversarial authoritarian that we didn't do business with. We tried to basically

unseat. Whether that was Gaddafi, Saddam we cooperated with in 84 for a brief period of time. Syria to me is the only example so far of an Arab authoritarian structure, which was fundamentally hollowed out and weakened and changed by a legitimate arguably, a jihadian asuit, maybe a machara. But the Syrian exception may well point even though Syria and Iran are vastly different. The Syrian exception strikes me as

the only example of how a polity in the wake of overthrows an Arab authoritarian and then begins to craft with external western and regional support. A polity that to some degree might be over time, Syria is still working progress, more inclusive with respect for human rights. I mean, again, I'm a loose guy in here. So down the road, and again, I defer to Hali here, the Ahmad Sharis scenario, the legitimate

struggler granted a formal newsroom, al-Qaeda derivative, emerges and strong man centralizes control and power and then because of his needs and requirements, begins to moderate. I just don't, I don't see that as a pathway for Iran now for the reasons Hali is mentioned. Um, and one last point, all life, even in political life, has an element of the personal, there's a personal corollary about everybody, every leader's story.

If most of us survived, and I said to some of the other day, Hashimisahedine lasted six days after the Israelis killed Hassan Nasrallah. His designated successor lasted six days. If most of us survived, this is the 56-year-old guy who, last Saturday, lost his father, his wife, his mother, his brother-in-law, and I think Hali, a daughter, and maybe a

So I'm sorry to disappoint you. I just, I don't see it on your, I'm with Hali here.

That, you're, you're, you're not disappointing. Before I go to Max for a final word here, Hali,

“Aaron referred to you a couple of times there. Do you have anything you want to pick up on?”

Though, Darren's on what Aaron said. Well, Aaron, Aaron laid it out beautifully. The Batman arc that Moshnavahamani has is some Iranian social media managed to stay online during this internet shut down. I just, you know, this is an ideological regime at the heart or the core of the Islamic Republic. Their motive's operandi is to oppose the United States and Israel.

And so I keep scratching my head that I, I guess I'm not surprised at the Trump administration

didn't know that, given that they had rifts so many people or dodged them, and that it's just a core group of top officials and Trump making those decisions. Sometimes from what I hear within 15 minutes. And I just, again, if I had a magic one, I would hope that the democratic transition that the Iranian people have been so badly wanting where to happen. And, but again, the situation on the ground is just not looking great. I had probably the biggest hope for that before all this

happened, but the direction it's going so far. It's just, this juncture doesn't look great. Again,

there might be something that happens down the line. I want to be open-minded because this war

still ongoing. But I think that with that in mind, Western governments should be thinking about these issues and planning for a post-Slamic Republic in the event that things go in a different direction, we shouldn't be caught flat-footed. Yeah, planning, we don't do so much. And to illustrate

“that point, Max, I mean, if you want to address the question I just asked that's fine, but because,”

you know, you have this sort of broader ambit and a lot of stuff you've written about, it seems to me that this war has been terrible news for some people around the world and good news for others. You know, it's been, if you buy gasoline for your cards, not so good, if it keeps going for a while, and you buy food, it's not so good. Well, some people say, you know, it's good for the Ukrainian drone industry. It seems to me it's pretty bad for you,

Ukrainian in terms of the weapons they need to defend themselves from the Russians. It's even a little worse if you see the lengths to which the Trump administration is bending over backwards to say, oh, the Russians, maybe they're helping the Iranians target our troops,

“but you know, all between friends and war with cough, I believe what Putin says. He says they're”

not doing it, so I believe them. So I think bad for Ukraine, Chinese must be looking at this and looking their chops in terms of Taiwan. So just sort of let me, you know, in a couple of minutes, your sense of the broader geopolitical implications. Well, I just wrote this week, did I think that the big winners in the war between the US and Iran are likely to be Russia and China, and I think you're seeing a lot of evidence of that. I would just note to begin on,

to pick up on your point about Trump's response to the reports that the Russians are helping the Iranians with intelligence, the target US troops, and there's also reports that they're providing tips on how to use drones effectively against US troops. You know, imagine if there's anybody other than Russia doing this, I mean, just look at the way that Trump is having a meltdown because Spain is not allowing the US to use its bases for the war, and it's not like Spain is

helping Iran. They just don't want to be involved either way, and Trump is threatening to cut off all trade with Spain, blah, blah, blah. And yet he doesn't have a single negative thing to say about Putin helping the Iranians when they're battling American troops. In fact, he, after his phone call with Putin, he praised Putin as being helpful. You know, he's, I can see Putin being helpful to Iran. I don't see him being helpful to the United States. So this is, unfortunately, as you know, David

and have you've written and spoken about this a lot about a long and shameful pattern of Trump caltowing to Putin. But, you know, I think the, the, the big benefits to Russia are in direct having to do with the rising oil prices. That's a boom to the Russian war machine.

previously, and even more with Trump talking about relaxing Russian oil sanctions on India and possibly other countries as well to counteract the rise in oil prices. All of that is going to go to the Russian bottom line. The fact that the U.S. is expanding all these precious and scarce munitions against Iran and a war of choice means that there is no hope that they will be sold to

“Ukraine for use against Russia. And President Zelensky pointed out, I think correctly, that in the”

first three days of fighting against Iran, the U.S. and its allies used that more patriot intercept

ers than Ukraine has received since the start of the of the major war in 2022. So, just imagine if Trump had not launched this war of choice and had actually given or were likely sold these interceptors to the Europeans for passing on to the Ukrainians. Just think of how much Ukrainian energy infrastructure could have survived the winter how many Ukrainians of billions could have survived the winter, but no, Trump has denied all these weapons to Ukraine,

and now he's utilizing them, expanding them against Iran. And so many of the munitions that the U.S. is using are these very scarce, high-end guided weapons systems, whether it's

patriot interceptors, SM3 interceptors, Tomahawk cruise missiles, sad interceptors. Now some of those are

getting damaged by the Iranians because they're being very clever, possibly with Russian targeting help. They're taking out sad radars and other air defense radars of which we have very few and which cost a lot of money. And meanwhile, we're expanding all these munitions, where in some cases we produce, you know, maybe it does in two dozen of these missiles every year. So it could cut, take years to replenish U.S. stockpiles. And so that is weakening the U.S. deterrence posture,

not just against Russia, but also against China. Because again, these are all weapons that would be needed in a contingency involving China or for that matter involving North Korea. And we've been

“moving sad systems out of South Korea towards the Middle East. So I think this is something that”

General Dan K and actually warned about, according to the leaks that came out before the war started, that this was going to complete U.S. munitions stockpiles and potentially leave the U.S. in a dicey situation with other potential scenarios around the world. And that is, in fact, what has come to pass? And I think the larger cost of the war is simply the opportunity cost. Because again, we are constantly getting mired in the Middle East even though generations of the

public and leaders and think tankers and academics and others have all said, this is kind of a distraction. The Middle East is clearly, especially when the U.S. is essentially energy self-sufficient. The Middle East should not be the center of American defense policy, strategy, diplomacy, everything else. But it is, which means we're not focused on other threats, including the threat from China. And you know, it's kind of tragic to see China is making these massive investments,

not just in their military, but also in their economy. And they are spending to dominate the industries of the future. In many ways, they're ready to do. They dominate electrical vehicles, drones, solar panels, lithium ion batteries, so many of the industries that hold a term in the future of the global economy. And Trump and the U.S. were completely distracted. We're focusing on side shows, including this war of choice against Iran. So I just think this is a,

whatever happens in this conflict tonight. And I hope that at least that Iran will emerge as less of a threat than when we started. But even if that happens, I think this is just a tragic misapplication of resources in a huge mis opportunity. We're taking our ball off the real threats

countries like China and Russia and focusing on a third-rate threat like Iran.

Well, I mean, first of all, I would like to thank the three of you, very perspectives. They are all unsettling and give us pause. But I think at this particular point,

“that's what we need. And we needed to cut through the malarkey that is T is a Joe Biden term”

that's coming out of this administration. And I think, you know, one of the reasons we do this show is that it's important to get expert perspectives in depth in order to get that kind of context and historical view and long-term view that you need to have. And we're especially fortunate today to have three people of the caliber of Holly and of Aaron and of Max. So to them, I extend my thanks and all of you. I extend my thanks. We will be covering this as we do every single day in

via the DSR network as a podcast where you can support us as a member. For now, thanks everybody, bye, bye. Oh, my David Max, Holly, did care. Thank you very much.