Lawfare Daily: Breaking Down the Lebanon Ceasefire

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[MUSIC] I will point out this is a very unilateral approach to this whole problem, where Israel is simply saying, "Look, we're going to solve this by removing the threat completely, rather than negotiating it over it, or otherwise trying to build up alternatives to his follow-up." It's the law fair podcast. I'm Senior Editor Scott R. Anderson here with Dan Byman and Mono-Icubian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Joe Brunald of the Center Project. Are they able to reach some kind of interroma agreement? I do not see the big

comprehensive deal that includes Iran's nuclear ambitions, et cetera, being addressed in this round of talks. Today we're discussing the recent ceasefire in Lebanon and what it may mean for the broader region.

Due to some scheduling difficulties, I first sat down with Dan Byman and Mono-Icubian for conversation on April 21st,

then talked with Joe Brunald separately the next day. Notably, after the Islamabad talks were ongoing during my first conversation with Dan and Mono had ended in conclusive. Here's my first conversation with Dan and Mono recorded on April 21st. So we've seen a very eventful couple of weeks, but particularly a couple of days in regards to Lebanon.

“We know Israel started a second front in Lebanon or engaged in a second front. I think it's a little bit open for the”

Peyton who started it after the initial conflict with Iran a couple of weeks ago. That has been ongoing at a point of tension as part of the broader conflict with Iran. As soon as the United States and Iran hit upon a two-week ceasefire about two weeks ago now, we saw what some of described as the Black Wednesday strikes on Lebanon by Israel. A aggressive and tactically impressive, I think it's fair to say, set of strikes hitting hundreds

of hundred targets in a short window of time, inflicting a lot of damage on his well-infrastructure, hitting targets in Bay Route and other parts of Lebanon as well. But that has proven to be a diplomatic point of concern for the broader U.S. Iran discussions, which led the United States to push for and apparently successfully secure late last week a ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel of a particular sort for the next or for ten days. We're now about a week from out from today.

So, Dan, I want to start with you. Talk to us a little about where the ceasefire leaves

this conflict as far as we know. We know that these railways are trying to secure basically

have secured at this point, control of a kind of security strip in southern Lebanon. That raises sovereignty concerns, raises political concerns for the Lebanese for many others. We also know that there is, while this is a ceasefire, there have been some rules that it seem to be a little bit of an evolving target about the types of action. Israel is allowed to take particularly in that protective band. So, talk to us about where the ceasefire leaves this conflict

at this particular moment and how that fits into the strategic vision that Israel leaves has been pursuing in terms of what is trying to accomplish. So, the ceasefire leaves Israel in physical possession of parts of Lebanon and also the ability to control or at least shape. I'll say the kind of who goes in and who goes out of other parts of Lebanese territory near its borders. So, right along the border, there is a strip that Israel has declared that effectively is that annexed territory in a legal sense,

but that this is territory that is going to be in Israeli buffer zone. And beyond that, though, there are areas where Israel is telling Lebanese not to go, not to return to, and these areas will be areas where Israel wants to control, who lives there, wants to control the activities there. And then you could think of a further strip where Israel is seeking that the Lebanese government exert control. And some of these are due to geography, but a part of it simply due to weapons range.

So, the strip immediately along the Israeli border, a part of the recent forest distance is because that's the rough range of anti-tank guided missiles, which his ballad has been firing

“into northern Israel. And Israel's belief, which I think is correct, is that if it controls that”

territory, it reduces the effectiveness of this particular weapon system. However, and this is

where it wants to devastate his ballad. But this is an organization that is deeply brewed in Lebanon,

has thousands of fighters. And even after what I would have characterized as devastating Israeli attacks and many wars in 2004, and then numerous follow-on attacks in the months that followed, his ballad is still probably the strongest single organization in Lebanon. So many Israelis are looking and saying, yes, Israel has achieved tactical benefits on the ground for Israel in terms of creating some security space, but his ballad self is still strong. And that, yeah, whose critics,

of course, politically are eager to point this out. I will point out this is a very unilateral approach to this whole problem, where Israel is simply saying, look, we're going to solve this by removing

the threat completely, rather than negotiating an operator, otherwise trying to build up alternatives

“to his ballad. And that gets to one of the challenges that I think this military operation”

presents to Israel, which is that in terms of a domestic political situation, we know big swaths of northern Israel have been evacuated substantially under threat when not evacuated really for passively years, some extent, because of the tensions in African hostilities with his ballad, particularly in the last several months, domestic figures in Israel, the leadership in various quarters have signaled, look, a goal of this operation to let people go home to the north.

But to what extent, Dan, is there a sense that you can create enough stability through these military measures to allow that return? Or is there going to have to be some sort of diplomatic solution? And do we have a sense about these railies acknowledging that in terms of getting to the level of confidence that they won't have rockets and other things coming in that will force a further evacuation or otherwise inhibit life in northern Israel, which has been a real hardship a lot of

Israelis have been experiencing? So my view in the end, this is going to have to be a diplomatic solution.

“Now, I think Israel's approach, though, is diplomatic solutions are temporary,”

diplomatic solutions signal weakness. And their post-Ectober 7 security policy is very much, we can't trust the intentions of our adversaries, we have to make sure their capabilities are weak, we have to effectively cripple them, and Israel's taking that approach, obviously Gaza, but also Lebanon is now trying to do so in certain ways with Iran. But if you look at his bubble, simply because of its extensive networks within Lebanon, it's going to be very hard for

Israel or anyone else to uproot it completely. And so it's going to be there. And yes, if it's weaker, it's going to pose less of a threat, but in terms of disrupting the lives of Israelis living in northern Lebanon, the occasional rocket attack can do that. And so to me, this has to come from some sort of effort where there are restrictions on his bubble, where the Lebanese government has built up,

“that's a very painstaking effort, it's going to have lots of bits and starts. I can see why there”

would be frustrations with it, but to me in the end, it's the most realistic long-term alternative as opposed to military operations every couple years that pushes bubble back, devastated Lebanon, but still cost disruption from many Israelis to spite the suffering on the Lebanese side. And let's talk and shift our focus to Lebanese side, Mona. Let's start with just a clear understanding about what this conflict has meant for Lebanon and for the thousands of Lebanese

civilians that have been caught in this conflict. Give us a sense about the humanitarian situation that is facing Lebanon, its urgency and particularly southern Lebanon, those areas that have been most targeted by military operations are now by Israeli military occupation. Yeah, I mean, it's been pretty devastating for Lebanon. This conflict that kicked off a guess, March 2nd, and it did start with Hasbalah shooting off drones and missiles in protest

or in solidarity with Iran following the Israeli U.S. strikes that led to killing of Ali

Havana in the Supreme Leader. When I say devastating, I mean, devastating. More than a million

Lebanese have been displaced, there are numbers as up to 1.2 million, at least 20% of the population, the majority of them share from the south as well as from the Hezbollah dominated suburbs and southern Beirut the Dahia. And this has had an enormous effect because they have been increasingly constrained in terms of where they can go. This speaks to the underlying sectarian tensions in Lebanon that have been exacerbated by this latest chapter in the conflict where you

have confessional communities who are simply not willing to host displaced Shea for fear that they too will come under bombardment. Some of this has been reported in the New York times

to villages in southern Lebanon of other confessions do not allow displaced Shea to come and seek safe refuge in your midst. And so they have refused. And so what you're seeing is that these displaced are actually in a smaller and smaller, more narrow confined part of Lebanon. For example, the population of Beirut has increased by 50%. And the majority is in West Beirut, which is predominantly Muslim, rather than in East Beirut. So you're seeing this enormous displacement. Of course,

there have been an estimated more than 2,000 Lebanese kill, which is a significant number given again the country's small population. And then this has also had devastating economic impacts. This is a country that was already dealing with compounding crises, beginning with the collapse of the economy in 2019 followed by the COVID crisis and the Beirut port explosion in August. So this they've been contending with crisis upon crisis upon crisis. It's estimated that the country

witnessed a five to seven percent contraction in GDP just in the five weeks since this latest

“conflict has kicked off. So it's really put Lebanon on the back foot and in many ways. I think”

put it sort of about the precipice of even potential collapse, if in fact conflict resumes. Part of the demands that these railways have made that other people in our community have suggested would be at least a useful step, not a hard demand. It's the idea of disarming has blah, and minimizing its political role. Has blah has been, I think, arguably, I think,

most politically, the, if not among the, if not the most powerful political actor in Lebanon, both within

the political system and outside the political system as a separate armed group. So talk to us about the extent to which that's even a realistic demand. And how the Lebanese government has been engaging both the negotiations with Israel and with Hezbollah, how they're trying to navigate this relationship between this powerful domestic actor and the demands of Israel, it's neighbor who with

“whom it's an armed conflict. It's extraordinary, Lee Complex, and I think Dan laid out well”

the dimensions of the challenge. Let's go back, because I think this really sort of begins in 2023, 2024, in particular, 2024. When Israel responded with a pretty significant offensive

beginning in September with the Pager attacks that then, and then, ultimately, the decapitation

strikes that led to the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, the very charismatic Hezbollah leader and very significant assassinations down two and three levels of Hezbollah leadership, as well as, you know, eroding, although clearly not completely, it's arsenal of missiles. This then led to eventually a Biden administration mediated or negotiated, I should say, ceasefire in November of 2024, which really left Hezbollah, decimated very much on the back foot, and frankly paved the way for a very

significant political transformation that we have seen in Lebanon in the ensuing months. It paved

the way for the first time in decades, the election of a president and a cabinet, really not

“under the sway of Hezbollah and Hezbollah's political power. And this is significant, and I think”

with it came real hope that the country could embark on a trajectory in which it would be able to regain its sovereignty, to address longstanding need for reforms, economic, political judicial reforms, address longstanding challenges with pervasive corruption, and there was some hope at that time. It has, in the intervening times, taken quite some time, but eventually you had the Lebanese government, in fact, announced a plan to disarm Hezbollah throughout the country, which is

again significant. They began this phased plan. It was to become out in five phases in September, and they announced the completion of the first phase of that disarmament in early January of this year. Now, by most accounts, that disarmament plan proceeded far too slowly. It was far too timid, and there are real concerns and questions about whether Hezbollah was rearming faster than the Lebanese government could disarm, or the Lebanese armed forces in particular. But again, very complex question,

the need for more resources from the U.S. and others, and just real questions about how to,

“indeed, uproot this deeply entrenched militant group. The other point I'd make, though, is I think”

one of the lessons learned is that disarmament in Lebanon to be successful has to be a whole of government effort. It can't simply be the kinetic action needed to take Hezbollah's arms away, but rather has to really get to the root of how it has built its support within this year community. It has to, we have to look at things like economic offerings, for an example, but also kind of how the government can actually regain its position as a central government

that takes care of all Lebanese citizens. So there has to be engagement with the Shea community as well. Last point I'll make is that, well, it's understandable why Israel is doing what it's doing, given its post-October 7th security doctrine, and the need to sort of preempt threats outside of Israel before they materialize into attacks inside Israel. We also have to understand that this desire to create a puffer zone, a security zone, and southern Lebanon,

simply feeds into Hezbollah's narrative of resistance, and allows them to point to this Israeli occupation as a rationale for why they should be able to continue to hold their arms. So Dan Mona mentioned the involvement outside forces, and there's at least one presence that we should mention in discussing this conflict that's been there on the border between Lebanon and Israel. For the last several decades, that the United Nations interim force of Lebanon, Unifill,

a UN peacekeeping mission, our monitoring mission, I should say, that's been there. Since the end of 1978, Israel Lebanon conflict was originally set to wind up, wind up its mission next year, but has already been caught in the middle of this conflict,

“including having many personnel injured, I believe, a few of them killed, and potentially being”

involved either accidentally or by some accounts being targeted by different sides of this conflict. Talked about the Unifill mission, the role it is playing, or isn't playing in this current conflict, and perhaps what it might signal in terms of the involvement of the United Nations or other elements of the United Nations, or other elements of the National Community, any potential

resolution to this conflict? So the Unifill mission, in my view, has always been a

dysfunction between what peacekeeping was, you know, imagined to accomplish, but the actual powers and authorities given to the troops in question. So the hope was that, you know, this would keep the peace between Israel and Lebanon, and that these troops would be in assurance to both sides, and, especially to Israel that his Bala or other groups would not do attacks from Lebanon. It is relevant, it would not be cross-border attacks, and at the same time, the presence of

UN troops would discourage Israel from doing its own operations because of the risk of creating international complications. At the same time, the UN presence would serve to monitor, and it would say that their violations, whether on this really side, or by his Bala or the Lebanese side, the problem, though, is the mandate given to UNifill was exceptionally cautious. The troops that were in there were mixed in nationalities, where they were not there to

keep the peace in a broader sense, and they're there to try and keep the peace between,

you know, his Bala and Israel, both of which are exceptionally powerful actors,

compared to UNifill on the ground, and well before October 7th, his railways were very frustrated, because they found that his Bala had reestablished its presence along the Israeli border, and they saw this as a direct threat, and then after October 7th, they worry that his Bala, which is much stronger than Hamas, would be able to do a similar attack by perhaps even more lethal,

“and that UNifill would do little. Israel is complain, I think, with some justification,”

that when they brought violations to UNifill's attention, not much happened. And the UN, in general, is very negatively perceived among Israelis, and they see UN agencies that have been biased against Israel, so this fed into a broader narrative that you could hear

about Palestinian refugee camps and UN support in Gaza or the West Bank or critical UN resolutions.

And in reality, I think that the UN presence simply wasn't matched to what was realistic here, that this was not going to be a UN force that was going to serve his Bala, or in force of peace against very powerful adversaries, and so in a way it was kind of worst of all worlds, you had this group there that was, I think, bound to disappoint both sides, yet the same time

complete any serious mission. Yeah, I would agree with exactly how Dan has framed it,

“but I think it then teed up another question, which is, as the UNifill mandate was coming”

toward a close, then what? What fills that vacuum? And this is, of course, before this latest iteration of the conflict, and there was no Israeli occupation in the south, other than post November 2024, five posts along the border. But this was this sort of elevated, I think, the urgency for, okay, if Lebanon is to regain its sovereignty with a weakened his Bala, then the Lebanese

armed forces need to fill in those areas that ultimately are going to be vacated by UNifill,

and this sort of then added to, I think, the pressure that its capacity, the laughs capacity, needed to be built out, and that this was yet another argument for why they're needed to be more support. And again, I should note, with Lebanon's devastating economic crisis, Lebanese armed forces soldiers were making a pittance, certainly compared to Hezbollah recruits. There was long standing concern. There were some of them time, sometimes they were holding down more than one job that

even of these are, you know, members of the Lebanese armed forces. And so this is why I think this pressure or these questions about what is the disposition of southern Lebanon post-unifill,

and how to ensure that as the Lebanese government seeks to strengthen its sovereignty

throughout the country to gain a monopoly over arms, as it's called in the country, that it's the

“need to bolster the laugh, I think, was, you know, even became even more important once it was clear,”

that the Unifill mandate was not going to be renewed. There is, of course, at least one other significant actor we should talk about in relation to this conflict, particularly for this audience as we have mostly American audience, that is the United States government. The United States obviously played a pretty significant role in pushing the ceasefire, particularly in persuading these railies to get on board. We saw a fairly unusual social media message from President

Trump, essentially declaring the ceasefire insisting that there would be no violations, making fairly strong statements about these really position. We've seen equally interesting comments by Tom Brock, the US ambassador to Turkey, who's also a special envoy to Syria just last few days, essentially describing both sides of the ceasefire as equally untrustworthy, I think, as the quote I saw. So some unorthodox diplomacy, saying very least, in some clear

tension between the United States and to some extent both sides, both Israel and Lebanon, although notably the President said actually very nice things about the Lebanese government in his social media message, and there's been some more positive messaging there. So one let me start with you and Dan, I'd welcome you to some of them. It talks a little about what American engagement has looked like so far, how productive it's been, direction seems to be pushing in and

and how much follow through you expect to see they seem to be singling, they may be falling through to deliver these sorts of support that as you describe Mona, it's likely to be necessary to actually achieve a meaningful and enduring ceasefire in this conflict. Well, I think US engagement on Lebanon has been episodic, you know, it's been up and down, depending on the circumstances. I think most recently, of course, our tension pivoted to Iran

with that conflict, but even before, I think there's a sense from some observers, I would put myself in that category that, again, with this decimation of his ballo with this new government, in Lebanon, there was an important opportunity to seize, to try to help build up the Lebanese armed forces as an important counterweight to his ballo and to help push through this project of disarmament. Well, I think what we've seen now is, as I said, this sort of episodic engagement on the part

of the United States at times, you know, pressuring the Lebanese government, which I think is

“incredibly important, also pushing on the Israelis for necessary restraint. But I think what's,”

what's missing is sustained commitment to this project. And I, I fear that without the United States playing a key role, things can very quickly unravel. So let's see what happens. There are,

there's a second round of negotiations slated to take place later this week on Thursday

between Israel and Lebanon, mediated by the United States. This is, I think, an example of the U.S. playing an important role here. But can the U.S. sustain its diplomatic engagement and will there be continued support for the Lebanese armed forces, which at times is controversial,

another impediment, I think, moving forward. Dan, anything to add on that? Yeah, let me just

“briefly add. I think Mona really is stressing to me the most important point, which is sustained”

engagement, right? And you could say sustained pressure and sustained diplomatic attention. The United States has often treated Lebanon as an afterthought. And so it's linked to Israel is really wars with the United States. It might become engaged. And now, with, of course, the broader Iran war. But the Trump administration's focus, perhaps understandably, is very much on the state of our moves and on Iran. And so it is seeing Lebanon as a way of, as a distraction and

something that might be an impediment to deal that is working towards with Iran. As opposed to an important theater in its own right, that is a source of regional instability. And that needs sustained attention because the disaster that has been Lebanon since well before the October 7th attacks really has the potential to pull in other powers, not just Israel. And that sustained instability could be a long-term problem that if the United States doesn't really take advantage

of to be what is of a genuine moment to move things forward right now, it's really going to be a missed opportunity. So Mona, you recently published a piece in foreign policy, laying out which you think the United States, Lebanon, Israel, the other actors involved, should do to make the most of the ceasefire to make progress on disarming his bala and towards working towards a more sustainable solution for all parties here. Talk us through what you think needs to happen and where we are

seeing progress and where we may be falling short. Yeah, so I do think as like all the piece

“a moment of reckoning, which I believe it is in particular for Lebanon, which has bala with Israel,”

with its own population. I do think it's also an opportunity, but to your point Scott, it is essential

that this opportunity be seized. It's a very narrow window. So in the piece, I certainly lay down a clear-eyed view of all of the various challenges that lie ahead, but I do think there are important steps each actor can take. To move the ball forward, if the ultimate goal is lasting peace and stability both within Lebanon and I very much concur with Dan's point that stability and Lebanon is critical, not just for Lebanon, but has regional implications. And so in this regard,

what I call for is number one that the Lebanese government does have to continue to demonstrate its commitment, especially now at the toward disarming his bala, especially now that there is a ceasefire. And one way to do that is to move forward on a plan that has been floating around to disarming his bala within bayroot proper, which in some level would be quite symbolic. You don't have major Hezbollah presence inside bayroot proper, but nonetheless, very important, especially the

Lebanese government demonstrating its control over its own capital. It also, I think, would go a long way toward, or would some way, let's say, toward diminishing concerns within other conventional communities about Hezbollah elements within the midst of displaced shea. So I think

“that's an important step to be taken. We've also seen, I think, a lot of courage on the part of the”

Lebanese president. He gave a really powerful speech last week in which he raised the possibility

of building on this ceasefire and really ushering in in his words, you know, a new chapter, a new stage for Lebanon. And he talks about negotiations with Israel, not as a concession, as it's often portrayed, but actually as an important entry point to moving the country as a whole forward. And so I think, you know, that kind of building of political support is also really important. For the Israelis, I think it's all about restraint. I think that it is about seeking to maintain

this ceasefire. The ceasefire does give Israel wide latitude to undertake strikes against not only imminent threats, but even planned threats. And so I think restraining itself and not undertaking all of these different strikes is important. I also think it's important for Israel not to broaden its target set against the shea community in its entirety, which I think has all kinds of negative implications and escalatory implications within Lebanon and also with Israel. And lastly,

I really highlight as we've been talking about before the U.S. as essentially indispensable here.

to both Lebanon and Israel, but also, again, to providing support if not directly, then also catalyzing key actors, the World Bank, for example, and some golf partners who also have an important role to play here in supporting the Lebanese government as it seeks to exit from this multi-faceted crisis that it's contending with. So Dan, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge the broader context in which this ceasefire

has been accomplished and which these negotiations are ongoing. And that is the broader conflict between Israel or Iran and the United States. Media reports suggest at least that a big part of the reason why the Trump administration pushed so hard for this ceasefire was because the issue had been linked to its ongoing efforts to get a ceasefire, but with Iran and the reopening of the

“straight-of-arm moves and resolution of a variety of other issues. I think some of the specific”

reporting noted that they need to essentially some breathing room to get some resolution on the Iran

U.S. and some extent, Israeli negotiations, and that ultimately is what persuaded them to put

enough pressure on these rallies to concede to the ceasefire. Now, at least according to some reports, there's a goal where a hope on the part of the U.S. administration to de-link these two issues be able to get a separate track going on Lebanon that isn't contingent upon Iran, U.S. is really negotiations which are ongoing as we speak in Islamabad, Vice President France, is there, and of course the two-exes fire there ends, I think tomorrow, or according to some

of the 21st, I believe it's set to expire tomorrow, talk about the challenges of de-linking

“these two, which extent these two conflicts are inherently linked, and whether there is a path forward”

to potentially being able to segregate out the Lebanon issue, make progress there, even if progress on the other fronts of the Iran U.S. is really conflict might lag. Part of the two integrated that, trying to address them separately, is unrealistic. So I would say that it is realistic to address them separately in times of peace, but at present it's not realistic to address them separately, and let me go into a bit more detail on that. So right now, as I mentioned,

Israel feels that the job is at best half done in Lebanon, and that's a very important point politically in Israel, where Netanyahu was be criticized for not doing enough against his Bala, and he clearly has agreed to cease operations because of U.S. pressure. But should events in Iran go south, which it can be is, I want to say likely in a long term sense, but I will say there will certainly be ups and downs, and I could easily see moments when the United States decides

“to resort to, let me do, as a force. One that happens, I believe, Israel is going to try to”

cease it, and use force in Lebanon, that it will say, okay, we stop this in order to encourage the Iran deal. That's not happening therefore we don't have to stop anymore. So I think you're going to see Israel waiting for that moment because it feels that it shouldn't have stopped in the first place. Also from his Bala's point of view, this is a group that has monopointed out, started the latest round of attacks in solidarity with Iran, and now that was not something

that the vast majority of the Lebanese people wide, it was criticized by the Lebanese government

for doing so, but it has historically always had an extremely close relationship with Iran,

that continues. So you're going to see both his Bala and Iran and Israel all seeing this as an interwoven conflict. Now at different times in different historical periods, they've been able to separate where you haven't had conflict between Israel and Iran, it's been more of a proxy battle within Lebanon. It's the United States that really sees them as quite different, and I don't think US preferences are going to easily carry through given how all the other actors see the

conflicts as interwoven. So obviously we are entering into a delicate moment, both in the next 24 to 48 hours between Iran, the United States and Islamabad, and over the next week between Israel and Lebanon, other parties in the Middle East. As we watch events unfold over the next few days, what will you all be looking for? What should our listeners be looking for to get a sense about

what direction things are headed in? Mona, I'll turn to you first and then Dan, I'll give you the last word.

conflicting reports as we speak at 245 p.m. on April 21st, Washington, D.C. time, and then if they do

come off, are they able to reach some kind of interim agreement? I do not see the big comprehensive deal that includes Iran's nuclear ambitions, et cetera, being addressed in this round of talks. I also am not, it's not clear that President Trump is going to issue yet another

“extension of the ceasefire deadline. We've seen him do that a few times. I think each time he does”

it, his credibility is eroded, and the Iranians come away feeling that they have the upper hand. So I'm going to be watching for what happens in Islamabad, and then what happens in Washington, D.C. Is there some way to build on this very, very fragile momentum that has started between Israel and Lebanon in their efforts to seek some kind of motorsmavendi? Let's say it like that. And then in particular, what do we see happen inside Lebanon? We haven't really talked,

I had not really addressed much the simmering sectarian tensions, which are not insignificant, and the very, very tenuous nature of the situation on the ground in Lebanon. Is there something that happens that, in fact, leads to an unintended or unexpected outcome? And I agree with Dan as well on the role that if Hezbollah could play, for example, as a spoiler, if things go south between the U.S. and Iran, there are all kinds of ways in which this very fragile and very

tenuous progress can be derailed, and unfortunately, then we're back to conflict both with Iran

“and also between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. I think Mona summed up the big points very nicely,”

so let me just briefly add a few small points up. First of all, does the Lebanese government

continue to push against his mama as Mona's point out in a foreign policy piece and in her remarks? This is a big step. And this is something that the United States should be building. We have to recognize that it's incomplete and there's a huge distance to go, but it's something that should be supported. But if they don't feel they have the support, they're going to be very cautious and recognizing that their own position within Lebanon might be weak. So that's one thing

I'm watching is how strong with the Lebanese government be as the raster to do more and more. I'm a secondist politics within Israel. Are Israelis who are exhausted by war, still wanting this conflict to continue? Even if it might drag on on and the answer right now seems actually to be asked for many Israelis, especially supporters of Netanyahu, believe that this is incomplete and Israel needs to face the job. But how pressing a political concern is that to me is a very

important factor because all elections are coming up in October and Israel Netanyahu is a very

“political creature. And I think he's going to be looking at home as much as strategically as he decides”

his next steps. Well, we will all have to keep our eyes peeled for developments along these various avenues, but until then we are out of time, Dan Mona, thank you for joining us here today on the

Lawfare podcast. Thank you Scott. Thanks, Rabbi Scott. Now here is my second conversation with

Joel, recorded the next day on April 22nd. So Joel, we've been talking about the ceasefire in Lebanon. Remind us what has been these really posture towards this latest round in the conflict with Lebanon. You know, what's triggered off what its demands have been and the condition of that led to it accepting the ceasefire? Well, during this war with Iran, I think early on the question was, was his bullet going to join in and quite early on, I think, was in three days of the war.

There was a rocket or a missile that was fired. And in many ways, he has really said, this is proof that his bullet is still there, the disarmament that was supposed to happen after the previous ceasefire in 2024 had a work and we're going to go in and they went in extremely hard. There was a big round maneuver and the idea of when and to try and create a buffer zone within South Lebanon. So there's a question about whether the Israelis were waiting for an excuse

or whether his bullet gave them an excuse but his bullet did and there were questions and some commentary about whether this was his bullet or a rogue IRG C commander. In many ways, it's irrelevant to the Israelis. The north in Israel since October 8th, so the day after October 7th had been being sheld by his bullet and it's been under significant threat. Unlike in October 8th, though, when

And so Israel decided to say we're going to clear up to the Latin East and the whole of South

Lebanon, we're going to push all of the population and we're going to actually flatten their words, like we're going to or the words of Israel cats, the defense minister. We're going to do to the buffer zone around South Lebanon. There's villages. We're going to flatten them like we did in Gaza.

“And by doing so, we're going to create a real buffer of I think 10 kilometers that we're just”

going to permanently occupy, or at least until you know, as well as been fully disarmed and whatever else. And we're going to try and push the entire population north of the Latin East and bomb the bridges over the Latin East to prevent has bullet from coming back. And so the Israeli operation was very clear to say, look, we're going to need strategic depth in Lebanon

in order to prevent this rocket fire. And yet, this military ground operation is very reminiscent

of when Israel had previously occupied South Lebanon that was from the 80s until the government of Avid Barak and the early 2000s. And so you've got this generational trauma where parents and grandparents of soldiers who had occupied South Lebanon and are sending their children and their grandchildren to do exactly what they had done before. And so that unlike other arenas, there's a real reticence in Israel about this particular ground operation, because also

there's a question, you know, if you push his bullet north of the Latin East, well, you know, missiles and rockets can still fly. It might be that they have less rockets because it's a further range, but it's not like they have no rockets. And throughout the war with Iran, his bullet after this was has been firing mercilessly rockets into north. And there's been mass frustration from the residents of the north from mayors and city council members and everyone who said that the

north is being destroyed and they're complaining that there's been a historic under investment in bombshellters by the government. And so there's a deep level of anger and frustration of the northern residents. And awareness to say, why will this time be any different from previous times? Like if you're telling us at the end of this, the threat will be over great. But if you cannot get rid of this threat through military force alone, think of something else out because we can't live like this anymore.

“And I think that's why you see the huge pushback about this concept of a ceasefire in the north,”

because if it's just going to keep the problem happening again in six months, we can't live like this. So if you're going to make a deal, make a deal that surely ends this. But if you're not making a deal that can truly end this, then what was the point in any of this anyway? So this latest ceasefire, most of the reports suggest from the media that there's a strong role of U.S. pressure being put on Netanyahu in these really government to accept the terms.

We saw a very kind of extraordinary social media message by President Trump late last week, essentially saying there will be no violation of the ceasefire, giving some nice words towards the own government in Beirut for their cooperation. We saw some other comments by

Tom Barack, just this last few days, basically suggesting that both sides of the ceasefire are

equally lacking credibility or equally untrustworthy in terms of enforcing its terms. So it's an interesting posture of the United States and the Trump administration has taken both towards the ceasefire. And to some extent towards the Israeli government's engagement in this broader conflict, talks about what this tells us about the dynamics between the Trump administration and the Netanyahu government, perhaps Israel more generally,

“had this particular stage. I think that one of the main reasons or at least war aims that both”

the Trump administration and the Netanyahu government at least could agree on was about preventing Iran's proxies in the region from threatening the region. The Israelis have a major problem we've discussed before and previous podcasts about having non-state actors operating from sovereign territory of a different territory and the post-October 7 that's not just going to put up with it. If the government, if the sovereign government doesn't deal with it, the Israelis

will, because they're not willing to be surrounded by Iranian armed militias on their borders. It's just not going to fly anymore. And so there was a real war in Israel and there was a real red line that if the Trump administration does a ceasefire in Iran in Islamabad and the Islamabad talks, this can't cover Lebanon. Because if it covers Lebanon, you're reinforcing the concept of proxies that what happens in Islamabad governs what happens in Beirut, even though the government

of Lebanon isn't there. And so this is why you had this bizarre thing where the Grand Field Marshall and the Prime Minister of Pakistan announced a ceasefire and in their tweet they say it includes Lebanon. You have the Israelis saying it does not include Lebanon and the next day on April 8 the Israelis have a massive bombing raid in Beirut outside of just the Daria neighborhood that really truly shocks the Lebanese. There was really no warning us when people picking up people from

schools, people were still digging through the rubble afterwards. The reports are over 380 people

There's disputes about who was who wasn't, but it was a deeply shocking moment for Lebanon.

“And the Trump administration actually, it might be quite smart. You tried to find a face”

saving way that they could get the ceasefire by basically trying to broker this through the

government of Lebanon and the government of Israel. And therefore it's the Lebanese government asking for a ceasefire rather than the Iranian I.R.G.C. basically who are doing it. And in doing so reasserting the sovereignty of Lebanon while trying to maintain a ceasefire, which they also need for Iran. Now for the Israelis, not only to agree to a ceasefire in Lebanon when the Ebola is still there and that the Israelis felt that they were hammering the Ebola and they were

really pushing them back is a deeply difficult political construct in many ways even more difficult than the Iran-Sisvah. With the Iranian ceasefire, the Israelis complained that they degraded the Iranians. You know, there's all the talk, letting our promise total victory, but him and Trump are aligned about saying what they've achieved. When it comes to Lebanon, it's very clear that the threat still exists as well as still is there and there's still a big skepticism about whether the

government of Lebanon has the ability to disarm his bullet. And so what do you do? As a BB is suddenly

facing an election in six months with the North Furiesy at him and his opposition basically

saying, "Look, not only have you now become a client state of the United States that President Trump can literally write you are prohibited at destroying buildings because the Israelis weren't just trying to fight." Because bullet they were trying to flatten parts of southern Lebanon to prevent any lived communities that could live within a ten kilometer border of Israel. President Trump prohibited that. And suddenly Netanyahu is acting as if he is a literal client state of America

because the President is dictating terms. And President Trump announces this ceasefire before BB-Eason has a chance to call the security cabinet. So in many ways, he doesn't call a vote of the security cabinet. He just does what President Trump wants. So you've limited the Israeli decision making to literally just one man, in this case, Prime Minister Netanyahu felt completely obligated given the dependency on President Trump to give this damn. And then President

Trump further prohibits him from doing things in order to show strength. And so for these for Prime Minister Netanyahu, it's a very difficult moment. So what do we see? You see in English, I want to

say not in Hebrew, a whole series of tweets from the Israeli Prime Minister's office, basically saying,

"Look, you know, this use of force has taken us so far." And now we're going to have to try diplomacy to see if we can actually get rid of the threat from Khazmalu wants and for all by working with the Lebanese government and other allies in order to strengthen this relationship and see if we can have a historic peace agreement with the Lebanese. And basically saying, "Look, this promise that we will eventually have a meeting, though if you notice, President Unknown

has not agreed to meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu yet and wanted to ceasefire first," which he's

“gotten. And I think we'll try and delay having a meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu until he knows”

that he's not going to give that sort of reward before an election to Prime Minister Netanyahu if it doesn't come with real rewards for Lebanon. But the Prime Minister's basically moving away from what was a very much October 7 thinking that just the utilization of power and military power in and of itself was success that we could just bomb our way to security and saying, "No, you also need diplomacy." And in many ways, this is starting to create the first formulations

of post-October 7 thinking now that the limits of power have been recognised. And what I would say Scott is very important is that if Prime Minister Netanyahu's current coalition and include smotheryach and Bengweir and all these things that we've spoken about before, can come up to say, "Look, there has to be a diplomatic answer alongside military pressure." It gives space for a future government to also say, "Look, we need to have diplomatic answers and not just military pressure."

“And so I think that this move, even though it was coerced by President Trump quite clearly,”

onto the Israelis, is forcing them into a new format and utilization of forced doctrine that actually could be more promising for things moving forward than motivated it. But it requires this diplomacy to be successful. And to the extent that the Trump administration links what happens in Tehran, to what happens in Beirut, strengthens the proxy construct. And so what's going to be the test case? If things go badly in Islamabad and that war starts, does the war restart

in the north in terms of between Lebanon and Israel again? Or does it not? Have they truly broken these proxies or have they not? I think that's going to be a big test case because there will be tremendous pressure if the war in Iran starts for the Israelis domestically to once again started in North as well. And that kind of gets to the core question. We've heard chatter from reports from particularly U.S. administration officials about hopes of finding a way to separate the Lebanese

ceasefire from the broader Iran conflict, but on a separate track, hopefully separate conversations.

what are the prospects of actually having a successful least ceasefire lead to a more enduring

resolution of this conflict? If the Iran broader Iran war remains at its current point, which is still an ambiguity around the ceasefire, but no clear resolution on either partying North clear path towards one? It goes to a central question about the war with Iran. Does Iran control territory that is not that? So can they really give the Lebanese were furious? Do you have which person has a bullet for dragging them back into this? Why should we, you know, has bullet

is reacting more to the assassination of the Supreme Leader than to Hassan Nasrallah in some ways? Like, you know, what it is, but it also demonstrates the three Israelis that has bullet still has, you know, a prominent and poaching punch to it, right? It hasn't been completely defeated. So can it succeed separately? I think that the question is going to be, what does the government

of Lebanon need? And, you know, when we talk about state-to-state normalization, they're breaking

many taboo's, you know, there's been media reports that there's a push from the US for the Lebanese to uproot their very infamous anti-normalization laws to prevent Lebanese citizens from engaging

“with Israeli citizens. Now, if someone who believes in peace building, I think it's essential that”

that law goes away, but do you do it all at once instantaneously? Like, you can't, you need to push strong enough that you can overcome institutional barriers to peace. But if you push too quickly, you could shatter the country very quickly, get to civil war. And in many ways, one of the arguments that the Shiite community that I've had is like, you know, Lebanon is a patchwork culture, different minorities, and there are there are compats in there that try and hold the country

together. And if you move too quickly through too many taboo's, just through pressure alone,

you could literally get into a scenario where you go back to civil war, which is something

that the Lebanese really fit. So how do you do this successfully? It's going to require both extreme smart, diplomatic nuance, patience, but not patience, patience, sake. And the ability to have strong partners behind the Lebanese government that can give them enough strength, credibility, literal ammunition, and economic ammunition to be able to disarm occurs below, which is something that most, you know, not Iran, but people in the non-Aranian access do

want to see. They don't want to see militias that suddenly throw the region into conflict again. So the success will be if the region can find a way to strengthen the Lebanese to do this. And again, to the extent that this is tied into a wider regional integrative picture, to the extent that this can also help stabilize Syria, the extent that there's progress somehow, not just on Gaza, but on the West Bank. If this moves into a wider regional framework of integrating,

I think that there's a good opportunity that this can be done. But if you try and segment these things out from the rest of the context, you just put the Lebanese government in an incredibly difficult position of how do you simultaneously try and create a separate piece of code with this? Well, if other things are going on, they'll also create in crisis and distress. It doesn't

“mean that it's all or nothing. Of course, you should be able to progress. It's in the Lebanese”

interests for their not to be resolved on the border, right? And for them to be able to control one person among them, they don't want to be fighting with Israel. But the Israelis also have to understand that therefore they're going to have to demarcate territorial borders. They can't just permanently occupy southern Lebanon. They're going to have to agree on Shabbah farms and all these other things. So if the Israelis can't actually come up with real borders that they can

negotiate with the Lebanese and demonstrate at the same time, they're not trying to liquidate the entire future of the Palestinian national cause. There's probably a way forward in order to do that. And we have seen school that whether it's in camps in Lebanon or, you know, in other parts in Syria, that at least present a bus and some of the PA factions, at least with Fata, have tried to disarm Palestinian camps in Lebanon to try and demonstrate their all militias in Lebanon should be

disarms. It's not just because they're putting their exams, but also some of the Palestinian militias. And the Lebanese and return have tried to change some of their constitutional bands about some professions that Palestinians can work in because they were trying to prevent the Palestinians from inventing into Lebanon. So it's not just, you know, this weird, left-wing perspective that everything's connected. I mean, the Lebanese is really conflict is connected to the Palestinian

conflict because the amount of refugees in Lebanon and the constitutional barriers, both in terms of engagement with Israel and in terms of the integration of Palestinians into Lebanese society are part of a parcel of a similar picture. But one of the big questions in Israel that I think they're struggling with is, do we want strong states around us or do we want

“weak states around us? We don't want non-state actors, so you need to have a strong enough state”

that they can prevent non-state actors from doing that, right? So we know we want that, but yet, if those states are dominated by what we feel are regional competitors, if you have a Turkish dominated Syria or a Turkish dominated Lebanon or whatever else it might be an Iranian dominated Lebanon,

by someone else. So for the Israeli strategic questioning, it's how do we create a strong enough state

“that it can prevent non-state actors? And yet, it's not dominated by a different regional”

power that threatens us. That's a very complicated scenario because if the Israelis continue to power project, it inspires others in the region to counter power project and also work with

governments that are clearly more friendly to them than those that they've been historically

aware with AK as well. So this is some, you know, what is Israel's sense of security and how it can actually translate that into policy as one of these big questions. And so how these Israelis handle

“the Lebanon fathers get be really interesting and indicative, I think, to many in the region,”

about what may be opposed around conflict, compact could potentially look like. Well, there is a lot to monitor in that broad interconnected picture. You've given us of this conflict and how it fits in the broader region. We'll have to turn back to that at another time that is for now, we are out of time, Joel Brownell, thank you for joining us here on the Laugh Fair podcast. The Laugh Fair podcast is produced by the Laugh Fair Institute.

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