All-In with Chamath, Jason, Sacks & Friedberg
All-In with Chamath, Jason, Sacks & Friedberg

Graham Allison on the Global Realignment: Iran, China, Israel, Greenland

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(0:00) The Besties welcome legendary Harvard professor Graham Allison (1:14) Iran Conflict: Strategy, Netanyahu's influence, Trump's motivation, redefining Middle East security (11:44) Iran endgame sc...

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Welcome to another episode of the all-in-interview.

Back to all-in, Harvard Professor Graham Allison. Professor Allison, welcome back to all-in. Thanks for having me. We last had you at the summit in Los Angeles, so it's great to have a conversation a lot to happen since we last got together for the audience. Graham Allison's the founding dean of the Harvard Kennedy School. He's advised every secretary of defense since Kessinger.

He's helped his mantle 12,000 Soviet nuclear weapons and his book Destined For War

remains the definitive framework for understanding the US China relationship. I think it's worth

kind of bringing forward some of the things that have happened in the world since we last met.

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Where do you think this conflict will take us? Are we sleepwalking into World War 3? Well, thank you again for having me back. I will have a great podcast. I enjoyed the summit,

and I'm sorry we're not there in person to catch up, but I think about Iran how much to say.

So this could be a long lecture. Let me just do four or five quick points.

First point, most important point, is that there's more questions than answers. Though there's a huge

level of uncertainty currently about what's happening and about what's likely to happen. Part of this is Godson's famous fog of war, but there's a fog of war that's actually increased because we got two big fog machines adding to the confusion namely Trump and the administration on the one hand and BB on the other, and then we got all the chattering class around this. So I would say why did Trump decide to go to war now? Are there six different reasons he and the administration

have given, and each one they back around? What's the objective? There's five different objectives,

back at around, and when is this work at an end? You know, a day, a week, a month, who knows?

So it's very uncomfortable to recognize how uncertain things are, and most of the conversation about it, tries to make it more confident. I think the place to start is, there's a huge amount of uncertainty. Having said that, I'll still give my prejudices about a few of the points. Point two, this has been an extraordinary demonstration of supreme military power and supreme intelligence power. US military and the intelligence community and the Israeli counterparts have been

way, way, way off the charts. And I think this should make all Americans proud of what's been built over this decade of two decades of investment, but especially the past decade. A third point, there's no tears to be shed for how many and Islamic Republic regime, it's an evil leader, an evil regime, it's no bad thing that could happen to them, that we shouldn't be cheering. Now, the next point, though, breaking something's a lot easier than building

something. And destroying targets is something that our military knows very well how to do. Building a new regime, regime change is something that we know historically doesn't work very well, at least in Iraq and Afghanistan. We had every word said that's been said in this case.

And we then went and all in and spent more than a billion dollars of many, many thousands of American

lives. And when we went to Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling, when we left Afghanistan, the Taliban were ruling. So I would say, unfortunately, it's against a backdrop that's hard. And next point, slightly more controversial, but I think this is BB's war. If you read her or if you're a collector, so don't remember, Lombie Dick, they should go look at it again. A Hab had this fixation, obsession with the white whale and tried to find a way to kill the white

whale whenever he could. For the last two decades, that's been BB's number one, number two, number three agenda. He's tried to sell that word to Obama, to Trump one, to Biden,

How he succeeded in mesmerizing Trump who I thought had his number, I was sur...

So I'm pro-Israel, but anti-BB in this respect. And I think that I understand he's brilliant politically,

but I don't think this, the arguments that were made that the Trump is actually repeated, that in foreign was about to attack us. I see no evidence for that. That Iran was about to get a nuclear weapon. I see no evidence for that. That Iran was building an ICBM that was going to attack the US. I see no evidence for that. There's many, many bad things about the Iranian regime, but not most of the claims said that were made.

So I, I look at this, and I hope it turns out well, but I remember that it was very frequently,

it's easy to get in, and it's quite difficult to get out.

Let me double click on that point. You mentioned there's multiple reasons that the administration has methods for doing this, multiple views on what success looks like, multiple timelines, on ending it, and that this is BB's war. How do you think Trump was motivated to do this? What is the real motivation? And I will ask this in the context of the big delegation and visit to China coming up next month with Trump motivated fundamentally to create leverage with China

and use this as a tool to try and maximize his negotiating leverage going into the Chinese negotiations.

That's a great question, then. I wish that the answer was this was all part of a grand strategy.

That would make me feel hugely better, but I tried to do topology, and I was actually having

dinner last night with Bill O'Reilly, a former student who I think is one of the better topologists

who are trying to interpret and we were going back and forth through this. It's easy enough to see why the window, tactically, the window in which this attack occurred was chosen, because here you got 40, you got the supreme leader in 40 of the other leaders of Iran out in public, so that's an opportunity as a target. And the best top opportunity did come along. The question is why would you be attacking them? And especially Trump given his campaign and his previous views about not

repeating the mistakes of the people that took us into endless winless wars? And I think it's, I mean, I think BB is a magician. I think his single mind in this is impressive. I think his agility in making arguments and developing arguments is impressive. How he managed to persuade Trump. This was a good idea for the US now. I don't have a good idea.

And I think that if I listen to the reasons why even the people closest around

they may have given or that Trump have given, they don't seem persuasive. Now, partly, Trump is in erratic. Partly, he, you know, who actually the basis of instincts, somehow it came to him that this was something that could be done. I think actually BB painted a pretty, I mean, the upside in this picture, if it's successful, and I hope now that we've gotten to whether it would be, would be redefining security in the Middle East for a generation.

So getting rid of the Iranian regime as the BB and company have gotten rid of the proxies of the regime earlier, which again, since October 7, been extremely impressive, could possibly, you could say, well, there's going to be a whole new Middle East. And if the Middle East were all like the UAE, that would be fantastic. Fantastic for all the human beings that live there. So I think maybe he got excited by the upside, not quite careful enough about the risks or the downside, because the

number of ways in which this could go on, you know, if we work up tomorrow or today, and a couple of ships have been sunk or a couple of hundred Americans have been killed, this is going to have a very different image. And you think that this is independent than of the action with Maduro and independent of the big delegation headed to China for a big negotiation next month. Well, I wouldn't say entirely independent. I would think with Madera, so true. I think this again,

this is my, of whatever armchair tropology, but I would say, initially, he thought tariffs would a magic one. And every leader thinks, if you have a magic one, that's fantastic. He's tried the tariff magic one and discovered it, didn't quite have all the effects that he imagined on liberation

Day.

operation was just spectacular. I mean, again, it's a military and intelligence operation,

brilliant. No other country in the world could even imagine doing something like that. And that actually, you know, makes all of us stand taller. It can also provide a little or historically encourages hubris and then imagination that this magic one can work in many other ruinous. I don't mind at all of the proposition that every other country should take a count of the fact that the U.S. has the most remarkable military and intelligence community in the world.

And that's not a bad backdrop for China and for a China trip. So I agree that things may not

be completely disconnected, but I think in terms of the timing, we right now, when is the

work going to be over? If you talk about three or four weeks, we're, we're already, it'll be in China March 29. So my inclination, again, if we were destroying a prediction markets, is that he's going to find a way to declare this over before then, because he's needs a little time to get his mind set on that. But if you ask the folks at the defense department and if you ask the people in Israel, they're thinking this is another month or beyond, doesn't work. So again,

things I don't think are quite, you know, interesting. Jason, join us. Fresh elephant, it's always

a treat to have a view on you. Nice to see you. It's just amazing to have you on here and to give us this time. If things were to go extremely well, and Iran went from a monarchy to a dictatorship and now in this third act here in the modern day, to a democracy. And you actually had a democracy with 93 million citizens in the Middle East. What impact would that have on the region? We've seen the Gulf monarchies evolve human rights, but they're so monarchies. You have one other. I guess

democracy in the region in Israel, but this could be extraordinary if it was a democracy. But what would that mean to the global chessboard? Well, it's a good question. I mean, if this could occur,

it would be spectacular. Even, I think, but I would say this is a way, way, way too ambitious. There's

a hundred things that would be wonderful outcomes better than what's likely that would be shorter than that. I remember in Iraq, after Bush failed to find nuclear weapons, which was the initial, I would say somewhat hooked up, rationale for our going into Iraq. Thunder Rice, who was a secretary, gave a speech about, "Well, how wonderful it'll be when Iraq is a democracy and market economy, quote, radiating stability through the Middle East." So we're pretty good at doing, I have

a dream in that version. I think that's a very, very way stretch. I would be very happy with the regime there that simply was not about building nuclear weapons, was not about building missiles that threatened the U.S. and our friends and allies in the region, and not about supporting proxies. And if it's a pretty cruel regime, unfortunately, that's unfortunate for the Iranian people. The Persian people, when I'm a student of history, I love Persian. You know, I remember

of Cyrus, and I remember the Peloponnesian War. I remember, you know, this is a fantastic culture in history. They've been hijacked by a terrible terrible group of people. And if those people can be somehow ousted, you know, wonderful for Iranian people and wonderful for the world,

I, if I were betting it, again, I'd say, go back to the first point with questions uncertainty,

finding signals in the noise extremely difficult. But if I were betting it, it'll end up that the guys with the guns will in some version be the next situation. And if they're tailor and less determined to threaten their interests, will this have been worth it? Well, again,

we'll have to look at, you know, over the longer run. I think the other thing that we know about

wars is that they're unpredictable and that they have many uninticipated consequences. Now, I think as we watch what's happening now and see what impact does that have on oil and gas prices predictable, so you can see and go again going. Well, what does back does that have on other countries? A huge. So the number of countries now whose economies are being disrupted by this impact

Therefore blaming us for it.

"Wait a minute, did anybody think what's it's doing for us?" Since they had about half of their their electricity comes from their natural gas that they now come, you know, now not coming. If you ask about what is this meaning for Ukraine? Well, the patriots that were to hope to prevent missile strikes from Russia on Ukraine are now in the Middle East. So that's the many more target. So it's just unfortunately it unfolds in so many different directions.

Now, I don't want to seem too pessimistic about it because again, I think we've been shocked

fortunately on the upside by how a professional our military has and intelligence folks have been and also how pathetic or hollow the Iranians have been. First day in the attack I was at the divisive argument and I gave them a list of 11 things that I would do and be capable of doing if I were playing the Iranian hand and they seem to be happy. I mean, I, I, I hardly even want to say out loud, but they, they act like a paper tiger. Do you think there's

more damage that can be done by being more successful? You know, if we think back to Iraq,

Iran is twice as many people, 100 million versus 50 million, four times the land area, a much better

equipped military and arguably the military system, the regime is embedded in every aspect of industry. So the more successful the United States is in dismantling the Iranian regime and as was advised by Condolisa Rice, who apparently was just in the White House today and advising the President and publicly stated, "It's time to finish them off, it's time to go all the way, etc." Does that not then leave a country with no infrastructure, no leadership, a hundred million people

in tatters and that's the classic breeding ground for some of these extremist groups to seize control and seize power? And we don't have the resources to go in and have another multi-decade

Afghanistan Iraq problem. I would say that I agree, yes, I think the uncertainties about that.

I mean, you can do four or five different scenarios for how this might conceivably in. It could end up being a extended civil war in Iran, among the very national groups, even some of them, possibly, succeeding. So again, fairly chaotic. Look like Syria plus, okay? It could look like Iran or Afghanistan. Well, excuse me, we were there from more than a decade with unlimited resources, hardly any constraints on the number of people and how did that work out?

So I say that I'm a small sea conservative and

kind of think history is not always certainly not only guide, but it's a good place to start.

I would say nervous, Jim. Is it too late to have a Venezuelan outcome where we've taken out the head of the snake and we've simply replaced it? The snake can continue operating and living without too much destructive damage and effect, but it seems like we may be a little too far gone now and Iran and that to take this all the way might be very difficult to manage. All right, it's a too late. If I were again, then we're all in the dark and all the uncertainties,

so back to point one. But after that, I would say Trump is erratic, impulsive, but he has some coordinates and one of them is his power. November 3 is a big day for him. He's focused on the economy

as a crucial element of that. That's part of the framing of the China relationship.

The impact of this on the economy is already evident and could be come more evident.

The public opinion, again, I think he's I saw today in the journal that he's sent a

hex, hex path out to sell the war. Good luck. I'm not sure he can sell a so public opinion of this. It's about six to four unfraverable because he didn't make the case for the war in advance. The impact of this on other parties, including parties that we care about, is negative. So I can easily imagine in the next week, even, I'm to clarify, if you look at the

The way in which he's left himself room to declare victory at having, as you ...

had a kind of the head of the stake, destroyed their military, their nuclear capabilities,

destroyed their ability to project power or in the defense department, we always say,

destroy or degrade, degrade has a lot of dimensions as you would point out. And now it's up to the Iranian people to seize their own government and take advantage of this stuff. The difficulty with that will be, maybe once the fight until the regime is destroyed, and that'll be an interesting struggle to see how that goes. Earlier Trump demonstrated that when he thought it was in American

interests, he was prepared to pull baby's shame. So we'll see. This is, I think, before we move

out of the mean of region, a topic that's coming up, there's obviously no support for this more in

America. Most Americans put foreign affairs today at one or two percent of their concern,

economy, and many other issues are high on their list. And he's been pretty clear, hey, we're not going to put boots on the ground. And then there's this anti-Semitic underpinning that's happening in America. That's become pretty acute. And you had Rubio, who we mentioned earlier, say, hey, we did this because the Israelis were going it anyway. And we had no choice. And then they walked that back, explained to the audience how we should look at

that turn of events where there's a group of people in America, specifically people in the

Magapardi who believe Trump has betrayed them and that he's captured by the Israeli government

in some way. And he's doing their bidding. I'm not saying that that's my perspective, but that

is an undertone that we're seeing. And that's something new in our lifetime, I think.

It certainly is. So this is a big topic, but I say, when I talk about it, I say, I'm probably Israeli and anti-BB. So it's, BB is not Israel. The people whom I know mostly in respect mostly in Israel are the national security barons. The people who've been the chief of staff or the head of Mossad are the head of Shinbat or the people that work in that in those structures. And they believe that BB is actually destroying the bingurians Israeli democracy that they cared

about or take concrete, but it's pretty hard to accuse them of being anti-Semitic. But he's been, I think, very clear and very courageous in pointing out that what BB is doing, Israel's democracy is really destroying it. And the impact of that on Jewish kids in America, when I say this on campus, where they want to be proud of Israel, they deserve to be proud of the country that has been built over these years. But they look at the behavior of these crazy right-wing settlers and

their activities in the occupied West Bank, or they look at some of the activities in Gaza, or they look at now the kind of unlimited war without any even a tip to make arguments about proportionality. You just say, wait a minute, that's not the country I want to be proud of. I want to be proud of Robines Israel. I want to be proud of the Iraqis Israel. I want to be proud

of bingurians Israel. I'm pretty much of that of that persuasion. I think what what BB risks in this

and risked earlier with citing, I mean, interfering in the American politics, in vites, pushback. So I think this could have a big long-term negative effect, both in the Democratic Party, again, the Republican Party, especially under younger people. If you look at the polling for the under 30s, on Israel, it's just like trucker. Can we move to China? Because I think that, again, this is going to be the big story over the next month. You've said publicly that

Alsting Maduro from Venezuela could embolden China to accelerate a Taiwan takeover. The CIA, it has been reported in media, warned Tim Cook of Apple and other tech companies about a possible invasion as soon as next year. You've separately met publicly with Chinese officials. What's your view on the likelihood and the timeline of a China attempted takeover of Taiwan and what are these kind of motivating factors that might make that happen sooner? So let me clarify, I'm not sure

Where I may have been misinterpreted, but obviously the Chinese watch very ca...

wars and they will learn lessons from what's going on here. But I don't think that is, I don't think the Venezuelan operation other than making them feel invious about the capabilities. We'll

impact their likelihood of attacking Taiwan. So Taiwan, number one, I think they're likely

heard of an attack on Taiwan this year or next year or even into 28, but let me just do 26 and 27. Absent, so major provocation by Taiwan or some other third incident is very long. I put it at about where the, where the prediction markets are, 5% or something low. So I'm not counting on it. Second why is that so low? I'm just curious. Why five percent? Yeah, because first they have a theory of the case of what they call peaceful reunification and they think things are involving

in that direction. The theory of the case is that the current government, which is a DPP government, currently is stymied by its opposition in the parliament. So they can't even buy

the arm sales that we previously gave them. There's $11 billion arm sales that the Chinese have

complained about. But Taiwan is the legislature probably won't buy half of that. Okay? So the current president is struggling. There's going to be an election in January 28 and they think it's likely that the former party that KMT will be elected. Somebody there will be much worse sympathetic to China and a devolving relationship. So that's number one. Number two, the Chinese have been engaged in a deep, deep purge of all of their military leadership. I mean it's hard to believe

and you read about the paper from time to time that he fired this guy, he fired this guy. He's fired the equivalent of every four star in our whole political system and every combatant commander and every commander who would be commandoring the force, commanding the forces over, you know, to deal with Taiwan. So while they've been building up that military capability, takes a long time to get that back in the order in my view. So I would say that part makes me feel

less likely third. I think he understands that if he would do this, there's a risk, not a certain

need but a risk that the US would become involved and that the impact of that either on China's

economy, which he's got to worry about first and also when its evolution would be significant.

So I'm looking for in terms of, frankly, in Trump, he has the most accommodating president that China's likely to see with respect to Taiwan. So Trump has made no secrets. I mean he talks publicly of his use about Taiwan and I think a couple of the memoirs, there's this discussion where he's in the oval and he's talking about Taiwan and he picked, or somebody asks him about Taiwan, he picks up one of those sharpies and goes, "Don't get on a spot on the resolute desk," and he says,

"That Taiwan, then he draws his hand around the whole desk," he says, "That's China." So I would say, you know, I'm less worried about Taiwan in the current pat. Now over the longer run, the Chinese are absolutely clear, she and all the leadership that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and how that could be satisfied in a way that allow the Taiwanese, the degree or substantial degree of the freedom or both their economy and their society is the challenge that we've been

struggling with for a long time, but the good news is we've been doing this for 50 years and Taiwan

has never seen such a benefits, such circumstances. If I say to the Taiwanese,

you know, basically don't screw it up. Are we taking the right course of action? Do you think?

I guess the big question for you is, what's strategic imperative to keep Taiwan from falling under direct Chinese control for the United States and are we taking the right actions to hedge our bets, if you will, against that happening, meaning on-shoring of semiconductor manufacturing, but also maybe from a defense perspective and positioning perspective, you can share a little bit about whether we're sure. That's a big question. So first, Scott percent, the Secretary of the

Treasury, when he's asked about his, he says the biggest threat that he's ever seen,

Is the fact that 96% of the advanced semiconductors come from one small islan...

become cut off. So TSMC, as you all have discussed before, produces the advanced semiconductors

for essentially everybody of whom we're the principal consumer and we prevent them shipping this

to China. That's a pretty complicated situation to begin with. Secondly, Taiwan is halfway around the world as President Trump says and 90 miles off the shore of China and we're far away and we have a lot of other things to worry about. So it's a little bit like Cuba. So inherently indefensible if China were seriously determined to either destroy it or take it. Now, when the other hand, since the opening to China and the Shanghai community, there's been an agreement of

maintaining a status quo with the US commitment being what's called strategic ambiguity in which the US and China have been committed to Taiwan internal development is left to its own device and China doesn't use military force to prevent that. But we say Taiwan is this one China and the only China's capital is Beijing and then we have a little bit of ambiguous way to talk about the relationship between Taiwan and China. But certainly, living in evolve in any way

that the parties would be prepared to live with. Most people expecting that over time, this relationship will work its way out. And when I talk to Chinese about it, I say to them, first,

you've never seen 50 better years on either side of the streets. So this has been fantastic

for both societies in terms of what they care about. And secondly, if they look at this situation, if China's core strategy is correct, which is the inexorable rise of China, and that continues in another decade or two, Taiwan will look like a fleet. And therefore, we're not going to be an issue. If China's main narrative doesn't work, Taiwan is not going to be their biggest problem. So they should work on their other issues,

yeah? If you think about China projecting influence around the world, how important is it for them to continue to do that? There was recently

an objective, I think, of a GDP growth in the five percent range, four to five percent, is that right?

I know which four to have to find it. Four and a half to five, which is a record low in recent history for them. Is it imperative for China to continue to extend geopolitical and economic influence around the world to grow its economy? Going back to the framing of the rising power, do they still need to do that to keep people happy at home? Or is China going to be able to maintain happiness at home in a multi-polar world where China and perhaps the US and perhaps

some other countries share influence around the world? This is when you raised, and we talked about the last time, which is interesting. I think we agreed. So let me just again for people that

don't remember starting. So first, China is a meteoric rising power. Never has a country

risen so far so fast on so many different dimensions. If you take a snapshot of the year 2000 and the year 2025, and compare China on any metric of power, it's just unfoundly unfoundly. So country that I have compared it to kind of like a formula one racing. A country that we couldn't find in our review mirror in 2020, I'll show you 2000 because it was so far behind. We have trouble finding in our review mirror today because it's beside us or in many races, even slide the

anniversary. Now that's GDP, it was less than 5% of global, or it was less than a quarter the US in 2000. Today, by person power parity, it's 25% larger. In 2000, trading, it was 5% of global today and we were 15 today. It's 35 and we're 25. If you do advanced tech, in the arena, take 5G, burn my goodness, take EVs, my goodness, take whatever. So rapidly rising

power. That's essential, that's the infrastructure for their grand narrative, which is the

Inexorable rise of China to its natural position in the international order, ...

is at the top of the pyramid. So they are absolutely determined to be number one in their own arena

to begin with. And then after that, you know, maybe more. And they also, they have a second

proposition, there's the inexorable decline of the US. And they look at the various parts of the US and the components, including getting involved in unnecessary wars as part of that story, that part of their narrative. And that dynamic, the shifting of the seesaw, is what gives you this through civility and dynamic that we discussed before, which most often are, as it is doubly, but most often, this combobiliates people so much, that then some incident or accident, like something that happens

over Taiwan, leads to a vicious circle of actions and reactions that drags them into a war, after which they think, "My God, how did this ever happen?" So that's a long story. But I would say,

the economic piece is essential for this, and that economic piece means they want to be

the manufacturing workshop for the world and the foundry for the world and the supplier for the world.

There are two major challenges they have. I believe one of them is population decline,

other is unemployment and the AI that we've seen and what's hitting first could hit them in a major way. Manufacturing is moving to robotics at an alarming place, then you have things like self-driving, which is a major job there for many people. So on those two access, when you see the youth on employment, which I think is 15 or 20% in some locations in China and the population decline, is that she's too big as challenges to deal with and how does that affect this, you know,

this is a good question, and this is born in the old space that mine, because I've tried to follow, but Elon says there's going to be more robots than people. And if you ask him, "Where are the most advanced robots in the world?" The ones that are kicking his ass, or he worries about their China. So they could have a huge number of robot companies. When I was there in less, when it was I last there in January, I went to see a factory, a Xiaomi, a Xiaomi, the phone company. A Xiaomi

three years ago, decided they would make cars. After watching Apple spend ten million dollars

not able to make a car. Within three years, that factory is producing cars right now. And they have a huge demand for these cars. They have three lines, one of the lines is all robots. So they're putting a lot of robots to work. More than half of the working the factory worker robots in the world were in China. And so some of the people are saying, "Well, you know, demographics are going to be not so big a problem, because if demographic

is only a problem, because of workers, you know, we're going to have worker, in fact, the American workers are more worried about, you know, taking our jobs." So that's a, you know, the issue was for the impact on education. They have a number of people that have been educated in a winters that are now no longer, you know, high demand jobs. And unfortunately, we have a lot of that too. I mean, if you look at people, college graduates now that graduated in, I don't know,

DEI subjects, they have a government getting jobs. So I would say, it's a little, there were similarities there that diverges. The other thing is Chinese have demonstrated a great, butchgradic capacity already this who adopted the depth to new technologies. So if you look at the, I'm sure you have a Yola probably had him on the Johnson one. But when he went to China,

he said, gee, I think I came to the future, you know, that people don't, you know, they don't use

not only do they not use coins, they don't use bills, they don't use checks, they use credit cards, they just have their face and then go through the store. Let's shift around to what some have described as the longer-term playing field, which is near the Arctic, some have argued that a much of the recent push for Greenland by the United States is driven by the military threat coming over the Arctic from Russia and from China. I'm wondering if you could just help frame for our

audience, why is Greenland so strategic to the United States? And is this effectively a proxy for

Defense against China and Russia and why now?

bottom line. I think the, at least from the judgments of the people who my,

respect the most, we can, we the US can get everything we want from Greenland without invading it or owning it. So Greenland has been an important base for missile defenses, a tool, tool base. We had two other bases that we closed, but we can open as many other bases as we want

and they're very amenable to that. I think President Trump's right to say, "Well, yeah,

better. I don't want a short-term lease on these spaces." Now, I would say a 99-year lease, sounds like a pretty good lease to be for, you know, a 99-year-old knows what's going to be happening,

but to the extent that missile defenses and it's part of it, which it is, I would say that's

a part. For the naval component, yes, I think that as the Arctic melts, you already now have an opening of sea lanes and the way that territory alone is ship, the butters have their claim to the local and the regional, and the main claims are Russian, and Canadian, we have a shock from Alaska, and then Greenland would be a piece of that. So I would say that's relevant, but those sea lanes at least for the navy people I talk to are, they're not as important as they used to be,

because now there's so many different ways to get it. You're not going to try to block a,

you know, a waterway with ships, you know, with smart mines or you're going to do it simply

by attacking the ships on the, on the away, and if it's underwater, underwater is pretty much all the same, but it's good to have narrow places and shallow places for looking for things, but so I, I would say, I think Trump's Greenland Viter was more like for fun, a plus, I mean,

I think one of the people that knows him well, it says, and remember, he's first off the reality

TV producer and star. So he just has fun starting with that drama, getting people very excited, letting the tension rise and then finding a resolution, and I think we're going to attract to a resolution there. Let me push back just on that point. What I have heard is that there's rising socialism in Western Europe, growing concern that over time, as socialism becomes more of the mainstay in the governing models in Western European nations, those nations fall more under the

influence of China. And as a result, if you think about the influence that China could then have on Denmark, and on Danish foreign policy, if the United States doesn't secure what it needs for the long term, and it may not know what it needs for the long term physically in Greenland today, we only know what we need today, that we're at risk of China having outsized influence over Greenland tomorrow, and that that's the real reason for the big push today for Greenland. How does that

sit with you? And does that align kind of with what some folks are concerned about?

I have to think about it. I haven't heard that argument just that way. Again, what is socialism is complicated? Certainly, the Chinese, well, yes, they're socialist in some respect. I would say capitalism is, I mean, they're on a credit, and they're party led, but then their economy is essentially fiercely capitalist. I mean, you ever, the, you know, on the, on the, on the way, French, because gladiatorial conflict that makes the competition in Silicon Valley look

tame as the, you know, as the parties fight each other. So, because you can't make money because the taxes are so high. That's another. And in their case, you know, they decide they're going into what arena, let's say, for example, EVs, and so they give advantages to companies getting started, even subsidies, and then they let them fight it out, and lo and ball at the end, they'll be, you know, 10 or 5, but it's fiercely competitive in the meantime, and a lot of guys will get

it as trampled along the way. And in those guys are excess capacity, and they'll sell things off, you know, without any concern about the cap access, as long as they can stay ahead of the game, you know, selling items, or even selling up their inventory. So, I think the, uh, I think watching

The way, watching the evolution of other countries, including Europe, and the...

relations with China, as well as with us in this game is a very relevant point. And I would say

that, uh, one of the things that the Trump administration has had trouble with is recognizing that if we're at a fierce rival with China, they got four times as many people. We need to have some allies with F, on our side of the seesaw, to keep it from going the wrong direction. And

so, yes, kind of sometimes you need to give your ally a cold bath in order to get them to shape

up. But, uh, I think, uh, getting Canadians to think of us as an enemy is a pretty wild idea, uh, I mean, any treatment that comes to that conclusion. And if you take counting who might know from when it's finished our Harvard college kit, he's, he's a American as anybody, or he was. But the idea if you go and threaten a politician's survival, that's a pretty good way to disemot. And if you threaten to take territory from people, that's a pretty good way

to make them feel hostile. Uh, so this is an unusual treatment if we're trying to, you know, get guys with heft on our side of the seesaw. At the World Economic Forum, I wasn't sure if it was Davos or another one of their forums. Were you at the Davos one share? Sure. So, as a total aside, just bringing President Trump's impact, it was two and a half days of people wondering what he would say when he got there. The town shut down as people watched his two hours stand up, you know,

delivery, and then another two days of people sort of trying to understand and figure out what happened there. So, there's something, it was a reality TV show for sure. Yeah. So, it took all the things. This fellow, uh, Mooch, who was his communication guide for a week or 10 days until he got

fired in the first administration said on the first night, I was at an event. He said, remember,

this is going to be a reality TV show. He's going to start with a claim that we're going to invade Greenland, which, by God, the invading of the lie, that's a pretty big deal. He said, then you're going to watch the drama build. When Trump had a chance to speak, he's speaking this long way and back and forth back, but he didn't have, I'm just a paragraph in which he said,

he basically took the gun off the table. But before that, he was doing a mafia so act, even so,

some mafia so lines about, you know, you can either have it the easy way or the hard way, what a, that's a Godfather lie. And so people were saying, yikes, you know, this, what a, what a, what has been loose on us. So now we have all this drama, but then he says, I've decided we're not going to invade Greenland. You know, he just passes that off. So now the temperature goes down. And now the third day, he does some other, uh, uh, institute, or board a piece and he says,

we now have a framework and the agreement. So, uh, I think I think half of the time he's having fun.

Yeah. You know, it's kind of a, it does get people's attention. Sure, it does. Uh, you, um, on a substantive basis, share it a framework. 80, 80, nine. And I think, you know, I've, I've spent a bunch of time listening to the talk you gave and and some people's reaction to it. Maybe, you could share it with the audience and why it's important. Oh, thank you. I'm glad you had. So I think this is a big idea. So these are three numbers. Each of which is the answer to a question.

And if you can remember the three numbers and you could identify the question, to which each one is the answer, you have the big picture about international security in the lifetime of yourself and even your parents that's virtually everybody who's alive today.

So the first lady is the answer to what? How long it's been since the World War? How many years

since a great power war? Since the World War? Yeah. Now, whoa, wait a minute. 80 years. This is the longest piece in recorded history since Rome. This is not natural. This is very abnormal. This is a, it didn't happen by accident. This was what the people who founded the International Order after World War II were trying to build a new world order as they had just lived through a terrible World War II. Simply one generation before they remember, hey, there was World War

one. So if we just keep doing this, we should expect World War III. It should have already happened.

If it could have happened at the Human Resources.

a work can progress all the time eroding inevitably for many, many different reasons, hey,

second 80. How many years since we've had a nuclear bomb go off? Fantastic. So think about that.

If you had gone, if there have been prediction markets and you had gone in 1945 or 50, you would have got 10,000 to one out of your good set. Simply impossible. The weapon that ended in World War II when you're not ever going to see you to use those weapons in war? Whoa. And then nine, the number of countries, nation states that have nuclear bombs today. Fantastic.

Exactly. Right. Now, how in the world could you have only nine countries having nuclear weapons?

Nuclear weapons being your kind of ultimate security blanket. Again, John Kennedy, 1963, said, by the 70s, there'll be 25 or 30 nuclear weapons states. As he thought that his states acquired the capability to build nuclear weapons they would do so. Today, 90, 95 states could have nuclear weapons in a year or two if they decided to build them. Actually, into the 70s, Sweden had a series of nuclear weapons. South Korea had a nuclear weapon. Taiwan had a nuclear weapon.

US closed those down, created a so-called non-proliferation regime. That's counted for this nine. But I would say, again, fragile, eroding, not likely to be sustained. So when I try to do my giving thanks for things that I should be thankful for. Thanks for 80 years without a great power of war. If there were a great power of war, you and I, we wouldn't be here. And we wouldn't be having this conversation and all the other

issues we have to deal with. So I would say that 80, the 80 and 90, we should not take for great. We should give thanks for the work that was done to build them. And then we should notice what's going to be required to sustain this. And we almost had a 10th nuclear power in Iran. And we had the latest two, if I'm correct, you'll correct me because you're the expert,

Pakistan and North Korea. And we had that one doctor, Khan, I believe, is in with from Pakistan,

who was trying to spread and sell these. So absolutely. Did we make a critical era

we being the West, even the East humanity, leadership of letting Pakistan and North Korea into this club? Well, I mean, that's not into the club, but it allowed them to get nuclear weapons, which is right. The Israelis have had a different idea. And this goes back to the original attack on Iraq, and also Iraq. They call it affirmative non-proliferation. So they say, we're not allowing nuclear weapons in our neighborhood. And they've destroyed the nuclear weapon project in Iraq.

They destroyed the nuclear weapon activity in Syria. When the North Koreans were building a plant there, half dozen years ago. And now they've been the leaders in the destruction of the Iranian nuclear program, which we've participated in. However, I'm only comfortable about the wars even in Iran. I have to cheer for this because I fear additional nuclear weapons states. And I wish that we had managed somehow to say the North Korean case. I've even said this to

Chinese officials. I said, you know, we and you made a terrible mistake. Maybe we made a bigger mistake to let North Korea get nuclear weapons. But what we should have said to you is, hey, we have an idea. Nuclear weapons are either good for North Korea and South Korea,

or they're good for need or your choice. And that would have been hardball. But I think

the idea of having Kim Jong-un have now more than 100 nuclear warheads, and this one second

reached the American homeland is crazy. I mean, here we're talking about Iran and what it might be excuse me. It takes 20 minutes longer from Korea to get Boston than from Iran, or maybe 25 minutes. So I think that that's a useful perspective to remind us that we let this thing happen. It's a ticking bomb as far as I'm concerned. If you ask me what to do about it, that makes me, you know, cry because Trump, in the first administration focused on this problem,

Very, very seriously, and did everything that he thought he could, and I thou...

even though it was not successful. But the 20 other ways we've tried to deal with that problem, were equally unsuccessful. How does China feel about nuclear proliferation and North Korea having

these bombs? Well, I think they feel a little ashamed at least about what happened in North Korea

and kind of think, well, that wasn't really our problem. But now, when you say, well, if this keeps if things on the current path, well, maybe South Korea or Japan will have nuclear arsenal in their backyard, they think that's terrible, and we would be not very enthusiastic about a Venezuela or Canadian nuclear bomb, yeah. So, Dr. Allison, just to kind of wrap our toward of the world here, come back to the United States. Since we last spoke, there have been a number

of mayors elected in this country that are self-declared socialists or democratic socialists of America, the essay, and there's a rising populist movement in the United States that seems to be manifesting in many cases candidates that look and act like through deep socialists and want an act socialist policies. What is the risk to the United States if this continues to go the way it's going? And what is the risk to the United States? Do you think in 2028, if we have a Democrat

controlled house in Senate and a very populist Democrat candidate that looks like a DSA member, where does this take us? Well, again, good for y'all for thinking uncomfortable, a radical questions, but real. So, if you look at the numbers, I've been looking at them lightly, they're hard to believe in terms of the split between wealthy and poor or rich and poor. If you look at the who's benefited for the last generation in terms of the 0.01%, the 1%,

the 10%, the 20%. Well, that's us and all the people that we know virtually. And therefore,

when we say the market is, you know, third year in the bull market, and my goodness here,

it's up to 15 or 16% or this 80 or 70% of people, this is not part of their lives.

And when I look at the numbers about both what I think the facts are and then even more

people's perception, it's just not stable in the democracy. If everybody gets a vote, and if the top 10 or 20% are taking 80% or 70% of the pie, that's not stable and sustainable, I think, and it's political invitation for a populist and demographic, democratic countries. We need only even have to be a demographic to say, that's not fair. That's not reasonable. So, I think that it's not, I mean, this is beyond my, I can hardly deal with the problem,

I focus on this one, this one, that I look over my shoulder and think, gee, wait a minute,

this first this can't be true, but then whatever I've been looking into the numbers lately,

they look as bad as they appear. And then this is extremely dangerous, and I would say yes, and so I haven't heard people talking about plausible ways in which, you know, this could be addressed.

But I think it's an invitation, you know, for some more radical ideas, and the while I like

very much, the Trump accounts for kids to give them some stake, I think that's a fantastic thing. I could probably be persuaded that people, even at my level of income, should pay another 10% of taxes or whatever for for some more adjustment. I think the kind of adjustments that are

basically putting people on the dole or support for non-productive or semi-productive activity

makes me very uncomfortable. I mean, unless they're lame or, you know, ill or, or into UBI proposals people getting a universal basic income that takes much, makes me less, I like in center. I mean, I think that the stuff of America has been the opportunity for people to to be incentivized to invent, create, then create wealth that's benefits for everybody,

If the, if the jam is not getting spread to 70% of the people, that's not a s...

political situation, and I think, I mean, I thought in the, in the New York campaign,

we got to see some preview of a bit of this, and in the primaries, you're seeing people

going into this space. I haven't seen anybody with a, with a coherent program yet, but I think

for serious people thinking about what's good for the country, it's a, it's a good one to worry about.

Well, it seems very bugged that there's a couple proposals here, minimum wage, maybe some type

of a wealth tax. There are things that people are talking about. We may not all agree with them, and they may be hard to execute, but one of them is for the people at the top, and I think you would

agree, Professor Allison, the people at the top have the most elusive, and they should be thinking

about it, and maybe there's generosity and, you know, maybe giving away wealth in a more thoughtful

way, because there's so much wealth in this top 1%, 10%, that they can't possibly spend, and so this might be something that that group of people should be thinking a little bit more about. In the state of the Union, the Trump hauled out, you know, Dell, and a couple of other people

for having stepped up and say, okay, I'm, you know, I'm with all in on this, I would say,

there's something quite, you know, that's certainly, it got my attention, and made me think, maybe I should be doing something different. Yeah, right. Well, Professor Allison, you know, they say that you can measure a man's knowledge and thoughtfulness by his humility. I will say, you have extraordinary depth, and you've thought so deeply about so many of these issues that this world is facing right now, and yet you act with such humility and grace when you speak about them.

I want to thank you for that. I want to thank you for taking the time to be with us today. Really appreciate it and look forward to doing it again in person soon. Yeah. Thank you so much on behalf of the audience, and just on a personal basis, this is such a delight and privilege to be able to do with this with you every year or two, and I hope we can just do it every year, because it's the highlight of my year when we get to talk. Yeah, excuse me, it's an honor for me. Thank you so

much, and thank you for what you're all doing. Thanks for thinking of such hard questions out. Yeah. And thank me home tonight to think about socialism. Yes. Yeah. Okay. Thank you, sir. Thank you. I'm doing all of you. I'm doing all of you.

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