Episode 97: Can America and Israel finish the job? A conversation with John Spencer.

Hi, everybody.

“Welcome to a new episode of Ask to Leave Anything.”

We are on day 11 of the war,

depending on your time zone, maybe day 12. And there's so many questions being asked in Israel, in America, on the world stage, probably presumably in the Iran, about what's happening in this war, what the strategy is in the United States, what Israel's goals and objectives are,

when it all ends, what it's all meant to achieve, and who's actually winning, who's actually achieving their goals, and who isn't achieving their goals. To answer some of these questions, or at the very least, to tackle them with deep knowledge,

we've invited back, and I'm very grateful that he's joining us, John Spencer. Long time friend of this podcast, from its very early days, someone I have learned from a lot. But those who are not familiar, he's an internationally recognized national security and military analyst, specializing in war,

in strategy and tactics, specifically specializing in urban warfare. John currently serves as the co-director of the urban warfare project

and the chair of war studies at the Madison Policy Forum,

and he's the host of the urban warfare podcast. Now in its sixth year, which explores every dimension of urban combat

“through in-depth conversations with commanders of major battles,”

technical experts, veterans, and scholars. So we're gonna take part this war and really try to understand it from the perspective of someone who has commanded men in war and understands American strategy and understands historically how these wars look.

Before we get into it, I want to tell you that this episode is sponsored by Tina and Akiva Katz, and it's dedicated to two very different groups of Israelis who are close to their hearts. The first, they write us is our family. Specifically, the families Alfassi Pasal Gizbal,

Wise and Megidish, who fought and served so bravely and sacrificed so much since the 7th of October. We are forever grateful for your service and deeply inspired by your devotion to the state of Israel. The second group is our family by choice,

the Dhamari family of Khfal Azza, to the quietly indomitable and fierce Mandi Dhamari,

who fought tooth and nail to bring her amazing daughter Emili

and the rest of our host Gizhong. And to the Dhamari children, Emili Ben Tom Inshaan, we love you. - Thank you so much for that dedication. I also would like to invite you all to join us on the Patreon.

We have a wonderful community there. It helps us keep the lights on. We have discussions. They help shape what we talk about on this podcast. They're questions.

“Are the first questions we try to answer on this podcast?”

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John, how are you? Have you? I'm well. How are you? - You know, I didn't sleep much last night.

We had three sirens and the kids all fell right back asleep because our kids are better at that stuff. But you know, I'm raring to go. I want to understand this war. It's day 11.

One of the questions I want to ask you is how long it's going to last, but let's wait with that. Let's start with the tactical situation and then turn to the strategic.

What the heck is actually happening right now in the streets of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and the arrow for Iran? How do you understand the American effort the Israeli effort?

What can you tell us just to, you know, everyone can read the sort of last three paragraphs of any news article that tries to give that summary. But take us a little deeper. What does this war actually look like?

Where does it stand as you see it? - Sure. There's a lot of people trying to do some comparative analysis, you know, four times greater than the shocking all of the invasion

of Iraq that I was a part of, and they, you know, war isn't managed by Excel spreadsheets, but everybody is interested in the numbers. You know, the United States hitting over 5,000 targets to drill 4,000, the real target list to achieve

what are less argued on what the goals are on. Now we're continuing to hit nuclear program sites, hitting all the ballistic missile launchers in any part of the military industrial complex of the Islamic regime in Iran

for both missiles or drones, but also since the United States put the Navy at the very highest element of the strategic goals because of the 20% of the global oil production comes out of the streets or homoose.

So sinking the Iranian Navy in over 50 ships these are damaged or shut in the last 12, 11, 12 days. You really see the tactical fight on course with Israel's help, a lot of the decapitation, I call it almost a neurological strike.

So taking out the political, military leadership, Israel also has a lot of the mechanisms of the pressure

on the populations of the besieged, the headquarters, the cyber, the other forms of suppression that the Islamic regime has used on the population. So what we see is this a very large scale where actually a new is started with creating

the ability to bomb certain parts of the industrial complex that they both Israel and the United States wanted to bomb and that they went through that very methodically. So the fact that they haven't lost,

“although there is of course this, I think,”

almost dubious headline of 140 American soldiers, wounded although 108 of those, returned to duty, went right back to mission. I think some of the news are trying to lead with

we're about these headlines in these 30 second clips

of what's going on, but a very, one of the most sophisticated is that AI is being used to part of the targeting process and full admittance of that, which is its own conversation of people thinking that doesn't happen to go through this vast target list

of Iranian capabilities, which is a big part of their goals which is reduced to capabilities, not just in a nuclear, but the ballistic missile shield that it had built. As we watched although, we know what the United States and Israel is doing because they're being pretty direct

on what they hit per day. And then we can watch what the Islamic regime in Iran's been doing in probably one of the worst strategies I've ever seen, which is attack everybody else, not involved in the war, to bring them into the war

in some strategic thinking that it would cause a political pressure on the United States, and it actually did the opposite. It brought an alignment of countries against Iran, and rule, I'm sure we'll talk about the continuation,

I was started actually at the beginning of the Trump administration, which was really reducing the Iran's strategies and power in the Middle East to increase in this Gulf state, Sunni Arab coalition of forces economically, militarily, and big aspects.

But from the day to day aspect, it's really United States now in Israel going through this target list, a very large target list of Iranian capabilities to destroy. So if anything in the war happens already, the world is safer, Israel is safer,

it's just by the reduction of capabilities, while that may be short term, you can't deny it's actual what's happening is a destruction of these capabilities. - On day seven of the war, you wrote, that thus far the United States has been consistent

in publicly stating its goals. President Donald Trump's March 1st statement announcing the start of operations made clear that the war is aimed at ending the Iranian regime's nuclear weapons pursuit, destroying the missile capabilities

that Tehran is long used as a shield for that nuclear ambition, eliminating Iran's ability to threaten global commerce

through the streets of Hormotes, that basically is it.

And then you say, this is not a declared regime change war. Trump has said occasionally, we wouldn't mind it. It would be great, I'd love it for that not to be. I'm gonna be part of selecting the next leader, but the next leader in the Venezuelan sense.

And there's I don't care which regime, which structure of power throws up a leader,

“I just need the leader to play ball with America, right?”

There is so much speculation on what this war is about. I have become joined the camp briefly for now of the China speculators. I've read some interesting things from something, tank people, and they encourage me that it makes more sense

if you take the things that America's targeting, that Israel doesn't care about, right? There's this whole discourse on the American right. And on the American progressive left, and I don't know what to call them, the Wolk right,

the Tucker Carlson's, that Israel drag America to this war. And really, Iran doesn't threaten America, and only threatens Israel, and it's kind of wagged the dog situation.

And that never made any sense to me.

Like never mind, just like, maybe in a thing out has so much influence over Trump that maybe he convinced him or something. I maybe the entirety of the American strategic planning Estrolán and all the leaders of the military

and all the nations, and all these people who are going along with it and keeping quiet is just because they're also maybe in Israel's pockets. I'm out, the whole thing is strange. But what I think drives some of it

is that nobody has what most people don't believe. And I think we have polls on this, that they know exactly what America is doing this for, and what the exit conditions are. When this ends, when America can declare victory and walk away.

So let me just stop the question and just say,

“what is this war actually about in your estimation?”

Is it just literally what they've said? Have they been consistent? - So it's an interesting question. And why I'm sure you have a podcast, because there is no simple answer to some of these questions.

I even have a hopefully a Wall Street Journal article

and what is it impact in the Iran operation,

especially after Venezuela, how is it impact the one-belt road initiative, everything? The question begs, I mean, mixes were two troops can be, and two things can be true at the same time. Although I taught strategy at West Point,

“people will argue, does the United States have a grand strategy?”

And does an administration have broader policy goals, right? So if you read the National Security Strategy, that's when the administration puts things on paper, like this is a kind of a larger pursuit of rebuilding American strength reducing the attacks on American greatness

around the world, whether it's economically, militarily, politically, or even in the information domain. I would argue if I was teaching a class that, what all the things you just said are all true,

that there is a much larger grand strategy

and why when the United States and the National Security Council, especially with Rubio and many of the actors sit around the table, they walk through, okay, what are the primary interest of this operation? And how does it align with our foreign policy goals?

How does it align with our grand strategy on what we're trying to achieve in this relatively four years as consistent? Although there is, I was just on this morning with somebody who's talking about, this is not what he said on the campaign trail. There are no more wars, things like that.

And a lot of times, actually, somebody, if you study different administrations, I know it's different in Israel, where you might have the same people with the same policies. When you have different administrations,

of course, people on the campaign trail talk about, all the things they're going to do and things like that, and then you get into that seat of power, making these very complex decisions where I can tell you, have you what the goals of this operation are,

not hopefully not less of a opinion, but by just taking the statements that I think matter more, then every news interview that the President Trump or true social posts that he makes, I actually,

“that's why in that article I talk about,”

here are the formal statements, right? The prepared statements by the President who is the Commander in Chief, and then you go down the chain of command, right? So don't take anything at Lindsey Graham says

as American policies on what's for this operation, right? If you take the Commander in Chief, the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chief of Staff, and the SECOM Commander, I think, and actually, I've had a little pushback

at the goals that the United States have said, I've been extremely consistent. Yes, if you interview President Trump,

you never know quite what he's going to say,

and then you people read into that. Like, well, I don't care what he said in that formal prepared speech, which is more of a collective policy of what the goals are for this operation. I'm reading into the statement he made off the cuff.

I don't agree with that. So, of course, the operation that what you just read,

“I think are the goals, which would set how long it will take.”

When can you say you've achieved those goals of destroying the missile program, destroying the Navy, because it's so important to that, not only the key of the operation, which would be the impact on the direct price of oil, all of that,

but also the Scrander vision of rolling back the ability for China. There is a grander strategy, but I think the American administration has been very specific to this operation, because for many reason it has to be, right? Because if you live in my world,

the attack is, you know, this is another regime change war. This is your failed, you know, Iraq, Afghanistan, all of that very poor comparative analysis. When in this case, since I actually did jump into Northern Iraq, and was told it would only be a 60-day operation,

it ends up being a nine-year operation. In this case, I actually see the things that I would look for on going, no, this is very specific, and I also have a, I know a little bit of a strategy, where deception and uncertainty is actually built into this.

Whether that's a Trumpism or not, you've written about this, diving into that, don't mention it in passing. We have no, Trump is throwing a lot of stuff into the air. You think that nevertheless, if you listen to Rubio and Hegsaath and General Kane and President Trump himself, at least early on,

everything's coherent, everything's consistent, and everything they've done since fits that, and it really is about Iran. Or, let me ask you, if you would put it this way, it's 80% about the threat of Iran. Yes, obviously in the background, there's the 20% of China

and the larger architecture power and all that, but it's 80% Iran. And then you said, and so everyone's confused about this, and so you wrote, I forget when I read this, but you wrote in some piece in the last 12 days, it's not like all that terrible for the war effort

when America's goals are fulfilled.

“If America can do this for four more months, or if America's done in four days,”

if the Iranians don't know, that harms the Iranians' ability to plan ahead and to try to survive this thing. So can you walk us through that? Sure, and actually, we've talked about this with a much lesser enemy in Hamas, but the strategy of if when Hamas knew where Israel wouldn't go,

what Israel wouldn't do, and what were the things that timeline-wise, administration-wise, or whatever, it really, it is a word strategy. For your enemy to know what they can do, whether that's to how long they can hold out, what you're not willing to do, this is really three-dimensional chess between two adaptive combatants.

So the United States, I've said, that absolutely, I believe that there is uncertainty, not in the goals, but in the actions built into on purpose. So sometimes let President Trump say the thing he says, because it confuses everybody, definitely will confuse the Iranians on, what we're willing to do, what we're willing not to do.

And this is why like the boots on the ground comment,

it's like you never would tell the enemy what you're not willing to do to achieve your goals.

That's built in, like, military theory from Sun Zootel now.

“That's the worst thing you would do, it's like, oh, I'm going to attack you,”

but I'm not going to do these things. Here, I can't go on forever, I can't put boots on the ground, like that's just a recipe for the Islamic regime to build a strategy on how they survive. You want them to believe that they can't survive and hold on to all of their demands, right, to keep their nuclear program,

to keep their physiological, the 60 percent rich radium, to keep doing the same thing that they've been doing for decades. That's what the uncertainty does, it removes that ideal, because wars of context of will, that whoever takes command in Iran, not to believe that they can just survive this for another few days,

for another, and that we're not willing to do boots on the ground, who's boots on the ground or are you talking about? You insert the uncertainty, right, because there's a little bit of war, strategy, and war is about creating more dilemmas than your opponent can deal with. That's a cognitive aspect, so I saw the Kurdish discussion, like CAA helping Kurdish forces,

even though I served, I actually fought with the Iraq, Peshmerga, and Kurdish and Northern Iraq, was to create more dilemmas, and which the enemy must address, to create that sense of President Trump, I actually use this phrase sometimes, "Quiet Uncle," right, to believe that there are too many problems that they can't deal with, and when people put restrictions, not like ideals that are restricting,

that gives the enemy, okay, I don't have to worry about boots on the ground, I don't have to worry about this, and it's just poor strategy.

“So, I've written, I've said, that I believe the goals are clear,”

but there is some uncertainty built into, as much as we saw during the 12-day war, deception, as well, right? So, I mean, we put all of our B2 bombers, we sent seven towards the Middle East, we put six towards Guam, just to confuse the world on what was going on. There's actually a bit of deception that has been built in from the beginning of this as well, as much as I know, in Israel, the commanders not moving their cars before the start of this operation,

and things like that that are built into the plan. You have written that the hinting at a ground war, while also saying publicly,

the first of a domestic political reasons, obviously, I don't think Americans would allow

the administration to go to a ground war, but also Iran, you argue, was pushing for America to have to choose between a massive escalation, including a ground war, or conceding because it was going to choke the global oil supply and hurt all these allies of America. So, forcing that choice on America, and by saying we're not going to run war, America's denying Iran the sense that America itself doesn't know what it's going to do

with that America faces dilemmas. Let's get into Iran's strategy. You write, for decades, Iran pursued a grand strategy built on terrorism, proxy warfare, and regional chaos, or in just the shorthand chaos. Chaos was the strategy in invested billions of militant groups, missile forces, destabilizing campaigns across the Middle East, from Lebanon to Yemen to Iraq, terror uncultivated armed proxies designed to threaten Israel, attack American forces,

intimidate neighboring states, and destabilize the region. And then you have this one line, chaos was not a side effect of Iran's strategy. It was the strategy. And now, to survive,

and I completely agree with you. I don't see any other strategy. The stated goal of the American

effort is to compel the regime to fundamentally change that behavior. Abandon the nuclear weapons ambitions, degrade the ballistic missile capabilities, stop threatening the closure of her moves, stop its decades long use of proxy terrorism across the Middle East, and Iran's response. And here I'm quoting you again, Iran hoped to widen the war faster than the U.S. and Israel could control it. And it hoped to do that essentially with rocket and drone attacks and

missile attacks on 10 different countries. And that strategy so far appears to be failing. So forcing America to either retreat because the damage is too great, put all the political, you know, get the Emirates and the Saudis and even the Turks to come running to America begging for it to stop the war. All of that seems to have failed. And America's also not going to go

to any kind of ground invasion. So what we should expect is America basically it's as my question

holding the line. Iran's strategy to escalate the war has failed. And America's going to hold the line and keep hammering away at their capabilities, their institutions, their people until when. How do you assess Iran's counter strategy? And what's the American response to that counter strategy? Yeah. Absolutely. Don't. I mean, I don't. You know, sometimes I'll be not. I won't quit, but I don't underestimate the Islamic regime and Iran strategy

and what it was trying to do for decades and what it's trying to do in this war. And that attempt to widen the war, of course that happened, but in that chaos strategy was also

to separate, to get, you know, not only to bring more actors into the war, but then to create a

not coherent strategy against them, right, to get all these individual nations to come forth with a

“disagreement on what's happening. And I think that failed by the attack of 12 different nations as far”

as Cyprus, Turkey, Azerbaijan, which I've spent a lot of time as a President, I think that was a great mistake. Saudi Arabia and others, the strategy completely backfired on pressuring the United States to shorten this timeline and actually has created resolve in the nations and in kind of a global interest towards, now we, it's almost gives credibility to the necessity of the operation, because it's, you know, 2,500 missiles, look what it did if they had had 8,000 or more, what it wanted

to have, what would have done in this case of this strategy in order to protect this nuclear program. In the worst case scenarios, we tiptoe and to like a North Korea scenario where it's too late, you can't do anything about it. I think that they also wanted to increase the cost of the operation on the both the American administration, both politically, right, and this is what you've seen. I'm sure there's some bots involved in the disinformation fueling that, what we've also seen since

October 7th, fueling the disagreements within the American society to say, like, what's, it's not clear, what are you doing here, you know, when's this over, you're to ask those questions and and, but also the dollar amount, right, the whole cost of a barrel of oil and all the bad element in their strategy. I think it's thus far, it's failed. I can't give you a timeline of the, and it goes back to, this is a military, it should choose your planner, who teaches it,

“the worst thing you could do is tell your enemy how long you're going to do this to them.”

If your, if your true goal is to break their will to believe that they can survive it, the worst thing you can do is give them a timeline. Logically though, as both the United States and Israel goes through this target list of destroying capabilities. One, I believe that both the United States and Israel are in a safer place today than they were 12 days ago. Just in a reduction of the regime's capabilities, what had built billions of dollars, but also, I do believe, well, some people are argue that

de-capitation strikes don't work to achieve that that you have other hardliners. I think the paradigm of what I don't want to get to a mode of the grass scenario where this is necessary every few years, this is where they even the boots on the ground, it's just, it's not right to say that you can't achieve the behavior change without boots on the ground, because who's boots on the ground you're talking about? Are you saying we can't change the Islamic regime's behavior won't

change? Unless American boots on the ground, I don't think that's a logical scenario, but this is the

“whole population variable that hasn't been put into play, that I think a lot of people won't”

well, whoops, not a strategy based on January's protest, that there is a belief that there will be

and I think I saw the Prime Minister Netanyahu on TV as well talking directly to Iranian people,

but it's, it's a not yet scenario of they want to reduce, continue to reduce the Islamic regime's capabilities across the board to not only project power outside the borders of Iran, which is also a definable goal, but also just suppressed the population. Once somebody says in the signal, this is your chance to try to take it now, and there's a lot going on in the background that we don't even know about to facilitate what that scenario is. I'm not in the camp either, I don't know if you're

talking to anybody who says that the worst case scenario is a civil war, and that would happen, I don't believe even in my understanding of the different factions within the Iran that that would

“happen to either, but your question is, do I think the Iran strategy is working no,”

they thought they could hold on to a lot more than they've already lost. I think that they thought

that that they would make certain countries power, and thought they'd have a greater success. I have been surprised by even some of the Gulf States air defense capabilities, despite Saudi Arabia receiving more ballistic missiles this time, then Israel, and then the drone strikes, I've been surprised at their air defenses, and I'm also happily surprised to see Ukraine sending advisors to many of those countries to facilitate, which is this growing threat of these large, slow-moving

drones, and when the damage that they've caused across the Middle East, as a American veteran lastly, he'll be having lost soldiers to Islamah regime in Iran, proxies, and direct coups for us training going on to try to kill Americans all across the Middle East. I agree, I also further believe, again, American interests are safer in the Middle East, just by the reduction of the IRGC coups force and their belief that they could continue doing what they were doing and

“have no repercussions. Bottom line, how is the war progressing? Do you think from an American view?”

How is the war progressing from the view of Israeli objectives? Where do those diverge? Is it possible that America cuts out much earlier than Israel and Israel is left with, you know, I don't know what, a longer term kind of operation, is it possible that they're going to do this together? Perfectly well, we talked to the last episode, we had on a military expert in Israeli who

journalists have said, this is the first Israeli war actually fought in English, and the Israeli

Air Force is flying on Zulu time for the very first time, because the level of integration with the American war effort is just that deep. So where do these diverge? Yeah, you would probably be, you could answer that probably a lot more. As I've been focusing on official US statements on the goals of the war, I personally don't believe, I personally believe that just like we've seen the which the byproducts of this really is the birth of a new understanding of the capabilities of

Israel, not just diplomatically to survive what was supposedly the seclusion of Israel in the Middle East and all of the agreements with India and Germany and all of this, it's doing quite well, but really the birth of Israel as a peer superpower, almost military of the United States, and I have especially with my military now, it's been really appreciated, surprised by some of the comments, but also a realization of the world that like Israel's Air Force, far exceeds many

Israel just overtook the UK and export of military technologies, but in this operation it's simply to demonstrate the power of Israel military as in truly a peer in a joint operation against

“Iran, has been a story that I think that will continue for a while and surprised a lot of people,”

those of us that study it doesn't, but truly a joint operation like this and how many months that was planned together in the separation of targets and 300, you know, Israeli Air Force flying side-by-side with American Air Force matching capability demonstrating more capability in some cases, especially with intelligence, a penetration to be able to target leadership. I don't think personally, John Spencer that there would be a scenario in which the United States would stop and an Israel

continue. Based on all of the shared goals, I don't know where exactly there is of course different interest every nation of the world has different interests, both in their grand strategy and what they're trying to achieve larger than the operation, but specifically this operation, I've seen also a consistency while even saying without saying directly, which I am sure everybody wants to say,

they are the closest target, they are the number one statement of the destruction of Israel and

“everything that they've done to include building this largest terror army ever seen on the planet of”

Hezbollah was in the, of course we want to see a change, but we've already seen a massive change in Iran's ability to pursue its strategy and uninhindered. I'm not going to say there's a victory, I'm clearly United States and Israel is winning the war and as we've talked about in the past with

other wars, I can't tell you who's going to win the war and you always have to assess those wars

based on the objectives, which some people think aren't clear, I say they are clear on what the objectives are and that behavior change, I don't know when we'll see that get put to the test, will we see with this new leadership, a change in behavior, but I know for sure we have already seen a change in their capabilities to pursue their behavior and that will last for a long time, so I was just arguing this morning that supposedly all the wars have ever been started in the

last 30 years, have a worse outcome. I don't believe that this is, I don't, that's not true actually,

“but also that this war, this specific operation, will make things worse. Absolutely, I believe,”

Israel becomes safer because of this war, that the United States has become safer, its forces

in the Middle East and its neighboring countries, but we have to see what comes after, I can't tell you when this is going to end, but I don't think that we would see Israel continuing the operation, but that paradigm, and I just got this some more from like Hezbollah, this paradigm that people can attack Israel and there's a certain threshold, that's okay, you know, they knocked it down, whatever the rocket was or their proxy forces are in check for right now, I think that paradigm

has already been broken, so that's another positive accomplishment of the operation. I want to have you answer Walter Russell, he wrote a piece in the Wall Street Journal recently, and maybe this

I guess is, there's a lot you don't know and you don't want to say things that you don't know

and I keep asking you okay, but how's this going? How's it gonna end? Where's it right? But maybe the question is best articulated in the way he phrased that he writes that if America ends the conflict, before certain things have been achieved, specifically America violently, physically through military force reopens, for example, shipping through the streets of Hormos and doesn't quit the war and then Iran reopens, then America will have lost, that is, for him, the definition of defeat,

because any wrong can impose costs that America can't handle and everyone in the region will understand that even greater America even going to these lengths can't handle. Walter Russell made writes with missile and drone attacks, Tehran has succeeded in at least temporarily blocking nearly all traffic in and out of the straight of Hormos and has forced some golf countries to curtail oil and gas production. If it remains closed, then it might be the biggest energy

shocks since the 70s. And then he writes, the war looks at to end in one of three ways. One is a clear and damaging American defeat in which America has to stop the war before Iran has to lift essentially the oil blockade in the streets of Hormos. If a mix of global pressure and domestic opposition forces of Trump administration to end the conflict before full trade is restored through the golf, a battered Iran will emerge having demonstrated its ability to close the

golf against everything the world's greatest military power can throw at it. America's power and prestige not to mention, Mr. Trump's would struggle to recover from such a fiasco. So even if we just set the terms at, you know, they launched missiles and rockets at 10 different

“countries, UAE also got, I think, three times more than Israel. If not, if not more than that.”

And those countries have not, therefore, gone running to America, begging for it to stop, have not sided with Iran, have not hedged. If not big, the Qataris are in a real crisis because they're like, where's anti-Israel's you get? Iran would, like, what are you doing? You're hitting up. Oh, man, was just complaining at Trump because Trump was negotiating through them while planning the strike. And now they're being hit by the Iran, they kind of ran defense for, right?

Do so. What the heck is Iran trying to accomplish its losing friends? It's not gaining them. But nevertheless, the closure of the streets of Hormos is a hard reality. If America can't impose the end of that, then has America, by the time the war has to end for whatever reason on whatever clock has, is that a valuable sort of test of whether it's losing or winning? Is America going to reopen that militarily? I think that's a very narrow metric in which to assess the four

closely. Is it fair to say that's the number one more objective of the Gulf allies of America's

Gulf allies? It's all about the oil flow. If you think you keep the oil flowing, you know, Iran has lost. If you can't, we have to live in a world in which we have to assume for our perspective, the perspective of the Emirates, the Bahrainis, the Qataris, the Kuwaitis,

“we have to live in a world in which Iran functionally as a veto overshipping. I think that's one of the”

guns, so deterrence theory relies on somebody having the capability and the will to do it. So Iran demonstrated that they had the will to attack everybody just because they want to. And then they had the capability, right? So this is the air defense, air attack, kind of capability conversation. So I believe Iran is already lost in by showing every neighbor, to include as it's northern, like every neighbor around it, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and I really

think that they really messed up with that. But even the Gulf states, like the Gulf states,

of course, care about their economic vitality. But all states care first about their national

security survival. And to acknowledge through actual actions, not talk that Iran has the ability and interest to attack everybody to kill the citizens of their nation, which is their primary responsibility. I don't care what what MED says. That's the number one interest of a country. And yes, economic will cause pain and economic is important. And yes, the oil, the 20% of that oil that comes through the streets is important. Actually, but the recent news of even the

price of a barrel of oil dropping when it flucks a little bit. And while they have the interest, which is the behavior, right? They want the ability to threaten the streets of our moves. They've already lost 50 ships and the pressure is continuing. And that may be a determination of one of the metrics of when do you, this is stop is when you've taken that capability through threaten the streets way down to almost nothing. And the United States signaling that

we're willing to use the US Navy to escort ships through is a big deal. I don't think that's just talk. It is a signal of strength going back to whether you're not willing to do and the whole thing about ensuring the tankers, all of these things. It's not a game, but it's also not the single metric. It's an important metric, the streets are home moves. But as much as an important is the destruction, more destruction of the nuclear program, and changing the behavior of all of these

pursuits. That would be measures. The streets are home moves is not the only measure of this operation. And no, it wouldn't say that they didn't defeat it. Everybody wants to say that they

“defeated the US, made it so they couldn't achieve their objectives. That's why my I always say”

is winning. Has it won? Because nobody knows. Not somebody writing the Wall Street Journal and definitely nobody in the open source says that how is this going to go and how will we remember this in history based on why I started my article with if you're going to do all this conversation, all this analysis. Don't start measuring what you believe the goals to be. Let's start with what they said the goals are. Multiple times over and over, assess the war today,

based on the goals we have today. Yes, in the future we can say whether this what did it do to the global energy supplies, what did it do to the Middle East peace process and aligning this greater vision of the Gulf state, all the agreements and expanding the Abrahamic words, all these things. You measure that later. But in the operation measure it against what they say the goals are today. And then if your metric is how many ships get through the the structure

of our moves today versus tomorrow, great do that. But it isn't the only measure. And yes,

“that is a high goal, but it's not the only goal. That's not the only thing that the United States”

is striking today. Although they have expanded the strikes to every basically boat that can float

in Iran so that to make sure that it's not a mind-dropping boat. Will America succeed in holding open or reopening the streets of Hormuz without ending the war and will the war end before America has smashed deeply profoundly set back by too many years for the regime to seriously contemplate rebuilding the strategic missile arsenal and the nuclear program. I mean, I guess I only have one question for John Spencer and I keep coming at it from 16 directions. Right. I look, I can tell you

I don't know who replaces Trump, but it doesn't even matter who replaces Trump. They're going

“to have a harder time reaching this moment once again for domestic political reasons for a thousand”

other reasons. America's finally doubling down seriously on missile defense. We're seeing that with in January, there's the uptick of the order for a new thad to a missiles from 96 a year to

400 a year. So America's understanding and now that never mind, the Israeli capabilities, which everybody

was astounded by, we now see those capabilities in the Emirates. This is replicable Israel's successes and all these things. So a lot of things are moving in a very good direction, but this is the moment. There isn't going to be another moment like this. It politically, probably almost certainly for a generation. And this regime will do harm and will do damage and will do pain and inflict and the younger humane who's replaced in the older humane, Iran's

revolution was against the hereditary monarchy and he'd been hereditary as part of its corruption. Well, now it's a hereditary police state. So, mazaltov, you've managed to make something of your

revolution, right? But this guy is said to be by analysts in Israel and America in the West,

worse than his father. He was in charge of the crackdown in 2009. He literally took the ratings of the crackdown in 2009. The young, the young, mochtabah, mochtabah, humane, he was now in charge. So, has to get done now. And speaking of Israel, he's not an analyst and a journalist and an interviewer, just it's got to get done now. And you have an ally, you mentioned Israel's willingness capabilities, almost as a peer in the battlefield at a very small regional scale. Yeah,

we're a peer. I mean, you know, America can do this across the globe. We can't. But we're also willing to absorb the damage. We're also willing to lose the troops. We're also

willing to fly into into the war zone. If America had a couple of Israel's, in terms of the

capabilities and the loyal ally ship in the West Pacific, right, at facing China, the whole China question would be different. It's all here now. Are they going to do it? I know they can do it. It's just the end of the question of test of will. You taught me that. All wars are tester. Are they going to do it? Because it's not going to come again. So, this is the, I don't know where it's going to go, but I know what's already happened and it has been a generational

combining of two great nations for shared interest. I mean, I don't want my son who's 14 to have to fight the same battles against Islamic regime proxies that I Americans have had to fight

“for different reasons. I believe that we've already seen a generational change and to decades of”

filled approaches towards Iran and I know for Israel, it's all of the proxies. But there are many other people who get to have to make a vote, right? I truly also believe that I would love to see the power of Iran released, right? So, the Islamic regime has spent squandered the entire GDP of Islamic state. We run towards this terrorism and this grander vision of a caliphate, you know, with Israel destroyed and all that Jewish people killed out of the way.

I believe that they now also have a once-in-generational chance to vote with their feet and take the regime and that's, I truly believe that's the byproduct, intended byproduct and not the state of the objective of this operation for both Israel and the United States is to create that moment. But war is human and everybody gets to make a vote to include the other Russia and China aspects of this. They are involved. Everybody gets to vote. I'm extremely proud

as an American just personal opinion that this operation has even happened because it would have been

“unimaginable prior to October 7th. I believe for some way to imagine the United States and”

Israel conducting this operation to reduce what has been built not overnight, but over decades the nuclear program, the ballistic missile program, the Navy capabilities. I couldn't have imagined an operation to take this gun towards the global economy that Iran has had ready to pull whenever it once, as a threat to every administration of the United States on. Yeah, but they could close the streets of Hamoos and really cause pain on our, our us and our, you know, on India, on

rut, you're everybody to take that away because I do believe in the global international order. And we've had this one person who's been outside of that, there are others, but, and that this is a generous opportunity. So I believe, Hivee, if I can't tell you whether what the outcome is that we already have seen a generational positive action, I believe, Israel's safer because of this operation, I believe the United States is safer, and the world has the potential to

we could do a lot of historical conversation in a very long time. Just a line in the Gulf states

towards a shared enemy. I mean, it's a lot of talk about that in the past, but to put that into reality, I still not going to answer your question, though, whether we'll finish the job in order to achieve those goals, to get the behavior changed, that we all truly know is the, is the underlying goal, but also understanding every nation's grain strategy and strategy for the war. I believe that we've already had extreme success. Nobody, I don't care what they write,

you can say, we've lost, we weren't able to do something, or we won't win because of this metric.

“It's context really matters, and that's why I hate sloppy analysis.”

I'm, I'm, I very much support this war because when you're being extorted, when you're being bullied by a brutal mafia, then, you know, if you're small, if you're a little shopkeeper, maybe you have to pay protection, maybe you literally don't have a choice, but if you're competent in cohesive and serious and have the tools to fight back, caving only makes it worse and only ups the costs and only ups the danger, and they were getting in, they signed two months ago,

a contract with China to get supersonic missiles that could penetrate American air defenses around American, you know, naval strike groups, and so the danger from Iran, was that not true? I'd be careful about believing in what China's technologies can do. I mean, India just showed

“what a Chinese proxy in Pakistan can't do, and one of those things to stop missiles, so”

that it is a true statement that that is the belief, and on paper, that is what Iran was buying. Yes, but the same thing is not, don't buy Russian air defense systems. I'd be really careful about it, but I actually want them to buy Chinese stuff. Go ahead, mine, Chinese knock off weapons that are showing not to be effective against Israel in Iran. So you're taking that back and please buy them and buy them in bulk. Right. Yes. Yeah, we heard about the S-300s and the S-400s

and how unbelievably dangerous and spectacularly they were to the Israeli fans out, you can clean them up on the way in without noticing them, and Putin now knows that. At the end of the day, you, this is not a regime capable of compromise, not a regime capable of anything but slow escalation.

We have an episode explaining what the mukawama was, what it means by resistance, this never-ending

low-grade war, you know, for all time on which it will sacrifice its own people. Where that comes from religiously and ideologically. And so yes, I am very much in support of this war, but we're a moment before. And the number of people who have to make the decisions is very small. And so it's inherently unpredictable. We don't know what Trump will decide or Trump in consultation with Hexat, Rubio, General Cain, whatever. I mean, it's not a large group of people who

will make the next decision. And so we stand before, you know, the football. And nevertheless, you're saying, and tell me if this is a good summary, you're saying America has done this right, fundamentally. It might still not succeed, but because it's war and the enemy gets to say, but America has done this the way it should be done. And it is a reasonable war with clear objectives, carried out properly. And you know, you parse that out in your writings and I urge people to google

them and in great detail. Fundamentally, that's your perspective on this. Absolutely. I truly believe a piece through strength and that this has been a demonstration of enough as enough strength with clear goals and the capability to achieve those goals 100%. And I truly, John Spencer, believe this needs to continue because the depth of what was built is very deep. And you need,

“and that's why they keep saying, well, tomorrow, it's going to be bigger, right? The bombings”

and the targets destroyed will be much more. I believe we should continue this. Because the longer you continue it, the longer, if you did like a bell curve, the longer there is a period of them not rebuilding capabilities, even if they don't change their behavior, which also, nobody could say they won't because they don't know what the other variables will happen when the bombs stop falling. I believe the United States did this right with Israel, could only have done it with

Israel, and that there will be a greater peace coming through this demonstration of not just military

strength that the world has never seen before. What we've seen in the last 12 days, between

actor, whether that's the next leader who can't show his face in public or Iran, Russia, China,

“it should put the fear in God, but I truly believe and I don't like war, but this became a necessary”

operation in order to create a greater peace and to take that bully out of the picture, at least knock him down so he's not thinking that he'll continue with those threats anymore. I truly believe that. And so you just mentioned, couldn't have been done without Israel. I wanted to just finish with this question. This was written down as my last question. People have been making this argument that Israel is pushing America to this war, and I've been challenged with this by several

interviewers and various points, and I suggested, and I want to test this with you, that Israel

did in one sense lead America to this war, drag America, convince America to go over this war,

and that sense was what it did in June. In June, it demonstrated what American hardware can do. I mean, I'll take every compliment for Israel's capabilities. You'll give me, but it's all with American tech, American hardware. American hardware turns out can shrug off. Everything Russia has ever made. American hardware can completely ignore everything that Iran could possibly throw at it. And Israel showed that American hardware flying over Iran could deliver the blows and needed

to deliver work with the intelligence on the ground needs to work with, you know, and not be afraid

“and because of the success of June. That's why President Trump made the decision to join the”

June conflict with the one big bombing strike at the end. He made the decision like two days before, right? It wasn't something that like he expected to be because the Israelis were so successful doing this so well, he wanted to make sure it was as effective as it could have been. So he'll throw in that last little American sort of, you know, football pass, right? That I suspect, I sense with my psychic powers. I don't have evidence for this for many months saying it explicitly,

with that showed the Pentagon and showed the National Security Council, showed the people involved that this was very doable. This was much lower hanging fruit than anybody expected. Did the Israelis do that demonstration that opened up possibilities? Maybe people were able to think in these terms in the United States in ways that maybe they had would not have had Israel not fought that

“operation in June? Absolutely. And I'll give, I agree. And I believe that white and blue, right,”

American to that, of course, American technologies, whether it's the F-35 or other aspects, but they're almost, is really fired American technology. So technologies that the Americans built, but I didn't have a true adaptive enemy to put the test against, a lot of war gaming, Israel modified almost every piece of equipment for the better. And then we reap the benefits, whether that was in the Maduro raid, Venezuela operation or now in this operation. It wasn't just

demonstrating that American technology with Israeli advancements could dominate even Russian backed forces, air defense capabilities. It's also that Israel had the intelligence capability that the United States doesn't have that deep penetration to be able to do this overwhelming reduce the risk to the forces military operation. But I definitely agree with your assessment

that the told they were demonstrated, but also showed what not fear, but you always appreciate

what your enemy can or can't do. I remember, and I know you haven't had these people on there, but these different analysts, I will say, you know, Iran was going to unleash Armageddon. It was going to sink American aircraft carriers. It was going to do this or that, not with future capabilities, but with their capabilities today. And in the 12-day war, Israel demonstrated again, they're not all that powerful. And you can find their weaknesses, not that they're not

a threat, not that they're very dangerous, but 100% agree with you. That will reduce the risk for President Trump. Who of course, any leader, trust the United States leadership, once to assess the risk, both militarily, but also politically, reduce the risk. And that has been also, I mean, this is why there are, you know, Israel and the United States and Iran. Those are the belligerence, of course, but there are of course all these other nations that are a part of this,

and that part of what happened in the 12-day war, where did everybody sit and response to Iran was doing, which is attacking civilian sites in Israel versus what then in this war have been doing, all a part of, because Israel had the courage and bravery to do the 12-day operation,

Israel doesn't have. And that facilitated lowering the risk to be able to do this necessary

“operation. John Spencer, thank you so much for joining me. I, I don't know how it's going to end.”

You don't know how it's going to end. I don't hear from the Israelis' clarity on when,

it's in, yeah, I should say, unlike President Trump, unlike Pete Hexan, has not spoken to the

“Israeli people over the course of these 12 days, which is, you know, as we know is his way of doing things,”

but we don't know what's going to happen. Also, me from my end of this conversation,

but it was necessary, and it's being done as well as it's being done vastly better than I

“would have allowed myself to hope, put it that way. So hopefully this sends, this sends well.”

There are more countries in the Middle East today by a factor of probably three to one. But one to Israel and America to win this, then one to Iran to win this. Thank you so much for joining me. Thank you for offering. I don't know if it's clarity, but constructive ambiguity. Thank you, Pete. And I leave you with the, of course, Klaus Wachian, all that we know in wars, clouded in three-fourths of a fog. I know we're trying to see through

the fog and have a better understanding, because we live in democracies, and that's the freedom that we have to question the objectives and whatever, but there's a lot of uncertainty, and I appreciate what you do on day-to-day, on your podcast, and trying to understand what's going on. Thank you. That's it.