The Commanders: Rommel

battalion waits for first-like to creep over the ridges along the Isons O River, fog-liced

in the valley, clingy to the water and muting sound and vision. The faint smell of poison gas lingers in the air. A platoon commander gives hushed orders and reassures his men as they wait for the battleers to come. They can hear the sound of artillery shells screaming over his head. The young platoon commander is called Irwin Brahmel, a hearty young officer who has already owned himself a reputation for daring on the western front. Now he finds himself

in the rugged mountains of Northeastern Italy, facing the Italian army along the infamous Isons O Front. 11 times the Italians have tried dislodged Germany's allies, the Austro-Hungarians and 11 times they failed. Hundreds of thousands have died in the attempt. The Italian front

“is an important reminder that the trenches of France and Belgium, certainly did not have them”

monopoly on futile slaughter in the first world war. Here, like on the western front, the

two sides are dug in along trench lines facing each other, but here those lines run along the riches of towering mountains. The weather is even worse than it is in flanders, fighting is deteriorated into a brutal, atritional slog. For many, it is struggle to simply survive. Both sides have found it impossible to dislodge one another, and the casualty lists grow and grow. But now this young German platoon commander, Rommel and his stormtroopers are going to

try something different. They specialize in a new kind of fighting, not the masked assaults that we tend to think of until this point of the First World War, but targeted infiltration

“small, motivated units moving fast by passing strongpoints and attacking from behind. Something”

about some war akin to modern day, special forces, then the regimented over the top charges of 1914-15. These "stross trooper" stormtroopers have already proved their worth against Germany's enemies, but they select France, Romania, and now the German High Command has sent them to break the stalemate here, and relieved that the league at Austro-Hungarian allies. When the artillery bombardment finishes, no time is wasted. Rommel's men are already climbing,

slipping through gaps in the chaotic, battered Italian front line. Resistance is uneven, something that's defends doubtly they even try to counter attack towards the sound of gunfire.

Others wait for orders that will never arrive. Communication breaks down as messengers

are killed and telephone wires cut. In several areas, Italian commons are uncertain whether they're being attacked from the front or the rear. Rommel thrives in this environment, in this confusion. By daylight, his platoon isn't well behind the Italian forward positions. There, Rommel does not wait for orders. This will become something of a trademark. With a handful of men, he strikes an isolated outpost, overwhelming them with rifle flame throws

and grenades. He comes from unexpected directions. He uses the terrain to his advantage,

“entire units surrender to his comparatively tiny force. He sees as a key position,”

call it that up bridge, taking an entire regiment. Rather than lose his momentum, Rommel leaves guards with the prisoners and pushes on. Ahead rises Mount Matajra, snow-dusted, steep. He doesn't have any explicit orders to take it, but Rommel understands instinctively as important. If the Germans take Matajra, they can force the complete collapse of this stretch of Italian defenses. For two days, he and his men advance almost continuously, climbing,

flanking, laughing, they eat little, they sleep less. Italian units surrender in batches, sometimes outfiring a shot, convinced that a much larger force was surrounded them and cut them off. By the 27th, Matajra has fallen. Rommel's small force has captured over 9,000 Italian prisoners and dozens of guns. He's lost only a handful of men himself. Mostly wounded. He would late describe his actions in precise, technical language, he would obsess over the angles

of fire and timings and equipment, but this battle at Cabaretto was much more than just a technical

that audacity, speed and psychological shock could negate the overwhelming firepower of this industrial age. He could win spectacular victories in the traditional age of trench warfare. On the riches of the Asons Ovali, the myth of Irwin Rommel had begun to take shape.

“In the long and contested history of the Second World War, few German commanders, I think,”

have inspired as much fascination and debate and discussion as Field Marshal Irwin Rommel.

To his admirers, he was always the desert fox. He was brilliant and he was daring and he was

relatively chivalrous. He fought with speed and imagination, always against formidable odds. To his critics, well, he was a good tactician, but he was elevated far beyond the strategic abilities. He was a vital cog in the monstrous Nazi war machine, but when his reputation has been washed, it's been burnished by myth and propaganda and post-war necessity. So who really was Irwin Rommel? How did his life and experience his shape, his command style, and how should we judge his legacy?

Just how good was he? This is the first episode, not commander's series where we dig into the lives and decisions of five legendary well-war two commanders. We're going to cut through the myth,

“we're going to really look at what shaped their styles of command, what they did right, what they did wrong.”

From daring gambles to meticulous planning, we're going to ask where their victories were

and through brilliance, calculation, or luck. Indeed, we'll be asking the bigger questions, do their repetitions, hold up to scrutiny at all while they're in turkeys among them. We'll be releasing a new episode every Monday, so make sure you follow and check back in for those. For now, I'm very pleased to say that joining us to kick start this series, and dig into Rommel, is a great friend of the podcast, Saul David, his broadcaster, historian, author, most recently

of the fantastic ingenious crowd victory in Africa. Let's get going. Owen Rommel was born in 1891 in the town of Hydenheim in southern Germany. Part of what was known as the Kingdom of Vertemberg. We've to bear in mind that Germany, around this time, only been an existence for a very brief period. It wasn't really a kind of uniform nation state in the modern sense. It was more a sort of federal empire. It was 20 years old

and it had been made up of a patchwork of monarchies and city states of very different histories, and Vertemberg sat firmly within that structure. So each state like Vertemberg had its own court and bureaucracy, and when Rommel was born, he was technically a subject of the King of Vertemberg as well as the citizen of this new German empire. Now, Rommel did not come from traditional military aristocracy. That sort of prussian yunkers that dominate the German officer court at this

time. His upbringing was solidly middle class. His mother came from very mind-nobility, dad was a schoolteacher. Even so, at the age of 18, Rommel was able to sign up for officer training. Now, you might be forgiven for thinking that in this deeply militarised empire, steeped in the traditions, the hierarchy of this prussian military, that his sort of unassuming background might be a problem, but it was to prove less of an issue than we might think. His sort of tell us about it.

“I think there's a bit of a myth that the only people even in the prussian army were aristocrats.”

A big chunk of them were, and an even bigger chunk in the cordial lead, and that was the famous general staff. But in reality, the German army for a long time, or German armies, better way of putting it down for a long time, hand-had middle class officers, it had to, you know, the demographics insisted that would be the case. And also, there were lots of technical arms, like the artillery, the engineers. Eventually, we're going to get armour, not quite,

yeah, pre-first world war. And as a result of all of that, you needed people with education,

they didn't just typically have to come from an aristocratic background. And so, people like Rommel were, and not least, because Rommel did have on his mother's side a bit of mind-in-nobility. People like Rommel were fairly typical in the versionberg army at that time. It's one thing getting a commission. It's another being an outstanding officer. That's the big question mark that's going to be placed against anyone, including Rommel. So, he ends up as good

old infantry, though. Poor bloody infantry. Apparently he's very good at mathematics, but he wasn't outstanding as a student academically. And also, you know, as we've already discussed, he didn't come from the absolute top draw. And therefore, wasn't able to choose where he was going to go.

grounding him, frankly, down, because if you can prove to be an outstanding junior officer in

“the infantry, particularly in combat, that's really going to stand you in good step.”

In 1912, Rommel completed Officer Training. It was commissioned in the 124th Virtemberg infantry regiment. So, look, let's take a step back here, look at the broader picture of Europe, as you know, 1912's all about to happen. So, with the German Empire founded in 1871, and a lot of catching up to do, it was surrounded by great empires. Britain had begun industrialization decades before, and it now ruled over the largest empire on the planet. Germany's ancestral foe, France,

was expanding rapidly on the global stage, big empire North Africa, South East Asia elsewhere, even if it did face some issues at home. Russia, to the east, controlled giant swathes of territory, and could bring to bear massive resources. So, by the 1890's, the leaders of Germany had determined that they needed rapid industrialization, and they needed to expand their

“military. Not only to survive, surrounded as they thought they were by enemies, but to, by German”

membership of this great power club, Germany wanted to be a player. It would pursue a policy of Veltopolitik world policy. It wanted to become an imperial superpower. It had great advantages. It had coal, had iron, German industry exploded. The steel mills of the rar and nazar, valleys churned out vast quantities of steel, railways were carved across the empire, transport raw materials and goods, brilliant universities, trained chemist engineers and physicists who would

work hand-in-hand with industry. At the same time that industrial might was harnessed to further the military. Hardware was pumped out, fantastic state-of-the-art battleships, artillery pieces, but also things like belt buckles for infantry. All able-bodied men were required to serve in the Imperial German army. So that means that Germany could mobilize millions of men with military experience at short notice if there was war. Those same railways that they'd built transport

industrial goods could also rapidly move troops across the empire. And that gave Germany a great advantage. It could move troops from land frontier to land frontier very quickly. The German general staff became masters of logistics. They dominated train time tables of a planned all sorts of war scenarios. War plans of incredible details were drawn up. In anticipation of a future conflict. One thing this new German is particularly proud of was it's navy. That would really

be a token of its status on the world stage. Now, you only have to look at a map so that Germany didn't need a cutting-edge navy to defend itself against France and Russia. But they still wanted navy because this is an era in which global trade, colonial, influx, diplomatic prestige.

Well that's all inextricably linked to sea power. The German Emperor, Vilhelm, had always been jealous

of his British first cousin. King Emperor George the Fifth who presided over the most powerful navy on the planet. The Royal Navy had allowed the British Empire to project power to the thirdest reaches of the planet. And the theory went that if Germany could build a fleet strong enough to challenge the Royal Navy, then Britain might be scared of Germany. It would avoid confrontation or it would treat Germany with respect as an equal. So that's the picture, really. By the time

Owen Rommel joins the Vertenberg Infantry in 1912. Germany is a massive continental empire. It's got a extraordinary military machine that seems to be permanently poised for war. It's got a fleet out there in the North Sea and the Baltic that's giving the British nightmares. And just two years later, in 1914, all that machinery ruled into motion for a young ambitious officer being shaped by the martial culture of the German Empire, war couldn't have come

and a more perfect time. This was a real opportunity and it's fascinating the speed with which

“he grasps it with both hands. I think one thing you have to say about him physically he wasn't huge”

done. He's a relatively small rencily slight bill, but he's very hardy. He's tough and he's incredibly

brave. He always had been from a young boy getting into little tussles with schoolmates. He

would never allow you know someone who appeared to be physically bigger to get the better of him. And that was a lesson he absolutely brought to his career as a young soldier as a young platoon commander. If he saw a problem immediately ahead, he went straight for it. Personally, you know, it didn't send his men ahead of him. He actually would go for it himself. I mean, I suppose the initial encounter right at the beginning of the first World War. This is August 1914 when he first comes into contact

with the enemy French troops. He's leading a scouting troop ahead. There are only three guys with him and they come across a group of French soldiers who aren't actually expecting them.

he goes straight for them orders the three guys with him to open fire and they take a number of them prisoner. And that is just absolutely typical rumble. He's not going to wait for support. He is going to take an opportunity and he is going to act very aggressively in any situation. He finds himself in. Now, I saw a lot of paper has been a lot of ink has been split. A lot of blood has been shared by historians like you on this subject of decision making in the German army compared

to other armies in World War I. Was he encouraged to do that? Are these young, well-trained,

“highly motivated, physically fit young, you have to be allowed to make decisions, perhaps,”

given more authority, more decision making than their equivalents in other combat nations at this point? Definitely. Comparatively speaking, there we have to say, Dan, you can absolutely overdo the point and I'll give you an illustration when he does overdo it and there were many instances actually. We'll see this later on in his career as he climbs the ranks and of course he has more men under his command where he will go off,

you know, like a bullet of gate without necessarily informing superiors. There's one classic example of that in early 1915 when he is effectively ordered to take his troops forward in an attack

that is not intended to be pressed particularly firmly. He sees an opportunity breaks into the first

kind of bit of the defenses and just keeps going. This again is against the French. And finds himself in a position where he's way behind enemy lines, but with only a relatively small number of

“troops with him. Now what he was hoping is his superiors, the other company commanders,”

the other people in his battalion are going to see the situation he's in and they're going to come and support him. Their argument is he's gone out on a limb and he's up to him to extricate himself, which he does incredibly effectively, partly by being aggressive initially and then by pulling back and getting all his men back. He's very disappointed at the way everyone else is behaved within the battalion. They think he's really gone out on a limb and has put him and his men

under threat. So you can see in that one example down there, there were limits to younger officers and certainly NCOs. There was a tradition in the even in the Imperial German army of them using

a certain amount of initiative. But you could take that too far and basically driving this wedge

deep into the enemy line without support was perceived by his superiors as being a little bit irresponsible. Even if his provider got him into hot water as superiors, in the trench of the Western Front, Rommel built himself a reputation for boldness, initiative and courage. He led from the front. He exposed himself to danger alongside his troops. He demonstrating distinctive grasp of maneuver warfare, even in those trenches trying to outflank your enemy, trying to exploit surprise,

press attacks relentlessly. By 1915, he had the iron cross, he'd earn that medal. Both first and second class, I should say, and he was made a company commander in an elite new unit that

“specialised in mountain warfare, the Alpine Corps. And I think we can say for certain is that Rommel”

cared about his men. Casualties are always going to be inevitable, but his operating principle

was that the more certain, the more bold you are in your military actions, the fewer casualties you'll take. And during some larger scale operations in 1917, he would test this strategy to its limit. In 1917, Italy was an especially bad shape. Since 1915, the Italians had joined the Anton, the Allies, Britain and France and others. And it's army had launched 11 offensive against the Austro-Hungarians along the Asso-Mso River. These battles gained little ground and cost enormous

numbers like. I mean, if you think the Western Front was bad, honestly, these other fronts, I think actually they were. Over 700,000 combined casualties by most estimates for a total advance of just a few kilometres. Morales, fragile units were depleted and overextended. Leadership was rigid and disconnected from reality at the front. Now, many of you will be familiar with the trench warfare in France and Belgium. And this is similar, but worse in a way, imagine

trench warfare, but among mountain peaks at altitude, the airs thin, fighting is particularly exhausting, extreme weather rolls down on you in seconds to blind or freeze you. Shell blasts and thousands of jagged shards of rock, carining into human flesh. This also front was just a nightmare, even by the stands of the First World War. And the Austro-Hungarians were also desperate and over stretch and they asked Germany for help and Berlin agreed with conditions. Instead of just

maintaining that grinding slog, the Germans wanted a decisive blow, a new kind of attack, fast, ruthless, caparetto was chosen as the weak point. Their plan relied on infiltration. So, rather these mass infantry assaults you'll be familiar, they thought about deploying specially trained mountain units that would slip through weak points and push deep into the enemy rear, causing confusion and panic and eventually collapse. Now, this is Rommel's signature,

this is in his wheelhouse. That offensive began on October 24th, 1917. German and Austro-Hungarian

Rommel went straightly used his playbook. He's sort of ignored really how things were unconventionally

“he advanced, wherever resistance was weakest. He scaled steep slopes, the Italians believed”

they were impossible. He split his force into small groups, he took advantage of the Italians' rigid command structure, which meant that when Italian units were cut off and out flanked, they often just surrendered because they weren't receiving instructions anymore. And they didn't

realise how many men had actually surrounded them, it might only be a handful. And Rommel never

stopped to consolidate, he just kept moving and moving and moving. His most famous action came at Mount Matagir, a dominant peak overlooking the Italian rear. With few of them 200 men, Rommel advanced for hours through broken terrain by passing enemy positions, striking violent expected directions. By the time the Italian defenders realised the threat, Rommel's troops already behind them. And over the course of the day, Italians just became completely

demoralised. The enemy's behind you assumed that the situation is collapsed. Entire units surrendered. Some estimates, but the total figure of captured Italians as high as 9000 with some 80 odd artillery pieces guns taken to boot. By contrast, Rommel's forces probably took a couple of dozen casualties dead and wounded at most. It's astonishing. And here's that principle on full display. Act swiftly, violently, decisively, spontaneously, and your men will be better off for it.

For his efforts, Rommel was awarded Germany's second highest on a polar merit or the blue max.

But with Rommel, you always have to check yourself and ensure you're not straying into myth.

“The truth is that those achievements were about circumstances. They were about Italian weakness”

as well as his own brilliance. So the lessons that he took from the first floor, I think possibly they might hinder him as much as helping when he took on a different kind of foe, like the famous fighting British general Bernard Monty Montgommery. Here's all again. What's interesting about Rommel is that in the first world war, I think it was very fortunate in the theatres he fought in and you could argue the same thing the second world war. So he fights in the mountains a lot and there

are fewer defenders. It's easier to hide in the foes of ground. And if you're thinking about the western front with these two massively entrenched with a lot of artillery support facing each other, that's when Monty gets most of the experience. And that's where Monty learns that firepower is everything. That is not to say the Rommel doesn't consider firepower important. He does, but he considers it important in as far as you bring fire to bear on a particular point and then

you infiltrate. So those lessons that he's learned in the first world war, in the nature of the

fighting that he was involved in, particularly in the mountains, he is going to bring into practice in the second world war. He's going to bring them into practice both as an armored commander, but also when he actually gets into the desert. So in 1918, as you know, the first world war came to an end, Germany lost for those of you who don't know, I'll spade the glory details, but from 1918 onwards, Germany went through a very painful period of our people. The economy would collapse

and employment run rampant, militias roam the streets, coups took place, multiple coups, and this chaos would set the stage for the next global conflict. Most importantly for our story, the German army, the Reichswehr, was drastically reduced in size. Rommel, like many officers, was forced to accept what he felt was an unjust and humiliating defeat. And the next few years, he would have to adapt from the lofty heights of mountain top victories to the monotonous

“slog of military life in a much smaller army during peacetime. I think the simple fact that”

he's been selected is one of the 100,000 members of the Reichswehr, and remember the end of the First World War. Germany was forced to reduce its armed forces to just 100,000 strong for the army. And that meant that an army that had been millions at the end of the First World War, all of a sudden had to shrink to this tiny size. And they were very choosey about who they selected as their officers in particular for this reduced army. And he was one of the chosen people,

but inevitably during this peacetime period, it took a long time to get promotion. I mean, by 1931, he's finally promoted major. And he's already 40. So we love to think of this vunderkinge. You know, he'd done extraordinary things in the First World War, but he's a relatively slow process of promotion and sort of getting on in his career. Because that was the nature of the interwar military. Now, things are going to change after Hitler takes power. Of course,

when the German armed forces gets expanded exponentially, but up until that point, it's relatively tough sledding for him. You know, he gets some experiences in his structure in infantry tactics. He eventually gets promoted to left-hand and colonel in charge of this Yager battalion in about 1934, but it's been a slow gradual process up until then. And he hasn't really had an opportunity to put a lot of these principles, which he has learned

in the First World War, yet interpractice. In January 1933, the leader of the Nazi party,

by the end of the First World War by the Treaty of Versailles. They thought about the turmoil

“that had followed, and they believed that the Nazi party offered something powerful. National”

revival, there'd be economic recovery. There'd be a return of national pride. There'd be strong leadership, and massive state-funded public works rolled out, unemployment was reduced, and it was further reduced by a rapid program of rearmament. Rommel, a career army officer. Well, the one veteran, he was not immune to that appeal. In 1970, published a very interesting book, so infantry attacks are really at university and it's great. And it's a detailed study of his First World War experiences,

especially the infiltration tactics he'd mastered at Cabaretto. And the book was significant, it attracted lots of attention from military thinkers around the world. But most importantly, it put him in direct contact with Adolf Hitler. Hitler admired bold, aggressive commanders, men who embodied speed and surprise and offensive spirit and doing things unusually, and Rommel's style fit that image perfectly. I wouldn't be at all surprised if Hitler subsequently

“envied Rommel. For so completely embodying his image of a modern German battlefield commander,”

something that Hitler would love to have been seen as. Rommel, in turn, was impressed by Hitler's apparent political boldness, Germany's recovery. And like many officers, he just appreciated the restoration of military spending of prestige. He liked the fact that the army was growing, more opportunities for him. And it seemed to eradicate some of the memory of Germany's defeat, which was a source of frustration, sadness, embarrassment for him.

He's a great fan of Hitler's. He's not alone in that, of course. He has a very

haunted reputation from the First World War, but he also, he's well-known, even in the 1930s

in Camandides, Yager Battalion, as a very aggressive commander, Mani Drills, his troops relentlessly. A man who is not interested in Admin per se, he's perceived to be a man of action. At the same time, he's at a matter of Hitler, because like many officers of that time, there was a sense

“that Germany had been stabbed in the back at the end of the First World War, whether that myth was”

true or not, they certainly believed it. Germany hadn't been utterly defeated on the field, it was so the argument. Therefore, other elements, the socialist in Rommel's mind, Hitler, of course, you know, conflated the socialist with a Judeo Bolshevik conspiracy. But nevertheless, the idea that a leader would come in, who would rejuvenate the army, would make Germany great again, would carry out a series of bloodless conquests, the remilitarization of the Rhine land,

the Anxilus with Austria, even, and this did make people nervous. It's true, even the deal that was done to get this to date in land in the end of 1938. And at this point, he'd already come to Hitler's attention. He was actually working as an instructor at the War Academy, in Potstam, in Berlin. Hitler was aware of it, he'd met in the year before, and he was given what was considered to be quite a prestigious post, which was a posting from the War Ministry

attached to the Hitler youth organization. Now, he didn't last long in that position, but he was given command of the Fuhrer Escort Battalion. Both when Hitler went into the Sardatian land, with all the cheering German Sardatians in the end of 1938. And also in 1939, when he enters Prague, after the bloodless capture of the rest of Czechoslovakia. So, for those two moments, you could see that there was favor from Hitler, but also from Rommel, there was a sense of Hitler's amount of

destiny, leading Germany to greatness. And at that point, he was all in as a supporter. As a mutual respect group between the two men, Rommel, we increasingly threw a lot in with the Fuhrer, even as Nazi antisemitism stepped up a gear with the outbreak of the Second World War and became impossible to see beyond. Now, much has been made of Rommel's dance and

antisemitism. He never formally joined the Nazi party, but as a senior, Vammart commander,

he can't be considered as anything other than complicit in the crimes of the Nazi regime. At the beginning of the Second World War, he's promoted to major generals. So, he's gone from major in 1931 to major general in 1939, and he's on his way, but it's the posting, he gets the significant. He's given command of Hitler's field headquarters at the start of the Second World War. So, for the whole of the Polish campaign, he's in charge of the Escort Battalion and the whole

administrative arrangement around Supreme Headquarters, where Hitler goes he goes, and they have a chance during this period, during the whole of the Polish campaign. A lot of personal conversations, he's very admiring of what Hitler does, he gets a sense of Hitler has a real kind of feel for war. There are a number of people sort of suggesting that maybe Hitler, with his experience from the First World War, as a corpora really didn't know what he was doing. You leave that to the

He absolutely felt that Hitler did have something. He's going to change that view later on,

“but at this stage of the war, they were relatively close. And the question marks start coming at”

this stage, Dan, as to what did Rommel know and when? Did he know, for example, of some of the darker aspects of what was happening in the Polish campaign? The answer to that, in my view, is probably not at this stage. He is going to find out about it later. Of course, in the wake of all the armies going into Poland, you've got the Einsatzgruppen who are carrying out terrible atrocities, but it's probable at this stage that he certainly was aware of the anti-Semitism in Germany. He didn't

personally agree with that. He did believe so we think that there was a Jewish problem, but only in so far as Jews within Germany weren't necessarily loyal to the state. They had lauded to their own community. He felt that was slightly problematic, but he certainly wasn't a virulent anti-Semi, and he certainly wasn't a supporter of the more violent acts like Crystal Nact in November 1938.

“It listens to Dan's nose history, because we're coming up.”

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So Rommel's opinion on the Jews is a little bit ambiguous in the late 1930s, but his stance on war is anything but. This is the man who'd storm the peaks of caparetto,

and with the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, he wants to be back on those front lines.

I mean, on the one hand, being so close to Hitler was a privileged position, you know, he could see the campaign unfolding, but he also wanted to take part in being in charge of Hitler's Supreme Headquarters was not really giving him an opportunity for any action. So a couple of months after that, he puts in for a posting as there any chance I can get my hands on one of the armoured divisions. There were only ten at that time, Panzer divisions. So these were much

sought after posting, and importantly, of course, Dan, he had no armoured experience. So the chances him getting it were relatively scanty if he hadn't had such close relationship with Hitler. Apparently, he was turned down initially, but Hitler interceded, and he's given command of the 7th Panzer Division. And as soon as he takes command, you see the classic rumble fingerprint being put all over this division. You know, it's an armoured force that has a Panzer regimen. It has

Panzer grenadiers in support that effectively armoured infantry. It also has a reconnaissance battalion, but this is a formation that's designed to be used as a striking force. And those are exactly the lessons that rumours learned from the first World War. So he can't wait to get into action. He trains with these man, he's very fair to make sure everyone knows what they're doing. He trains incessantly so that they can move in close formation. But already from this early stage,

you're getting the sense that someone, even though he's a divisional commander, actually wants to be up close to the scene of the action with the individual bits of the 7th Panzer Division,

he's never going to remain back in the rear like a normal major general wood. I suppose the most

famous incident. I mean, it's well-known, you know, the Blitz Creek campaign, the use of the Rden,

“the arrival at the Mers River. But the key thing is how quickly can you get across the Mers River?”

This was the big barrier. If they can break through the French defenses on the Mers River and get into the rear, then Blitz Creek has a chance, which is you drive these armoured formations deep into the enemy rear, causing the sort of dislocation he'd done with infantry in the first World War. But you've got to get across the Mers River first. And that was a major obstacle. The French are defending it from the far side. And when he arrives, or at least the 7th Panzer Division arrives

at the Mers River, remember this stage, Dan, a number of Panzer divisions are arriving at the river

at the same time and they all got the task of getting across, which is the first division across.

It's the 7th Panzer Division mainly because Rommel himself takes personal charge of the crossing. He goes right up. He directs the crossing of infantry in small rubber dinghies. He goes across himself. There's a counter attack against one of the bridgeheads. The E, personally directs and manages to fight off. Then he goes back across, gets the Panzers to cross over a pontoon bridge a little bit further north. And then at that stage, he's able to lead the Panzer Division

forward in our coups with other Panzer divisions into this stage of Blitz Creek that is

by some within the 7th Panzer Division. He's putting himself in too much personal jeopardy.

“If he gets killed, we lose the commander. And in any case, even if you take the individual”

elements of a Panzer Division, the commanders of those elements wouldn't necessarily have been right up at the front. And yet as the division of commander, he was in that position. So on the one hand, he's making a real difference. But on the other hand, he's acting in a way that is likely to take him out of direct communication. He's disrupting the chain of commander. That's something he's got a continued doing. Even though he becomes more senior, core commander, army commander,

and even army group commander later on in the war. Rommel 7th Chamber Division appeared to be unstoppable. During the invasion of France, they'd found so quickly that their own high command often apparent didn't know where they were. That alone the bewildered allied defenders. Their speed, in fact, weren't the nickname, the ghost division. They would come out of thin air, and then just melt away at a moment's notice. During the advance on Cherbourg, the division famously

covered 150 miles in just 24 hours. It was a record for Armoured Warfare. I'm sure Genghis Khan's cavalry beat that. But a record for modern Armoured Warfare. The French garrison surrendered just

two days later. As he had during the first war, what he'd do is he would buy past strong points,

he wouldn't attack them directly. He left pockets of resistance to be cleared out by following infantry. Instead, he focused on outflanking, on disrupting enemy communications rear areas, showing complete confusion and terror. On the 22nd of June, an armistice was signed with the French and Rommel cemented himself in as really the rising star of the German military. But with the advantage of hindsight, there's still just a little lingering question. To what extent are these

successes Rommels? Was he brilliant as a commander? Or was this question of technology of operational doctrine? Was this the high water market, like the apex moment of this kind of what we call

“Blitzkrieg Warfare? I think it's a bit of both. I mean, there's no question that other”

Panzer divisions were doing remarkable things. But the division that was generally gaining the

most ground was the seventh Panzer Division. It was the first one across the murs. It had the record

that the number of miles covered in a single day. It was responsible almost single handedly for cutting off and capturing the haunted 51st Highland Division, the subject of my very first book, where I first came across Rommel. And although he was perceived to be someone in Hitler's favor, and therefore he only got the job as a result of that, he certainly did by his performance live up to the hype as it were. The end result of all of this is that he ends the French campaign,

which of course is a total destruction of not only the French army, but also the B.F., which is forced to withdraw from Dunkirk as the most famous divisional commander in the German army. And the only one to be granted, you know, sort of personal audience with Hitler as a result of all of that.

“And you know, if you think that the more senior commanders like Von Runchtet, a Colonel general,”

Von Hoff, and various other characters, Kluger are much more senior in rank than him. There was already at this point a cut of sense of this guy's getting far too much attention, a sense of jealousy, as you can imagine, among the other senior commanders. Rommel's mutual advice, underway, and the jealousy of his colleagues wasn't going to stop him. Meanwhile, hundreds of miles away, North Africa, things were also in motion.

So Hitler's ally, they'd tell you that Mussolini had declared war on Britain, and he hoped to profit from, or he assumed, was the imminent German victory in Europe, so he wanted to seize Britain's possessions in North Africa, and sort of rebuild the Roman Empire of the Mediterranean. In September, Italian forces in Libya, which they already controlled, invaded British controlled Egypt, who went badly. In December, the British launched

Operation Compass, which is an astonishing counter offensive, it just shattered and humiliated the much larger Italian army. Within weeks, tens of thousands of Italian troops were captured, large amounts of equipment had been lost, and the British advanced deep into Libya. Far from conquering North Africa, Italy's North African position was close to total collapse. They were about to be conquered, and Mussolini urgently requested German help.

Now Hitler was not enthusiastic about this talk. He was, by early 1941, only interested

in the Soviet Union. North Africa is a side shot, it's a distraction, but the problem is he couldn't

let Italy's position collapse completely. If Libya fell, Britain would gain prestige, and it would threaten southern Europe, it would destabilise the access. So Hitler agreed to send a limited German force, the Deutsche Africa court, the D.A.K. And the plan was that this might sound familiar, it would be an elite hearteting force of tanks and infantry who, through speed and excellence and sheer violence, would deal a decisive

blow to the British. They would shore up their talent defense. Rommel's battle field exploits in France that earned him Hitler's respect and admiration, so it was to rumble that he

teeth into no one to answer to, Rommel was raring to go. This is perfect for him, really,

“isn't it? And partly because the terrain, you know, the great expanses of North Africa are”

going to give his particular form of mobile warfare an opportunity to play out, but also because he's so separate from the immediate chain of command. I mean, it's interesting during the whole of the North African camp, and he's technically under the command of the Italians. But he also has this line of appeal all the way back to the OKW, that's the armed forces high command, and that the apex of that Hitler himself. And he certainly uses it. So if, for

example, he's given an order by the Italians like he was when he first arrives in North Africa,

really to bail them out of a hole. The Italians have been roundly defeated by the British, driven all the way back to Tripoli. I mean, there's a real danger they're going to be forced out of North Africa itself. Africa Corps goes the other way with Rommel attached. There's only two divisions to begin with, and only one of those is arrived by the time Rommel begins to take immediate

“action when he arrives in Tripoli. He's effectively told by his Italian commanders, just act”

on the defensive. Let's just shore up the ship, and then we can consider once we build up supplies, and we've got more of your troops, both of your divisions over, to actually take the initiative. Well, he doesn't pay any attention to that tall. He immediately rounds up any of the forces

he can, including some of the motorized Italian forces, and takes the initiative. Again,

it's lucky for him, a British and Commonwealth force that is not the force that had just defeated the Italians, mainly because a lot of those faction troops have been said to Greece. This is a much less experienced force. It's strung out, it's not well-led, and it's perfect fodder for his type of aggressive action, which in astonishingly short period of time, just a few weeks, manages to retake all the ground that's just been lost and recover the whole of Cyreneica,

which in effect means that Libya, the original Italian colony, is now back under Axis control.

“Is he up at the front in this campaign? He's always at the front, so this is an extraordinary”

thing about Rommel. I mean, it's a miracle he's not killed, but his feeling is, you go that person, he moves around in an armored car or a stalk, I mean he'll fly overhead, there are instances of him in the North African campaign looking down from the torch, radioing down to his subordinate commanders and saying, if you don't get a move on, I'm going to come down and make you get a move on. So he, on the one hand, had this all seeing

eye when he was up in the air, but on the other hand, and this is not always entitled to his credit,

he would drive his arm and car right to the point of the attack, forcing people forward, encouraging them, organizing petrol supplies, trying to e-count, and because this is a big issue all the way through the North African campaign, supplies, there's often been an accusation that he didn't pay any attention to logistics, he did pay attention to logistics, but he paid attention to taking risks even more so, and that meant that supply people who are under him,

weren't literally tearing their hair out, because they knew that the more successfully was in the more ground he gained, the harder it would be to supply those troops, and the more danger he would put those troops in, and it was that constant battle really between him thinking, where you can defeat an enemy by getting deep into their rear, and his staff officers knowing actually those troops have got to be resupplied. So we got the friction here between Rommel's audacious

style of command and the hard realities of warfare. Sure, motivation and innovation will achieve great feet on the battlefield, Rommel proved that in spades, but at some point, the laws of gravity apply, soldiers succumb to the same fact as the limited armies for centuries, you need lots of, well, everything stuff, particularly modern armies, you need sleep, you need food, you need fresh water, you need bullets and grenades and petrol, a replacement parts, even hardened veterans need that,

I mean, they need socks and new boots, as Rommel pushed further into the desert, and chased the Brits around North Africa, the more stretch and tenuous and fragile these supply lines came, and his army's fighting ability suffered as a result. His neglect of those logistics is the most commonly cited criticism against him, I suppose it's that fair though. What was other options, can a case be made that this was the only route open to him, you know,

sort of I really go back and forward on this subject and particularly reading your book Tunis grad that was such a fantastic account of this campaign and it's finale, but in a way was Rommel right, because he faced overwhelming odds. There were plans of foot for another massive vanglo American anger allied landing in North West Africa, the Italians and the Germans were really up against it. Was Rommel right to just see if he could throw a Hail Mary, see if he could punch

the other guy on the teeth and hope that they collapse, I mean, how do you now judge his performance

was right down, I think you've had the nail on the head that the longer the war goes on, particularly,

“I mean, the clock is ticking particularly after two major events in 1941, that of course is hit”

there's invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, but even more importantly, Hail Harbour at the end of 1941 which brings the Americans into the war. The clock is ticking from that point onwards. I mean, I've told the story of what happens when the Americans actually get to North Africa in late 1942, so it's that window of opportunity that he tries to take a vanglo job and almost pulls off the really improbable trick of getting all the way to the Sue

is Canal. Remember this, Dan, after the fall of Taboruk, which he's been trying to achieve for the

previous year and he finally manages it in June 1942 and begins to advance into Egypt and on towards

Alexandria and Cairo, people in Cairo are burning papers. They're thinking the game's up. They're thinking he can't be stopped. He's going to get all the way here. He's going to take the Sue's canal and he's going to cut us off from our vital oil supply lines in the middle east, so he does come

“with an ace of actually getting there. Before the Americans can bring their power to bear and I think”

it must have been incredibly frustrating for him. You can see this in his writing in the next year, or so, that what he saw as a real strategic opportunity, not just getting to the Sue is Canal, but actually advancing through the Middle East all the way to the Caucasus, was a real missed opportunity

because he was never properly resourced. I mean, it's interesting that the number of resources that

are put into Tunisia when the game is effectively almost or technically already up. If he'd been given the year before, he'd almost certainly would have succeeded in getting to the Sue's canal and he almost gets there anyway. I think if there's a question mark is that he keeps batting his head against the brick wall after he's been initially repulsed from Egypt after he's been initially repulsed from the Alameen position and that's at the beginning of July and yeah, he keeps

trying to batting his way through when it was probably clear that that wasn't going to succeed and effectively it's downhill all the way. By July, his forces were exhausted. He made a botched final attempt to defeat the British for good. He tried to encircle him at Alamehalfa and that assaults stalled near a place called L Alameen. But it would be the later famous celebrated battle L Alameen that would prove the final nail in the coffin for the German Warfare in North Africa.

That battle took place in October and it took place with Rommel's army suffering from serious problems. There were chronic fuel shortages. Overstretched supply lines, they were running all the way back to Tripoli. He was completely reliant on sea transport from Italy, which is very, very vulnerable to the Royal Navy. He had fewer tanks and fewer men than the British and their allies. Meanwhile, that British 8th Army under Bernard Montgomery was reorganized, which revitalized, monitored

built up an overwhelming superiority in men and tanks artillery and airpower, you name it every aspect of warfare. By October, the British had to lead twice as many troops, more than twice many tanks and hugely superior artillery and logistics. They had far more stuff. The result was a set piece grinding assault and ultimately weight of numbers one the day. The Axis line broke a long retreat across Egypt and Libya began and to make matters worse. To defeat that L Alameen,

coincided with Operation Torch, which saw more than 100,000 fresh allied troops land on the North West coast of North Africa and the French colonies of North Africa. From that moment on

“German hopes in North Africa had been dashed for good. The question I think is, could Rommel have”

done anything differently? His issue was twofold. You mentioned the material resources the enemy have against him, but they're also up against a ray of effective commander. Probably for the first time he's coming up against Britain's 18 as it were. I don't think he really does have an opportunity to change things because he is up against the guy who's very well prepared. He's got a well thought out plan and when that plan doesn't entirely go as he hoped it would. He adjusts on the who

from that another thing Monty was very good at and people think he's very inflexible. He has a plan and he sticks to it not a bit of it. He's constantly changing his plans on the hoof. But

always bringing to bear his advantage in fire, particularly artillery, anti-tank guns and tanks

and slowly but surely, Rommel is grounded into the dust of Alameen and it's only really thanks to him that the army gets away. That is, his plans are army gets away with any resources because of course, Hitler famously wanted him to stand fast. It's in order he exceeds two for 24 hours and then actually takes it on his own initiative to order a retreat. Which, by the way, is something

C Hitler and the Wolfsler headquarters and tells him the gains up in North Africa. He could see that

“by the end of 1942 and he was absolutely right. Hitler's not prepared to accept that not least”

because he has to support Mussolini and so they pour more and more troops into a theatre that is going to result in one of the biggest disasters for the Germans in the Second World War. And that was not Rommel's fault. There's Dan Snow's history. There's more on this topic coming up. Ever wondered what it feels like to be a gladiator facing a roaring crowd and potential death

in the Coliseum. Find out on the ancients podcast from History Hit. Twice a week, join me, Tristan Hughes, as I hear exciting new research about people living thousands of years ago from the Babylonians to the Coats to the Romans and visit the ancient sites which

reveal who and just how amazing our distant ancestors were. That's the ancients from History Hit.

“In late 1942, the Allies were advancing from both directions.”

He got Montgomery's 8th Army coming from the east and then from the west he got American British forces who landed in Morocco and Algeria and so German force in Africa and now facing a two front war. A source said the German High Command continued to pour troops into the region. Had they arrived earlier? Well, who knows what happened? But now it was a bit pointless. Rommel was telling them that defeat was inevitable. These German troops were a bit airlifted

into Tunisia. Now Rommel did have some advantages here. He suddenly had shorter supply lines from Italy to Sicily and into Tunisia. He also had Tunisia's rugged terrain which helps his defense. The American troops go up against him while inevitably at the start of the war for them. They were inexperienced and he was able to inflict a bloody nose at the casserine past the Americans took sharp losses but ultimately this didn't really matter much. The game was up. In March 1943,

Rommel who was personally exhausted. He was in poor health. He was recalled to Germany, officially on medical leave but in reality, well in reality he'd been pulled out before the inevitable defeat. The North African campaign was lost. By May, the Axis forces surrendered.

Around 250,000 German Italian troops went into captivity. Rommel would never return to the desert.

Back in Europe, well things changed a lot since the heady days of the invasion of France. Germany was now firmly on the defensive. The Soviet Union was pushing West after Stalingrad. The Allies invaded Sicily in July 1943. Italy was teetering on the edge and would soon attempt to switch sides. Hitler needed capable commanders to help him defend his empire in Europe against. The inevitable Anglo-American invasion in the West. Rommel's reputation made him the obvious choice.

In 1893, Rommel was appointed inspector of coastal defenses. Later command of Army Group B, which was responsible for defending northern France and the low countries against that allied invasion. He was tasked with stopping what everybody knew was coming. Now this would not be easy. The Allies had an overwhelming superiority, particularly now in the American military industrial power behind them. The superroutine and everything. Airpack naval forces, troop numbers, industrial

production, you name it. Rommel knew Germany could not win a prolonged battle of

a tradition in France. He believed that the invasion had to be defeated in the first few hours

on the beaches. The Allies had to be thrown back into the sea, prevented from landing really in the first place. And to do this, he came up with a plan. His plan, and it was a sensible plan, because it was the only plan that could have worked, was to defeat the Allies before they actually land. So defeat the Allies on the beaches. You don't let them get off the beaches.

“And the only way he's going to be able to do that is if he's given enough counter-attacking power,”

and that's effectively Panzer divisions. And at this stage of the war, there are ten Panzer divisions in France. There's a big argument between him and the commander of the Panzer forces von Schreppenberg as to the strategy for using these Panzers. Rommel wants them to be available, so therefore close to the coast. Von Schreppenberg wants them all kept in the central sort of reserves so that they can then be deployed. But Rommel knows that Allied Airpower

is not going to allow them the time and the opportunity to just deploy and get to the beaches. And even if there is the time, they're probably going to get there too late. So they need to be close to the shoreline and they need to react immediately. Well, the end results is a kind of hash. It's a halfway house. Hitler allows him to have three Panzer divisions here.

to have another three. And the remaining four are kept in central reserve. And the outcome of all of this is that on the day itself, there's any single Panzer Division. The 21st Panzer Division available to counter attack. And it doesn't counter attack in time partly because Rommel's not there and not able to issue the necessary orders. Is it true also that there were further hold ups on the 6th of June because of various decisions they hit that to make whether those

Panzers could be unleashed on the beaches as well? Yeah. Well, it was seems to be clear as that Rommel had the authority to use the Panzer divisions that he already had in his area of operations. But remember, his area of operations included the whole of the paddock hallay. So some of the

“armoured divisions were up there. That's why there was only one available for a day. And really”

it's the speed with which you can get the Panzers held in reserve in the centre of France quickly to the beaches. And he was this classic delay. Those Panzers aren't released until the afternoon or the day. And of course they're not going to get into position for another 24

hours. So these crucial first day, first 48 hours are lost partly because Rommel as I say

wasn't physically present until the end of the day. And partly because Hitler's refused to release the strategic reserve without his say. So he's not even woken up by the way. On D Day, until about 10 o'clock in the morning, you know, people are terrified of waking him. And when he is woken up, he's not immediately aware of the danger. He's still thinking the paddock hallay is where the real problem is going to come. By D Day by the summer of 1944, is it possible for any German

general to shine? It's just staving off the inevitable, you know, the greatest assault in the history of warfare against Third Reich from three different directions. Yeah, you all have little moments, I suppose, where there's an opportunity to win tactically in a relatively small area. But certainly as an army group commander, which Rommel is by 1944, there's very little opportunity. But certainly by 1944 when Rommel's an army group commander, there's no chance of winning a campaign. You know,

that up against it, there's going to be a grinding, nutritional warfare. What's interesting about Rommel is he realizes very early on in North Africa, the games up. He also realizes very early on in North Western Europe that the games up and tells Hitler on the 16th of June. That's just 10 days into D Day that basically we need to do a deal with the Western Allies because we can't hold them.

They've got air superiority. They're bringing more and more supplies. We're never going to wipe out

the bridgehead. Now it's too late. This is going to be a war of attrition. We cannot win. We need to do a deal with the Western Allies, and so at least we can save Berlin from the Soviets.

“I think that's his thinking. On July 20, 1944, we're Germany on the ropes. A bomb”

exploded at off Hitler's headquarters. His wolf's lair. The explosion was meant to kill him, but it narrowly failed. In the weeks that followed thousands were arrested and executed, including several hundred conspirators. Among the names mentioned in torture chambers across his empire as part of the conspiracy was one Irwin Rommel. As Saul said throughout June, early July 1944, Rommel had repeatedly urged Hitler to recognize reality. The war must be ended before Germany

was utterly destroyed. But Hitler refused to listen. He insisted a holding ground at all costs in fighting on. Rommel became increasingly frustrated and pessimistic. And this is where, well, his position became a little complicated. There's a lot of confusion about this. We have a

crucial meeting between Rommel and Hitler, and also Von Runchtet. From Runchetet, by the way,

has been persuaded by Rommel that they can't win in the West, and they both need to suggest to

“Hitler that they need a political solution. This is inverted commerce effectively. You need to”

start talking to the Western allies. Now, that doesn't go down well. Hitler totally shuts them down at that meeting at Margabal at the end of June. And it says a result of this that I think it coalesces in Rommel's mind as July unfolds that Hitler is a major obstacle to staving off a disastrous defeat for Germany. He needs to be removed. I think there's a kind of sense in Rommel's mind. Maybe it can be done bloodlessly. Maybe I can take responsibility by opening. He tells some of

his subordinates. There's a possibility he's going to open the Western front. In other words, order his men on the Western front to lay down their arms and let the Western allies through. And obviously, technically, get to Berlin. Just how Hitler's going to be toppled in that context. Nobody knows. Presumably, Rommel's going to be captured by the Western allies. But he's going to open the flood dates as very much in his mind that Hitler needs to be stopped one way or another.

But I don't think he ever comes to terms with the possibility, although Schwiebel, his deputy, is absolutely right at the heart of the bomb plot that they need to assassinate Hitler. That is one step too far for Rommel. And I don't think he ever goes to that point.

That's a nasty leadership. This did present an issue. Rommel was very popular in last part

“of because of the massive propaganda campaign that the Nazis had been happy to”

build around him. And so all that made a public trial quite dangerous. Hitler could not risk turning a national hero into a symbol of resistance. So a different solution that was chosen. On October 14, 1944, two generals arrived at Rommel's home and they gave him a choice. Either he would have to stand trial before a people's call, which meant humiliation. He might be tortured. He would be executed. His family could also suffer consequences.

Or he could take poison quietly. His family would be spared. He'd receive a state funeral. His reputation would be preserved. He's in an impossible position. He's effectively been denounced by one of the officers who was directly involved in the plot as Hoffa got, who was chief of staff in Paris at the time. So he's not on his staff, but Hoffa

is basically implicated him unfairly in my view. But what is clear in Rommel's own mind is that

his behavior was treasonous. So he can't really see any way out of the option. Basically, either you come to Germany and we try you or you take your own life and your family will be spared being drawn into the consequences for a traitor. It was to save his family from the consequences of what he believed in his own heart to have been treacherous or traitorous behavior. That he accepts the deal and he felt it was a good deal. I mean, you've got this heart-rending moment where he

has to tell his family, first his wife and then his son, Ma'am Fred, who's on leave at the time. This is what he's going to do, but he undoubtedly does it for the benefit of his family. And a sense that there was no way out for him at that stage. Rommel chose to take his own life. He took cyanide in a staff car outside his home. The regime announced that he died of wounds sustained in their attack and he was given a full military funeral.

The truth would only emerge after the war. So, particularly in Britain, where the memory of his jewel with Montgomery and the Western Desert is so imprinted on the popular imagination. But particularly in Britain, he is regarded as this great, some master tactician. Does he deserve that reputation? I mean, would his fellow generals in the head of the very much? Would they be angry that we'd selected him to talk about in this series about great

commanders that Second World War? I think he could fairly be described as certainly one of

the greatest German commanders of the Second World War, arguably the greatest commander of the Second World War, but he did have flaws. He was someone who sometimes took himself out of the communications loop, which is relatively unacceptable even for a divisional commander, certainly for a core commander, army commander, an army group commander, and there were times in his career in North Africa, for example, the famous race to the wire, where he goes completely in Camuna, Cardo,

and there are real consequences for the forces fighting under him. This belief that aggression

“is always going to win out, is not necessarily the case in warfare. Sometimes you have to take”

stock, you have to pause. Yes, aggression generally is a good thing, but not at the expense of all other factors, you know, how strong the enemy is, what the intelligence is, what your supplies are, and he definitely had some weaknesses in all those aspects, but on the other hands, he did win

some astonishing victories in North Africa. He was never given the opportunity, as we've already

discussed, to do that again in the Normandy campaign. He'd done outstanding work as a divisional commander. In the back of my mind, my feeling is that he probably was at his absolute height as a core commander, but a core commander's not going to really do it when you think about the greatest commanders of the Second World War. So I am slightly conflicted on that front, but I'm also slightly conflicted on the idea that he was very much white-washed, as a good German at the end of the

Second World War, because as I've already tried to explain, he was very close to Hitler, it was a great admirer of Hitler. Yes, he finally fell out of love with Hitler, but only when he perceived that the war was being lost, and by that point he was under no illusions that some pretty bad things had been done in Germany's name. He wasn't personally responsible. He tended to fight a relatively fair war, the war without hated in his expression in North Africa, and it's absolutely

true that if he was given a distasteful order in his view, he ignored it, the so-called commander order, where you execute anyone who's an allied soldier, who you capture, who's operating behind the lines, we just ignored that. A lot of commanders were captured by his forces, and they weren't executed. So he fought fairly, but he was also someone who wasn't able to detach himself from the Hitler regime until it was clear that Germany was losing the war. This is not a moral decision for him.

“This is a sense of the whole house he's coming crashing down, and that's why I think you have”

to distinguish him between some of the people involved in the bomb plot, of course most famously, the man who actually planted the bomb himself, who did have moral crimes from

actually comes to that point of view. So there are question marks in portraying him as the post-the-boy

“of the good Germans in the Second World War. I think his reputation is overdone in that sense.”

I think it's slightly overdone as a military commander, yet he did have outstanding talents, and he did produce them outstanding results.

So all you produce outstanding results, thank you very much for coming back on the podcast, where it's always such a huge pleasure buddy.

Cheers Dan, ready to check. So how should we judge Erwin Romal?

“Unquestionably, a gifted battlefield commander, particularly at the tactical and operational level,”

his instinct for movement and surprise, and used new technologies, and to keep morale high, placed him on the most effective combat leaders of that period. And yet, he also, you know, he had his limitations. He struggled with logistics and coordination, and the broader political dimensions of war. Morely, well, his legacy is complex, or perhaps not so complex, really. He might not have been an Nazi ideology. He didn't participate in war crimes on the scale

scene elsewhere, but that's not so much for Nazi generals. There was persecution of North African Jews on his watch. He certainly served a criminal regime. He benefited from its crimes, and he only distanced himself from it a bit when defeat became inevitable. In post-war years, though Romal became useful, Germany was seeking respectable military traditions. The Allies were eager to separate professional soldiers, who they were now allies with,

as West Germany joined NATO to stand against the Soviet threat. So the Allies built up these so-called professional soldiers from out and out Nazi criminals, the myth of the good

“German general grew up and we still live with that today. I think perhaps the fairest assessment”

is this. Owen Romal was neither an out and out villain or an out and out hero. He was a very

capable soldier. He was shaped by, but also ultimately totally undone by the system, which he served.

He was a brilliant commander, he headed blind spots. He's remembered for not to afford, but for the uneasy questions that his career still poses about leadership and loyalty and responsibility of a serving officer in wartime. Thanks listening to this episode of our Commander Series folks, next Monday we're going to turn to Bernard Montgomery, Rommel's nemesis, you might say, Britain's most famous World War II commander, make sure you hit following your podcast

player and it'll drop into your feed automatically. See you next time folks.