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Are Human Drivers Finally Obsolete?

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How a secret project at Google led to driverless cars on American roads.  Freakonomics Radio shares a story from our friends at Search Engine. (Part one of a two-part series.)   SOURCES: Alex...

Transcript

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PJ, how have you been? >> I've been good, how have you been? >> Yeah, I'm a little better now having listened to your series. I love it. >> Oh, thank you.

Do you recognize that voice? It is PJ vote, host of the podcast search engine in friend of Freak Namak's radio. You may remember hearing him back in 2024 when we published a search engine episode called the fascinatingly mundane secrets of the world's most exclusive

nightclub about Bergheim in Berlin. That was a great story and not too long ago, PJ came to us with another one. It's a two-part series on driverless cars. This is a topic that we have touched on many times over the years at Freak Namak's radio, but PJ decided to go deep.

The other day, I had a chance to ask him how he got interested in this. >> There's a whole lesson in this, but I've gotten, and this is not the next sentence you're going to expect me to say, to end a bench pressing. >> That's not where I thought you were going.

>> And I injured myself, I had a hernia, and then I had to have a hernia of repair, I see. So there were like some minor complications. I was not moving easily. I was in a lot of pain.

So I had kind of limited mobility. And I was visiting a friend in San Francisco and I took a waymo, and it was such an experience of the future that immediately becomes normal.

First, the idea that I would press about on my phone, a car would come out of nowhere,

driven by nobody. I would get in, watch the steering wheel turn itself. I was trying to describe to somebody recently. I was like, the first time it feels like the first time you're in an airplane, and by the third time it feels like you're in an elevator.

It was a moment where I thought, oh, it lots about to change. And it was confusing to me that people were not talking about that more. >> What should we expect to hear in the series? There are two parts. The first is really about the car, and then the second is really about the driver.

Tell me who you think are some of the most compelling characters in why?

>> So in the first part, there's this guy Sebastian Thrun. He's so good. He's this German-born roboticist, AI expert, who lost a friend as a teenager or to a car accident, and he really thinks that his invention is not just going to make money for a tech company or be more convenient.

He wants to reshape the modern world as it exists. And it's just the story of him and his team beginning to figure that out. And having ideas that sounded crazy 20 years ago and with every year towards the present have sounded more sane and at least possible. And then in the second part, I find the Boston politicians to be very vivid talkers,

very opinionated people. >> vivid is a very blatant, there's strongly opinionated. They sometimes commit gaps. When you ask them about the gaps, they are totally like, yep, I screwed that one up.

The thing that I most enjoyed about this story, which when I'm always looking for is that

particularly in the second half, every time I spoke to someone as they were talking, I thought, everything they're saying makes sense. I totally get it. I would be nodding my head vigorously for the most part. And then I would go talk to the next person who saw things completely differently and

it would just spin my head the other way. And I would think, well, this makes sense too.

And it was about trying to really do what I think we're all going to have to do a lot

of soon, which is way competing, not totally reconcilable interests, and really take them seriously. And that was us trying to do it for this one thing. >> I'll be honest with you, I've been anti-human driver for about 50 years now. 50 years. >> Oh, yeah, I mean, have you ever seen a human driver car including yourself?

We're not that good. >> No, I have no illusions about my driving skills. I'm not that good. I have a temper, I am distracted. I rode in an autonomous test vehicle at Carnegie Mellon University that a test track in Pittsburgh

on an old steel mill property. And after this one 20 minute or whatever ride, I said, give me the autonomous vehicles. It's so plainly better than I am as a driver certainly. So I'm eager for it. And I appreciate your putting the pedal to the mental for autonomous.

I hope it gives people a little context for this.

>> All the questions people have, it's a safe, what is it going to do?

We've answered as much as we can. >> Today on Freakonomics Radio, we turn the mic over to PJ and our friends at the

Sir Tension podcast for the first of a two-part series on driverless cars.

The listeners start your engines. Before we start the story today, I want to ask you to imagine a different version of your life. You're you, but it's almost 200 years ago.

Unfortunately, I don't know how I have been that at all, it's Monday morning.

It's Monday morning, and it's fairly early, pre-done.

You wake up to this really hard wrapping at your window.

That's the knocker upper here to get you up for work. We're in the 1800s before the invention of the adjustable alarm clock. The knocker upper is a job. The knocker upper walks the neighborhood with a long stick and taps it on the windows of people's houses early in the morning to wake them up for work.

Who wakes up to the knocker upper for work? Nobody knows. But this is a job, a job that'll actually exist for another century. Outside the gas street lamps are still burning. The lamplighter lit them the night before.

He's supposed to come at dawn to extinguish them, but it's so early that he hasn't yet. Your lamplighter is one of those neighbors you have a deep fondness for. A fixture. Every day you watch him make the rounds at dusk, but this ladder at his light.

You yourself are a driver.

Professional driver, 200 years ago, is also a job.

You're a person who sits on a coach and holds the reins of a horse. You take passengers where they want to go. You start your work day. Okay, hypothetical over. Two of those jobs are obviously so long to appear that most people don't know about them.

The knocker upper is your iPhone alarm. The lamplighter is the electric street light. The third one, driver, has persisted. As a job for some as a routine human task for nearly everyone else. This is a story about whether that's about to change.

It's about how the word driver, which right now makes me picture a human, could soon transform to refer to a machine. The same way the word dishwasher, printer, and computer all dead. I've thought about this maybe too much in the year. I've been working on this story.

In conversations constantly, I'd ask the human, say, met the same question. Are you a good driver? Are you? Do you consider yourself a good driver? I do.

Within limits.

I think I'm a good driver because I understand the limitations of my driving.

This is Alex Davies. He wrote an excellent book called "Driven," the race to create the autonomous car. Alex, like me, thinks a lot about human driving, about his own personal limitations. What are the limitations?

The limitations are that I can't always pay attention to everything that I get tired.

I've been trying really hard to be calmer in the road. My husband and I are expecting our first baby this fall. Congratulations. Thank you, and I thought that along with like reading all the baby books a good project to work on is just be calmer in the car.

A very good resolution, because of course, for most of us, driving is the riskiest behavior we routinely engage in. In fact, even Alex, despite his good intentions, would actually get in a car accident just a few months after we first spoke. He was okay.

It was the car that was told. Safety is the entire pitch for the driver of this car, which is really a car driven by a computer. The driverless cars don't get drunk, tired, or distracted.

They never text or feel road rage.

And these driverless cars, they aren't the future, they're actually already here. But it's funny, if you just don't happen to live in a place that already has them, it's easy to not see how fast things are changing. Robotaxes, like waymo, are operating in 10 American cities, providing millions of rides to Americans.

In China, the road is happening even more widely during twice as many cities. But here, if you live in a place like San Francisco or Austin, today a driverless car is about as exotic as an Uber. A passenger in those cities opens up their phone and decides who should drive them. A human driver, or a robot driver.

How that happened is a story. A story we are living through right now, whose ending promise is to totally reshape the place we live. And today we're going to tell you how we got here, in chapters. Chapter one, Dreams Without Drivers.

So it turns out this dream that inventors have had to replace the human driver with some kind of machine, that dream is about as old as the lamplighters. People have been thinking about a self-driving car for... Still, it's about as long as there's been a human-triven car? Why? There's this funny thing you lose when you move from the horse to a human-triven car, which is said, in a first-drawn

carriage, the horse is not just gonna run off a cliff if you let go of the reins. You lose sentience in your vehicle.

When automobiles first arrived, these powerful and non-sension cars, there's actually a

Passionate fight to keep them off the streets.

It was the 1800s and people feared these new things.

The steam powered vehicles thundering down the roads that soon evolved into gas powered

vehicles, also thundering down the roads. The fear was partly about jobs. These vehicles were seen as a huge threat to a whole network of working-class jobs. Horse breeders and horse-fairers, horse-feed suppliers, horse manure haulers, horse carriage manufacturers, not to mention the teamsters.

Teamsters today, the word makes me think of the teamsters union, but originally the teamsters were the workers who drove teams of horses. Teamsters were like truckers before we had trucks. Cars seemed to imparrel all these horse-related jobs, and even if you weren't worried

about these workers, the cars were also less safe.

Some anti-car activists battled to stop or slow the new technology. Mainly with regulations. There were red flag laws, which said if you had not of a bill, you had to hire a person to walk in front of it, waving a giant red flag to warn people. In Pennsylvania, a law was proposed requiring horse-less carriage drivers who encountered

livestock to stop, disassembled their car, and hide the parts behind the busives. The governor vetoed it. But the thing about these crazy anti-car activists, it's a directionally, they were right. Those cars did initially wipe out a lot of jobs, even if they created more. Cars were very unsafe.

The cities that threw their doors open to cars without regulation were rewarded with astonishing death rates. To try it, let drivers pretty much run wild. In the early 1900s, deaths accumulated, in a Detroit without driver's licensees stoplates or turn signals.

Many of those deaths were children. It took decades for society to mostly learn to live with cars. The rest of the story is just the world you grew up in. We invented laws, licenses, drivers ed, we learned to better design roads, we invented the highway, the seat belt, the airbag.

All those things made driving less deadly, although the smartphone reversed some of that progress. Nationally, today, deaths from cars are about as common in America as deaths from guns or opioids, about one in a hundred. It'll probably happen to someone you know in your life, maybe several summons.

Whether or not you see that as an urgent problem to solve, depends on you. But as long as there have been cars, there have been people who wanted to truly solve

what's left of the safety problem, the best way we knew how.

They wanted to make the car more like the horse it replaced, make the car more sensiant. And so that thought is there early and like early visions of it include, oh, we'll have radio controlled cars because they had radios at the time. There's a real effort at one point to build magnets under the road. And at each stage, what a self driving car can be is dictated by the technology that's

available at the time from the most part. Yeah, no one's thinking that much about a vehicle that thinks for itself. They're just thinking about a vehicle that the person in it doesn't have to drive. Many different attempts, many different failures. As many wonders as we invented, we could not approach natures, most majestic creation,

a horse is brain. At least not until the turn of the millennium. Deep within the Department of Defense, there's a little no military agency that has created some of the most innovative technology of the 20th century. This is the story of DARPA Chapter Two, DARPA's million dollar prize.

DARPA's current goal is to develop autonomous military vehicles, machines that can operate on their own without drivers.

This is from a documentary called The Million Dollar Challenge, honestly less a doc,

more an ad for DARPA, the Pentagon's Research Arm. DARPA's mission is to try to keep American technology one generation ahead of everybody else.

It doesn't always work, but DARPA has invented or funded a lot.

The DPS and the M16, thoroughly internet and the predator drone. In 2002, DARPA decided to pursue the driverless car in a very unusual way. The director of DARPA at the time, a guy named Tony Tether, who had been a door to door salesman in his use, definitely has that flare in that way of thinking, says, "Let's have a contest. Let's see, who can put all of these ingredients that we've developed together into a proper

self-driving car?"

His original idea is, "We'll try from down the Las Vegas strip.

That's almost immediately next because it's insane.

Oh, right. You would have to like literally gridlock a huge American city so people could put robot cars on it. Exactly. So he says, "Okay.

Do you know what? We'll do it in the desert." The desert, outside Las Vegas, and anyone who wants to can make a team, build a silt driving car, bring it to the desert, and all race them. The driver that DARPA wanted to replace was the American soldier.

DARPA wanted a vehicle that could drive itself down roads that might be filled with hidden explosive devices. So in this moment, at the tail end of the dot com boom, DARPA's trying to inspire tech to build something besides another website. DARPA's Tony Tether announces that the prize for whoever can win its grand challenge will

be $1 million. The rules for very open. There were literals like you couldn't have two vehicles communicating with one another, but you could build any kind of vehicle you wanted. You could have six wheels.

It could be a truck. It could be a motorcycle. It could be a tricycle. It just couldn't attack other vehicles. That was rolled out early on.

Oh, was that a concern that people would just like sort of battle bot the thing?

You're not talking to a vehicle. We would have a little shredder that would take out somebody else's. Someone asked, in the first Q and A at this, they said, "Can we attack other vehicles?" They said, "No." And it's funny you bring a battle bot because a lot of teams who entered this had

battle bots history, interesting. They were used to building robots for interesting purposes. And when they caught wind of this, they said, "We can do this. We can scrap together some money and this will just be fun." I'm going to tell you what happened in this robot race in the desert, not because I

care so much about these early robot vehicles, but because I care a lot about the engineers who are making them.

These would be the people who would later go on to lead development for the billion dollar

companies creating today's driverless cars. And these people had very different views about how to get that technology ready. For values, when it came to things like the acceptability of risking human life, abstract differences, they would become very concrete later on. So the point where people would be charged with federal crimes, that's the future.

But listening to this part of the story, what I listen for is how much of it can you detect already, how much of the differences are already present. The first engineer I want you to pay attention to is a man named Chris Armson.

Then way back in 2002, how did you end up being part of the DARPA Ground Challenge?

It sounded like fun. Chris, these days the CEO of a large tech company, back then a PhD student at Carnegie Mellon University.

When he first got recruited for the race, he was out in the field, observing a robot

as it crept across the Otacama Desert, training for its future deployment on the surface of Mars. The PhD advisor came down and was really excited about this DARPA Ground Challenge thing and the idea that you'd have a robot running across the desert at 50 miles an hour, just sounded exciting.

Having spent the last couple of weeks walking behind a robot at very low speed. So Chris would join Carnegie Mellon's red team and help build a car called Sandstorm, a bright red Humvee with a top-locked off, a plethora of futuristic sensors mounted to it. Like Scanners, a crackpot would use search for aliens. You can see Chris back in that documentary.

He explains to the filmmaker at the time that the hard part of course isn't the vehicle, it's the driver.

How do you even begin to teach a computer to operate a Humvee at all?

How does a computer make the steering wheel turn? How does a computer change the pressure on the brake and the throttle? Those are the issues that we're fighting through right now. The answer. Sandstorm represented the best entry from the Contest Traditional Academic Crowd, but there's

a different crowd there too, represented best by a man named Anthony Levin Dowsky. Can you tell me about Anthony Levin Dowsky? Anthony Levin Dowsky, we're going to begin, so Anthony is like an entrepreneur. He's a really charming guy. He's six foot six, he's gangly, has all get out.

He grew up mostly in Belgium because his mom was working for the EEO, for a high school he moved to Marin, to live with his dad, and he's a hospital. My name is Anthony Levin Dowsky. I was a grad student at Berkeley, instead of continuing to finish my PhD, I decided there was much better to do the grand challenge.

We asked Anthony for an interview, he didn't respond, but here he is in the footage from

Back then, Anthony did not have the engineering experience or resources of a ...

Carnegie Mellon's Red Team, so he tried something very different, a vehicle that had almost no chance of winning the race, but which was also perfectly designed to stand out. To get him a lot of attention, maybe a job. The race is only self-driving motorcycle, it was named Ghost Rider, a stubby little thing, covered in stickers, then intent on the back and cameras on the front.

This is steering actuator on the top here, which allows us to modify the steering angle.

So basically, if you're driving, you start to fall the left, you steer the left, that

makes you turn the left, and then you get the triple acceleration to put you back up to the right. And you monitoring that in real time and making small adjustments and you stay bounce. The strobe light is on the command from the tower is to move, ladies and gentlemen, sandstorm. The race happens on a Saturday in March of 2004.

Autonomous vehicle traversing the desert with the goal of keeping our young military personnel out of harm's way.

What happens the first time they try to do this competition?

The 2004 Grand Challenge has an utter hysterical disaster. Disaster number one, Ghost Rider, the motorcycle, anti-elevandowski forgot to flip on the switch for the stabilization system, the bike immediately topples. Ghost Rider down. Anthony, good effort.

And then every vehicle after it fails miserably. Like one vehicle drives up onto a berm, flips off. One vehicle drives straight out, does an inexplicable U-turn, and just drives back to the starting line. And the rules are that once your vehicle starts, you can't do anything.

Even sandstorm got stuck on a berm. Chris Armstrong's in just standing there, unable to help his robot. Or things was trying to get going, but it's wheels were just spinning on the gravel, and tried so hard that it actually melted the rubber of the tires, and so there's this flumes of black smoke before they killed it.

For the roboticists, this was obviously very disappointing. Chris Armstrong compared it to an Olympic marathon, where the best runner only makes it two of the 26 miles. What this contest had done though, was it had flushed all these inventors out.

Did jumps start at the scene that would develop the technology?

One of the most important people there that day, actually just watching, was someone I haven't

mentioned yet, a legendary roboticist named Sebastian Thrun. Sebastian Thrun, he was at the first grand challenge. He didn't bring a team, he wasn't participating. Darple wanted to show off some other projects, they'd been funding, including one of his robots, so he brings the robot, and so he's there.

And he watches this as if there are anything I can do better than this. I looked at the very first iteration of this grand challenge, but it didn't participate it was a spectator. This, of course, is Sebastian Thrun. He grew up in West Germany, moved to the US, taught at Carnegie Mellon before moving to Stanford.

Watching that day, he saw this fundamental error, he believed all the entrance it made. I saw that all the teams treated this like a harder problem, they looked at this and say we have to build a bigger wheels and bigger chassis and so on. And I looked at this and said about wait a minute, the challenge really is to build a self-driving carer that can drive for the desert.

I can get a rental car, they can do it just fine, provide there's a person inside, and the challenges we need to take the person out of the driver seat in replace the back computer. There is not a problem of bigger tires, it's issue videos, so far problem. Sebastian Thrun had a dual background, robotics and artificial intelligence, which probably explains his focus here on the robot driver's mind.

Here's thinking about something else, too. The military wanted this tech to replace a relatively small number of drivers in its war zones, but Sebastian was already imagining something bigger. What would happen to traffic deaths? Worldwide.

One day, everyone had access to a driverless car. I had experiences of losing people in my life to traffic accidents, and I felt we lost

over the million people in the world to traffic accidents, wouldn't it be amazing if

that I've invented something they would save a million lives a year?

In October of 2005, 43 teams have brought their vehicles to compete in a unique event. A race driven not by testosterone, but computer code. Capture 3. Machine. Learning.

The race course is a circular maze that zigzags for 132 minutes later.

For the second grand challenge, DARPA doubled the bounty, $2 million dollars.

This footage is from a PBS documentary called The Great Robot Race, narrated to my

mild joy by John Liskow, familiar faces have returned. Chris Armstrong sent back with the Carnegie Mellon team to sign with two vehicles, Highlander and Sandstorm. Anthony 11-Dowsky, back with his motorcycle, which still doesn't work, is knocked out in the qualifiers.

And now there's also Stanford's entrant. Compared to Sandstorm, the bulked-up hummer, the car looks measly, a blue SUV donated by Volkswagen. A baby faced run in smiles next to his soccer mom looking vehicle. The vehicle's name is Stanley, so Stanley is nothing else but Stanford, but it also gives

the vehicle the post-nellety. We think of the vehicle more and more as an entrant decision-making. And run really broad, more artificial intelligence, which at the time we're talking 2005, was still rather primitive, especially compared to what we have today, but he could use it to teach his vehicle how to recognize the road and how to do it much faster.

They found a dirt road, out near Stanford, and they drive it down a dirt road, and have the cars cameras record what they were seeing. The robot Stanley was able to train itself as a van in the way the work does. His eyes looked way ahead, and it could see stuff way at distance. When it drives over the stuff, he could tell it was a good place to drive on up because

it could measure how slippery or how bumpy the road was. And they could then retroactively train and say, "There's green stuff over there, it's something good to drive on, aka grass, and this browner stuff, aka mud, is not so good to drive."

And so it was able to detect patterns and generalize from what it had learned?

Yeah, absolutely.

And it did this like 30 times a second, I mean, just like a person.

The race kicks off with Stanley sandwiched between Carnegie Mellon's two behemoths. Highlander leads the pack, followed by Stanley and Sandstone. What happens in the second race? The second race is as successful as the first race is disastrous. Nearly every entry in the second race would go further than Sandstone had in the first.

Multiple vehicles would finish the course. The real question was who would do it fastest? And so at what point was it clear to you that you were going to win? Well, once we passed the front running team, we kind of saw the vehicle descendant to over the hardest part of the race course, a very, very treachery mountain pass.

And we saw, at a distance, a dust cloud, we saw a helicopter, we saw a little feature that made, must believe, wow, there's something happening, that's magical. And this dust cloud, then, all of a sudden, turned blueish, because the covers blue and came closer. And then it came closer to the finish line, it was unbelievable, magical.

At the end of the dock, over some criminally corny piano music, Sebastian Thrand gives his post-rac interview. He's dressed a lot like a race car driver, watching, you could forget, he wasn't in the car.

It was just amazing to see this community of people, that community succeeded today.

Behind me, there are three robots that made it all the way through the desert and all

the few of them did be unthinkable, it's such a fantastic success for this community, I think

we all win. I made for TV, Kumbaya, a moment. Still years before the race to build driverless cars, would enter its cutthroat phase. What would happen next is that a small band of lunatics would take driverless cars out of the desert, start secretly driving them on public roads in the state of California.

They would do this at the behest of a man who'd been observing from the stands that day, disguised in hat and sunglasses, who'd watched the challenge, was mine spun. That's after a short break. I'm Stephen Dubner, and you're listening to a special episode of the podcast search engine here on Freakonomics Radio, we will be right back.

It's Stephen Dubner. Today we are running an episode from the search engine podcast with host P.J. vote. After 4, something actually useful for the world. The race in the desert had been designed as a spectacle, something flashy to dry out America's smartest robot assists, but it had drawn another person who come for his own reasons.

Google's Larry Page arrived at the DARPA Grand Challenge in a baseball hat in...

a disguise.

He found Sebastian Thron and Button Holden, asking him a million highly specific questions

about things like "the wavelength is light our system used." But this meeting in the desert, this was not actually their first introduction. By the first time I met Larry, it was a bit earlier. He had built a small little robot that acted as a tailor presence for meetings, and he was trying to drive it around the Google offices instead of going to meeting with a robot.

And he sent me a message and said, "I'm going to show you the robot I've built." And in the spirit of like craziness, I send the message back saying, "Larry, I'm so glad that Google lets you use 20% of your time, do something useful for the world." I call that a thing.

I either expect it a rapid response or never hear from him again.

It turns out I was lucky. He responded immediately. "I took his robot and fixed it next 24 hours and he was very happy." Larry Page, it turned out. It actually been interested in autonomous vehicles since at least grad school.

That's what he'd wanted to do is thesis on, before being guided by some wise PhD advisor toward search engines instead. Now, as a spectator at DARPA's Second Grand Challenge, he could see real world evidence that autonomous vehicles might actually be a thing. At first, Larry Page hires Sebastian Thron, along with fellow DARPA contestants Anthony

Levin Dowski, just to build what will become Google Street View.

To actually modify the system that Stanley, the car's roof mounted cameras had used to

begin photographing American streets. But before long, Larry Page returns to Sebastian, with his dream of a driverless car. And so, how soon after arriving at Google, this project should further begin. Larry Page says to you, "I have a mission, like how does this happen?" This is an embarrassing moment for me, it's about two years later, 2009, where I sit in my cubicle

and Larry Page comes by and says, "The Sebastian, I think you should build a self-driving car.

They can drive anywhere in the world." And my immediate reaction was, no, taking the technology we built for this empty desert and putting it in the middle of market street in San Francisco is going to kill somebody. And Larry would come back the next day with the same idea, and I would give them the same answer, and both of us got increasingly more frustrated, like "God damn it, it can be done."

And eventually came and said, "Look, Sebastian, I can't get it, you can't do it." I would explain to Eric Schmidt, the CEO at the time, and Sergey Brady, my cubona, "Why it can't be done? Can you give me the technical reason why it can't be done?"

And that's the moment of incredible pain, because I go home and I can't think of a technical

reason why not. It was this kind of moment where I felt, "Look, I'm the world expert in self-driving cars." And I'm the person who denies that it can be done, like, that taught me an incredibly important lesson about experts. For the rest of my life, I decided to experts that usually explore the past not the future.

And if you ask an expert about innovation, something crazy new, there's at least like the person to say, "Yes, it can be done." So this is where the Google Self-driving car project begins in 2009. It's led by Sebastian joined by others from the DARPA challenges. The methodical Chris Armson was running most things day-to-day, Anthony Levendowski, the

flashy motorcycle guy, would work on hardware. Demetri Dorgav, another DARPA veteran, would be responsible for planning and optimization. It was a secret project. They report directly to Larry Page, a small enough team that there'd be no bureaucracy, few emails, fewer meetings.

Just 11 engineers who, writer Alex Davies, says, represented some of the best young talent in the country. And so Google builds this very quiet team, and it says to them, "Build us the self-driving car." And because that goal is super-nebulous, they give them two challenges.

They say, "Safely log 100,000 miles on public roads, but they also give them a challenge called the Larry 1K." So Larry and Sergey and I said together, and the two of them carved out 1,000 total miles of road surface in California. They open up Google Maps, and they just click around, and they look for 10 separate 100

mile routes that are really tricky, absolutely everything, like the Bay Bridge and Lake Town, and Highway 1 to Los Angeles, and Market Street, and even Crooked Lombard Street.

When they say to the team, "You have to drive each of these 100 mile routes without

one's human takeover of the system, without one failure of the car." To get off to a running start, the team licenses the code from Stanford's DARPA Urban Challenge Vehicle.

Anthony 11 Dowski goes to a local Toyota dealership, and buys eight Prizes, t...

back to Google, and retrofits them to accept a computer as a driver. He hooks that computer driver electronically into the brakes, the gas, the steering. These Prizes get a radar system behind the bumper, cameras, a lightar system, spending 360 degrees on top, lightar like radar, but it shoots lasers instead of soundways.

At first, the team gives each Prius a cool name, like night rider.

But I think we quickly realized that we're not going to be able to name all these vehicles as we scale up our fleet, and so we just started to number them, like, you know, Prius 27. This is Don Bernat. He'd been a researcher at working on autonomous submarines. He also friend in a car accident, separately got in a bad accident himself, and decided

he wanted to do work on self-driving cars.

That's how he eventually ended up on the team in its early days.

I was on the motion planning of behavior, decision making team, and my responsibility was to work on the nudging behavior. Imagine when a big truck passes a human driver on the right, the driver will nudge a little to the left.

For us, it's an instinct, Don's job was to teach a computer to nudge.

I'm trying to encode the behavior that you would use as a driver under kind of partially good perception, and it's a really tricky problem. A team of academic roboticsists, some of whom had had friends dying cars, spending Googles money to see if they could make driving safer, it was a weird era. There's this big concert venue near Google's offices called the Shoreline Empathieter.

In 2009, you could have seen Cheryl Crow there, the killers, fish. But the most interesting show that year was one almost nobody knew about. In the venue parking lot, on days when there was no concert, their tour buses around to see them.

The Google team would run its first test runs of their driverless cars, essentially hiding

in plain sight. A Prius, driving itself around the amphitheater parking lot with an attentive safety driver sitting behind the wheel, just in case. The team was making sure the basics functioned, that the sensors could really recognize another car to the computer and the car was abiding by their orders.

These were the baby steps that happened in this parking lot and at an empty airplane runway in this close to their offices.

Spring 2009, the team tries actual real road driving for the first time.

Chris Irmson takes one of the Prius' out on the central expressway, speed limit, 45mph. There are human driving here. And immediately, outside the confines of the empty parking lot and the empty airplane runway, here's what's clear. They had a real problem, the car was swirving wildly.

It was even around like a drunken sailor, and we realized that the scale of the runway was such that you didn't notice the one or two foot kind of oscillation it had in lateral control. And then you put it on central expressway and suddenly, you know, yeah, turns out actually that's a problem.

One more problem to fix. This thing to the story, it's funny because I can imagine it giving me a totally different feeling than it does. A tech company, with nobody's permission, was testing driverless cars on public roads in California.

I don't know why that strikes me as being about invention, instead of just hubris an impunity. Maybe it's because I know that Google would be one of the few tech companies whose driverless cars would not cause any fatal accidents in testing. And that the team would just take more safety precautions than the other companies who'd rush in later to catch up with them, once this was an arm's race.

The way these cars were designed, the safety drivers that behind the steering wheel, ready to take over. In the other seat was their partner, watching the monitor displaying a graphical interface, designed by the Demetri Dolgav. The people watching the screen would call out problems ahead, some discrepancy between

what the sensors were seeing and what was actually in the road. This is what teaching a car to drive actually looks like. Two person team is manning the cars, logging errors, going back to the office to troubleshoot and then updating the code. I asked Don Bernad about this era.

And while you're doing this, and then like you leave work and you get in your car, you drive as a human, did you find yourself thinking more carefully like how do I know what I know when I'm driving? Like you're trying to teach a machine by day, did it affect how you thought about human driving by night almost obnoxiously so to any passengers in the car with me.

I was obsessed with one big question, which is why do humans drive the way they drive?

And it turns out there were no good answers, and I still think they're not great answers. And instead of actually answering that question, we've just turned a machine learning to infer the detrudes behind why humans do what they do.

So there's some basic principles that you can understand like we try to minim...

acceleration meaning you don't want to be thrown to the outside of your car when you're making a turn.

So you're going to slow down, but how much do you slow down, right?

And it turns out that's contextual. Don gave me an example. So you're trying to figure out the right speed and angle for the car on one of those tight curvy on ramps onto the highway, you want it to feel comfortable for a passenger.

John says you can work out the math that lateral acceleration is two meters per second

squared, but the surprising thing is that number only applies on the on ramp. If I put you at a cold assac in a neighborhood and you were going to do a U-turn at the end of the cold assac, even though the speed is significantly slower, if you did two meters per second squared of lateral acceleration around a cold assac, you would tell you're driver, they were crazy, it would be incredibly uncomfortable, like incredibly

uncomfortable. You would feel like you were at Mario Kart. Yes, it would feel Mario Kart and remember, this is a force.

So it's a physical feeling on your body is exactly the same, but the contextual awareness

of the situation of speeding up to get on the highway versus making a U-turn in a residential street, tricks your brain into feeling opposite about the situation, and so it turns out the limit for a cold assac is around 0.75, it's almost three times less than you would be willing to tolerate as you accelerate onto a highway. And so there were things like that where you couldn't just say humans have specific physical

restrictions, right from a force's perspective, the context matters, and when the context matters, now all of a sudden anything is game, so things like that is where I spent my time as a researcher trying to figure out how we're going to make this comfortable for passengers. All these little problems to solve, but there's one gift, which is that the team at this point had an overarching goal uniting them.

The DARPA challenge told them drive across this patch of desert, the Larry one K challenge told them drive these 10 routes without human intervention.

The specificity of the mission meant they never had to squabble about why they were there.

By 2010, just a year-end, the team was really on a roll. They start knocking out routes. Each one of the routes was unique and distinct and different, and had its own challenges down route one, Silicon Valley, to Carmel. The bridges run, where we had to go across all of the bridges in the Bay Area, starting

in Mountain View, finishing crossing the Golden Gate Bridge. It's Chris Armstrong sent in the cards, Anthony Levin-Dowski in the car. I was in the car with Dimitri, Chris, and Anthony, who was the four of us in the Prius. They were figuring out the technology much faster than they thought they could. The Larry one K was set up like a video game, meaning they'd get to try the route over

and over until they could complete it without a single human take over.

Then they'd move on to the next one.

It was really a proof of concept exercise. Can you even make this happen once? When they fail a route, they know what the car can't handle, so they go back and say, "You have to be better at doing XYZ," and then we got back to the office. We regrouped.

We went back out. We went back to 11pm and by 1am we had completed the route. They buy a bottle of Corbell champagne. They all write their names on it, Corbell 1399 a bottle. The champagne they have at Trader Joe's.

They had one for every route they completed. And one by one, they pick off the Larry one K routes, and they think this is going to take them about two years when they start out, and they do it in a little bit more than a year. Nearly twice as fast as they had expected. I fall of 2010.

They're done. Here's Chris Armson.

And I think we had a big party up at Sebastian's house, and let's out those hills.

So it was pretty spectacular, right? They throw each other in the pool, they celebrate, and then they're not entirely sure what to do next. It was kind of, okay, and now what? The team had pulled off a kind of miracle in a year, a driverless car with human supervision

with lots of human coding, but still, a driverless car successfully navigating some very tricky roads in California. They done this safely, they done it quickly, and now things would begin to wobble. Competition would arrive, the team itself would begin to skism, and one member, a person who believed the team was moving too slowly, would actually take matters into his own hands

in a particularly extreme way. Half of the break, muting. Here there, Steven Dubner, that, again, is PJ vote, and you're listening to an episode

Of the search engine podcast here on Freakonomics Radio, we will be right back.

Welcome back to the show. As early as 2010, Google's driverless car project had developed some very impressive self-driving technology, but what they were struggling to decide was this.

What was the actual product they were developing here?

Here's the Bastion Thrun. We had a lot of debates inside Google what the white business model was. At some point, we actually had a big debate, we should just buy Tesla, and Tesla was

both $2 billion at the time, I remember this.

Maybe we should have in hindsight, but though this idea, there was a debate whether this is more of an assistive technology or a disruptive replacement technology. Basically, should they follow the route that Tesla ultimately would, design self-driving as a feature in your car, something that could take over sometimes, but still need human monitoring, or was it better to wait until the car could fully drive itself?

Thrun would eventually come around to this version of self-driving. Specifically, he'd come around to the idea of self-driving robot taxis. A taxis service type system is way more capital efficient than ownership. An owned car is being used for 4% of the time, and it's parked in the 1960s and imagine

a city without parked cars, where every car is being utilized, called it's 50% of the

time.

Which means we have only 10% of the number of cars needed that we need today when we own

own cars. That's going to happen. There's no option or question. What's the bastion is describing here, so matter of factally, is a fairly radical reimagination of American cities.

The idea that robot taxis would be so cheap and widely available that most people just wouldn't own cars that we could put something else anything else in the places where you put most of our parking lots and parking spaces, that is a far-fetched idea. Just given how much of American identity is tied into personal car ownership. A far-fetched idea, and for it to begin to happen, Google would have to bring a product

to market. But the years passed, and they didn't. And some people who were there felt stuck. Don Burnett says he believes life at Google got dangerously cushy. The food was great, the money was too.

These former academics making much more than they'd ever expected. It was a lack of urgency on the team to actually make something viable. We had a funding supply that effectively felt infinite, and maybe it wasn't, but it certainly felt infinite. And when you have infinite funding, you're not forced to make hard decisions.

You're not forced to focus. You're not forced to look at the opportunity, the market, the customer, and be the best. It was more like, hey, let's take our time. Let's make sure we do it right, which is on its face a good principle.

But at the end of the day, I think the lack of urgency wasn't for everyone.

And within the team, you get team Chris and team Anthony, and they start budding heads all the time. Chris and Anthony, meaning Chris Ermsen, official head of the project, versus Anthony Levin Dowski, who I still think of as the motorcycle guy. The main difference in their approach is how quickly they want to move.

Anthony is very okay with risk, whole thing. He gets one of these cars, and he's driving it back and he lives in Berkeley, works in Palota. He's just using this car on the Bay Bridge every day, probably outside the bounds of what the team actually wanted, and he's not necessarily logging data.

He's just enjoying his self-driving car taking it all over the place. Chris comes from an academic background, he's that Canadian, very nice, very careful, very risk of verse. When I asked Chris Ermsen about all this, his memory was slightly different. In his memory, team Anthony was pretty much just Anthony, and Anthony he said was a

move fast and break things kind of guy. A motto famously coined by Mark Zuckerberg, "It defines a way of developing technology

which once might have felt cute and revolutionary, but which today, at least to me, feels

pretty irresponsible." Chris didn't think that philosophy was an option for their team. Even if their cars were statistically safer than human drivers, he knew that the first news story about a self-driving car in a fatal accident was going to be a huge deal. Sanito was going to demolish data if they weren't extremely careful.

By all accounts, Anthony 11 Dowski felt differently, but he actually wasn't the only one.

Here's Don Bernat.

There were some people on the team, very famously, including myself that started to get

the itch kind of towards the three to four year mark. The itch of like, "Okay, where is this going? Who is it for? How are they going to use it? Where are they going to use it?"

And I felt like the leadership didn't have great answers to that. There was no commercial race, right? We had no competition and there was no market for the product. But competition would soon arrive in the form of Uber. This was the "Oh shit, moment" from me, Uber announced their self-driving program.

And I remember, like it was yesterday, waking up, reading the news, going to my desk

in the morning and thinking, "Oh crap."

These guys are going to eat our lunch. In 2013, then CEO of Uber, Travis Calenek, had gotten a ride in one of Google's prototype driverless cars. Sitting in a taxi without a human driver, he'd understood that this could be the end of his company.

And to Uber had plunged headlong into the driverless car race. The company hired nearly half of Carnegie Mellon's top robotics lab. And not long after, we also know, through court records and emails, that Uber also began communicating with Anthony 11 Daoske, who, in 2016, would leave Google, quitting just before he could be fired for recruiting team members, including Don Bernat.

Anthony would then start his own autonomous vehicle company, Uber would soon buy that company for almost $700 million. Even though the company had no product and was only months old, which raised a mystery,

why would Uber pay so much for a company who's only assets seem to be its people?

This is where Google goes into its computer security logs and realizes that not long before he left, Anthony 11 Daoske downloaded something like 14,000 technical files onto his computer and moved them onto an external disk. Obviously you can't do that. I mean, I'm assuming obviously you can't do that.

You definitely cannot do that. And this is the kind of thing that maybe if you had stayed there, this is the kind of thing Anthony would have done and he would have been like, oh, it's just so I could have access it to it somewhere else, and he probably would have gotten away with it. But when you then go and work for Uber and start running their direct competitor self-driving

car program, that's when you get in trouble. And that's when what's technically called Wemo at this point, Google's program, Sue's Uber, and puts Anthony at the center of an enormous legal battle between these tech giants. The secrets and sub-defeuge in Silicon Valley, a former Google engineer, has been charged with stealing files from Alphabet's self-driving car project and taking them to Uber.

Specifically, it involves a former lead engineer of Google's self-driving car unit, Anthony Levin Dowski. Now he's accused of using his personal laptop and downloading more than 14. In 2016, Google had just spun its driverless car unit into a new entity, Wemo.

Wemo sued Uber, Uber had to settle to the tune of $245 million dollars.

And in a separate criminal trial, Anthony Levin Dowski put guilty to stealing trade secrets. Afterwards, Uber continues their driverless car program without him, continuing to pursue its move fast, break things strategy. Which in 2018 leads to the death of a woman named Elaine Hurtspirk. Uber is sitting the brakes on its self-driving cars after one of them hit and killed a woman

in Arizona. The vehicle was in Autonomous mode, but it did have a safety driver on board, but a police report later indicating the safety driver was streaming TV shows on her phone for three hours that night. Including at the time of the crash.

The way this story was reported, nearly everyone blamed the safety driver. She was on her phone, she was streaming an episode of the voice. Tempe investigator saying, "Had Vask has been paying attention to the road, she could have stopped the car, 42 feet before impact. The NTSB slamming Uber."

There's some important additional context, which was that Uber's robot driver was also

just much worse than Wemo's. A statistic I found jaw dropping, at this point, Wemo's safety drivers were having to take over from the car once every 5,600 miles. Uber's safety driver sat here, had it intervene more than once every 13 miles. Despite that, five months before the crash, over employee objections, Uber had cut its

safety crews. Instead of two humans, they just used one. One safety driver overseeing a robot driver, it was arguably not ready to be on public roads. In the last moments of Leanne Hertzberg's life, the robot spent an indefensible 5.6 seconds

Trying and failing to guess the shape in the road that was a human body pushi...

Over those 5.6 seconds, the robot kept reclassifying her, wishing a known object, a vehicle, a bicycle.

During that time spent wondering, the car did not slow down.

Soon after Leanne Hertzberg's death, Uber halted its testing program. Uber has temporarily suspended its driverless fleet nationwide, as the NTSB, police, Uber, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration investigate. We reached out to Uber for common, a spokesperson said that the fatal collision was indeed a tragedy, which had a significant impact on Uber and the entire industry.

There would be other competitors who would shut down after similar accidents. There would also be Tesla, which by 2020 was publicly marketing a product company called full self-driving, but which absolutely was not. Meanwhile, Waimo had slowly continued to develop its attack. Their robot taxis would be ready for riders by 2020.

The team had gotten an unexpected boost from a technology that was, at the time, very little understood. In 2026, when most people talk about artificial intelligence, the conversation defaults to products like chat, GVT, and Quad, but artificial intelligence has been a core part of driverless cars going back two decades.

In the 2010s, neural net advances meant that you could now begin to feed a computer system large amounts of data, and watch as its perception, prediction, and decision-making abilities improved. Here's the bastion, Thron. That technology of massive data training was with us from the get-go, but has become

more and more and more important.

The surprise for all of us has been that size matters, when you put a million documents

into a AI, it's fine, a hundred million is fine, of any put a hundred billion documents

into an AI, it is a billion smart, and that I think shocked everybody myself and tutors.

The Google Brain Team, the deep learning people, started working with the driverless car team to use training data to help the computer drive or learn things, like how to better predict when another car was about to suddenly switch lines, how to more reliably speak about pedestrians. Over the years, as the car drove more miles, as the team gathered more data, plugged that data into the AI systems and tweaked the systems, the engineers

say the robot driver kept improving. As they tested the car in new weather conditions, they discovered problems that required hardware fixes. For instance, in Phoenix, Waymo had to design miniature wipers for their car's light or sensors to deal with the dust storms and heavy rains.

In 2020, Waymo finally debuts to the public in Arizona.

In the years after, it'll roll out to 10 more American cities. A funny consequence of Waymo's long development cycle is that the public's attitude towards

Silicon Valley has just really changed in that time. There's more suspicion towards Google

than there was back in 2009 when the project first started. And so now, many people look at the Waymo driver with a raised eyebrow, with a question immediately on their lips. Chapter 5 In a new story as you see the inside, where the human driver would normally set, there's an empty seat, you're not allowed in. With a steering wheel in front of it, just digital,

it turns itself. Cars without drivers are here. It sounds like something out of the jetzons, but get ready because you may look over at the car next to you and see it rolling down the street.

The TV newscasters always use the same G-Wiz tone. They can never resist the jetzons

reference. In every city, the influencers hop into record testimonials for their daily serving of cloud. So in today's video, I'm about to take my first ever driverless car. It's with an app called Waymo. Waymo is basically driverless car over, where it's like a service to you, call it, go

wherever you need it to go, but there's no driver. You guys, this is creepy. It's like I'm being driven around by a ghost person. It's a little terrifying. It is definitely-- Robo Taxi's poll hilariously badly. According to J.D. Power, I data analytics

firm. Among people who've not written in one, consumer confidence is at 20%. But among people who have taken a ride, the number shoots up to 76%. It's a thing I didn't capture in this story, but when I sat in one a couple years ago, I just found it persuasive as an experience. You know what? I'm not as nervous as I thought I was going to be. This is actually quite

relaxing. A gradual turn felt very safe. You know, it was kind of freaky at first, but now it's pretty chill. It's smooth ride though. It went driving fast. It went jerking.

It's driving like you always hope your Uber driver would.

So I guess that's one of the big sellers.

Chris Irmsen, that methodical team leader, had left Google years ago, but he told me about his experience as a civilian consumer, trying away him out in the world. My universal experience has been, and you can tell me if this was your experience. The first couple of minutes in the vehicle, it's ha, that's crazy. I just nobody behind the wheel. It's flowing with sharks, and then a few minutes in,

and it's like, okay, you know, it's just going to drive. Is that all it does? And then, you know, 10 minutes and people are looking at their phone. People tend to feel safe in these cars, but are they? Actually. So we know that the way Mo driver has now driven over 200 million real world miles.

And they really safety data so far for the first 127 million miles.

The way Mo's fairly transparent, they released their crash and safety data unredacted to the public. By contrast, Tesla redacts the details of its crashes. The company says they are confidential business information. In way Mo's case, I've looked at the data. I've looked at how the company interprets it, how skeptical, independent researchers interpret it.

I wanted to walk through it with an autonomous vehicle reporter I trust. His name is Timothy Bealey, author of the newsletter, Understanding AI. I asked him how much are picture of the way Mo's safety data has been evolving. So it's been pretty consistent the last couple years. They are scaling up and so all the numbers get bigger, like the total number of miles.

Get bigger, the number of crashes get bigger, but the like crashes per mile have not changed a ton.

The way Mo says, and I think this is correct that it's roughly 80% safer in terms of crashes that are severe enough to trigger an airbag.

Crash is severe enough to cause an injury and also crashes involving vulnerable road users like pedestrians or bicyclists. So 80% fewer airbag crashes than human drivers and actually 90% fewer crashes that cause a serious injury. Some independent experts have small quibbles with the methodology, but broadly they find way Mo's data credible. Timothy pointed out there's one very important thing we don't know, the fatal crash comparison.

For every 100 million miles human drive, we cause a little over one fatal crash.

The way Mo driver has driven 200 million miles without causing a fatal crash, but statistically speaking, that could still be a fluke. Some academics have suggested we need about 300 million miles to have statistical confidence. In the hundreds of millions of miles, the way Mo driver has traveled, it was involved in two fatal crashes, which it did not appear to cause. Here are the details of its crashes. In one, a speeding human driver rear ended a line of vehicles at a stoplight.

There's an empty way Mo in the line of struck cars. In another crash, a way Mo was yielding for a pedestrian, it was rear ended by a motorcycle. The motorcycle driver was in struck by a second car. That's everything. When Timothy B. Lee looks at the entire safety picture, there results we have so far from this big experiment.

Way Mo is conducting on American roads, what he sees is mainly promising.

So far it's the better than even drivers and so far I think the case for allowing the victim to do the experiment is very strong.

Which doesn't mean we shouldn't scrutinize this way Mo experiment as it continues. I find myself paying a lot of attention to Way Mo crashes, which isn't hard to make headlines. The most harrowing one recently was this January. A child near an elementary school in Santa Monica is struck by a way Mo. A child ran across the street from behind a double parked car and a way Mo hit the kid.

Santa Monica police hit a child, a 10-year-old girl was not hurt. The company issued a statement. Way Mo said its driver had breaked hard, reducing speed from 17 to under six miles per hour. A faster reaction they claimed than a human driver would have been capable of. What happened next at the accident scene actually answered your question I'd had?

What does a Way Mo do after a car crash since there's no human driver to help? Way Mo employs what they call human fleet response agents, human beings who can't remotely drive the cars, but who the car can ask questions to if it gets confused. In Santa Monica, the Way Mo called one of those humans. The human called 911 and this is the strangest part of Way Mo statement.

Apparently the car then waited at the scene of the accident until the police dismissed it.

That's what we know so far, but there's two federal agencies investigating this crash,

and so we'll have a full report in the future. One problem that's not really captured in the safety data that I've seen is what I'd call troubling edge cases. You see them in videos on social media. A Way Mo gets stuck at a dead stoplight or blocks an emergency vehicle.

Or an example Timothy gave Way Mo's redriving past stop school buses in Austin. I think it's reasonable to say this is like a clear cut rule that the vehicle should

Fall this rule.

thing, I think it's not that big of a deal as long as they are making progress,

which for most of these I think they are.

Timothy pointed to one area where Way Mo's not been as transparent as he'd like. Those human response agents, some of which are based here, some of the Philippines, there's questions about what specifically they do, and about how this will all work as Way Mo scales up. We asked Way Mo for comment on everything you heard in this episode, especially the recent safety incidents.

A spokesperson said that the data today indicates that the Way Mo driver is already making road safer in the places where they operate, and says that Way Mo can use to work with policy makers and regulators to improve its technology. That's the safety picture so far, which to me, after many months of looking at this, and talking to experts, looks pretty good.

As Way Mo continues its rollout, other companies are quickly following behind.

Amazon's new driverless taxi is launching in Las Vegas this summer, and it's expected to arrive now. There's other rubber taxi companies like Amazon Zeus, Uber is back in the mix, not making technology, but partnering with these rubber taxi companies. We ride recently struck partnership with Uber to bring its A-Vis to Abu Dhabi, another sign that many of those early Way Mo engineers are now CEOs of autonomous companies themselves.

Demi Tridogap is actually co-sealed Way Mo, but other team members run driverless trucking companies. Got Don Burnett, founder and CEO of Kodiak AI. Don, thank you so much for joining us. It's good to see you again. Don Burnett is head of Kodiak AI, which has a technology deployed in driverless trucks in the Permian Basin. Please welcome CEO of Aurora Chris Irmson, a big round of applause.

Chris Irmson now heads Aurora, which currently has semi trucks on Texas highways,

and my personal favorite plot development, which just emerged this week. I just broke on the information that Uber, founder, Travis Collinett, is starting a new self-driving car company, with financial backing from Uber, and in partnership with Anthony

Levin Dowski. Now for those who've been... They say there's no second acts in American

lives, somehow both of these men seem to be on their fourth. The big picture though, is that everywhere in America today that you see a driver, taxi, truck, food delivery, there are several companies working on the robot version, trying their best to make driver as a job, start to go the way of the knockerupper of the lampleder. There's knockeruppers, by the way, they disappeared quietly. The lampleder's did not.

Reader Carl Benedict Frey tells the story of the lampleder's union, how their strikes pondered New York City briefly into darkness, to the delight of lovers and thieves. In verivier Belgium, the lampleder's strikes turned violent, ending in an attack on the local police headquarters. The army was brought in. The lampleder's lost their fight, in part just because they were so outnumbered. But the drivers today, fighting to save their

livelihoods, are a significantly bigger force. We stand up, everybody that's right share, union members are someone who drives the vehicle. Stand up.

4.8 million Americans drive for living. It's one of the most common jobs we have, and these

workers do not plan to surrender to the California Tech companies. They're doing this because they stand to make an unfathomable amount of money if they eliminate driving jobs for working class people. I understand, if it's a business, if it's capitalism, but not in my city, at the expense of our jobs. These drivers are represented by unions backed by politicians, and in cities across America, blue cities. They're organizing. So far, they're winning.

Humans drive the city, law machines, labour drives the city, keep the work as in the workforce. If it works in another city, great, have fun, not yet, not bossing. Thank you. Next week, the fight to save a job, to save the human driver. Don't miss this one. Many thanks to PJ Vote and the entire search engine team for this story. You will hear Part Two right here on Freakonomics Radio very soon, until then take care of yourself. And

if you can, someone else too. Freakonomics Radio is produced by RenBud Radio. You can find our entire archive on any podcast app. It's also at Freakonomics.com, where we publish transcripts and show notes. For search engine, this episode was produced by Emily Maltaire. The show was created by PJ Vote and Shruthe Pinnominini. Garrett Graham is their senior producer, Leah Restennis is their executive producer, fact checking was done by Mary Mathis,

and sound design and original composition by Armin Bizarrean. Their production intern is

Piper Dumont.

an edited by Ellen Frankman. Freakonomics Radio Network staff also includes Augusta Chapman,

Eleanor Osborn, Elsa Hernandez, Gabriel Roth, Ellaria Montenicourt, Jasmine Klinger, Jeremy

Johnston, Teo Jacobs, and Zacla Pinsky. Our theme song is Mr. Fortune by the hitchhikers and

our composer is Luis Garra. As always, thanks for listening.

Is it possible that you were really stoned on painkillers in that first waymo ride?

I mean, I wasn't stoned on painkillers and I don't think I was stoned at all. I think I really

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