The Global Story: Are we heading for World War Three?

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Wherever you get your BBC podcast. You might remember from history class that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand

in 1914 led to the first world war.

But our guest today, in expert on the history of war, says it's a lot more complicated. There are masses of books and masses of articles. It's been estimated there's something like 32,000 things books in English alone on the origins of the First World War. Seriously.

Wow. Because we still don't know, it's still debated. It turns out wars often spiral out of control for all sorts of unexpected reasons, sometimes even by accident, miscalculation and pride. What started just over three weeks ago with the US and Israel bombing Iran, now unfolds

more than a dozen other countries. And despite some signs that the Trump administration wants to negotiate, it's not clear Israel and Iran feel the same way. And that has some people wondering if there really is an off-rap here, or could this continue to ratchet up and become an even bigger conflict?

“Is there a potential that this war could evolve into, dare I say, a World War 3?”

Could we be heading toward World War 3? Could it be World War 3? From the BBC, I must muck all it in Washington, DC. And today, on the global story, could we really be on the verge of World War 3? My name is Margaret Macmillan, and I'm a retired professor of the University of Toronto

and a retired professor of history, International History at the University of Oxford. And I specialize in international relations of the 19th and 20th centuries. I saw you were described as a professor of meritists, is that the official title that give you if you're retired. Yes.

Well, they give it to you. When they put you out to grass, they give you a nice little title. Well, thanks again for joining us. So we brought you on our show today to discuss a question that I have been hearing raised in recent days.

It is a question I've heard from some listeners. It's also a question that I've been reading about. It's been percolating in the atmosphere. And that is, are we headed to World War 3? No, Margaret, to be clear, I don't personally think we are, but it is a question people

are asking. And so here at the outset, I want to hear from you, do you think it's a relevant question in this moment? Fortunately, I do think it's a relevant question. We tend to think that wars are very carefully planned and those who go to war know exactly

what they're doing and they have very clear plans.

In fact, if you look at past wars and I'm thinking particularly of the First World War, a lot

of what set it up finally was accident and people misjudging their opponents and people feeling like they didn't dare back down. I mean, think of it sometime like a sort of fight in a school yard, reach a point where you can't back down and you lose face. And so you decide to go ahead.

“And so I think we have to remember in history there's accident, but things like pride,”

sense of honor, fear of the opponent. And so I think often nations like people get into fights that they don't really want to be in. And once in, of course, it's very difficult to get out. So the First World War was not something I think that most people in New York wanted, including

those who were their leaders, but enough people were prepared to risk it that it did happen. And so we can't rule out the possibility, I think, at the present as we see tension spots on. We were in the middle at the moment of increasing tension and open fighting in the Middle East. And there are those, of course, the South China Sea, the Taiwan, the India China border.

And so it's not foolish or, you know, imagining things to be worried about conflict spreading at the moment. Before we go deeper into this conversation, I think it's worth just making sure we know what we're talking about in terms of the lexicon, the terminology we're using. You are a historian of war.

And so Margaret, what exactly is a world war? Is there an agreed upon definition?

“I suppose no, I think we just all use it to describe the war.”

It's not confined to one part of the world. Uh-huh. There were still bits of the world that didn't really suffer actual fighting in either

the first or second world war in Latin America didn't see much fighting.

And Canada didn't actually see in the United States didn't see fighting on its territory, but we were engaged overseas. But a world war, I think, is a fact of a global world that there are these connections between

Margaret, we know that you're a historian, not a military analyst, but the context in which we are having this conversation today is the war in the Middle East. And we wanted to talk to you about how this situation could possibly escalate into a broader war. And conversely, how we might avoid it escalating into such a dire world war situation.

And so first, let's talk about scenario one, the past toward world war three. As we are recording with you, there have been missiles, air strikes, drone strikes, not just in Iran, but also in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Azerbaijan, occupied West Bank, and Cyprus. And overall, if we include the United States involvement, we're talking about more than

a dozen countries. It is still what many people describe as a regional war, but can you imagine a scenario

“where it escalates to a bigger war, possibly to a world war?”

I think the country that's likely to escalate is probably Iran, or allies of Iran, such as the Houthi in Yemen. And what will happen if they start attacking tankers or naval vessels belonging to global powers? And what will happen if Iran destroys?

It's already attacked. I believe one of the desalination plants in the Emirates. Which the Gulf views is you're saying for drinking water, in many cases. Because they don't have ample supplies of water of their own. And what will happen if Iran decides to go further and simply close the streets of almost

begin to really choke off, for example, China's oil supplies and gas supplies. And so it has the possibility, I think, of drawing in other powers. We have to hope it won't happen. China, I think, is reluctant to get drawn into any sort of conflict in the Middle East. It has other things, it's concerned about.

But that's, say, for example, what happens if China thinks, well, this is actually a good time to try and take Taiwan. It will be a direct result of the conflict in the Middle East, but it will be seen possibly by Chinese thinkers, strategists, Xi Jinping himself, possibly as an opportunity, a good

“time for China to make a move on Taiwan if that's what it wants to do.”

And so there is always a possibility of conflict spreading outside a region, partly because

others outside the region will see opportunities in the conflict because it's engaging people who might stop them from doing what they want. So you've studied wars in the past. And so I want to understand from you, if there are common ingredients that you have seen in previous wars, that you are seeing now, that give you concern that this could potentially

become a larger conflict. Well, I think the whole thing about how it's easier to start a war than it is to end it, and I think, you know, the French Prime Minister, who climbed on so in the first world war, said making peace is harder than making war, and I think he was right, that once you start a war, once you get the losses, I think people become engaged, and

there is often an argument that, you know, for the sacrifice that these people that we've already made, we must continue to win the war, and I think that can be a factor.

“I mean, I think we have to look at the role of emotions and things like pride.”

You get lead, don't want to be seen as backing down. Now, Putin, I think, is very much an example of this. I mean, he's clearly made a real mistake in trying to invade Ukraine. The month marks four years since Russia invaded Ukraine. The casualty's count is staggering.

But he will not admit it, and he keeps on claiming victory, and even though the losses keep

mounting, with nearly two million soldiers on both sides killed, wounded, or missing.

Russia's military suffering the worst with 1.2 million casualties. And so I think we have to look at the individual leaders, and we had at the end of the second world war. We had Hitler sitting in his bunker in Berlin. In the final hours of the European war, Hitler prolongs the war to live as long as he could

and consign his country to destruction. He was prepared to sacrifice every German, to see the German people fight on and be destroyed. And when someone said, "You know, they don't deserve it," he said, "they failed me." "The Nazi monster died hard and had to be smashed into submission." You know, we have to look at the role of leadership, human emotions.

It's like looking at a very complicated chess game being played on many levels, and which

factor is going to be the most important one.

But I think, in all wars, you see, pretty much a sense that we didn't think it would turn out quite this way. You said earlier in our conversation, that accidents can play often a big role into determining whether war's spiral into just bigger and bigger wars. Can you spell out an example or two from history in which that has happened, even if you're

Well, I think the classic is the first world war.

The assassination of Franz Faden and the Archduke probably shouldn't have happened. He went to Bosnia and Herzegovino on the day of the Great Serbian National holiday and got himself assassinated, in spite of all the warnings, and I would call that an accident, an accident that could have been avoided.

“And I think what this assassination of Franz Faden and did was set a match to a pile of”

fuel that was already there. And so Austria-Hangry for long had seen Serbi as this poisonous little country on its southern border. And so in Vienna, when they heard about the Archduke, they said, "This is our chance. We're going to destroy Serbia.

It's quite clear that behind it, we've got every excuse that we need." Austria-Hangry then went to Germany and said, "Look, we're going to try and really finish Serbia once and for all will invade whatever they said they were going to do." Will you back this? And that's when Germany gave the infamous blank check.

Go ahead. Serbia then looked to Russia, it's patron, and said, "Are you with us?" And more or less Russia said, "Yes, you know, we were not going to let them push you around like this." And at that point, things began to move very fast indeed.

The Russians then said to the French who were their allies, "If we go to war with Germany and Austria-Hangry, are you with it and the French said, "Yes, what we have in alliance." The French more or less said to the British, "Well, what about you?" And the British didn't have to go in, but they felt it was a matter of honor. And they also didn't want to continent dominated by Germany, and so the assassination took place

on the 28th of June 1914 by August 1914 Europe was involved in a major war, and that then spread through the rest of Europe and through other parts of the world. And of course, in 1917 the United States came into it. I mean, I'm simplifying it, but it more or less was a chain reaction that happened. And of course the assumption was that it was going to be a very short war, and we should

never assume things about war because we don't know how it's going to go.

[music] Margaret, if I can take us back to the Iran war, I want to turn now to the other big alternative scenario. And that is the path that takes us away from World War III. I mean, first off, do you foresee the other major powers, whether we're talking about China,

but also Russia, for instance, do you see them being drawn into this conflict, or is that unlikely in your view?

“I think the other major powers will be drawn in simply by the fact that they get, especially”

in the case of China, they get fuel and fertilizer from Iran. And so they're supplies of being threatened. I doubt if they'll be drawn in militarily. Why would they want to be? I notice that both Russian and China have been very quiet about the possibility of sending

ships, for example, to the Gulf to try and protect tankers. And so I think the way they've been drawn in is simply because of economic factors, and in the case of Russia, they've had a relationship with Iran for some time. So I don't think we'll see either of those countries coming in and creating conflict, engaging in a war, but it is quite possible that Russia will redouble its efforts in Ukraine, because

other powers are distracted. And it's quite possible that China may decide to make a move against Taiwan, because again, other powers are distracted. So given where we are in the war at this moment in time in the Middle East, what are

“some of the ways you could envision this conflict de-escalating?”

If you say that economics might draw China into the conflict in some ways, I've been wondering too. I mean, it is the economy not a way in which this crawl entirely de-escalate. I mean, I covered the White House for several years here. I said here in Washington, DC, and I know that President Trump, for example, does get

issue about the health of the stock markets, the economy, that undoubtedly factors into his thinking? And I think it is possible that on both sides, let's take the two main protagonists, states, Iran, but also in Israel, and a number of the other Middle Eastern countries, there are those who say this has gone far enough.

We can't sustain this and it's causing problems. And of course, in the United States, the President and the administration have to think about the mid-times that are coming up and wars tend not to be popular with the American

public and rising prices, so domestic factors are always consideration in these things.

I mean, what we have to hope is that a number of the parties will get together. I mean, he would be the United States and whoever is speaking for Iran, speaking to each other, but I think Israel has to be in some ways part of this because Israel has played such a part in the war. And I think a number of the Middle Eastern countries, the Emirates Saudi Arabia, would

like some sort of participation, but it may also be that much as it's been reviled and disregarded, the UN can play a role in actually coming in. And you think so, because that's certainly not the perspective I hear from the Trump administration,

Well, the United Nations, and we all know its weaknesses, what the United Nations has done

and can still do is provide a forum for discussions, and it has previously come in and wanted to cease fires, and it has in previous conflicts helped with reconstruction in post-conflict situations. And so I wouldn't write the UN off, but we badly needed the moment as some sort of discussions which will be backed enough by outside other interested parties who want to make this work.

If you see the economy or domestic politics, the upcoming midterm elections as possible motivations for de-escalation, I mean, I understand why President Trump might want to de-escalate, but I don't have a clear sense of what are the paths for de-escalating

“from the perspective of the Iranians or from the perspective of the Israelis?”

Well, I think with the Israelis, I mean, again, so much depends on Netanyahu who seems to really making the running here, and he seems to have his war in which I don't think is any longer in American War, and it's toppling the regime in Iran. And I think the United States will have to make it clear to him that they're not going to support that if they want to get some sort of peace.

As long as Israel is prepared to keep on bombing Iranian infrastructure and causing damage to that infrastructure, then I don't think there's going to be much hope of peace. But the United States has a lot of leverage that it can exert over Israel. And there are those in Israel. I mean, we've seen it in some of these really press who simply don't support what is going

on who think it's very, very risky indeed. In Iran, I mean, I think we were told that there were those who were ready to possibly

hand over the enriched uranium, were prepared to hand it over to a third-party possibly Russia.

Now whether there's still prepared to do that as another matter, but I mean, there's not

“going to be any sort of settlement, I think, unless of some sort of agreement on Iran's capacity”

to make nuclear weapons, and whether or not they're still willing to do this, it remains to be seen. It's got to be if we want to end this conflict before it goes on and before it spreads and causes even more misery, then we need to see some sort of talking. So it will depend, I think, a lot on who's in charge in Iran and what they want, a lot

on what's happening inside Israel, but also a lot on the United States. And these are all difficult to gauge and we'll have to see. But I think it's costing them all in their own ways. And it may well be that they're all reaching a conclusion that we're not getting what we thought we were going to get.

It's not worth it. I mean, I think both Israel and the United States assumed that the Iranian regime would top all of the Iranians would immediately sue for peace, and we're now seeing that this is not the case.

“And so it may well be that people on all sides are beginning to think how do we stop this?”

Are there some examples from history of regional conflicts that involved major powers that could have exploded into a larger war, into a potential world war? But instead, we're averted. I mean, we talk a lot about the wars that did happen in World War I, World War II, but what about the wars that didn't happen?

Yeah, no, they're always wars that don't explode into wider conflicts.

I mean, in Europe in the 19th century, which was about European standards, a pretty peaceful century that were was promoted by Germany to unify all the German-speaking states into what became Germany, and those wars never involved more than two parties. And that, I think, in one case, there was three. But in that case, I think you did see wars that were contained in other powers standing

aside, because they didn't want to get involved. I mean, some more interesting examples when the accident doesn't turn into war. Hello Americans, I'm coming before you tonight about the Korean-Airline massacre. The attack by the Soviet Union again. And that's when one, for example, when the Korean-Airline or 007 was shot down in the

at the beginning of the 1980s, and it was apparently shot down by Russians by mistake. But those in charge of the Soviet Union thought the United States was probably going to attack them for it. The Soviet Union has carried on the most massive military build-up the world has ever seen until they're willing to join the rest of the world community.

We must maintain the strength to deter their aggression. And they became convinced, and they began to read every sign that the United States produced that the United States was planning an all-out nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. We know it will be hard to make a nation that rules its own people through force to cease using force against the rest of the world.

But we must try. This is not a role we sought. Very close to war, closely in the Middle East, I think, because the Soviet Union was thinking of how to retaliate. So sometimes an accident can create a situation where both sides are apprehensive, and they

begin to read what's happening on the other side as clear evidence of what they fear.

The situation in the 1980s just described. There were NATO exercises taking place, which the Russians had been told about the Soviets have been told about, but they persuaded themselves apparently that these were actually preparations for real attack. President Reagan and Mr. Satchel, the Prime Minister of Britain, were meant to be taking part

in the final bit of the exercises of going into their bunkers just to test that it all worked. And they luckily got word that the Soviets saw this as preparations for real attack. And so they called off the last stages. And Reagan and Satchel were in public. And then they talked to the Soviets and said no, we really didn't need it, and we're not going

to attack you. So they actually picked up the phone that we called. So I think they did actually directly reassure the Soviets and also through their ambassadors. But the terrifying thing was just how close we came to know, I mean, we're because the Soviets have persuaded themselves.

They were about to be attacked. This fascinating. It is terrifying. There was also to me, Margaret, also reassuring that in that moment, we were able to avoid that really, really dangerous and terrifying result between the USSR and the United States, right?

Is there a lesson you take away from that USSR example?

“I think the example is that diplomacy is very important.”

You need to know about the other side. You need to know what they're likely to do and you need to be in touch with them. And you need to take measures to reassure the other side. And that began to happen a lot in the latest stages of the Cold War, the confidence building measures where the Soviets who say to the Americans or to NATO, by the way, we're going

to be doing some naval exercises and the NATO forces who say to the Soviets by the way, we're just going to be practicing. And so they sort of got used to each other. I mean, it was rather like a very tricky relationship where they started out hating each other.

And then they sort of came like, "Oh, not friends, but sort of old foes." And they sort of got used to the... Friendly. Yeah. We know there are not examples where sort of people have said, "Wait a minute, this is getting

crazy." They understood it was getting too volatile and they needed to bring the temperature down. And that happened during the Cold War in several occasions.

And so what never happened was that the Soviet Union United States fought each other directly.

“And the reason for that was largely, I think, because of nuclear weapons.”

Because if the two big powers came in the United States and the Soviet Union with their nuclear arsenals, the real danger was of escalation. And so we had what came to be called mad. Mutually, as sure, destruction needed nuclear powers would not go to war with each other. Yeah.

So you held back. Now we shouldn't get sentimental about that because there were moments when we came very closer, I think, the Cuban missile crisis. But I think we did have a sort of stasis, and we had those on both sides who said, "We cannot go to war directly with each other."

Didn't mean a lot of people weren't killed. It didn't mean that war didn't cause ghastly things in the course of the Cold War, but they never fought each other directly. And that two nuclear superpowers. These two nuclear weapons.

And I think we may have to hope for that today, but of course, some more nuclear powers today. Yeah.

I mean, that's actually exactly what I want to ask you about, which is that after the Second

World War, there were these two big theories that developed sort of suggested we were in this post-war order. I mean, one is, as you mentioned, mutually assured destruction. The idea that nuclear powers would not go to war with each other. But the other was capitalist peace theory.

The idea that countries that trade with each other wouldn't go to war against each other. How much merit do these theories have today?

“Well, this is where history, I think, can be helpful.”

Britain and Germany were each other's biggest trading partners before the First World War. Did that stop them from going to war? No. You know, again, we have other factors.

You know, it's not all about economics. I mean, I know there was this whole theory that no countries that have McDonald's will ever go to war with each other. You know, Russia had McDonald's, Ukraine had McDonald's, look where we are. So I think we shouldn't assume that one factor will keep everyone happy.

And there was a lot of talk during the Cold War of, you know, how we've moved into more peaceful world. Well, we haven't. I mean, there was a war every year somewhere in the world since 1945. Look how many people got killed in the wars in Africa, in the war's in the Middle East,

in the war's in Asia. Mm-hmm. It's the world of wars. You know, we still are a violent people. And we've seen a lot of violence since 1945, what we did is to avoid with the massive wars

that we saw in the first and second world wars.

I realize that we're having this conversation in the context of Iran, because that's when I began hearing questions about, you know, are we headed towards a potential world war three, at least in the American context? But I realize perhaps this view looks differently if you're sitting in Europe. Ukraine's president, Volodymyr Zelensky recently told, "My colleague Jeremy Boen at the BBC."

I believe that Putin has already started it. That Russia's Vladimir Putin has already started World War three. The question is how much territory he will be able to seize and how to stop him.

and not realized it? Well, I hope not.

And I think, I'm not saying we should be foolishly optimistic.

But if we throw up our hands and say, "With nothing we can do, it's all going to happen." And that's very dangerous as well. I think we have to keep on struggling against that, and we have to keep on hoping it won't happen. Putin is more and more isolated, his pride now is involved in the Ukraine war.

He can't back down, but he's not winning. And I don't see how he can win, actually.

“And I think it's important that it is not just Ukraine's war, it's Europe's war.”

And it's a war of those who want peace, and it's a war of those who want to resist aggression. But I don't think that is the same as World War three. You've written a lot about how we in the West, since World War two, sometimes actors that we kind of invented are way out of war. And yet, you've also suggested that that's an unwise way to think and operate.

Can you explain why? The period from 1945 to the 1990s is very short in terms of the history of Europe or the history of the world.

“And I think we became smug, I think we felt we didn't do war anymore, that was something”

that those people on where else did. And I think it's very much the same sort of feeling that a lot of Europeans had before the First World War. They were no longer barbaric. They were civilized.

I mean, this is a sort of language they used. And I think it was a mistake. I think we don't realize just how present war is, and we're not perhaps aware enough. And we should be aware that peace is something that doesn't just happen. It has to be maintained.

And we have to think about how we maintain it.

And we haven't wanted, and I speak as a Canadian, and we're ultimately guilty.

We haven't wanted to spend on defensive weapons or any sorts of weapons, because the public has got other things that once money spent on. But if we don't keep our defenses up, then we are going to be more vulnerable.

“And I think we're all realizing this now.”

In NATO has tended to assume that the United States will look after everything. And now they're realizing that they have got to look after some things themselves. Well, Margaret, thanks so much for sharing your knowledge, but that's really appreciated. Thank you very much for all your rather difficult questions. That was Margaret McMillan, a Meredith Professor of International History at the University

of Oxford. But if you enjoyed our show today, then please leave us a rating and review. It really helps other folks find us. Today's show was produced by Chris Benderev and Lucy Paul, who was mixed by Travis Evans. Our executive producer was James Shield, our digital producer is Matt Pintis.

Our senior news editor is China Collins, and I'm Asma Khalid.

Thanks as always for listening, and we'll talk to you again tomorrow.