Chaos & Control in Iran: Amb. Jeffrey Feltman

was enhanced by the way his father died. I'm host Michael Allen with Beacon Global Strategies. Today, I'm joined by Mr. Jeffrey Feldman, the John C. Whitehead visiting fellow in an international diplomacy at the Brookings Institution. Previously, Mr. Feldman served as the United Nations Undersecretary General for political

affairs. Mr. Feldman joins us today for discussion on the evolving situation in Iran and the outlook for the region going forward. Stay with us as we speak with Jeffrey Feldman. Jeffrey Feldman, welcome back to Natsek Matters. Great to be back with you, Michael. Thanks for having me.

While we have some big news, of course, we have a new Supreme Leader, the son of the last Supreme Leader. Much toaba, co-mani. Do you know this individual? What do you think of them and what can we expect? I do not know him. As you know, we've talked about this before. I did meet the Supreme Leader himself, the late Supreme Leader, and a very weird surreal meeting when I was a

UN official. But no, I did not meet the son. This is the second son of Ali Khamenei, the

Supreme Leader. It was killed on the first day of the war. He's a hardliner. Very much a hard blanner. And his chances of becoming Supreme Leader succeeding his father increased exponentially because of the way his father left office because the Islamic regime was on your book of Iran had said earlier, we don't have hereditary succession. Those are monarchies.

“That's what the Shah did. We are going to have a leader that's based on the clerical wisdom,”

leadership, blah, blah, blah. Well, all that went out to window when Shaman A was killed. And so it was sort of a signal to us that moached about who's a hardliner. He was part of the Iranian Revolution, I garg, of course, himself during the war with the rock. Back in the 80s, was selected. But, but no one has seen him publicly. Now, you could say that's prudence. That, you know, that he doesn't want to make himself an easy target for foreign Israeli or

American air strike. We heard with President Trump has said that he's not an acceptable individual. But, there's also the fact that when his father was killed, the last Supreme Leader Al-Shaman A, so was moached to his wife and so was moached to his mother. Suggestion the whole family was together, suggesting that these rumors that moached to both was seriously injured may not be just rumors.

It may be true. We don't know. But the bottom line is we would not see a significant change in policy

under moached to us leadership. He's a hardliner, perhaps even more of a hardliner than his father. So, as I understand it, not only is he lacking in legitimacy because he is sort of a, you know, assumed office under nepotism. He's also not exactly a religious scholar and some degree

“of clout in Iran is derived from the ability to be a real clerical heavyweight. Does that sound right?”

Mike, he's actually more of a political heavyweight than his father was. He has more clerical legitimacy than his father did. Now, neither one of them are like Ali Khamenei, the first Supreme Leader who took office with the Iranian Revolution in '79. When Khamenei died, and Ali Khamenei was made the Supreme Leader, the guy who just killed who was in the office for 37 years, they basically had to change the Iranian constitution. They basically had to come up with special procedures to let him in because he was

not a clerical heavyweight. His son has gone through a lot more clerical training, but the legitimacy of his son, which would have been questioned a month ago as a successor, was enhanced by the way

his father died. It's sort of like a message. Okay, you kill one Khamenei, you're going to get never

Khamenei. You know, so we basically trained one Ali Khamenei, Iotola Khamenei for another Ayotola Khamenei.

“Yeah, how effective do you see Khamenei if he's in hiding? I think there's a big question,”

you write to us the question. There's a big question about the command and control that the Iranian regime has right now given the targeting given the elimination of so many top leaders. My sense is that though his father and charged for 37 years built a pretty deep bench in the clerical system, in the judiciary, in the IRGC, in the other parts of the security apparatus. My guess is that the question of who the supreme leader is, or whether most of us

years ago when the Islamic Republic had its first succession, because Ali Khamenei has basically

put loyalists at every level of the regime. The regime has lost the legitimacy of its population. Without question, we saw that in December and January with the protests that you and I talked about the last time we got together. But the cohesion of the regime, even with the assassinations, even with the targeting of Hamanai himself, remains strong. We have seen no signs of dissident. We see no signs of defections from the regime. So you've got this read situation where the population has lost

confidence in their government for the most part. But the government itself, the regime itself has maintained coherence. So I think that whose supreme leader matters symbolically. The fact that

“it's most about after a father was killed, that's important symbolically. But I think that the”

system is able to go on no matter who's the supreme leader. And there's one thing that we're talking about this war Michael, is that I think that there's a greater resilience in the system than some of the advocates of striking Iran, particularly among the Israelis, probably believe. Yeah, they have a ton of resilience, I can see it. It has much to have been piloticking his whole life for this job or is this kind of a surprise. He's been rumored for a long time. He's one of

those people who say, "Well, how about much to remember?" He says, "Well, you got that succession issue, the shot of that." I don't remember about much about it. So he's been talked about for a long

time. He's always on the short list of those that were speculating about who was going to replace

the old man. But usually he was being in a way that you would dismiss him. You say, "Well, let's consider him a dismissive." He's been relatively quiet publicly. He hasn't had a high public profile, but as I said, he came out of that IRGC atmosphere. He was a teenager during the around-a-walk Iraq war and he actually fought in that. He's close to Ali Lerjani, Ali Lerjani's national security visor, who's basically in charge now, possessing him the president is almost irrelevant. And Ali Lerjani,

who was close to Ali Hamanay, very much a hardliner and experienced hardliner, is also close to the sun. So I don't see a significant change in approach from one Hamanay to another.

Got it. Explain to us, is Ali Lerjani going to be the power behind the throne,

“as much above begins to assert himself over time, or how would you forecast this?”

I would under Ali Hamanay that the former Supreme Leader over his 37 years, the system became much more militarized. The system became much more security-focused. The IRGC, when Hamanay took over Iran in '79, you had this senior clerical figure and the clerics were all important. The balance is shifted under Ali Hamanay to where you have the clerics being less pretty, less predominant. Still important, but not as, but the IRGC and the security apparatus

have gained in importance. So I think, and that's part of Ali Lerjani's network. So yes, I think you're going to see an increasing control by the IRGC and other security organizations that was already in place, already starting well in the Hamanay's Ali Hamanay's reign. So Jeff, I've noticed some new targeting from the Israelis over the weekend. For one thing, they seem to be hitting IRGC oil refineries. People seem to underscore that it's

IRGC, which they're trying to suggest, means that it's aimed at the regime and not if the people. And then they're actually going way down the chain of instruments of repression to hit police stations, which says to me, they're trying to think of every target they can to foster some sort of

“rebellion. What do you think of that theory? I think the Iranian people right now”

as much as they may load through the regime are probably not going to come out. You have the besieged, which is the local militias, like the neighborhood militias, that are reportedly out in force everywhere, setting up checkpoints and stuff. And people just experienced that awful crackdown that unrelenting violence at the beginning of January, where anywhere between six or seven thousand and 30,000 people were killed. I don't see right now our ability to use

airstrikes, no matter how targeted they are, as would be an incentive if you get people to turn out into the street right now. I could, you'll see, I could be proving wrong.

I'd give you a statistic because I find interesting. There were, in February,

like 21 million users of peer-to-peer platforms, there were able to get messages out of Iran

using VPNs and stuff. That number has fallen to almost zero now. Like, well, if that's zero, it's like 60, that 70,000 messages a day, rather than 21 million messages a day. In February, and that shows you how paranoid the, how paranoid and controlling the system is right now.

“And I think the people understand that, the people understand that that they, that it would be”

almost suicidal to gather in great numbers in the way that they did at the end of December and in the January. They saw what was like when there was no war, how hard the regime cracked down.

And what are they going to do if the regime thinks that they have an existential threat from

both the inside and the outside simultaneously? I don't think there's any question with that they would be using as much force as possible against the no matter, no matter how many police stations the Israelis decide to hit. So what other tools are there in the kit for these railies at least to try and set conditions for regime change? If they're hitting, all the instruments of regime repression are they able to recruit certain people in the army or IRGC or anywhere where

“there might be a cleavage and literally give them weapons? What else could they do?”

Well, one thing that's been discussed privately and publicly, President Trump has, I think rightly,

at least so far, downplayed it. But it's the idea of arming the Kurds, arming the pollute, arming some of these groups on the periphery of Iran who have resented the sort of Persian dominance of the country. The Israelis, I think, have seriously considered that. And I don't know if it's off the table or not. But what that would do, that would be there sort of consequences of doing that that are far beyond Iran. The last thing Turkey's going to

want to see is another armed Kurdish movement looking for autonomy. They just saw the U.S. um, able to move away from the Syrian Kurds. There's the most preventive with the Iraqi Kurd. But they're not going to want to see the Israelis or the Americans arming and encouraging the Kurds to try to carve out an autonomous territory. And that could have ramifications elsewhere

“as the Turkish-Israeli tensions rise. So I think I don't think it's a perfect way for the Israelis”

to um, incite a rebellion against a weekend regime. And I'm not sure the Israelis are going to be satisfied anyway. Look at Lebanon. Freak change, go, go to Lebanon for a minute. The Lebanese government is saying the types of things that would have been unheard of that would have been music to our ears only a few years ago, outlawing Hezbollah's military activities, taking control of the airport grabbing it out of Hezbollah's hands, arresting Hezbollah members a checkpoints who are carrying

weapons. The sorts of statements coming out of the Prime Minister and President of Lebanon are again, they're just, they would have been unimaginable a few years ago. But that doesn't mean they're disarming Hezbollah. That doesn't, so the Israelis will not be satisfied with anything less than a physical disarmament. And I think that in Iran, what you would have is you could have the deterioration of the periphery, but you're still going to have enough of the regime

left that the Israelis are going to think, "My gosh, that could be reconstituted. They could work beyond the nuclear ballistic missile program." I think I really think that the Israelis are in the lemma over how they accomplish their goal of making sure that this regime cannot reconstituted. So, and then there's the question Mike, we haven't talked about this. One of the, one of the, I think elements of success for President Trump should be a solution for the 970 pounds of highly enriched

uranium. That, right now, that highly enriched uranium seems to be in gas form and canisters buried under the, under the, um, the rubble of, of the nuclear facilities and, and forderring the tents. But if this regime survives this war, as I think it will, if I had to place a bed I'd say it will, it, and much we can form. But why wouldn't they race for the bomb? Right. We have got to find a way to secure those 970, um, kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Now, there's, there's talk about

I'll leave that to the military. People did, did the determine how long that would take how much

of, or how much you'd have to secure on the ground. But you can also talk about some solution with the IAEA, um, where the IAEA monitors and, and removes it. There was monitoring and removal of, of, of stocks of, of enriched uranium after the signing of the, the, the Iranian nuclear nuclear nuclear, the, you know, the JCPOA that the President Obama had shepherded through. Um, so there are mechanisms that the news before to get really looted, but the highly

enriched uranium. But that has to be one of the focus of President Trump's determination was this war of success or not. Did we take, did we manage to secure somehow and control the highly enriched

uranium? Yeah. It's, it's, it's a real problem. I mean, I've noticed, in the press coverage, it went

from, well, who knows where it is to, over the weekend, we know it's still at Esfahan and it might be accessible. So, that sort of provoked the article saying we could be using special operations forces to get into the act. So, that would be a quite, quite something. You know, I sort of

“touching on this. But I think that there's going to be a growing discrepancy between the Israeli”

objectives for this war and the American objectives for this war. I think that the coordination up until now has been very tight, very close, very, you know, very constructive in terms of a military perspective. But as this goes on, I think that we should anticipate that there will be some differences.

And there was, well, there was even some differences we've seen already. Michael, and you mentioned the,

the target, the Israeli targeting of the, of the oil depose the oil refinery, where it seems that the Trump administration wasn't all together happy with the extent of that of the, of targeting of the oil facilities. So I think we'll, we'll see some discrepancies. And my guess is that the Trump administration is going to want to line this up earlier than the Neffinian administration. So I think you're right, I also wonder if there's a divergence in what an acceptable end state is. I think the Israelis

or maybe this is cynical to cynical. It seems like the Israelis might be able to live with the

“civil war inside of Iran, whereas we certainly, I think, would appreciate stability.”

I agree with your 100%. And I, yes, the Israelis, if they can, if they see that the, that the nuclear file and the ballistic missile file has been, has been overtaken because the Iran is raw fighting each other, because they're all focused inward. I think that's, that's maybe not there, that maybe not there. Preferred outcome, but that's an acceptable outcome. I think they're preferred outcome of some friendly regime, I don't like what Israel is, is, is pie in the sky at this

point. But I think they can live with chaos. We're not going to want that. And President Trump is certainly indicated that that's not his, that's not his goal. You know, he, he talks, you know, he talks about what sounds to be close to a Venezuelan situation. I'm sure the White House understands that Venezuela is a lot of quite different. But you know, that you have a strong man, a strong leader who's sort of in charge, but a strong leader who's not going to be

posing risk to the neighborhood. And we have the Gulf states to think about are the six countries of the Gulf corporation council, including Noxati Rabia, UAE, Qatar, etc., who are being hit intensely by the Iranians. The Iranians want to make this, what they want to inflict maximum pain on as many, on as many people in countries as possible, so that those people in countries say anything out of states in Israel. Stop, stop, stop. But anyway, after this is all over, the

we're going to want to have rebuild a constructive relationship with our Gulf partners. Our Gulf partners didn't want this war. And if we leave Iran in utter chaos, where the chaos is spilling over into our Gulf partners, affecting their ability to track investments, to rebuild the infrastructure that's been damaged, to attract tourism, to buy and out Ula and Saudi Arabia, they're going

“to be very happy. So I think that you're right, that President Trump does not want chaos, but”

the Israelis could live with chaos as long as they think the nuclear ballistic missile threat has been taken care of. Okay. And what did you make of these railies targeting oil refineries over the weekend? This isn't answering your questions directly like a black guy. I got sort of PTSD. I was the US ambassador in Beirut in 2006 when Hezbollah dragged Lebanon and Israel went to war, when Hezbollah provoked war with Israel in 2006. And then the Israelis targeted and bombed in the

war against Hezbollah, the oil tanks and storage facilities in Lebanon. And so we had the same sort of

discrepancy between the United States and Israel that the United States in 2006, under George W. Bush,

“wanted to put some separation between fighting Hezbollah and a partnership with the Lebanese”

people, trying to try to build a wedge between Hezbollah and the Israelis by bombing the oil plants by sending this pollution on everyone's houses by ending the ability to treat sewage and clean water for the Lebanese. We're doing the opposite. So you had a similar discrepancy in 2006 at a much smaller scale. But again, I had flashbacks to the 2006 war because it was the same thing. The United States wanted to show the civilians we weren't after. The civilians were after

terrorist group. Here we want to show the civilians we're after the Islamic regime. Leadership and the dangers of causes were not against the Iranian people. But but the Israelis by going after to that extent they did. The oil facility starts to undermine the narrative that the United States is trying to give. Yeah. And they're making a big deal. There's a difference between regular refineries in the IRGC, trying to suggest, of course. Did they think that if that the

IRGC doesn't have the ability to go over to take fuel out the other the other oil depose, it makes no sense. Yeah. Yeah, I hear you. We're going to take a quick break and we'll be right back with more of our discussion with Jeffrey Feldman. Beacon Global Strategies is the premier National Security Advisory firm. Beacon works side by side with leading companies to help them understand national security policy, geopolitical risk, global technology policy, and federal

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their toughest challenges. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has been trying to function

at a high level since this conflict began. Of course, they've taken a lot of blows, especially in their leadership. But have you heard anything about how things are going within that sort of

“guardian of the regime right now? No, I have it. But it's one thing that I think this should”

concern us all that we haven't seen any signs of defections. We haven't seen people trying to get there, you know, regime figures trying to get their children out of the country. It goes back to my, to my earlier thought that no matter how repulsive this regime is to us and particularly to the most of the writing people themselves, there's an internal cohesion. They're all in it together. So no, I have not, I've not seen any sign. I do think it'd be hard to do the command and

control when you can't get together for fear of being targeted. But no, the regime seems to have seems to be sticking together. Yeah. Right. You know, they're saying else, Michael, that's rumored in the paper. I wonder what you think of this, since you've been part of government and political discussions for as long as I've had almost. You know, there's talk that we could put boots on the ground to take a large island, which is where 80s, 90% of Iran's oil is processed

in the exported, that this would be another parallel to Venezuela that that we would be basically

using boots on the ground. We didn't have that as well. We'd boots on the ground around to control the Iranian oil exports, i.e. control their primary source of revenue. And I'm wondering if that's, if you think that something realistic or is that just everyone talks about everything during

“during times of war? So I think it's more the latter. Although I have no doubt that this question”

has been asked by the president. And by the way, same, but the Straits of Formus. I think there's attention between political appointees saying, let's do these things in the uniform military saying, well, it's not that easy. Clark Island has got to be at the top of the list and I think we've read between the lines and the navy might be saying to the president, we don't have the right ships here. These are not the types of ships where you do an expeditionary crashing of the beach.

We're in a different ballgame here. So there's at least some issue pertaining to what sort of warcraft we need to be able to do this. I think Trump's thinking about it, though. I think you

of practical reasons. Hey, just the maddening thing for the the poor Iranian people who are the

“primary victims of this regime is that Iran should be a G20 country. You know, it has 902 million”

people. The territory is the size of France, United Kingdom, and Spain combined. It has something like 12% of the world's oil reserves, 15% of the natural gas reserves. You know, it's it should be in the G20 and it's and but when you have a country or you have a regime that has identified the country with depth to America and death to Israel rather than life for Iranians, it's going to automatically not be able to reach its potential and end up being as sanctioned as it is now,

because of and and unable to be integrated into the world economy in a way that would create that G20 type status. It's just it's just maddening that the that you know, I don't particularly agree with with the president's decision that there was an imminent danger for Iran that we had to act now. I kind of like looking at Iran at the Iranian leadership trying to figure how they're going to address the the the grievances of this population. You know, I like that sort of

internal dilemma that they were facing, but the primary problem with Iran is a leadership is the is the whole identification of the of the clerical here in judicial leaders with the with

that sort of revolutionary death to America death to Israel. Yeah, I mean that's a good point. Talk to

me a little bit about the president here. He seems to be saying on occasion that we've achieved many of our goals. Maybe this thing isn't going to go on as long as we thought, how is he going to claim victory? Is it going to be strictly on eliminating the vestiges, the nuclear program and the missile program and so in a sense it's one and done all over again. Like, he's put out so many

“objectives over the course of these of these past 10 or 11 days for the war. I think that he could pick”

any objective he wants when he's when he's decided he's had enough. When he's decided that he's for whatever reason that that he's that he's achieved certain things or that or that the economic costs are becoming too great or the supply chain problems are growing whatever. Whatever the reason is I have I have full confidence that the president will be able to cite at least one of the objectives of the many that he's given out over the over the past 10 days. But my concern again is that

will they will we have resolved that nuclear program or not? I had certainly hope that that remains

one of the focuses of his objectives. Yeah, I think he's going to be faulted ultimately if he

is an at least tied down that loose end. Yeah, I agree. He's so called missing HU. Well, tell us a little bit more about where you think the Iranian people are right now. Do you think that they're excited and hopeful about the bombing campaign because they believe there's an outside chance that it could lead to the collapse of the regime? Or do you think that they're just hunkered down unlikely to come out? You said as much earlier unlikely to come out onto the

“streets? Can you paint any scenario where they do come back out to the streets in a big way?”

I think that the initial reaction by a console part of the population was a nation. You know, you saw the celebrations when they were came out the carbonated and killed. It's hard to monitor now because the crackdown on the internet have been so severe where the sort of the peer-to-peer platforms have been used to get information out have been largely shut down by the by the regime. So it's harder now than it was during that protest movement in December, January to monitor what

actually going on on the ground. But my sense is that that initial elation, felt by many people, has evolved into much more of a hunkering down that they see that 10 days in, that the militias are still portraying their neighborhood, that the other ally, Lergenic, and still make statements that the Iranian regime is still able to launch attacks against

people who are very hopeful that this is going to lead to something. But for the moment,

they're hunkering down that they're not going to dare to come out into the streets right now, that it would take something much more significant. Like, for example, what if these rumors are true that most of a is seriously wounded from the attacks on the the compound horse father, wife, and mother were killed. And if they would have to announce that he's dead, too, with that,

“with so that they've lost two eye-tolls in the row, would that bring them out in the street?”

Maybe. I don't know. But I think it's going to have to be signed dramatic. It tells them it's worth taking the risk. We took the risk in December, and we lost thousands of people. We started

taking the risk now when harmony was filled and the besieged crackdown on us. This is also fresh

and raw. I think that you're going to see more hunkering down for the moment than sustained protests. So one of my scenarios is that we don't have an immediate collapse of the regime, but mindful that it took the shot more than a year, we're living through protests before he collapsed. Maybe this just over time is that they will correct collapse. So let's start with this. Do you believe that at least now the days are numbered for the regime? Is it an

evitable that they're going to collapse in the short to medium term? I think that the regime is doomed. But I think it's doomed not by the air strikes. It's doomed by its inability to meet

the expectations to address the grievances of the population that we saw come out in such

fast numbers in December or the beginning and being a January. But what how long will this zombie regime stay in place? Can we accelerate its burial through air strikes? And that's the part where I'm worried that we actually extend it because we increase the solidarity of those that have been arrested at some of the Islamic regime and who know that they will be punished or killed once the regime falls. So I don't know. I mean, yes, I think the regime is absolutely doomed.

“That's why I kind of was, I think it was good to watch them in January, try to address that”

dilemma that they had no way of addressing the grievance of the population without reintegrating the world economy. And you can't reintegrate the world economy as long as you are supporting as long as you're behaving domestically and internationally the way that they run was. But now, so I don't know, Michael, it's hard to say. I mean, I've asked people, are there any successful examples of air strikes leading to regime change? Air strikes only, no boot tunneling to regime

change. And the one that comes up is Libya, but Libya already had an armed opposition or had an opposition on the ground already organized when those NATO air strikes started. So we don't have that pillar in place yet. We all see signs of that pillar in place yet. Yeah, it makes me wonder whether the United States and Israel think that the people are their ground troops and they really, really need them to come out and do something here.

But you know, this was a heavily heavily controlled population, a very deep repression, repression all the way to how people should address, you know, how you've seen in public. It was, it was, it's almost North Korea in terms of it's, it's attempt to control to unpopulation. And so it's not like in places like Yemen where the population had, had lots of small arms. It's a different, it's a different atmosphere and it's less conducive to organized opposition from

within. Even though the dissatisfaction, hate of the regime is sky high, their ability to organize themselves against it is, is minimal. Yeah. Tell us a little bit about where you think the UAE

“and Saudi are at this point in the play. Before this war started, I think we talked about this”

Michael. The UAE and Saudi Arabia were on different sides of a divide in the Middle East. You had the UAE working very closely with the Israelis, and you had the Saudis working very closely with the Turks, the places like Syria, where you had the, the Saudis and the Turks supporting a centralized government as as as did the United States under interim President of the Shahra. You had the Israelis and the Emirati's skeptical and much more interested in

successionous forces like the Kurds and the Druze because of of Ahmad Shahra's al-Qaeda passed.

the Saudis and the Emirati's run different sides. You see the same thing in Sudan,

“the same thing in in Somalia, between Ethiopia and Austria. So you saw the Saudis and the Emirati's”

detention between them basically exacerbating conflict situations in the elsewhere in the region

and across the Red Sea in Africa. And I wonder if there's if that tension will be eased in the aftermath of this war in that both countries themselves, along with their four other GCC partners, where victims of the of the Iranian of the Iranian response. So I'm, and I'm also curious whether the UAE is really partnership that was so close. Started, you know, it's starting well before the Abraham Accords, but politically of course came into public view with the Abraham Accords,

but became even closer in recent years. If that will be affected by the fact that the UAE didn't want this war, didn't so I didn't want to be attacked by Iran. And the Iranian attacks

“are in response to the Israeli American strikes. So I think that we could be seeing no matter how”

this war turns out shifts in the in the tensions and the alliances that were that were prevalent before this war started. The Israeli Turkish competition in rivalry, the Erdogan, Nathan Yahoo, hatred of each other, certainly will be escalated if the Israelis do arm the Kurds and the Kurds. But that Saudi Emirati rivalry, I hope is eased by the shared experience that they've just that they're now having under the Iranian attacks. The question I

have too is what will their relationship with us be like? You know, there was a celebratory atmosphere when Trump was elected in these capitals. I mean, we saw the very successful Trump visit to Abu Dhabi, Riyah and Doha last May, where Trump was in his happy spot in these countries. Will these countries anger about the Iranian attacks against them, transcend their

probable anger that this war happened in the first place. You know, the Saudi Arabia,

particular, had no love for the Iranian regime. But they had managed to establish a kind of live and let live relationship that would contribute that in theory would contribute to Muhammad been some on the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia's ability to attract investment tourism and to Saudi Arabia. That's kind of shattered down. You've seen even data centers have been hit by the Iranians. So I would imagine that our golf partners are going to be thinking their relationship with

our president, but they're also going to be very angry with their Iranian neighbor about what they've just gone through. Yeah, big things on the horizon was we begin to wrap up and it's

always funny to ask a black Swan question since it's by its very nature and foreseeable. But

if you had to come up with the secretaries asked you to come up with four or five things that we all may not be thinking about given where we are in the moment. Name a few. What should we be watching for? Can we build a different relationship with Iraq and Yemen given the fact that the

“Iraqi Shia militias haven't really responded in the big way and the Houthis have held their fires so far?”

What does this tell us about Iran's control in the broader region? Even if this regime survives, how do we make sure that they can't rebuild their relationships with the Houthis and the Iraqi Shia militias? I think the Israelis will take care of Hezbollah on their own. But that's one thing I would look at because I find it very intriguing that at least so far the Houthis haven't participated. So they must be calculating on domestic issues outwaying the Iranian interest in

having them attack, meaning is there a way to build our own connections with these groups that prevent the Iranians from rebuilding them. Jeff Feldman, thank you so much for joining us again today on Natsek Matters. Great to be with you, Michael. Thank you. That was Jeffrey Feldman.

Natsek Matters is produced by Steve Dorsey with a systems from Ashley Barry. Natsek Matters is a production of Beacon Global Strategies.