Red Sea Rivalries - The Proxy War for Sudan and the Geopolitical Interests in East Africa: Josh Meservey

I think is the correct focus.

“That should be the core of our relationship with African states.”

I'm host Michael Allen with Beacon Global Strategies. Today I'm joined by Mr. Josh Mazurvi, a senior fellow with the Hudson Institute, specializing in African geopolitics and counterterrorism. Mr. Mazurvi previously served as a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation and the Atlantic Council of Africa Center.

Mr. Mazurvi joins us today for a discussion on Sudan's relevance to Saudi Arabia and the relationships broader implications for Africa and the Middle East. Stay with us as we speak with Josh Mazurvi. Well, we really need you here. We have been trying to get a little bit smarter on a variety of different issues that they

pertain to the Middle East, Sudan in particular, but also just to talk a little bit about counterterrorism as well. But let me tell you what the impetus was of us tracking you down and asking you on to the podcast.

“When the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited President Trump recently, I think”

President Trump really hoped that he could nail down the Crown Prince on normalization with Israel. It's probably the biggest prize that maybe President Trump could achieve during a presidency and it certainly would be the big deal to the Abraham Accords. So I was sort of surprised when Mohammed bin Salman when he came to town started talking

to the President about I could never possibly do this. It's too hot in the Middle East.

But also I'm worried about things in Sudan and he seemed to be talking about refugees. He seemed to be talking about destabilization in general. And I think people like you probably knew the impact and the importance of this issue to the Saudis, but I had not heard it imported into the normalization discussions before. So that's why you're here. We want to understand this issue and make some sort of judgment

“about whether, honestly, is this a real issue that should delay the Abraham Accords?”

Or is it something that just sounds like a pretext because you don't really want to Saudi Arabia doesn't really want to do normalization now anyway? So that was a long windup Josh, but why don't you start with an overview of the Sudan Saudi relationship and tell us a little bit about Sudan's ongoing civil war?

Yeah, sure. So I'll start with the last element of that first, the sort of status

of the civil war. Sudan's been locked in this awful crisis for several years now. The country is effectively divided very roughly between eastern West and you have in the western parts, the Sudanese armed forces, which is the Sudanese military. And then in the east, you have the rapid support forces, the RSF, which is led by a man in General Hametti.

The RSF is a well, it's origins lie with the genuine militias, which were notorious, even in the United States back in the 90s and early 2000s as leading the genocide in Darfur under the old Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese dictatorship. Now the RSF was formalized as such, sort of graduated from its Genjuede status into a formal part of the Sudanese security services during the Bashir reign, Bashir was trying to coup-proof his regime.

Ultimately didn't work. He was couped by the RSF and the Saffin coordination. And then eventually, RSF and Saff started fighting. And now we have this, as I said, horrific civil war, millions displaced hundreds of thousands dead, unclear, you know, the exact numbers on that. But currently Saff holds cartoon, they had to retake it after our Saff controlled much of it.

And then ports Sudan, those are the two big prizes that Saff holds, ports Sudan is on the Red Sea, of course. The RSF holds a lot of Darfur, they've now moved into the court of funds which are near on the path to cartoon.

This is where Saudi Arabia comes in.

Saudi Arabia is very clearly aligned with the Saff. They have a long relationship with Sudan. It's not hard to see why. We can picture a map, Sudan is right across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. Sudan has over well around 500 miles of Red Sea coastline.

So obvious reasons for Saudi to be interested in Sudan. The UAE is the primary supporter of the RSF part of the Civil War. So Sudan very much plays into this nascent, burgeoning, however you want to categorize it. Rivalry between the UAE and Saudi, yeah, this is Sudan is a real part of it. So in very quick and dirty overview of Sudan's Civil War there.

Well, we're definitely going to get to this freeing relationship between Saudi Arabia and the UAE was in the papers again recently about events in Yemen. But let me just sort of ask you point blank. Obviously, this is a horrible Civil War and terrible leak percussions everywhere. But is it usually mentioned in the context of Middle East peace and are the Saudis constantly

worried about what it would be worried about refugees coming over in boats to seek safety in Saudi Arabia?

“Is this a real threat, a real problem for the kingdom?”

I think so, yes, I think is the answer. This is a real problem for the kingdom. And also, though, to your previous question, it doesn't have to impact on its relationship with Israel. That seems to be somewhat, to me, an artificial link that the Saudis are drawing here.

I don't know why the situation in Sudan would prevent the Saudis from normalizing with Israel. Now there are some esoteric Israel's Saudi issues, vis-a-vis the Horn of Africa, which would include Sudan, Israel just recognized Somali land, which is an autonomous self-governing on-clave of Somalia.

It also has a Gulf of Aden coastline, which is important because that leads up into the right sea, obviously, whereas Saudi Arabia is very close to the mode issue government, the government of Somalia. So tensions there, because the UAE and Israel, obviously, do have a normalized relation ship, UAE, very active in Somali land.

So there is Saudi Israel elements in the Horn of Africa issue, but they're a bit of ancillary out to say.

“So again, I think the answer is too full.”

Yes, Sudan, absolutely is a problem for Saudi Arabia, but also, I don't think it should, I don't see any real reasons for it to affect the Israel Saudi relationship, because the Somali land thing is, I don't want to minimize it, because it is important, but it's smaller potatoes, let's say, compared to other Middle East issues.

Well, I was skeptical having never heard it raised in this context before, by the way, have

you ever heard it raised, Sudan, in general, raised in the Saudi Middle East peace construct? Now, I haven't, so Sudan, was part of the Abraham Accords back when it was sort of a functioning state, but, you know, vis-a-vis Saudi, I don't see any strong links there. All right, so let's just stay at the basics here. What is the US policy towards Sudan?

Good question. Well, it is varied over the years of this conflict. So, initially, during the Biden administration, the United States with the Saudis was running the, what was called the jet of process, so this was essentially a process, I was trying to bring the warring sides together in jet of, as the name suggests, to reach some sort

of accommodation.

That was always a bit of a fool's errand, if you asked me, just because the Sinekwanan

first successful negotiations is that both sides have to actually be invested in them succeeding and be participating in good faith. That was never the case neither the staff nor the RSF were particularly motivated to negotiate. So that was always fruitless.

“Since President Trump retook office, the US has, I think, took a period of assessment, trying”

to figure out exactly what is going on. And then, more recently, starting last year, or the end of last year, it started working on what was called the quad process, so bringing Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE together

That group of countries, it makes sense. Those three countries, I referenced the size of the US are the main outside actors in Sudan. So you do have to reach some sort of agreement among those before you can even begin to address the actual problems on the ground in Sudan itself.

I'm always at pains, this is a bit of a hobby horse for me, or a soap box position, but

“I do try to remind people, while outside powers are very important to this conflict, I think”

they've lengthened it, they've intensified it for sure. Fundamentally, this is a Sudanese war, though, but Sudan is in civil war because these factions that have described the R-Saf and the Saph decided to fight. That's the bottom line, so even if you get the quad process going, which is absolutely necessary, it's still not going to solve this issue.

So I think that's useful to always bear in mind. What are the fundamental differences among the Sudanese that's keeping this going? Being regards to the Saph and the R-Saf fundamentally, both are led by men who want to control Sudan.

I don't want to be simplistic about it, but that is my bottom line assessment.

They just have decided that each of them should be the ruler of this country. Now, there's all sorts of other dynamics that play here, of course. There's a long history. Sudan is a deeply troubled country, you know, it has been since independence. It's better war for much of its existence, South Sudan, the world's newest country, was carved

off of Sudan after decades of war between Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan. So this is a deeply troubled country. The R-Saf is from the Darfur region, as I mentioned, whereas traditionally the elites of Sudan are from the center, around the cartoon, the Nile, these Nile tribes that are sort of the elite tribes, the economic and political and even social elites of the country are traditionally

from the interior or the center, whereas the R-Saf is much more of a periphery organization.

So there are those dynamics, the last dynamics, tribal dynamics, et cetera. But fundamentally, this is about power. These two men want supreme power in Sudan, and they are fighting for it and appear to be willing to continue fighting for it, no matter how many Sudanese have to die. Well, it sort of sounds like Russia's behavior and Russia Ukraine.

They're not very excited about or motivated to have a sincere conversation, either. So I get this question a lot, which is why should America care, and I'm usually talking about Russia Ukraine or any number of different places, frankly. So take that question and apply it to Sudan. Yeah.

“Well, it's the relevant question, right, where that you have to start from when you're thinking”

about American form policy. So Sudan matters, one, it's a very large African country. I think it's 10-th or 12-compopulation. I don't remember off-top my head. I was once the largest by land mass, and then I reference South Sudan being carved off,

so it lost to perch, in that way. But more particularly for the US is this red sea issue that you and I have already discussed. Sudan again has about 500 miles of coastline on the red sea. This is a major global shipping choke point. We saw the disruptions.

We saw the economic harm that can come when that choke point gets disrupted. In this case, by the Houthis, not long ago when they started lobbying missiles and then drones into that waterway, and because this waterway is the major artery for Asia Europe trade, back and forth between the two. This is why Israel is very interested in the Somali land issue because they're so dependent

on trade up through here.

“And then, so global trade, very important to the United States, also Sudan has a long history”

of hosting islamist even terrorist organizations. So what's remember, Osala bin Laden was in Sudan when he planned 9/11, eventually he was forced out by the Sudanese at the behest of the Americans. He went to Afghanistan, attack was launched, but he was in Sudan. There's a long history here of Islamists, as I say, and even outright terrorists operating in

Sudan. The longer you have instability of the type that Sudan is experiencing right now, the more fertile the territory becomes for Islamist terrorists and Islamist more generally. So, the Emirates will say, "Look, we're in there, we're supporting the RSF because the SAF is totally penetrated and even co-opted by Islamists."

So that's another element here, the US needs to care about, is that we don't want Islamist

taking over that government again, that Bashir ran Sudan as an isn'tist enterprise and it caused untold problems for the US and that region. Well, there's some Islamists there, but they're not harboring ISIS or any external terrorist are there? No, right now.

So, this is the fear, like again, the longer this goes, the more opportunities there are for entities like terrorist organizations to regain a foothold in Sudan. The other element is our adversaries take advantage of these types of situations. Russia, Iran, being two of the chief examples here in the Sudan context.

So Russia has struck a deal with the SAF to build a base in Port Sudan.

That's an obvious problem for the United States and a bunch of other countries to envision a Russian naval base right in the heart of the Red Sea, essentially. Sudan had cut ties with Iran at the behalf of the Saudis and the Emirates some years ago during the Qatar embargo years, but then it normalized its relations with Iran and is seeking weapons from Iran and what forms of help it can get.

No, I don't think that's because SAF is actually ideologically aligned with Iran. Right. SAF is trying to survive. Barhan is trying to win a war.

He will go anywhere, he will make deals of anybody to do so.

So that's the dynamic that has obtained in Sudan that's so damaging to the US because

“it allows our competitors to gain influence in a really, really important country that's”

on a very sensitive maritime route. And then there's the humanitarian suffering is horrific, refugee flows over the region, which are fundamentally destabilizing. So a lot of reasons here at the US needs to care. Okay, so also, I mean, talk a little bit about the United States interest in the horn

of Africa. But I think as everyone knows, we have President's presence in Djibouti, we have conducted counterterrorism, operations across Somalia for many, many years, just sort of, you know, puts you data in that context, but in the broader context of what's going on counterterrorism was in the Horn of Africa, and why?

I mean, sometimes that's like at the top of the list of, you know, quote unquote, ungoverned spaces that we need to worry about. Yes, Somalia has a long and tragic history, obviously going back, I mean, like in this

“to the 80s, well, even before if you want to count the coup, it will 60s, but.”

So there's a al-Qaeda's, one of its deadliest affiliates operates in Somalia. It's called Al-Shabab, it controls and has controlled swaths of Somalia for around 15 years. And it's killed Americans in the region, it attacked Kep Simba, which is an American military outpost in Kenya, killed Som Americans, and that attack, it's killed American civilians in attacks and places like Kenya, etc.

So this is an nasty, and unfortunately, quite capable organization that recently has also established ties with the Houthis, who if we talked about in Yemen, the Houthis, the real danger here is the Houthis are more technically sophisticated than Al-Shabab, and so they have access to drones, for instance, that are much more capable than anything Shabab has right now.

And supposedly the Houthis even have an indigenous drone manufacturing capability. So if there's skills transfer of that type or even just equipment transfer of that type, that's a huge problem for surrounding countries, and then in addition to Al-Shabab, you have an Islamic state affiliates also operating in Somalia. The Caliph, the leader of the IS affiliate in Somalia, was rumored even to be the leader

of the global organization. Now my sense is even if you was, it was probably more of a figurehead role, I don't think he was maybe the operational head, let's say, but there were really credible reports

“that this was a very important figure within the global ISIS terrorist organization.”

Now fortunately, these Islamic state has taken some real beating up in the north of Somalia recently, because there's a pretty capable federal member stayed up there at Puntland, which has capable military that is supported by the Emirates, and that really did

So these are the two main terrorist organizations that concern the US, particularly under

“President Trump, but also under Biden, and going further back under President Obama.”

The US has carried out a lot of air strikes in Somalia trying to grade these groups. Yeah. All right, so we have a big counterterrorism interest that's still there. We're going to take a quick break, and we'll be right back with more of our discussion with Josh Mazurvi.

Beacon Global Strategies is the premier national security advisory firm. Beacon works side by side with leading companies to help them understand national security policy, geopolitical risk, global technology policy, and federal procurement trends. Beacon's insight gives business leaders the decision advantage, founded in 2013, Beacon develops and supports the execution of bespoke strategies to mitigate business risk, drive

growth, and navigate a complex geopolitical environment with a bipartisan team in decades of experience, speak and provides a global perspective to help clients tackle their toughest challenges. So let's get back to this schism between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

For the longest time here in Washington, all we did was hear about their amazing partnerships

and how they saw the world the same. They together conspired against Qatar to freeze them out for several years and sort of labeled them as supporters of Islamic extremism and everything else. They were both operating as I understand it on the same side in Yemen, and then after

“the time the Saudis, I think were performing so poorly there, they began to back away, although”

they still do have a lot of interest there. Talk a little bit if you can about Sudan's impact on the schism between these two states and any other factors that you recognize from what's going on across the Red Sea in the Middle East. Yeah, so you gave the background well there, we used to think of for reason, good reason.

The UAE and the Saudis as being sort of in lockstep in both the Middle East and Africa, but real schisms have emerged recently, although I think you could look back years ago and start seeing the seeds of this. You mentioned Yemen, I was in 18, I don't know, like six years ago or something, just very, very briefly, with the Emirates and they were already talking about how they were stepping

back from the Houthi fights and they were only going to concentrate on AQAP, the al-Qaeda affiliate there because those tensions that already started with the Saudis. So yeah, this goes back away, but now it's on full display and Sudan is part of that. I referenced that UAE and Saudi are supporting separate sides and they are really supporting them.

This isn't just sort of a casual endeavor for them. The Emirates have poured who knows, but many millions of dollars, I would say, into the RSF, they send weapons all the time, material, they support them diplomatically, they've sort of rallied some regional states to support the RSF in various ways, so they are very, very deeply invested in the RSF, whereas the Saudis, as I mentioned, they stage themselves

as interlocutors, as sort of neutral interlocutors and mediators, but they've always

been disposed towards the SAF and recently there's been rumors that they may start providing fighter jets to the SAF, for instance, so it looks like the Saudis are really ramping up their engagements potentially.

“So I think the Sudan thing is both a manifestation of this UAE Saudi rift and also an”

accelerant of that because they are so heavily entrenched on different sides of a very bit of war that is clearly really important to both of them. Now maybe there's a path here where if the quad process can bear some fruit, it's been very difficult so far, but if that can happen, then maybe that can facilitate a little bit of men being offenses between the Emirates and the Saudis, if it removes that major

exacervant, maybe, but there's still very deep divisions on Yemen, like you reference and even recently the Saudis accuse the Emirates of spiriting off a, what they recall, the sessionist leader, you know, and helping him escape from Yemen, interestingly, they probably use Somalia to do that, a military base that the Emirates have in northern Somalia. So, you know, it looks a bit grim, honestly, for the Saudi UAE relationship, the least

But again, maybe if there's progress on the Sudan, that can be, you know, help a little bit here. Well let me ask just another innocent question, and I am well, I'm very familiar with the UAE

always talking about, and warning of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic extremism, well

short of Al-Qaeda and, you know, along the spectrum. But the Saudis have been in the same boat, mostly, I mean, they're not exactly on board with Islamic extremism, either, and understand and you mentioned the institutional interests that the Saudis have with the, let's call it, the original Sudanese government.

“But I mean, shouldn't they more or less see the world the same when it comes to Sudan?”

Well, it's, it's a great question because it is one of the really interesting and frustrating elements of the Sudan conflict. Because to your point, the Saudis have no love for the Muslim Brotherhood. They see it as a threat to their own, uh, monarchy, their own former government. So in that sense, it's, it's even an existential threat.

One of the things that cemented sort of the Saudis and the Emirates together was the Arab

Spring, those uprisings that toppled governments, uh, all across North Africa and in the Middle

East, uh, and brought to power the Brotherhood, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. That was that was the big one, um, until it was replaced by a coup, but also Libya had very strong Islamists, um, influences and continues. Uh, so, so that, that chair concern really helped galvanize the Emirates and the Saudis. So, so, so traditionally they have been, uh, more aligned on that specific issue.

In the Sudan context, uh, the other interesting element is that, um, we've already discussed how the South has, has, has, islamists elements. Um, but the RSF is not a principled in, in my analysis, so probably people were disagreeing me, but my sense is it's not a principled anti-Islamist force. It's, it's totally opportunistic.

Um, the RSF, again, it was formalized under Omar Al-Bashir, who was an Islamist president.

So, so, so it was very happy to, to work and do the bidding of, um, this Islamist regime

in cartoon. Uh, so, so it gets very, uh, confused and fuzzy on this question of the Brotherhood.

“Now, I, I think the Emirates, I take them at their word.”

I think they're sincere about their concerns about the Brotherhood, uh, in Sudan. But it, it seems a little less clear cuts of a, of an anti-Islamist anti-Brotherhood campaign than you might expect. Again, given that the Saudis are on the other side, they have deep concerns about the Brotherhood in, oh, by the way, also on the other side, also supportive of the South.

And the Egyptians, uh, and the Egyptians are, are deeply worried about the Brotherhood. So, it, again, it's, um, it's a big confused, uh, and, and I think, obviously, to me, that suggests that this is about more than just the Brotherhood issue, more than just the, you know, the Islamist issue. There are other things going on here, which I, which I think is, is absolutely the case.

And probably some of that's just the rivalry, who's going to be the head of the new Middle East. Yeah.

“So, um, I think clearly, uh, NDS and NBZ, um, maybe even have a personal, um, uh, issues.”

I don't know. I don't like to try to, you know, read the TV's on those things because it's so opaque. But, um, you also, you wonder, right? Um, they're both ambitious. They both have grand visions for what they want our chief, both in their countries, but also

regionally. Um, so you could see where they might start to, to have some friction there. And then I think there's other, other things that stake in Sudan, both countries had big agricultural investments, uh, in Sudan, for instance. So, this is one of the things that I think most, probably most people, and they think about

Sudan, uh, sort of picture a semi-arid or even total desert, uh, landscape, but the Nile goes right through Sudan. It's immensely fertile, uh, especially around the Nile region. Uh, interestingly, there's a, there's a sesame seed trade, only learned about this a year or so ago.

And apparently, that's hugely lucrative, uh, and then there's gold that comes out of Sudan. And, uh, you know, the UAE is, is, especially in that region, the capital for, um, moving gold and, and, unfortunately, especially illicit gold. So, uh, so there's that element, uh, in play as well, I don't know how, how significant of an element that is.

But I'm sure there's some key people who are benefiting, let's say, from the Sudanese gold trade. Yeah. Other things going on beyond just the broader issue. So let's go.

I, we talked a little bit about Yemen, and it seems to me that, well, we know, right?

to make a name for himself in Yemen by, you know, roughing up those who had rebelled against

“the central government, and UAE was right there with him, but I think the United States”

was even advocating a pullout or to become less involved in the war over time. I'm talking a little bit about what's been going on in Yemen, and the dispute, the split that occurred over time about UAE and Saudi, and what they were going to do. So Saudi has obvious concerns in Yemen. They really feared that the Houthis were going to become a Hezbollah style problem on their

border. Right.

And I think there's, there's some legitimacy to that concern, actually.

“So they launched a large-scale incursion, it was initially, I think it was, it was very air-powered”

dependent, but you can't win a war like that, with just air power, eventually it started to involve infantry, and here's another Sudan link, interestingly. So a lot of the mercenaries that fought, on behalf of the, especially the UAE, but even some, some with the Saudis were Sudanese, specifically from the RSF. So the RSF supplied a lot of mercenaries to Yemen, I think that's where the UAE Sudan relationship

probably really cemented.

But the SAF also had some, some fighters there, fighting with the, with the Emirates and

the Saudis. That war went terribly, there was all the stories, I still remember them well, the humanitarian suffering that was going on, et cetera, and the Saudis really suffered, specifically

“the Saudis, I think, the Emirates were heavily involved, but it seems like they weren't”

held as accountable, maybe, for what was going on, but the Saudis suffered real reputational damage, and I think they decided that they need to be a little less expeditionary, maybe, and try to reset its its reputation, and I wonder if that has thus far informed its approach in Sudan where they tried to take more of a mediator role and try to be seen as less of a supporter of an armed group, even though, you know, they haven't been doing that.

So Yemen, I'm not at all Yemen expert, it's a total mess you could study at your whole life and barely scratch the surface that seems to me, but they again, initially the Saudis and the Emirates were aligned, they were fighting the Houthis and a QAP, the split began as I already referenced, UAE started saying, we're not into the Houthi fighting anymore, we're just going to focus on a QAP, and now the situation is you have them both the Saudis

and the Emirates are backing different elements of the Saudis transition council, which is sort of a sassus movement within Yemen, there's been a split within the STC with the Saudi sporting one side, and the Emirates supporting another, it's gotten very messy, I don't know how you call it back together, and then overall this again, you have the Houthi threat, which is not at all going away, it remains potent, now it's Iranian benefactor is in big troubles, what's

hope that those troubles continue for the Iranians, and so that will impact the level of support the Houthis get from Iran, but even without that they have a pretty fearsome capability, unfortunately, and is going to be a long-term problem. Well I know this is of U.S. interest, I don't think we think it's a great idea for the UAE in Saudi to be on the opposite sides of so many different issues, I know just this weekend Saudi was asking certain things of

of UAE inside of Yemen, and they were not helping, which caused another round of irritation, so this is something we're going to just maybe have another podcast on down the road and begin to focus on the repercussions, but let me skip back over to Africa, your area of expertise, and as we begin to wind up a little bit here, talk about just the geopolitical significance, we've talked a little bit about counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa, I guess Trump's national security strategy

didn't say much other than we ought to see Africa is sort of a commercial place to do business,

doing? What bothers you the most? What do you urge on different administrations in this regard?

“Yeah. Oh, Hiquid, I could rent for hours here on that question, but I'll”

or strain myself. Yeah, so as far as the geopolitical significance, there's a bunch of things you point to, we've already talked about sea lanes and maritime choke points, so Red Sea is a big one, but Africa dominates several other, you know, the the state of Gibraltar, for instance. It's just across the med from Europe, it's Europe Southern flank, it's sort of the overused assessment, but it's a bit of accurate, and even, you know, the ape of good hope is a type of maritime shipping

choke point, especially as the Red Sea gets more fraught, we have seen more traffic around the cape, and you could even talk about the Mozambique channel, which is, which sits between Mozambique and Matt Gasgar, and then it has a long Indian Ocean coastline, Indian Ocean, increasingly contested

India, very interested in it, but in China, would be the other one. By 2100, every third person

on the planet will be African, so whether or not you, you want to deal with Africa, you're just going to have to, right, one way or the other, but I want to talk a little bit about the great

“power competition element of this, because I think this is key, China has, has priority to truly”

prioritize Africa for decades. They view it as hugely important to everything they're trying and achieve, including those goals that are expressly antagonistic to the United States. So China believes that developing countries of which Africa is 54 are natural allies in their quest to reordered the international system, which is a view from the Zoom for reorienting it away from the United States and the West to itself. That's the ultimate sort of foreign policy goal for the CCPE,

or the Chinese Communist Party. And they really rely on African diplomatic support at places like the United Nations to help them achieve their diplomatic goals at international organizations. And African countries have largely been really happy to do that. The Africa is extraordinarily

well endowed with critical minerals, including many of those that the United States is heavily

“exported to the import dependent on. These things are called critical for reason. They're key”

and you know how this, they're key to our defense attack. They are key to the economies of the present and the future. These things are critical. And Africa has a bunch of them. China moving very aggressively to corner and with with great success to corner supply chains for some of these minerals. So basically as soon as a rock comes out of the ground in Africa for certain minerals like like coal ball to rare earths, they enter a Chinese dominated supply chain, China

refined something like 98% of the world's rare earths, just a massive problem for the United States. Yeah, it's wild when you look at the charts and I mean, it's all mind blowing. So Africa is going to have to be part of the solution for the United States to de-risk its supply chain

and to secure its critical mineral supply chain. There's it's unavoidable that that

Africa will be part of this. But as I said, Africa's way out in front of the United States here. So you know, going back to the fall of the Berlin wall, the end of the Cold War, the U.S. was by far the most influential country on the continent. No question. The Chinese had been all over during the Cold War of the Cubans, the Soviets, it meant a major front in the Cold War, but U.S. S.R. Crumbles, U.S. is supreme. But really ever since the end, all of the immediately,

the Chinese started chipping away and with with great success. And now they are by far the largest trading partner with virtually every African country. They are by far the largest lender, traditionally, to virtually every African country. And they build infrastructure all over the continent. You know, roads and etc. but also really strategic pieces of infrastructure like ports. Yeah. Yeah. That that very much fit into this dual-use

principle that China has, this this civil military fusion dual-use principle. They are actively seeking an Atlantic Ocean base. So they have one in Djibouti. They're first overseas base was was put in Djibouti. It's large enough. They built a apply that's large enough to host a Chinese aircraft carrier as well as nuclear submarines. If they can get an Atlantic ocean base, they could much more effectively hold the U.S. homeland under continuous nuclear threat.

We'll just on that. I mean, aren't we actively fighting that idea?

“Where is it exactly? And aren't they denying that they've said yes to the Chinese?”

Yeah. So equatorial Guinea, one country that mentioned a lot. And I was told by someone who should know that the intelligence was really good on that. That the Chinese had made an offer. You hear other countries as well. We'll come up in this conversation. Nothing has materialized and goodness thus far because the U.S. has been somewhat rarely for the Afghan portfolio has been pretty vigilant on this issue.

Just because it's such an obvious problem. But it is its way behind the ball on sort of

longer term strategic engagement with the confidence for way too long the U.S. approach to the content has been overweighted to development assistance, to democracy promotion, to try to brow, be countries and to protecting human rights. I support all those goals. Sure. Absolutely. But I don't see any evidence that we were effective at achieving those goals. And in some contexts, the idea that a Jeffersonian democracies going to sprout

“in Somalia, for instance, is I think crazy because it just absolutely ignores”

the history and the culture and the society of that country. So I believe all people want a say in their government. I think democracies by far, the best political system that were devised to promote human flourishing. But on top of that impulse for a self-government is many deep layers of culture and history and society that you can't just wish away. So I think pursuing democracy promotion in some of these places is totally

unachievable and in an antagonized Afghan government as well. So under the Trump administration, they've done this pivot to commercial engagement, which I think is the correct focus, that should be the core of our relationship with African states. The U.S. has been talking about trade not aid for decades. So it's easy to say, really, really hard to implement. But I do think the Trump administration has the right impulse on this, that trade investment

that should really be the core of their relationship. Well, you know, this is a theme across many regions that while we were appropriately distracted by the global war on terrorism, China was stealing a march all over the world. And we're catching up. We're a country that obviously has interests everywhere. Now Trump said at the Western Hemisphere to the normal three

“in Africa, I think it's always, unfortunately, playing catch up. But I think you've got the right”

argument there, which is that we're in a geopolitical competition with China. And this is an

important battlefield for U.S. influence and ultimately African prosperity and U.S. prosperity.

But Josh, thank you so much. You have just really enlightened us. You, I think, were able to sort of help us look with a little skepticism towards the import of Sudan as a reason why the Saudis can't recognize Israel, but putting everything in the context in which it belongs, I think, does a great service. So thank you so much. And we'll have you back on the Africa issues in the future. Yeah, thank you, Michael. Really appreciate your interest to the topic. It's, I don't think it gets

enough attention. And so please, that, that you're giving it some here. Well, you're compelling on the topic. So thanks so much. That was Josh Mazurvi. I'm Michael Allen. If you enjoyed listening to NatSec matters, please leave us a rating and review. We'd love to hear from you. If you're interested in becoming a sponsor, please email our team at [email protected]. You can find the email in the show notes. Please join us next week for another episode of

NatSec matters. NatSec matters is produced by Steve Dorsey with a Citizens from Ashley Barry. NatSec matters is a production of beacon global strategies.