Lawfare Archive: ‘Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare,’ with Edward Fishman

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Good kick, and fun. I'm Sarah Willrich, intern at Loft Air with an episode from the Law of our Archives for August 30, 2020. On August 24th, Treasury Secretary Bessant announced the launch of Operation Economic Outcast, a series of sanctions on Iran and its trading partners in what President Trump

has called "Economic D-Day", on the quote. The sanctions are the latest installment in the Trump administration's ongoing efforts to use economic tools to pressure Iran into a favorable end to the ongoing conflict by cutting it off from the rest of the international economic system. For today's archive, I chose an episode from March 7, 2025, in which Scott our Anderson spoke

with Edward Fischman, author of choke points, American power in the age of economic warfare. They discussed how U.S. economic state craft has evolved, what role it plays in armed conflicts and great power competition, how it could shape the future global order and more. The concept of choke points is so important because it's what makes today's economic warfare different from economic warfare for the thousands of years of history that preceded

the 21st century. It's the Law of our podcast. I'm senior editor Scott our Anderson with Eddie Fischman, senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia School of International and Public Affairs. Today we're talking about his new book, choke points, American power in the age of economic

warfare. Today, you can have the director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Treasury Department, sign a document, and impose economic pressure on a foreign country that's even stronger than, you know, when you use to park a naval ship outside of our port.

You're here to talk about this new book that's just come out, which is an incredible

narrative sweep of a chapter of geopolitics that is incredibly important.

“I think people are beginning to recognize it as a more important, but hasn't gotten the”

sorts of treatments we may associate with diplomatic histories and other sort of political treaties about the events of the last 20 or 30 years, and you are really contributing a chapter to these discussions about the economic warfare, toolkit and element about it. In your new book, choke points, it's a phenomenally interesting read in depth, in detail, but planning in with these stories about the individuals involved and the processes that lead

to some of these determinations. But I think it's worth getting out there, something that you don't get at in the main narrative of your book, although if you read about the author, you read the acknowledgments at the end, it comes out, which is that you were yourself a player in a lot of these conversations. So before we start talking about the book, let's start with a little bit about yourself.

Talk to us about your background, how you got involved, not just in writing the book, but a lot of the policy discussions that it discusses, that it raises, and frankly, how you ended up being a leading expert on sanctions from college onward, having lived through a lot of these events in the book. Well, thank you.

I'm excited to be in the on the podcast today. So story for me, at least, starts when I was in college, this is in the mid-Aughts, you know, the mid-2000s. So right after sort of the US invasion of Iraq, several years into the war in Afghanistan, and I was studying history and international affairs, and in my coursework, we learned

that we were living in a unipolar moment, that the United States was the most powerful

country on Earth, and potentially the most powerful state we've seen in history since ancient

And the thing that just confused me about this, you know, the sense that we were learning in school was we were clearly not getting what we wanted in our foreign policy. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were not going well, and it just, you know, was a puzzle for me.

It would be so powerful, and yet so incapable.

And so it was right at this time when Iran's nuclear program became kind of the top most foreign policy problem for the United States. This is shortly after George W. Bush was re-elected, so, you know, in 2005, and basically all of Washington was seized with this issue.

“What are we going to do about Iran's nuclear program?”

We had invaded Iraq to try to get rid of a nuclear program that proved not to exist. Iran was building a real nuclear program, and yet there was no political will to fight another war against Iran, and very little, I think, sense that we could succeed if we were to fight a war given what was going on in Iraq and Afghanistan. And so it was kind of in that context where I started becoming interested in other tools

of statecraft and other ways that the United States could use its power to advance its foreign policy interests. And it was right around this time, actually, that Stuart Levy, who is a very central character in choke points, I'm kind of got on my radar. He was profiled in the New York Times magazine, I want to say this was maybe 2008.

And it was a really interesting article, and it was about how he was basically going around

the world trying to persuade banks to stop doing business with Iran.

“It was still pretty early, but it was important enough that he was profiled.”

And this kind of was a light bulb moment for me, where I thought to myself, "Wow, maybe there is a way to use American economic power to get a peaceful resolution to Iran's nuclear program." I mean, I'm an undergrad at the time, so this is doing this with probably a little bit of a twinkle in my eye and not knowing the realities of things, but it was interesting

enough that after college, I had applied for an internship to go work at the Treasury Department. And it was lucky enough that by sort of a random circumstance, got on the radar of a person named David Cohen who became Stuart Levy's successor, who invited me basically to go be his special assistant. So my first job in government was I started a week after graduating from college and got

to work directly for the person who runs sanctions policy of the Treasury Department, the undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence. And that one up sort of just being my entree into this world, eventually went up going to work at the State Department, where I was lucky enough to serve on the Iran sanctions team at a very pivotal moment when Rouhani was elected in 2013 and up until the time that

we got the first Iran nuclear deal in November of 2013 that froze the nuclear program. And then the next year when Rouhani invaded Ukraine and annex Crimea, we didn't have a Russia sanctions program. And so, you know, as a young person at the time who was willing to work very long hours, I sort of threw my hand up in the air and said, hey, I'll do this.

And was lucky enough to then be able to help create that initial Russia sanctions program and negotiate them with European Union. And then so the final sort of chapter of this is, you know, through the end of the Obama administration about observing on the policy planning staff, so for their working for the Secretary of State, where I covered economic state craft and sanctions issues more broadly.

And then after leaving government, it just occurred to me that we really needed to increase understanding of these issues amongst the foreign policy community. And so that's when I started working on designing my class that I teach at Columbia, the School of International Public Affairs, economic and financial state craft, which I've been teaching now for the last several years.

“So I really think the focus of your book, what you get from the title, this concept”

of choke points, really is something that comes out from that practitioner's perspective. I think a lot of people, including academics, including more casual observers, students of this sort of thing, think of economic sanctions and they envision, you know, the broad economy, the economic weight of the American economy, inevitably having this force on foreign actors to compel them, to comply when they issue these edex.

But the reality of it is that it is really much more about targeting specific points of pressure and specific comparative advantages, the United States or whatever the sanctioning entity is. In your case, in the case of the book, the United States has, and that's the choke point.

So talk to us about why choke points are so essential, both for your book and for the

enterprise you're describing in the book, which is the cultivation of capacity in the

The concept of choke points is so important because it's what makes today's economic warfare different from economic warfare for the thousands of years of history that preceded the 21st century. Because economic warfare is not a new concept, right, and in my book, I talk about the Athenians, ancient Athenians using economic warfare against their neighboring state,

Megara, and 432 BC. So clearly this is not something that just started. The thing that's different is that all the way up until, you know, really the time of Stuart Levy. So the mid-autts, when I first became interested in this, to impose significant economic

pressure on a foreign rival, you needed one of two things. You needed broad international unity, so in modern times that meant effectively backing from the United Nations, or, and likely, and you needed the use of naval force. So you needed warships that were willing to patrol the seas, basically, and intercept trade.

“That's how the UN embargo in the 90s worked against Iraq.”

There was a multinational naval force that patrolled the Persian Gulf, 24/7 for 13 years. And by the way, that was from 1990 to 2003, so it's not an ancient history.

The recent choke points are so essential, and what a choke point is, I should probably

define it. It's a part of the global economy where one state has a dominant position, and there are very few substitutes, so it's not something where, you know, if a state decides to cut you off, you can just go use something else. The reason choke points is a concept as so significant, is that it allowed the United

States government to take the choke points that are under the United States control, and by the way, there are some that are not under U.S. control, namely the U.S. dollar, but also advanced semiconductor technology, parts of the oil supply chains, and use basically the legal power of the American state to deny access to that choke point to a foreign reactor, and so all of a sudden, today, you can have the director of the Office of Foreign

Assets Control and the Treasury Department, sign a document, and impose economic pressure on a foreign country that's even stronger than, you know, when you use to park a naval ship outside of their port.

“So the book has a very fascinating historical scope, I think, like like any good sanctions”

history you do start with the MacGerryon decree that you reference already, I think that's

always the good starting point, but you actually do away with his unfair.

You actually cover, basically, the American history up until 2010, and the first under pages, and then the last 300 pages just covers the period from 2010 to 2025. Part of this might be that you, like I are in Elder millennial, and so those are our prime years. This is a, you know, nostalgia having it's early effect on us about saying these are the most

important years in history, but you have a compelling case for the, the, the, the thesis you're examining and advancing for the topic here, which isn't just sanctions, but particularly use and role of sanctions and related tools, that these years are pivotal in a way that I don't think most people recognize them as such. So talk to me about that historical scope.

“What makes the last 15 years so distinctive as to warrant such overwhelming weight in your analysis?”

Sure. So the choke points that I just described were created by factors that really go back to the early 1970s, so for instance, the globalization of finance, which really comes out of the Nixon shock when President Nixon takes the dollar off of the gold peg, and you wind up just seeing basically the dollarization of the global economy.

The creation of the petro-dollar, which is a story I recount in the book that really occurs in 1974, and as part of a deal with the Saudi Arabia government, but it doesn't really become fully possible until the 1990s, because you need the end of the Cold War to actually globalize supply chains and finance, because even though you are really internationalizing supply chains and finance in the 70s and 80s, you're not actually reaching the entire Soviet

block, you're not reaching China, and so it's really in the 90s when the whole world sort of comes under the regime of these choke points of the dollar-based system. And so it wouldn't have been possible, for instance, to do a aggressive dollar-based sanctions against the Soviet Union, I mean, you could have, but it wouldn't have been nearly as impactful as it is today, for instance, against Russia.

And so what the result of this one thread, which is the hypergobosation of the 90s,

plus another critical other thread, which comes through sort of in the latter three quarters

of the book that you mentioned, which is this growing legal regime in the United States that penalizes violations of sanctions that effectively conscripts banks as frontline infantry

the choke points, and then the expansion of the American regulatory and enforcement state to allow us to weaponize the choke points are these sort of confluence of factors that

enable powerful economic warfare today.

“And I think the reason that it's so important is that the threshold for the use of sanctions”

has gone way down, because you don't need you in backing, and you don't need to deploy the US Navy to make them work, and the impact has gone up. So in some ways, it's kind of similar to the advent of air power on military force. This is a similar dynamic that occurred in the early 20th century, where the advent of air power, all of a sudden, you could fly over an enemy's territory, and bomb their cities,

or bomb their industrial capacity without risking any lives. And drones, of course, have just been another step in that direction. I think it's a, the creation of these choke points in the 90s, and the American learning to weaponize them in the early 2000s, I think, is akin to the advent of air power in the beginning of the 20th century.

So there's one chapter I was surprised not to see get as much weight in your narrative. In part because in other books I've read on this topic, in my own kind of grasp of the history of this topic, it often weighs a little more heavily, is the post 9/11 to 2010 period, where we really saw the role and the use of targeted sanctions go into hyperdrive, particularly in targeting terrorists.

Arguably happens a little bit before 9/11 rolls up there, but really gets accelerated dramatically in that time period. You talk about that, certainly, and it plays a role in your book, and you get some time to do it, but it's interesting not to see it broken off, instead you kind of break your chapters up about Iran, Russia, China, Russia again, or kind of the four big case studies

you spend the bulk of your time on. And it occurred to me, and tell me if I'm right or wrong about this, that part of the part of the reason didn't feature so prominence, because you're again, you're not talking about sanctions generally, you're talking about sanctions as a tool of interstate and away major power, at least near-peer, with Iran rival competition, so it is a subset

of the bigger sanctions history. Are there lessons when people think about sanctions if they are thinking back to the terrorist model and the model that we see now see replicated for human rights, for narcoterrorist, for lots of other sort of global, transnational challenges, the United States is trying to address.

Really common tool, what differentiates those application of sanctions from a state-to-state application in a meaningful way that might make the experiences and lessons from that

first context, maybe more problematic or not translate so directly in the second context.

Why does that not deserve as much attention? And why is it better to focus on the real street to state-to-state case studies as the real

“places to learn how this type of diplomacy operates?”

I was very conscious that the name of my book is choke points American power in the age of economic warfare. Economic warfare is what the book is about, primarily, it's not just about sanctions, it's about sort of the whole toolkit of the whole arsenal that the United States uses to apply economic pressure on foreign governments.

And the way I look at the immediate year as post 9/11 and the Patriot Act and the really whole of government effort to constrain al Qaeda's financing is that it's important pre-history for the narrative I'm trying to tell. And the reason it's pre-history that is relevant is because that is when you see some of the arsenal itself be built, right? The Section 3/11, for instance, was created in the Patriot

Act, probably because there was a thought that it could be used against terrorist groups or countries that were supporting terrorists. It winds up being used against a North Korean bank in 2005, which is sort of the aha moment for many of the people working at the Treasury Department that you can use targeted sanctions very effectively to isolate other countries economically and financially.

The reason I chose to focus on Iran, Russia, and China is not just because they are the

three largest and most important countries that the United States has waged economic warfare

against, it's also because in my view, those three episodes, or they're really four because I break off the second Russia sanctions from 2022 to president as it's own episode, because

“I think it is distinct for reasons we can discuss, is because it were really in those four”

episodes where the American economic arsenal evolved and innovated and we built new weapons.

They weren't things that were conceived of in the campaign against al-Qaeda, for instance. Then in the 2014 Russia sanctions, there's a whole new group of tools that's created and a new paradigm that then winds up being reused against Venezuela and other countries.

And then, of course, during the first Trump administration, the export controls against Huawei

and the foreign direct product rule is its own sort of innovation, kind of a way to do extraterritorial export controls, kind of the secondary sanctions of export controls. And then a lot of these threads really come together in the 2022 sanctions against Russia, and you see even more innovation with the advent of the price cap, for instance. And then not only immobilizing Russia central bank reserves, but then using them basically

to finance loans for Ukraine.

“So, if you look at the other sanctions programs that the U.S. has, even important ones like”

Venezuela, the ideas that are used in those contexts really originated from one of the other, these kind of three tent poll sanctions programs. So walking through what you describe as these tent poll sanctions programs and the evolution development of them, I'm kind of curious what the big takeaways you try to try to try to go.

I'm kind of curious about what you take away as the big components of effective sanctions policy in this environment, a state-to-state significant power sort of environment, maybe not major power, again, with Iran, but something approximating that. You make a case in the Atlantic in a piece today that I take as adapted and kind of pulls out and spans upon a line of argument you have in the book about the possibility that

more clarity and credibility upfront could have allowed things to be more better deterrent of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And it kind of gets out of a challenge that when I interviewed some folks about the thing Julia Friedlander, if I recall correctly, the person who coined this anecdote, she was describing at the time the challenges of ramping up economic countermeasures to match

the tempo of the battlefield and how challenging that was. What are the components? If that's the sort of environment we expect we may deal with in the future and you flag that in this book, in the case of Ukraine, we had five months of warning, in the case of an invasion of Taiwan, we might have two weeks or less potentially.

What are the lessons take away that we need to put in our architecture to actually be able to use these tools effectively moving forward? Yeah.

“I think that a key point that came out of my research for this book is that we have seen”

the exponential growth of the use of American economic warfare over the last two decades.

And the state apparatus to back it has not grown with pit in pace, basically.

You don't have a purpose built institution in the United States for the planning and deployment of these tools. I had the good fortune during my time at the State Department to do a detail assignment to the Pentagon, where I worked for General Martin Demsi who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

And I was on the team called the chairman's action group that does strategic planning at the joint staff. And it was just remarkable to me the level of rigor that the U.S. military and defense department puts into planning for every contingency you can imagine. Including Taiwan, right?

This is there. They're not only have plans for what to do in different scenarios, but they practice them. That is what a military exercise is. We don't do any of that for economic warfare.

And so the norm is when a crisis happens is just for everyone to kind of scramble to the situation room, you know, spitball about different sanctions options with very little analysis that goes into it. The extent there is analysis, when I'm saying analysis, economic analysis, it's almost

always excessively cautious because, you know, you're dealing under intense time pressure

and the cost of getting things wrong seem pretty high, especially if, you know, you're deploying a sanction against Russia or China that were a run for that matter that could spike oil prices and lead to inflation in the United States or something that is going to be very bad.

“And I think that it's just well past time for us to take economic warfare more seriously”

as an asian. And I think that sort of the basic thing to do is to fund OFAC and BIS at commerce more generously.

Like I think even if you were to just fund them more, I don't think it would deal with

the fundamental problem.

“I think in the ideal scenario, you would have a government department that does economic”

state craft and other governments, by the way, have moved in this direction. You have a cabinet level minister for economic security in Japan. The EU has an economic security strategy. This is not something we have yet in the United States, although could happen in the near future.

So I think that we need that institutional capacity, but we also need to go even upstream of that. The motivating factor for me as some of the teachers graduate students at Columbia is to try to train the next generation of people in public policy to understand how these tools work at a strategic level and at a tactical level.

And then another reason why I wrote this book, frankly, why I wrote choke points, was my own experience working in the US government. I would find that you would go to a meeting in the situation room. And even at the expert level, at most, maybe two or three people in the room would feel they felt confident enough in their knowledge of things like sanctions and export controls

to weigh in, substantively. And then when you move up a level to the meetings of the deputies or the principles, that's like the deputy secretary of state or the deputy national security advisor or the level above the principles, the secretary of defense secretary of treasury, at those levels, there's no one in the room who felt they were confident enough to speak about these topics.

Maybe one person if you're lucky. And so you're having these conversations that are completely removed from, you can't even have a strategic conversation because people aren't even on the same level of understanding what the possibilities are.

“And so I think there's a real need to build up our understanding of how these tools work.”

And I'm hoping that choke points does that. The point you raise about the lessons learned from this most recent chapter, I think is particularly interesting because in a lot of ways, we're still living through at least a lot of the lessons of that chapter. One aspect that we are still living through very much today are the political consequences.

We saw a political backlash that is not entirely but can be significantly attributed to the economic effects of the war in Ukraine, as well as from COVID, as well as from global supply issues and a number of overlapping factors, at least in part, contributed to by the war in Ukraine, economic measures against that, contributing to inflation, contributing to other economic effects on the home front, and triggering kind of anti-incumbent attitude

that appears to have afflicted pretty much every other democracy in the world, including the United States. Is that a kind of weakness about the ability of democratic governments to engage in economic warfare? And if so, is there a way we can counter it?

Because Russia and China have the advantage that they are able to insulate themselves politically from the consequences even if felt by their publics. We all hoped Russia would eventually feel the pressure enough to put Putin out of office or have a revolution. And a few times it looked like maybe we're getting closer to that for the last few years.

Years have been hindsight, that was all seems a little naive now that they were ever going to get there. Although, who knows, maybe still, we'll still get there at a certain point. How do you balance that risk, the backlash effect, that is unique, that's a unique aspect of not just state to take competition, but true major power economic warfare, Iran, limited

measures against China.

They never implicated that.

But this latest chapter with Russia is close, we've gotten to all that warfare, and we really felt it back at home in a way that's very disruptive. So how do you counter that? How do you counter that? I'm so glad Scott, you asked this question.

“I think it's one of the most important questions that hangs over this whole area right”

now. And two few people are talking about it. I think that there's almost an irony that cuts across the broad narrative of my book, which is a major reason that the United States launched what I call the Age of Economic Warfare in the time of Stuart Levy, was because military force had lost its political

support, not only in Washington, but also across the United States.

To the point where I think even had George W. Bush during his second term made the case

to the American people that we should be invading Iran to get rid of their nuclear program and install a democratic government, you would have had substantial opposition on both sides of the aisle to that kind of idea. So in some ways, the rise of economic warfare was because the alternative military force had become politically unpalatable.

The irony is that as we started using economic warfare against major powers, most importantly

than limited military warfare, because at least with military warfare, sometimes it's a limited subset of the population who serves in the military. If you're fighting a limited war, you may not risk that many casualties. Whereas with a full-scale economic war against Russia, there's broad-based effects at home.

And it's hard to quantify. I think it's difficult to draw a street line between sanctions on Russia and oil prices and inflation. But there is a relationship and that is why the Biden administration, even with the President Joe Biden, who's the most hawkish American president on Russia we've had in the post-Cold

War era, wasn't willing to do aggressive oil sanctions on Russia for domestic political reasons. And myself, you know, I'm someone who comes at this from the side of economic statecraft.

I've been very critical of the Biden administration for not being more aggressive on targeting

Russian oil sales, but at the same time, like Kamala Harris lost the election probably in large part because of really high inflation. And so they were right probably that this was a big issue. I think it's hard to say whether or not things would have been different in the election had we not imposed sanctions on Russia on a little skeptical of that.

“So, yeah, I think that this is a really important, an important just reality that we need”

to take into account. So the question is what do we do about it? I think there are really two things that we need to do.

The first is we need to realize that economic warfare is not just about offense but also defense.

We need to prepare ourselves proactively for foreign retaliation, the fact that Russia could cut off nuclear fuel shipments to the United States. And we still have our reactors that are relying on their nuclear fuel for a fifth of nuclear fuel. The Europeans, you know, could have prepared better for the gas cut off that they suffered

in 2022 from Russia, right? They had spent years sort of dragging their feet and not really transitioning away from Russian gas. I think we started doing a little bit of this in the United States with public investments like the Chips Act, the inflation reduction act.

I think that like a big underlying rationale for strategic investments and industrial policy is kind of defense against foreign economic warfare and also making ourselves more resilient on the blowback of our own tools against the China's and Russia's of the world.

“So I think that that is a really important thing for us to do.”

I think the second thing beyond investing in our own defenses and our own resilience is that we have to be more honest with the American people. And I say, we American politicians and in particular the president needs to be more honest with the American people about the sacrifices that economic warfare requires. I think this was something that President Biden addressed when he said that, you know,

we're taking steps to ensure that Russia sanctions don't raise prices at the pump. That's almost a direct quote that he said in the early 2022. But I think that kind of rhetoric actually is not right because it just signals weakness

to Russia and signals, okay, well, you're not willing to go after the most important sector

of my economy. How serious really are you? What I would prefer to hear is this may result in some level of increases of prices at the pump, but it's worth it for XYZ reason that matters for you, the American people.

“You know, to hear that kind of rhetoric, but I think that's what's necessary.”

And I think President Trump will find that kind of rhetoric to be necessary if he truly does embark on a multi-front trade war with China, Canada, and Mexico are three largest trading partners. If he goes down that path, he's going to need to be honest with the American people and say, look, this is going to lead to some economic pain at home, but it's worth it for

to stop fentanyl from coming across our borders, whatever his argument is. We don't hear those types of arguments, but we need them more if the use of economic warfare is going to be sustainable politically and successful. You know, President Trump is a very smart guy, I have a mobile phone call, my whole life is a very smart guy, I'm not my smart guy. But with mobile phones in real life, Frank, a mobile phone for 10 Euro a month, inclusive EU roaming, also in the Swiss.

Frank, in Greece and in the world, President Trump is not a very smart guy, but he has a very smart guy.

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“A related phenomenon that I think is a really interesting and important aspect of sanctions, policy, in particular, although other economics hatecraft tools as well.”

And then you talk about the book and a couple of different places.

I think as a bearing on this question, we're just discussing is this question of derisking and excess derisking. The momentum you put into place when you start sanctioning and stigmatizing entities and how the private sector sometimes reacts beyond the strict legal limits in cutting actors off. Something that was often seen as desirable in the counterterrorism context where who cares if a terrorism is even more isolated, or a terrorist is even more isolated than we thought they're going to be by our regulations and laws.

You mentioned the strategic role played in the initial Iran sanctions program about saying that this understanding of that private sector actors are going to weigh going to respond beyond even the hard limits we can put is going to magnify the economic impacts. But more recently, we've really seen the U.S. government and allied governments and also the international strategic U.N., wrestle with the downside of that existing risking bet. The, both say this example is Afghanistan, where you see in this real effort to say yes, the Taliban is still sanctioned, it's going to stay sanctioned, but we're permitting and creating exceptions for all sorts of activity you want you to do, because we want to resolve the economic crisis there.

And those efforts faced all these challenges that no matter how much they lifted sanctions actors wouldn't eventually come back somewhat remedied, but still a kind of a persistent problem similar problems in Syria now. And then the Russia context that right sizing that you're describing with the Biden administration went into rightfully or wrongfully encounter problems as well, where when they start issuing licenses permitting sorts of conduct to limit the economic backlash against ourselves against allies.

You saw entities like Marisk famously, you know, cutting off shipments to Russia, well, and excess of what was actually required or even desirable from U.S. policy perspective early on requiring more specific engagement to kind of right size that.

How big a problem is that when you are dealing with a higher risk sort of engagement like true economic interstate warfare.

How do you calibrate to account for the double edge sort of sanction the fact that if you start something in motion, the private sector may go even further within you want to in a way that will amplify negative effects.

“The short answer is, if you're going to start an economic war, you have to mean it and you have to be ready to finish it.”

What I mean by that is you don't know exactly what the private sector is going to react to. And that's one of the reasons why precision guided munition is not in my view the best analogy for targeted sanctions because. U.S. government doesn't actually even implement sanctions where the rubber meets the road, it's compliance officers at banks and technology companies and oil companies and each of them have different levels of power within their own institutions and different risk appetites. Sometimes you have under compliance, other times you have significant over compliance, it's what you're talking about right now, derisking. And so what I think is we should have even though it's easy to impose sanctions, even though all it takes is, you know, the president signing an executive order and the head of the office of foreign assets control adding someone to the SDN list.

We should have a high threshold for doing that and we should have a strategic purpose for doing it because, you know, we should expect over compliance to happen. My own view and this is maybe seems a bit heterodox or strange is if we are going to be serious about having economic competition or economic warfare with the China's and Russia's and Iran's of the world. It should be very, very, very, very circumspect about sanctioning other countries too.

“I think there's probably at least a dozen sanctions regimes that we could get rid of that would do much more good than harm if we just literally excise them from the books.”

This actually would be a good use of dojas time, you know, go find the sanctions programs that haven't been working, we don't really know why they still exist. And to the extent they do exist, they probably just prevent people from sending remittances to their home or something that we probably are okay with.

We should do this with purpose and we should be clear eyed that sometimes the consequences aren't going to be all positive.

The same way that when you fight a war, you know there's going to be collateral damage, you know that you can't always control how events flow.

“And so I think that would be my answer, which is I don't think there's a way necessarily for us to make the tool.”

More precise, we're not going to send US government officials to be the compliance officers at every bank so that they're reviewing every transaction deciding which are good for the US and which are bad. We need to just be more circumspecting our use of sanctions and when we do decide to use them, the flip side of this coin of being circumspect is when we do decide to use them, go big. Go and try to achieve what we want to achieve and don't look back.

This question that you raise about how the narrative we spread is perceived by others in the international community and the impact that has on compliance both among companies and also among states.

And then we get into another aspect that's been a big focus of sanctions conversations for the last few years and played in major role in the last round of Russia. So that is the centrality of multilateralism. You know, obviously, the major effort was made to put Europeans not only at the center, but a lot of ways at the forefront of Russian sanctions. Sometimes a little bit more for optics than for reality, but nonetheless to make clear this was not only a multilateral, but a substantial European-driven effort to push back on Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

We know the Treasury Department is strategic review of sanctions policies as you think two years ago now under the Biden administration highlighted this point that multilateralism is really an important element of the sanctions tool.

How much is that true for this particular application of sanctions and other economic state craft tools for the state-to-state competition element?

Is multilateralism in the central component, at least for the United States or for all countries, or is there reasons why it might be overstated in centrality?

“So I think the answer is that multilateralism is extremely important, but for not the reasons that people think it is.”

The mainstream view of this is that you need multilateralism to make sanctions effective in terms of their economic impact on a foreign government. So the argument would be, oh, well, if the US does unilateral sanctions on Russia, then a European company will just backfill the work of a US company, and the result will be that Russia is the same. The European company is better off, and the American company is worse off, and so we're the only loser in that scenario. My own view is that perspective is a bit of a relic from this older era of economic warfare that came before the choke points from the 1990s, for instance.

That was, by the way, what happened in the 90s, and it's what inspired the creation of secondary sanctions in the Iran-Libia Sanctions Act of 1996 when Conaco, a Houston-based oil company, left an oil project in Iran, and then because of sanctions, and then total the French oil company backfilled them within a few weeks. And that was like, kind of, in some ways, the founding movement of secondary sanctions, because you realize that this was a problem. Because of the choke points we discussed earlier, and the use of things like secondary sanctions, the US has the unilateral power to impose devastating economic harm, even without any international support.

That is the Trump maximum pressure sanctions on Iran, or Trump tears up the JCPOA in 2018, reinforces the Obama era sanctions without any international support. And in fact, with a direct international effort to undermine the sanctions, right? You have the British, French, and German to create a platform to facilitate European trade with Iran and evade American sanctions, which is really remarkable, and I hope people remember that now. And it's in matter, Iran's economy went into freefall again. And so, I do think that America has tremendous power to impose unilateral economic pain on foreign countries, similar to our unilateral power in the military domain.

The reason unilateral, multilateralism, sorry, let me restart. The reason multilateralism is important, is because economic pain is not an end in itself, it's a means to an end.

“And I think you need multilateral coalitions to achieve big diplomatic victories. So if you go back to the Obama administration, the Obama sanctions on Iran had a multilateral component.”

But the most important parts of them were unilateral. The oil sanctions that wound up locking up over a hundred billion dollars of Iran's oil revenues in overseas escrow accounts was a unilateral sanction imposed by Washington.

It was much easier to have those conversations by saying that we're doing this in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1929, an international law was on our side.

“And I think it made compliance much easier and also built support, frankly, for the nuclear negotiations, which were backed by the P5+1, the full weight of the international community.”

The second reason that multilateralism is important, and this is a lesson I haven't really seen talked about many places, although I keep trying to put it out there, so hopefully it'll stick after this conversation. The only way that we can preserve our control over these choke points. If the US is just doing unilateral sanctions run a buck, you will see everyone hedge against the dollar, against key American technology companies, and start building alternatives.

I think one of the most interesting contrasts that I sort of pulled out of my research is, in 2018, Trump really not without thinking about it.

Just under pressure from Congress because Trump had done nothing on Russia sanctions. They passed a law telling him to impose sanctions on Russian oligarchs. He hadn't done anything. So randomly, to impose the sanctions on oligarchs, who owns a aluminum company called Russel. And Russel basically is on the brink of collapse within a few days of this, and aluminum prices skyrocket, and Trump basically winds up ignominously backing out of these sanctions without getting anything from it. The thing that people talk about less is that in the wake of that, the Russian central bank took all of its dollar holdings and moved them into euros primarily, but also RMB in gold.

You saw basically, do you risking away from the dollar toward the euro, because the euro was seen as a good enough substitute for the dollar without all of the political risk of getting unilaterally sanctioned by the US. Now, contrast that, Scott, with 2022, where, as I described in the book, people like Janet Ellen are petrified that sanctions on the central bank of Russia are going to destroy the dollars roll as the world's reserve currency. The difference is Biden successfully gets all the other key issuers of reserve currencies, so the euro pound and yet to go along with these sanctions. And so it's not just the US sanctioning the central bank of Russia, but the US and its allies.

And as a result, what have we seen since 2022? The use of the dollar in international finance has skyrocketed. It's gone up since the central bank of Russia sanctions, and it has taken away share, for instance, in international payments from the euro.

“And I think it's because countries that had been sort of using the euro for their trade or using the euro for their reserve allocations and doing it potentially to hedge against the geopolitical risk of getting sanctioned by the US.”

Start realizing, well, the euro and the dollar have the same geopolitical risk and there's way better investment opportunities with the dollar and the dollars way easier to use.

So, I think if we're going to preserve American economic power, we better do multilateral sanctions. So that leads up to the other big issue that is always hanging over sanctions policy, which is this phenomenon of people leaving the dollar, the de-dollarization fear that Janet Yellen was concerned about that it's still an ever-present concern.

“In the book, I think you point out what I think reflects the conventional wisdom, which is that there's not much evidence we are near a turning point yet in terms of the dollar losing its dominant role.”

Other competitors are chipping around the edges popping out, but none of them really have a grasp are becoming a really big market share. So what does that tell us about how that risk should be priced into how do we approach a lot of these policies. It's one of these things where the costs are so substantial and potentially recoverable when it happens that I think it really does psychologically weigh extremely heavily on policy makers and observers alike. Because the idea is that once you drive all these other actors to an alternative remedy, you know, once you make the choke point too tight and the water just begins to flow around it, it's hard to guide them back through that initial channel.

What are the indicators? How do we know when we're getting too close to that? How do we calibrate to avoid becoming that last straw that breaks the camel's back? So no choke point is immutable. They come and go, they rise and fall, currencies rise and fall. So I think at some point we will see a real alternative to the dollar. I think that people have sometimes not imagined the real plausible way that this could happen and what the threat would be. Because I think sometimes people say, oh well, the R&B is so far from having the same benefits of the dollar, right?

But they don't realize that there's another way that the dollar could be undermined. And I think it's a more plausible way, which is that there's not a replacement, but something totally different, like alternative or a parallel that develops.

“And I think that's what's happening right now. I mean, you've seen China launch a central bank digital currency a couple years ago.”

And I think the explicit goal of this digital currency is to get around the choke points in cross border financial networks, such as correspondent bank accounts in the United States.

You've seen China develop a platform called "embridge" that they initially developed in association with the Bank of International settlements. I'll mention BIS actually pulled out of this project a few months ago. The goal being to build a coalition of countries that include Saudi Arabia and several others to clear transactions using their own central bank digital currencies and not using the dollar at all. So I think that the real risk we have is that these infrastructures develop sort of in parallel with the dollar.

And then in some sort of crisis moment, say a Chinese quarantine or invasion of Taiwan, countries around the world are left with the choice, which is, what do we do? How do we continue trading with China if they're going to be cut off in the dollar system? And this is a serious dilemma that will face countries because 120 countries in the world count China as their number one trading partner.

So it's not like they're just going to say, well, we can't trade with China in dollars, so we're not going to trade with them anymore.

And I think in that kind of a moment, if you have a digital R&B or an embridge that are at scale and ready to be used in a reliable way, it will significantly undermine the value of American sanctions.

“And I think that that's why we need to pay attention to these types of projects.”

I think on a much more micro level, you saw Russia do something like this where in 2014, they passed a law on shoring all of their domestic payments processing and created NSPK and the mere payment card network. And as a result, even right after the invasion of Ukraine, the big invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Visa and Mastercard pulled out of Russia, Russians who held visas and Mastercards continue to be able to use them because the payment infrastructure was all based inside Russia. And so I think that's the real risk and that's something that could happen at scale. I think the way to mitigate it, the way to get around it is first of all, be multilateral, sort of as I said before, don't, don't, it's not that you shouldn't use sanctions.

It's just when you do use them have a good reason and work with the issuers of the other reserve currency, so you know, if you're not inadvertently pushing everyone toward the euro or the yen or the pound.

And second of all, I think takes seriously these emerging threats like the digital R&B and Mbridge. And what do you do about them?

I think with the digital R&B, I do think central bank digital currencies are going to be a thing.

“And so we could either just sit on the sidelines and do nothing about it or we could issue our own central bank digital currency, which I think would probably be a smart move in a way for us to cut the digital R&B off at the knees.”

For some of these other infrastructure plays like China's cross border interbank payment system, currently US banks are allowed to participate. Does that make any sense? I'm not so sure. I mean, this is their alternative to swift. These networks rely on network effects. You need more, they're only valuable of more banks or part of them. I think it'll be much easier to discourage banks from joining them now when they're in their earlier stages, than it will be five to ten years from now when they're only half as big a swift and they're really important.

So I think we need to take these things seriously. And potentially impose regulations that make it harder for global financial institutions in places like New York and London from participating in them. So something you touch on your book is something I've been watching that folks in law fair of watching. We've been tracking along the podcast, particularly with our regulators series, we've been talking with a lot of senior officials in the government about new toolkits that are coming out. Is the rapid diversification of the economic state craft toolkit?

Financial sanctions blocking sanctions, which still is the bread and butter, is still the most dominant toolkit. Usually international words say economic powers act in based. Very familiar tool with using a lot of valuable ways, a lot of different contexts are still there. There are still in a lot of ways, you know, the hammer and nails, but now we have, as you described in the book, the development of the foreign direct product rule of very deep, far reaching export control regime or derivative export controls regime.

That says, you know, intellectual property that belongs to the United States, deep in a supply chain. Deep overseas across multiple borders at a certain point can be restricted and constrained.

cutting off whole industries, industrial actors, major economic actors there.

We now have outbound investment restrictions intended to limit the extent to which US money flows to certain purposes and certain industries in China, is really the only target currently, but maybe to be expanded the future. How do these lessons translate? How do these other tools fit into this toolkit? You know, the foreign direct product rule you talk about it like that's definitely a prominent significant one.

“But how much is it, is there a risk of overlearning the lessons of sanctions and applying to these other tools?”

In particular, I have the strong sense that a lot of policy makers and a lot of observers think when you to deploy these new regimes and you put a, you know, sanctioned entity, a targeted entity on a list. That will take care of itself. And enforcement becomes automatically at the end of that. And that is the reality we live in in a lot of ways for financial sanctions. But at that kind of the product of 20 or 30 years of evolution in the financial industry that just isn't there in other industries and probably isn't going to get there.

So how do we approach these other tools? How do we make them maximally efficient and integrate them with this broader strategic picture? Yeah, this is a really important point. I'm glad you're bringing it up. I do think that export controls are part of the same arsenal that includes sanctions.

And in some ways, it doesn't really make sense for us to have two totally separate government agencies, bureaucracies doing them. Because, you know, we use them in combination, right? I mean, both China and Russia are under both sanctions and export controls is hard to find any country that's under one and not the other, right? I mean, it's usually have some combination of the two. And even when on the legal side, a lot of times the enforcement actions have some blended virtue, you know, aspect of, you know, violating the export control regime and the sanctions regime.

For instance, the famous Huawei case with Mung Wanjo, I think it was both sanctions and export controls. So I think that the thing that gets missed though, and I think Washington has gotten a bit giddy about export controls, in particular, since the FDPR in 2020 against Huawei. And then this of course was expanded to all of China in 2022 during the Biden administration. The thing that gets missed, I think, is that you don't have the infantry yet. As we talked about before, the infantry in American economic wars are people at companies.

They're human beings who are making risk decisions at a bank, at a tech company, at an oil company. And those risk calculations differ by industry. In the banking sector, there used to be a sort of very low, or, sorry, let me restate that. In the banking sector, executives used to be willing to take a lot more risk about dealing in sanction jurisdictions.

“That's why you saw, for instance, BNP Paribot blatantly violating American sanctions.”

They didn't think it would matter. They didn't, they thought that the benefits would outweigh the rewards they didn't think they would get penalized.

Loam to hold their fine $9 billion in 2014, it wiped out their entire net income from the year.

I think it takes that track record of enforcement to conscript the banking sector into becoming effective infantrymen in American economic wars. That does not yet happen for Silicon Valley or for big oil. And in fact, I dealt a lot with the oil sector with the Iran and Russia sanctions in the 2010s. And one kind of lesson I had dealing with some of these oil companies is that the way that we think about risk calculus for a bank CEO is basically flipped for an oil executive. You know, if when the U.S. imposes export controls on Russian Arctic offshore and shale oil projects, which is what we did in the summer of 2014,

if at that first sign of danger, Rex Tillerson, who's the CEO of Exxon at the time, decides he's going to pull out of his major joint venture with Raskev.

“All of a sudden, all of these other high risk jurisdictions where you need to drill for oil, look at Exxon and say, well, these guys are not reliable.”

They're going to run at the first sign of danger.

You cannot succeed as an oil executive if you're not willing to make risky bets in countries that don't have strong rule of law, that don't have necessarily the most reliable governments. And so in some ways, you know, it made sense that Exxon kind of played a game of chicken with the U.S. government in 2014, and it took explicitly making their projects in Russia illegal to get them to exit the country. With the Silicon Valley companies right now, who are, you know, the ones who are supposed to be implementing the export controls,

they're in a very difficult spot because China's a giant market for them.

So they don't have the investments that have been made at banks to even do export control compliance if they want to. And then on the U.S. government side, it is a bit challenging to on the one hand say that the American semiconductor industry is so strategically important,

that it deserves $52 billion worth of taxpayer money.

And then on the other hand, say, hey, actually, we're going to find you $10 billion because you sold chips to Huawei in violation of export controls.

“So I think it's really tough. Do I think we'll get there? Possibly for all we know there's somebody squirrelling away,”

have to adjust this department right now and has been for several years working on a massive fine that's just going to change everything in this industry. But I think until that happens until, you know, Jensen Wong or these top CEOs realize that like if they don't comply to the letter of the law and maybe even beyond the letter of the law, they're risking their financial performance, they're not going to be effective infantry. So we're just about at time, but I want to close with what you close within your book,

which I think is a really useful heristic for thinking of the trade-offs of this particular moment. You describe as the impossible trinity. That's kind of one of these classic models that I feel like I, you see in a lot of undergrad policy classes, you know, kind of like the two-by-two's grid, this is the triangle of which you can only have two sides, right? And for you, that triangle is economic interdependence, economic security and geopolitical competition.

Two of those can coexist, three of them together cannot. Right now we're in an era where we have economic interdependence and geopolitical competition, but economic security feels lacking. And maybe one day we'll drop economic interdependence and then we'll have security and geopolitical competition, but then without economic interdependence sanctions,

lots of other tools stop working. And you end on a very pessimistic note, a little bit of an apocalyptic note, where you point out that seems like the easiest trajectory from here, from this moment of this age of economic warfare we're living in, is for that economic interdependence to begin to fade out.

Because we live in an era of pendulum swinging, of thermostatic responses, and we're in an era of extreme economic interdependence a few years ago, and we've just been on writing that pendulum back the other way since, and it's going to be a while, probably, before it hits its ultimate, the end of it swinging begins coming back in a different direction.

But that's a pretty bad outcome, because not only does it mean your book stops being relevant, because all these tools we use are no longer good. As you make the point, the benefit of these tools,

the reason they've always been seen as desirable is because they let us escape

the other tool that's dominated human history, which is violent warfare. So, if you were in the position, and you are through your book, and you may yet be again, and more directly, in a position to advise senior policymakers, the president, whoever it may be, or foreign leaders, weighing this question, saying, "How do we approach this coming era for the next 15 years?

How do we approach it?" So we just accept that economic interdependence is going to fall away, or there are steps we should be taking to try and against all odds, keep all three legs of the stool in place to some extent moving forward. So I think there's some irony about the fact that I decided to end the book

on the impossible Trinity, because the whole idea of the book, and honestly, the way that I think about the world, is really less through frameworks and more through individuals, decisions how people act, because my own view of history is that people make history.

“And that's why I decided to write choke points as a narrative history,”

told through the eyes of the individuals who are actually shaping the age of economic warfare. And I didn't start writing this book thinking I'd end on the impossible Trinity. The last thing I wrote, the very last thing, was this conclusion. And I remember walking around thinking, "How do I end this book?" And the thing that struck me was even for someone like me,

who believes in historical contingency and free will and the role of the individual. I had to admit that there was a clear trend, an exponential trend, that sanctions, export controls, tariffs, are just being used more and more and more with every single president. In fact, they're doubly, right?

So Obama imposed sanctions at double the rate of George W. Bush, Trump imposed sanctions at double the rate of Obama. And then Biden imposed sanctions at double the rate of Trump.

I don't know what's going to happen in the second term administration,

but if you just carried forward, I'm sure it will double again.

“And so you have to, sorry, ask yourself then,”

is there some structural factor at play here? It can't just be that these presidents all love sanctions. I think there's something structural. And that's why I came up with this idea of the impossible Trinity.

geopolitical competition reign supreme. And so as a result, you can have economic security and geopolitical competition, because there's no economic interdependence.

“In the 90s, we don't have geopolitical competition, right?”

We view China and Russia as friends. Or would be friends as opposed to rivals. And so you can embrace economic interdependence without losing any sense of economic security. What we have now is economic interdependence persists,

but geopolitical competition has come roaring back, and so we've lost our sense of economic security. When I say we, I mean the world, it's not just the United States. China doesn't feel economically secure. Russia doesn't feel economically secure.

The EU, Japan, all of these governments are explicitly investing in economic security. And so that's sort of how I came up with the concept. In terms of what to do about it and what I would be advising, I don't think that there's really a way out of this Trinity.

Could you get rid of geopolitical competition? I'm skeptical.

“I think that the trajectory of Russian and Chinese power”

is such that you're going to have intense geopolitical competition for at least the next decade or more. So the question is how do you regain economic security? As I see it, there are really two paths, sort of out of our current predicament.

The first is you go to a world that is dominated by two blocks,

where you have an authoritarian block that's led by China and Russia, and then a democratic block that's led by the US, the European Union, Japan and other democratic liberal societies. And what you have in that world is you have deeper economic interdependence that develops within this democratic block.

So you don't necessarily lose the benefits of economic interdependence. And in some ways, you could see this world being more secure in some of the ways that the Cold War gave us a sense of security. The thing I'm more worried about, though, is that that kind of model, which is sort of encapsulated by Janet Ellen's concept of French-horing,

or even Bob Lighthizer's concept that he put forward in a recent New York Times of having a group of democracies that have low tariffs, and then higher tariffs on everybody else.

The problem is that's not the direction that Donald Trump is taking us in right now.

He's taking us in the direction that I'm a little bit more concerned about than I end my book on, which is you just have a complete breakdown, a chaotic breakdown of economic interdependence, in which you're using these sanctions, tariffs, export controls against anyone and everyone.

You don't have any permanent economic agreements that are worth the paper that are written on. And so the only secure long-term investment, if you're an American company, is in the United States. Because you can't feel confident that you're not going to just have a big tariff

put on your product made overseas, or they're not going to be cut off from a specific market. And where that leads us is a world where every nation is sort of for themselves. And without any recourse to pressuring other countries through economics, I do think you get to an era where military force is, again,

the primary tool of great power competition. And beyond that, what history has shown us is that when states can't secure markets through open trade, that is when the temptation for conquest and imperialism rises.

“And I think you see echoes of this when Trump says that he wants to seize Greenland”

for its mineral resources. It's this perspective that you can only feel confident obtaining specific resources or having access to a market if you physically control it. So I think that's the darker future. I certainly hope that we wind up in this first road that I mentioned.

Well, we will have to leave the conversation there for now. But Edward Fishman, author of choke points American power in the age of economic warfare. Thank you for coming to join us here today on the Lawfare podcast. Thanks so much for having me on. It was a really fun conversation.

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