Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha

Hey everyone, this is Leon from Prologue Projects.

“On this week's episode of 5-4, Peter, Reannon and Michael are talking about”

INS, the China, a 1983 case that revolved around the potential deportation of a man from Kenya, who had been in the United States on a student visa. The immigration and naturalization service had decided not to deport China, but the house of representatives stepped in and used legislative veto to overrule the executive branch. In a 72 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of China, who was able to stay in the United States.

But the court did not stop there. Majority also ruled that the legislative veto itself was

unconstitutional, forever weakening the legislative branch, and expanding the power of the executive branch. This is 5-4, a podcast about how much the Supreme Court sucks.

“Welcome to 5-4, where we dissect and analyze the Supreme Court cases that have drained our”

civil liberties, like Trump's payments to January 6 are draining the treasury. I'm Peter, I'm here with Michael, day everybody, and Reannon. Hi, hello. This is my favorite Trump move so far. Seems like we say that every week. Yeah. The guy gets more and more creative.

Now, this one is the best, because as you probably know, Donald Trump sued the IRS and then

settled, and as part of the settlement secured a slush fund that is going to be paid out to January 6th, who are unfairly maligned by our justice system, right? Yeah. It's like a non-mutrily exclusive set of pedophiles, you know, Confederate freaks and realtors, as I understand it. Yeah. Yeah, realtors from Texas, as well, which is like a synonym for demon, you know. Right. I was saying all awful people talked about. Yeah. He's letting everybody know when you do January 6th, too,

and two years, you'll get paid. Yeah. Well, and he thinks that Quid Pro Quo is like this very morally just thing. This is like a very consistent thing. He doesn't understand people who view Quid Pro Quo prives as like immoral or legal. Like he doesn't understand what they're talking about, right? He's like, you did me favor. I do you favor like this. What could be pure than that? Right.

“That's the only thing he understands. And what could be a better use of my power of my position of”

power than to reward extract favors from others and give them favors in return? Yeah. And this is extra funny because as you may well know, a very large number of January 6ths have showed up with like sexual assault on a child or other pedophilia adjacent charges to a degree where like people have runs statistical analysis. Oh, yeah. Being like here's how many people are at January 6th, here's how many people have been fully convicted of offenses against the child. And it's like

statistically anomalous to a degree that cannot be explained away. Right. It's not random. Not random, not random. Something about Donald Trump, something mysterious attracts these folks who knows what it could be. Maybe it's this terrific face. Maybe. All right. This week's case, immigration and naturalization service, the Chata case from 1983. But a little thing called the legislative veto. In the past, Congress would often pass laws delegating power to the executive

branch, but then giving itself veto power over the executive branch's decisions. So in this particular case, Congress created a law that granted the attorney general power over deportation decisions, but then allowed either house of Congress to veto those decisions if they disagree. This is a way to maintain the balance of power between the branches, as well as sort of keep a dialogue between them. But the Supreme Court in a seven to two decision said that this arrangement was unconstitutional.

And this might sound like a bunch of nerdy procedural bullshit. And perhaps it is. But the reason we're talking about it is because this decision and the move away from the legislative veto actually created a power vacuum that Donald Trump and the conservative Supreme Court stepped into. And it's very plausible that you do not get the Trump presidency as we are experiencing it today

before we go into the background here and start talking about this case, want to say up top that we

“are drawing heavily from a forthcoming article in the Georgetown Law Journal by Josh Chaffetz,”

who really, really breaks down how this Supreme Court case charted from the 1980s completely sets the stage in so many ways for how we're seeing the Trump administration moving. Right. So let's talk about the facts of this case, the particular person who took this case to the Supreme Court. And we're actually not going to spend a ton of time there because the result for that person was good. And it's actually everything that came afterwards and what this

case implied that is bad. So Chada, the individual here, is a man who was set for deportation from the United States and immigrant was facing deportation. And the INS actually decided not to deport Chada. But all of the sudden provisions of the immigration statutes here allowed Congress to veto some of these deportation decisions and Congress actually vetoed that decision not

“to deport Chada and Chada was facing deportation again. That's how this case comes up to the Supreme”

Court and the Supreme Court gets rid of legislative vetoes. Chada gets to stay in the United States. Great for him. But what we're talking about here is the sort of restructuring of checks and balances that the Supreme Court made in this decision. So let's talk a little bit about the history of legislative vetoes. What are legislative vetoes? How did they come to be and how historically they've been used by Congress in this relationship of checks and balances between Congress

and the executive branch? So a legislative veto historically was really like a major tool in

the legislative toolbox to check the executive branch's power. It's a tool that basically allows

Congress a veto to check executive action. If the executive branch takes action or an independent agency takes action, Congress essentially has this veto and legislative veto requires that Congress, you know, they could approve. They can give a thumbs up to executive action or they can disapprove. They can say, no, you're not allowed to do that. A legislative veto is created in statute. So Congress passes a law and it would include details of the legislative veto

within that law with regard to like relevant executive actions or agency actions that Congress could exercise the legislative veto for and the process by which Congress could enact the legislative veto, meaning sometimes in a certain law the legislative veto would be defined as something that a congressional committee could do or it could be all the way to requiring that both houses of Congress agree to enact a legislative veto about a different executive action. I'm going to give

an example here with the first legislative veto that was ever enacted. So as part of the legislative

branch appropriations act back in 1933, Congress passed a law called the Economy Act and this law authorized the president at the time Herbert Hoover to use executive orders to basically like transfer agency functions to other federal agencies or transfer executive actions or functions to another executive department. Basically like this was a huge delegation of power to the president in an effort to balance the federal budget, right, squeeze the federal government spending

“and so all of the sudden president Hoover had the power to like consolidate whole agencies, right?”

Like make the decision about like laying people off and shrinking this agency over here, putting agencies together. So Congress knew that that was a huge delegation of power that they had just

handed to the executive but they wanted some kind of check on this. So they basically include

a legislative veto provision in the Economy Act and it required in this case that Hoover submitted any reorganization plans to Congress and then Congress would have 60 days to pass a bicameral both houses resolution to disapprove of that plan if they didn't want that to go forward, right? So another example is a legislative veto that was enacted in the reorganization act during FDR's presidency, right? We know that during the New Deal there was a ton of reorganization of the

federal government happening and even with a Congress that was like largely in support of FDR during the New Deal, they still had this check. They still retained the legislative veto in a lot of ways to maintain that check on massive executive action and massive executive power. And it's not in

legislative vetoes also have been enacted over the course of decades within other statutes that

apply to like all sorts of executive action or federal agency action. There was a 1944 law pass that authorized the Navy to take on certain construction projects that included a legislative veto provision, right? The Naval Affairs Committees of both houses of Congress could veto the Navy's proposed construction plans. In 1974, the Federal Election Campaign Act gave each chamber of Congress 30 days to veto certain changes to FBC rules about reporting requirements for elected candidates.

In 1975, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act had more than a dozen legislative veto provisions, you know, gave Congress the power to veto a ton of what they just defined broadly as like energy actions taken by the President taken by the Secretary of Transportation, other federal agencies. So,

“you know, this is a really important provision and historically sort of not ubiquitous, but like”

around a lot, right, a sort of known and used and often incorporated check on executive action, that Congress was enacting. So, really importantly, as we're moving like through history and the use of legislative vetoes, legislative vetoes were included in a bunch of host watergate laws to reform and check the power of the President after the Nixon administration, right? Kukubinanas, chaos, the President really fucking up. And so Congress is passing all of these laws afterwards.

The War Powers Act, the impoundment control act, many others, that included legislative vetoes to really put, again, ensure a structure in which there could be congressional oversight over executive action, even when Congress is delegating authority to the executive branch. So, you know, if you think about this timeline, what you're looking at is like the legislative

“veto has been a huge part of the response to both the Great Depression and Watergate, right?”

Yeah, both in terms of reorganizing the entire federal government so that it can handle big challenges like, you know, in all consuming depression or handling big challenges like a terribly corrupt executive, the sort of bargains that were struck, the balance that was achieved, involved delegating some authority to the President, but retaining some authority in the legislative branch via the legislative veto. So this was just a huge part of the 20th century restructuring

of the federal government. Yeah, exactly. I think that's a good jumping off place to expand on like why we think this is a good thing, right? This might seem relatively abstract and procedural, but the idea here broadly is that very often Congress will pass laws where they delegate power to the executive branch so that the executive branch can enforce the law. So, you know, they pass the Clean Water Act, for example, and then in that law, they granted the EPA an executive agency,

the power to enforce it. They pass the Civil Rights Act, which has anti-discrimination provisions,

and they grant the EEOC, the power to enforce those. This is critical to a properly functioning

government, right? But it also creates a problem, which is that sometimes the executive branch agencies might wield this power in a way that Congress does not like or do not intend, and so Congress builds in this veto power so that if that happens, they can step in and object, right and say, no, that's not what we meant. Yeah. But it's challenged here as unconstitutional, and the majority strikes down this idea of the legislative veto. They say that it's unconstitutional

because it violates the presentment clause. That clause says that for a law to be passed, it must be approved by each house of Congress and then signed by the president. So they're saying, look, in this arrangement, in this particular law, you're giving either a house of Congress the ability to veto something, and then the president doesn't sign it, so that violates the rule for passing a law, right? The problem with this argument is that that's the rule for passing a law, but this isn't

passing a law, right? They're just vetoing the executive branch's decision. And it's like a

procedure within a law. Right. It's a procedure for enforcing the law, right? But the court is basically

“saying, no, you're just trying to pass another law, right? Right. And so you must follow the formal”

process. You can't just have one house vote on a veto. So I think this fundamentally just doesn't make sense, right? Congress has the power to pass and enforce these laws. They delegate some of that power to the executive branch, but they aren't allowed to retain some of the power for themselves.

like, be absolute, like you're just saying, like, whatever we delegate, they can do it, and we have

no say afterwards. Right. It doesn't make sense to me that here, for example, they delegate to the attorney general, this decision about deportation, right? And the attorney general can make that decision without it going through Congress. But if Congress disagrees, they need to go through the whole process of passing a law. It just doesn't make sense. Right. I don't get it. Yeah, talk about this little more in depth when we get to the descent. But there's something so obviously just wrong about

this logic that doesn't scan when you consider, like, the legislative veto in most instances is dealing with agencies that have authority delegated to them from Congress, who are passing things with the force of law, like regulations or deportation decisions, which the people being deported will tell you that shit has the force of law. Yeah. This is fully enforceable without satisfying by capitalism in percent, right? It's, it's just the executive is making a call

through the rulemaking process, right? And then you have something with the force of law behind it, right? And the by-camelism in percent, is satisfied by the statute that created the agency, which is also the statute that creates the legislative veto in many cases. So, like, what's the problem here? Like, why is this- It doesn't- It doesn't improve by both houses of Congress. Right. Yeah. It doesn't make, it doesn't make any sense. It just doesn't scan, like at all.

The majority says that this particular law, this particular type of legislative veto, where only one house needs to oppose it for it to be a veto, right? Both houses maintain their veto power. They see that this violates by-camelism because laws need to go through both houses. But I actually think that gets it backwards because both houses need to uproof of how the law is being executed. So, if even one disagrees, then the attorney general can't

“execute the law like that, right? I think that that makes sense. I think that's perfectly consistent”

with the by-camelism principle. In fact, it comes out of it. And the court also holds at the legislative veto's violate the presentment part of the presentment clause. By-camelism is the idea that you have both houses of Congress and both need to prove. And then presentment is the idea that it needs to be presented to the president for his signature, right? Yeah. So, they're like, well, look, this legislative veto wasn't presented to the president for his approval. Like,

laws need to be- Again, that doesn't make sense for all the reasons we've stated, but it also leads to absurd situations. We're going to talk about where this has led us in the Trump era,

but one example is from his first term. He declared a national emergency about the border,

right, to like redirect funds for the border wall. Under the National Emergencies Act, Congress used to have a legislative veto. Yeah. So, the president could declare an emergency, but Congress could just disagree and be like, no, we're ending this emergency. But after Chata,

“the only way for Congress to end an emergency is to pass a resolution in both houses and then get”

the president's signature. So, Trump declares an emergency, Congress passes a resolution blocking the emergency, and then Trump just vetoes it, right? So, and to override a veto, you need two thirds of Congress. So, Congress delegated its own power to the president. But now, after Chata, the president can just veto their decision, and now you need two thirds of Congress to enforce their own power under the Constitution, right? Right. So, it's Congress's power, but thanks to

this ruling, the executive branch can wield it basically unfettered, and Congress can't intervene.

Again, just doesn't make sense. Just doesn't make sense. Yeah, very, very upside down, very illogical. I don't really understand why the majority lands where it does, and the like scope of the decision to like the holding the Supreme Court decision could have just been about the legislative

“veto in this law, in this delegation of authority to the attorney general to the INS, right?”

But it did it. It disapproved of the legislative veto as a mechanism in general. Yeah, they're just like, we just don't like the vibes of the legislative veto. Yeah. And we'll talk about this a little bit later, but a big part of our government dysfunction right now is sort of the inability of these branches to communicate and check each other, right? Right. And this was like one of the main ways in which it happened. Right. And gave Congress an avenue for delegating power to the executive branch

without having to worry about what the executive branch might do with that power once delegated. But this is sort of created a world where Congress has, okay, we've delegated you power under this law. Please don't abuse it. And now you get Donald Trump, right? Yeah. And that's that's the end of it.

that power away, he just vetoes them, right? It's absurd. Yeah. There's a short concurrence by Justice

Powell here. Powell agreeing with the holding as to the legislative veto being unconstitutional in this instance. Powell says, hey, legislative vetoes. They're a serious matter. We shouldn't get rid of all of them. That's not the primary question in this case. But narrowly, I'm looking at this.

“And I think this legislative veto is unconstitutional. But the reasoning also illogical doesn't hit.”

He's saying that Congress is retaining a judicative authority by stepping on the authority of the attorney general in deportation decisions rather than Congress just having legislative authority. But that also doesn't make sense. So he's saying, you know, this is like a violation of separation of powers. Congress can't do a function that is a judicative. But that's like the judiciary. He's talking about a different branch of government. But this isn't power that was delegated to the

judiciary. Congress isn't making an adjudicative decision because it's power that was delegated to the executive. It's the attorney general doing this. It's Congress's power that they gave to the attorney general. Exactly. You do they had it where they don't. I don't throw it whenever. Listen, listen, listen. Really silly. Really silly. I don't. Yeah. Don't get it. I don't understand

“what's going on with the Supreme Court Justice in 1983. But it seems like they don't understand”

anything about separation of powers. They don't understand anything about functional function, executive function, or judicial function of 10th grade civics class with voter fucking minds here. Yeah. So Justice White has a lengthy descent where it's like, oh, so they weren't all idiots back then because he like lays it out very well. Like I did feel like I was losing my mind until I read the descent. I was like, is there something about our government

that I don't understand? Yeah. Right. Finally, it's like, okay, somebody does get it. Yeah.

And he hits a lot of the points that that we've hit already. He talks about like, look, this is nonsense. You know, the agencies wield legislative power without satisfying by capitalism and resentment on an individual basis, like per individual deportation decision, in this case, or per individual, you know, promulgation of regulation and other agency actions. He's like, that's making the law without satisfying by capitalism and resentment. And he says,

“but it's satisfied because it's satisfied in the initial statute. And he's like, that's what's”

happening with the legislative veto, too. This doesn't make any sense. He also, I think gets into what Peter was talking about earlier. And I think he does it really well, where he says sort of the spirit of bicameralism and resentment is satisfied. He's like, the whole idea behind that is you can't depart from the status quo without both branches of government and the executive branch in agreement. And so, like, in this specific instance here, you know, the executive branch

is an in agreement because the attorney general makes a determination not to deport someone, right? And then the question is, do both houses agree with them? And if even one doesn't, well, then, you know, it fails, which is like, very analogous to a bill, right? Like, a bill needs to be passed both houses. So he's like, look, in this case, if you think of the attorney general's determination not to deport someone as proposing a bill, you'd need a majority in both houses of

Congress for that bill to become law, which means the contrapoint here is if even one has vetoes that decision, then the law doesn't pass, right? So this is essentially, this is for all intents and purposes. This is functionally bicameralism and resentment in action. Yeah. Yeah. And to the status quo point where he's saying, like, the the status quo can't be changed without bicameralism and resentment, the status quo here is the law that was passed with bicameralism

and resentment that included the legislative veto, right? Yeah. Right. That is the status quo. I feel like I'm talking in circles every time I try to explain what's going on in this case. We're just repeating ourselves. Yeah. It's just bizarre to me. I just don't get it fundamentally.

It doesn't actually click. They're basically just saying at the end of the day that the attorney

general can make a decision without bicameralism and resentment, but if Congress makes a decision, it has to be with bicameralism and resentment. Right. It's the same decision and I just don't get it. It doesn't fucking make sense. Even if the attorney general only has that power because Congress

bicameralism and resentment over and over again. It's so fucking annoying. It's melting my brain.

Pal makes the point that like, you know, because of this weird sort of inversion of bicameralism and resentment, the one house veto is actually more constitutionally sound. And he's sort of like, we should be taking all these legislative vetoes one at a time. Like they present different challenges. Maybe one that's like a committee. Maybe the committee one is unconstitutional. Right. And maybe the two house one is unconstitutional. Maybe it's only one house vetoes.

But we should consider that all wrong, by the way. They're all constitutional. Yeah. No, I actually agree.

“But, but his point, I think, which is right, is like we should be deciding these on their own”

individually statute by statute. He also has a nice little like point that like really what's going on.

Here's policy analysis. He quotes the Court of Appeals, which had struck down the legislative veto. As unconstitutional, he says the Court of Appeals said in action by Congress could equally imply endorsement, acquiescence, passivity, indecision, or indifference. And he's like, well, you know, that's more properly directed at the wisdom of the legislative veto than its constitutionality. Like who cares? Like that's not like that only matters if we're like reviewing it. Like,

but why would we be reviewing it? Like they, you know, like it. Yeah. Congress made the decision to do this to give themselves this opportunity. As long as it's a constitutional who cares what it signals. Like that doesn't, it doesn't matter, right? Like you're just, you just don't like it.

“And I think final point he makes that, that I liked, that gets to the scope of this decision”

in why like even though it sort of feels maybe in the jurisprudential weeds here for us, why this still does think, I think, track well as a five four case for us to discuss. He says, today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Congress than the court has cumulatively invalidated in its history. Like this was a massive, massive case. Nothing for the Roberts Court, by the way. They, no, not at all. But it's not just that like

Congress, that this said Congress, you know, has to delegate its power all or nothing, essentially. It said Congress already has, right? It says, sorry to late no backsees, you gave this authority the executive. And now if you want it back, you either get to have to get the president's signature

on taking that power back or override his veto, right? So good luck. Just a massive second restructuring

of the federal government to shift a ton of power into the executive branch all at once. And this time by the Supreme Court. Yeah. There's also a rankist descent, where he makes a pretty narrow point about what's called severability. We're already talking about bi-cameralism and presentment over and over again. So I don't really feel like explaining severability right now. So we're just going to skip past this. It's not that it's something to believe Warden.

Oh, actually, I want to talk about severability. I do unbelievable. I was going to talk about it too. You guys all want to talk about severability. You fucking nerds. Several abilities just the idea that like you can strike down or invalidate one provision of a law while leaving the rest of its standing. And rankist point is like, look, Congress can delegate the authority to the attorney general to suspend deportations at his discretion.

They haven't. And so by striking this provision down, we are essentially creating a law that Congress has not approved. And we shouldn't. We should just strike the entire thing. Like the attorney general should not retain this power at all. And I just I wanted to highlight that because it actually it kind of matters for some of the stuff we're going to talk about in a minute. Okay. Now that we've explained severability, let's talk a little bit more about why this

stuff matters beyond just the sort of like abstract notion of congressional power, vis-a-vis executive

“power, et cetera. And I think the simplest way to do this borrowing again from Josh Chaffetz's work”

is to give examples of things that Trump has done that are impacted very directly by the lack of a legislative veto that used to be there. Yeah. Yeah. A very simple one is tariffs. The IEPA gives the president the power to enact tariffs. And originally it contained a legislative veto. So without this case, Congress could have very quickly intervened and shut down the tariffs much more easily, right? Instead, we had to wait a year for the Supreme Court to step in

and all this sort of shit, right? Because Congress was sort of powerless and the president was abusing this power that Congress gave him, right? And Congress was sort of forced to just look on helpless. Yeah. Another major area of executive authority that has massively expanded

president to make war, sustain war, bomb and invade other countries and kill a bunch of people all

over the world. So, you know, take, for example, in Trump's first term, Chaffetz in this piece

talks about a couple of sort of war powers actions that Trump took, including the assassination of Soleimani in Iran, the dedication of military resources to support Saudi Arabia's assault on Yemen, and Congress tried to act in a couple of different ways sort of following that executive action in the realm of war powers. But as we know, the war powers act that love mentioned earlier and we've talked about a bunch of times on the podcast, passed in response to the Nixon

“administration, particularly the revelation of bombing Cambodia in secret, the wide spread disapproval”

of the handling of the Vietnam War. War powers resolution is passed to sort of check the president's

war powers. But we all know, the war powers resolution, the war powers act is largely ineffective, right? It failed to address a lot of things like the evolution of what military action even is, the definition of the commitment of armed forces. Is it boots on the ground? Is it something else, right? And so we know that that legislation is ineffective and insufficient to actually check the president's powers. But who knows what Congress would be able to do, had it had a legislative

veto, which did exist in the war powers resolution before this case invalidated that, right? And then of course, in the second Trump administration, we've seen even more expansion, even more use

“of war powers, military action, that Trump is really just largely getting away with without a”

sufficient and powerful war powers resolution and without a legislative veto function inside those

statutes. So we see obviously the bombing of Iran, the invasion and kidnapping of Venezuela's president, the threat to invade Greenland. I mean, on and on and on, right? And so Congress is really left quite hamstrung, not just, right? We don't want to set aside the war powers resolution is like some great thing that would be really effective if Congress were finally able to pass a war powers resolution as to Trump right now. But very hamstrung in this relationship of checks and balances

with the executive branch, with the president, particularly, without a legislative veto anywhere. Right. You know, one thing that has been sort of talked about a lot in the Trump presidency

“has been impoundments and if you don't know what that is, it's when the executive branch”

essentially declines to spend money that has been appropriated by Congress essentially impounding funds. And there is a law about this called the impoundment control act and it's a nice sort of counterfactual because the original impoundment control act for what are called resisions when the executive branch doesn't want to spend money required essentially by capitalism and presentment. The executive branch had to present a resision proposal and both

houses of Congress had to agree to it. So it wasn't invalidated by Chata. There were other parts of the law that weren't severed and so essentially what happened was very strict substantive limits got put on the executive branch codified into statute, absent a legislative veto. Congress, rather than giving up a bunch of authority to the executive branch gave very narrow authority to the executive branch because it couldn't veto the executive branch's use of that authority.

It gave it very little and that has played out well in the Trump administration. He has at times not wanted to spend money and followed the law and sent resision proposals to Congress and some of those have been modified in past some of them have not passed. Other times he's impounded funds and there have been consequences for it. For example, he was impeached for impounding funds. He impounded funds that were meant for Ukraine and he used the withholding of those funds to extort

Ukraine into ginning up an investigation into Joe Biden who was going to be his competition in the coming election and he wanted to controversy around Biden and so he tried to get Ukraine to do that for him via impounding funds and he was impeached for that, right? He's impounded funds and other instances and it has allowed other actors to say this is illegal like very clearly like the government accountability office. It's created both political and real-world repercussions and constraints

a legislative veto, right? A more recent example is there's been a lot of reporting around the allegations

at least that Trump is impounding or threatening to impound funds allocated for Colorado in order to get the Colorado governor to offer clemency or commutation to Tina Peters who was convicted of election interference, right? She's an election denier. She allowed people access to voting machines. She's shown no remorse and Jared Paulis did it. He folded. He commuted her sentence.

“I wouldn't say he folded considering what he said since he's like what are we the thought police?”

I know. He's such a fucking loser. You can't even believe the wrong thing anymore. It's like dude, she actually took material actions. Right. And the first thing she said is like yeah,

I'm going to get to the bottom of this election interference and I'm going to make sure we never

use those machines again or whatever. She's it's very upset. It's very upset. It's very upset. May Tina Peters? What she says? But again, if the reporting is accurate and there's threatened impoundment there, that is grounds for impeachment, that is grounds for saying something he did with illegal, there's the possibility of possible maybe repercussions for Trump for this action because there was a better balance struck, which I think goes to what we've been saying,

what rank was this saying with severability? Like you can't just redo the bargain

“between cops and the executive. You have to let them figure out how this power is shared.”

Like you can't just be like sorry, this one little bit is out. And where that did happen,

it is functioned much better. It hasn't fully constrained Trump, it hasn't prevented him from appounding funds, but there have been repercussions. It's been much easier to describe what he's doing as illegal. And yes, at times being materially constrained. I think like the big picture lesson of all of this is that this decision takes away one of the most fundamental checks on executive power that we had, right? And it also creates a power vacuum. Congress would pass a law

delegate some of its authority to the executive and if the executive branch did something they didn't like, it could act quickly and take that power away. But now it can't. So you have this dispute, this tension between the executive branch and the legislative branch. And who gets to resolve that dispute? The Supreme Court, right? The judicial branch, the Supreme Court very frequently weighs in on these issues. And a big reason for that is that

there is no functional legislative veto anymore. So you've lost this dialogue, this form of communication between the executive and legislative branches. So you've heard us cover countless cases about the administrative state, right? The non-delegation doctrine, major questions, all that shit. All of those are about delegations of power by Congress to the executive branch. If the legislative veto were still in place, a lot of those issues probably would have been

resolved between Congress and the executive. But instead what's happened is that the Supreme Court has become the arbiter of that relationship. So just to give all like off the dome examples, there's a very real possibility that without this case, you don't have the student loan for given this case, right? Like Congress might veto it. Yeah, because if you build a legislative veto into that provision, Congress is either saying, yes, you can do this or know you can't,

right? But because Congress doesn't have that function, the Supreme Court just sort of steps into the void. And they decide what Congress can do, what the executive branch can do, etc. For another example, like during COVID, OSHA, which regulates health and safety in the workplace, the past of rule saying, you know, employees need to be vaccinated or tested once a week for coronavirus. And the court struck that down and said, that was beyond their powers, right? That

was not something that was delegated to them by Congress. And again, if there was a legislative veto in place, Congress could have either spoken and determined that for themselves or, you know, the absence of their enacting a legislative veto would at the very least be very persuasive authority that this was not outside the powers of the executive branch, right? And it makes it much harder

“for the Supreme Court to justify invalidating a regulation like that. Yeah. Yeah, and I think it's worth”

noting that part of the concern here is not just like, oh, there was this law that had a legislative

veto, right? So if you're trying to pass a law concerning the environment, right, you're going to end

“up delegating authority to the executive branch and not retaining much of that authority in Congress,”

right, which can run into trouble when you have Republican presidents, right? So it basically

hampered the ability of Congress to create effective legislation proactively, right? Every time Congress crafts a law now, it has to be willing to dump a bunch of power in the executive branch and basically unable to easily claw it back. Right, which to be clear is like what we're talking about in the COVID example, like that's based on the law that the, you know, OSHA said empowered them was passed long after Chata, right? So it's not like there was a legislative veto

“invalidated by Chata there, but there was maybe an opportunity for a legislative veto”

in a different world where Congress doesn't have to choose between all or nothing

in its investigations of authority. Right. And, you know, a lot of people are like big picture, just all these conversations about like, why is in Congress doing anything, right? Well, they, they used to have a mechanism in a lot of cases for for stepping in and you wouldn't need both houses, right? You wouldn't need to like overcome a filibuster, for example, right? A lot of things that hamper Congress's ability to check the executive branch are not just like constitutional

mechanisms, they're the result of the Supreme Court taking away this avenue and taking away this check so that now Trump runs around unfettered and as long as Republicans hold on to like roughly a majority of either house of Congress. Yeah. Congress has a really hard time reeling him in. And all of this because in 1983, most of the Supreme Court justices didn't understand how laws work and how are going to work. There's really nothing else to be said about it.

Yeah. It's also, also, rank list doesn't join the white descent, so it's really only one Supreme Court justice who's like, guys, I don't think this is how the government works at all, right? He just like nails it and all of the other justices are like, no, I don't know what you're

talking about. Yeah. You're way off base. Our, our hero third good marshal did not see Donald

Trump coming. Yeah. It's the worst. Donald Trump has made me learn so many things against my will.

“It sucks, dude. Bye, camera, listen and present, man. Are you fucking kidding me?”

You also have to know about so many more little demons, too. And it's like, yeah, like, I don't want to know who Stephen Miller is. I fucking can get that guy right at the past. Now I have to learn about his wife. What? Why? Why? What's happened? I want none of it. All right, folks, next week, California, the Greenwood case about whether cops can look through your trash. This is a case that said if raccoons can do it, cops don't need a warrant to do it.

And that is not an exaggeration. Get excited. Follow us on social media at five, four pod. Subscribe to our patreon patreon.com/54 pod. I'll spell it out for access to premium and add free episodes, special events, our slack, all sorts of shit. We'll see you next week. Bye, y'all. Bye, everybody. you