Lawfare Archive: Should the U.S. Sanction the ICC, with Nema Milaninia

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you're building tomorrow's advantage. PWC's managed services, we run your operations with tech and talent, so you can run faster, scale smarter, lead stronger. I'm Sarah Little Rich, intern at Laugh Fair with an episode from the Laugher archive from July 18th, 2026. On July 13th, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced new campaign to "dismantle the threat" posed by the International Criminal Court to US sovereignty. Unquote. Rubio's proposed actions include urging other countries to withdraw from the ICC, sanctions against the ICC,

“and visa revocations for ICC personnel. For today's archive, I chose an episode from February 3, 2025,”

in which Thailand, McBrion, spoke with Nima Millenia, a former prosecutor at the International Criminal Court, an International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, about the Trump administration's previous efforts to sanction the ICC. They discussed the many criticisms of the court, what effects sanctions would have on the court's ability to function and more. It's the Laugher podcast. I'm Thailand McBrion, managing editor of Laugher, with Nima Millenia, a former prosecutor at the International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,

as well as a current partner at the Laugher King and Spalding. We typically reserve sanctions for criminal institutions, and we don't, and should not target human rights bodies, especially those which have been given a mandate to investigate and prosecute the worst crimes that mankind experiences. Today, we're talking about recent efforts by the Trump administration and the U.S. Congress to sanction the ICC. So Nima, I want to start with the U.S. Congress and the status of the bill that is intending to sanction the ICC.

Though I proceed with some caution because we are recording on January 29th, and it's a bit of a fast moving story. So could you just catch us up to speed as of right now of the status of this legislation and what's in the bill?

“Thanks, Tyler, and thanks again for having me here, and I think this is obviously not just an important topic, but as you mentioned the timely one.”

Before I begin, let me just caveat everything and note that my obviously my remarks reflect my personal thoughts and are not intended to be attributed to any organization that I am or have been a part of. But Tyler, to answer your question, I think it's important to understand that there's there's been two parallel tracks for sanctions and both are different phases and have different histories.

The first is there is a current track that's already concretized concerning sanctions imposed by executive order as some of your listeners may recall during the first Trump administration.

The president issued sanctions by executive order on June 11th, 2020, and response to the progression on the Afghanistan situation, which at that point encompassed potentially allegations against US personnel, both defense personnel, but also personnel in the intelligence branch in relation to crimes alleged with regards to rendition, but also the detention sites that US personnel worked on in Afghanistan. Those sanctions were rescinded by President Biden shortly after heat took office. However, those have then now been reinstated as part of President Trump's second term first day executive order.

So we currently actually have a state already whereby the sanctions that the president had imposed during his first term have been restored and what we're waiting upon arguably is designations as to who those would target since the persons that were targeted during the president's first term are no longer in office. And those individuals were the former prosecutor factor in the suitah and her cooperation advisor.

Now there's a second track, obviously, which is legislative sanctions. And there were no congressional sanctions that were imposed during President Trump's first term.

The first that these sanctions were were were advanced was actually under the last year of President Biden's term following a restaurant applications issued by Prosecutor Khan in his investigation against both Israeli officials and Hamas officials after he announced that he had filed for applications against Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, and then Defense Minister Galant.

However, obviously, as a new Congress took to cold and given the fact that the Senate at that point had not moved a sanctions bill, they had to start a new, which is what we see currently.

“So the House again has passed the same version of a sanctions legislation that they had advanced last year passing this time with 45 members of the democratic caucus in the same number of Republican members, and that's again before the Senate.”

And as of yesterday, in fact, and I know recording this on on the 29th, the Senate has tried to move it and they weren't able to get a pass by a closure. The members of the democratic caucus with the exception of Senator Fetterman voted against moving a pass and opened debate and not therefore getting to 60 votes, and is to be seen whether or not further efforts will be made to try to push this and get some form of consensus across the the two parties for our Senate version of this legislation. Thanks for that, that's really helpful starting point, but to back up even one step why pursue two tracks of sanctions, in other words, what would this bill do that the Trump administration can't do with executive action.

There's two elements of this, which are motivating legislative action. There's obviously the political element of this, which is to demonstrate not just from an executive standpoint, but also from a legislative standpoint, our our alliance and support of Israel. And but also obviously our support of U.S. personnel, and that's certainly been amongst the talking points that have been advanced by individuals, including Senator Fetterman, as of yesterday, for why they support a sanctions legislation at the legislative level, even though executive action has already been taken.

But the second and this has also been remarked upon by, especially the Republican members both the House and the Senate, is a desire to prevent a circumstance that had already occurred whereby a subsequent president or especially from from the Democratic party can overturn sanctions against the ICC.

“And therefore to to not permit what president Biden did in his in his first few months, which is rescind by executive order sanctions that were imposed by the administration.”

Those are the two main motivating causes here for why the legislation continues to push forward a sanctions bill.

Out of curiosity, did the Senate blocking the bill yesterday surprised you? Yes, and and know the Senate dams have always.

Blocked against sanctions legislation as in particular going too far given the fact that sanctions by the rate by the very nature are tools that we intend to use as blunt instruments to try to combat terrorist organizations and obviously armed groups like cartels.

“They're not tools that are typically known for being discrete or tailored or can be tailored in a way to target very specific interests or aims.”

And many members of the Senate dams have remarked on this and were were were the reason why a sanctions legislation didn't advance during the time in which they were part of the majority, so it's not too surprising to see them.

And also oppose a sanctions legislation this time around in particular given the fact that even even though such legislation is really intended to target efforts to aid and assist.

Investigation or prosecution concerning U.S. personnel and personnel or nationals of our allies because they're blunt instruments by definition they'll have implications for other investigations that we do support like the ICC's investigation on Ukraine where they've already issued arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin but other other senior members of the Russian military and political establishment. Also in Darfur where we see an ongoing violence and where the Secretary has supported a genocide determination and Libya another circumstance where the United States supported a security council referral to the ICC but also the institution writ large.

And we do have the impact of not just targeting obviously individuals but also the institution and organizations especially U.S. companies which provide necessary resources to the institution. And many members of the Senate Democratic caucus have a point on this exact fact and in fact what we've seen over the course of the past 48 hours is a lot of big tech companies that are incorporated here the U.S. express these similar concerns to both the Senate dams and Senate Republicans.

And I wonder if if we could break that down a bit I was hoping you could sort of sketch out the different camps or the different schools of thinking on the ICC within Congress or within the U.S. government broadly.

To set that up I wanted to just read quickly something that Tom Cotton posted on X shortly after the Senate blocked the bill.

He wrote this was on January 28th the ICC has a corrupt international organization that targets Americans and our allies instead of standing up for our sovereignty and national security. The Senate Democrats just voted to allow the ICC to continue to target U.S. troops. So I want to break that down a bit and I wonder if you can sort of sketch out what you see as the major criticisms among both Democrats and Republicans about the ICC.

“I think we can take one step back and I'll just break down where I think we have a general bipartisan consensus and where I where I think things then fall apart in terms of where there's deep political divisions.”

And the first begins I think more in relation to the rule of law ecosystem more generally at the international level where I genuinely truly believe there is bipartisan not consensus but a general understanding that we need a system of rule of law at the international level. As an element of exerting our core national security interests we need in international framework of rule of law for purposes of international trade which I know is something obviously a deep significance and importance for this administration.

For purposes of deep national security interests as relates to our conflict with China and securing and supporting our allies there such as South Korea and their interests over the South China Sea and we obviously need it for other issues that are currently circulating for which we're engaged in negotiations and disputes such as access and rights over the Panama Canal and obviously access to middle deposits in Greenland but also elsewhere. As we're seeing those conversations happening so there is a deep understanding irrespective of the rhetoric that we hear oftentimes by both sides of the house but also obviously in the in the executive that we need a system of rule of law at the international level.

Just before we get into the flip side of that where have you seen recently especially among Republicans voicing at least reflecting this consensus or these shared values.

I'm thinking maybe as an example some of Secretary Rubio's statements in his confirmation hearing.

“That's right I think that's a good touching point of Secretary Rubio doing his confirmation hearing didn't talk about destroying our system of international laws and agreements.”

He rather reflected upon why they're so important and why it's important to be careful when we're entering into certain arrangements and the way he described it and the way.

I would argue many administrations think about it is that whenever we engage at the international level either by agreement or in terms of negotiating bilateral or multilateral arrangements. Because by definition we see an aspect of our sovereignty because we're no longer saying that we're going to be bound strictly by domestic laws and processes but rather we're going to also see parts of our authority to an international institution or international arrangement. Also in the case of for instance trade that's also in the case of access to resources but obviously in this instance it's also in the case of whether we bind ourselves or not to international institutions such as the ICC or other international courts and tribunals.

So Senator Rubio's remarks are telling not from this standpoint just of the fact that he supports in general the notion of international arrangements but rather that that we need to take him and we should be taking them very seriously.

“But unfortunately interrupted you a bit ago when you were on a bit of a roll I believe you were about to break down some of where this consensus diverges so that is to say.”

Where are the points of departure on the ICC especially among Republicans and Democrats on the pro sanctions camp anti sanctions camp. I think that's a very important thing to do with the fact that we're in a part of our position that even there with again outliers on on both sides of the of the Hill general consensus that there needs to be some form of accountability for there to be deterrence for international crimes and that that form of accountability should happen by international institutions where domestic institutions don't have the ability.

And on that level we even saw efforts during the last during the last Congress to expand authorities not only that we have in the US to prosecute for those crimes but also to support accountability for.

“And so that the international level including by the ICC in fact it was Senator Graham who who led the charge to expand.”

Our authorities to be able to cooperate with the ICC to ensure that we could support the institution in its investigation concerning Ukraine.

Understanding that deterring Russia in its crime of aggression against Ukraine is also one of the most effective ways by which we can deter similar types of offenses from being committed by other countries including Russia again. Where that consensus however breaks down is where there's efforts by the court and those institutions to investigate instances that concern our allies, but I would argue to investigate instances where there is. Deeper conflict with our foreign policy objectives writ large such that when the court does go after Israel or decides to investigate us, but I would argue also where would investigate other nationals of countries that we have close ties to that we believe they go too far.

“And and there there is a breakdown in consensus with regards to what the appropriate response to be should be in those circumstances.”

There is consensus I would argue that the court goes too far when it takes on those cases including the cases that I mentioned because oftentimes there's no consent to the court jurisdiction by those states as in the case with Israel, but also as in the case with us.

But where breaks down is as to to what the appropriate response should be in such circumstances.

And just staying with the critiques one more beat. What do you make of the claim I just mentioned made by Tom Cotton that participation in the ICC is not only bad because of a certain amount of seating sovereignty, but in fact he goes further in in accusing the court of targeting Americans specifically do you see any evidence for that claim. The evidence that the court is targeting American specifically and in fact if anything recent developments suggest that any investigation that kind of included US personnel have had been removed in our off the table.

When he first took office, made it a point to announce and he announced it publicly, which he does not usually do in in relation to other investigations, that his investigation in the situation of it concerning Afghanistan was going to deprioritize other elements of that investigation that did not concern the offenses that occurred after the Taliban took over a cobble and and the rest of Afghanistan, which by definition meant that he was not going to prioritize or advance in investigation. Against US personnel or other non Afghan international officials, coupled with the fact that just in the past two weeks, he announced arrest warrant applications for the first time in that situation against two senior Taliban leaders.

We reiterated the fact that his investigation, though not complete, was going to continue against members of the Taliban, but also members of ISHwar Hassan explicitly omitting, therefore any aspect of his investigation concerning US personnel or, again, other international figures. And that that I don't think was done by or mission or neglect, but that that said a clear explicit message that his investigation against the US and any investigation against US personnel is likely concluded in no longer going to continue or be repiratized at any point.

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So instead of maintaining yesterday's model, you're building tomorrow's advantage. PWC's managed services, we run your operations with tech and talent, so you can run faster, scale smarter, lead stronger. Yeah, I can't help but think about the irony in that last point because there is a common criticism of the court that does not apply the law equally. And I think many strange bedfellows would agree generally with that statement, but approach it from much different points of view and bring up seemingly contradictory examples of that principle at play.

Do you have a sense of how much of these critiques are bound up in the prosecutor himself versus the institution as far as the Americans go?

“I think there are two overriding critiques that members of Congress are concerned about that both relate to the prosecutor specifically, but also the institution more generally.”

And at the end of the day is what's fueling a lot of the reactions that we're currently seeing. The first is is one of the prosecutor acting more politically than he is acting independently and by by application of the rule of law. And in particular there is a deep sense and I would argue not a fully erroneous one that as it relates to Israel in particular that the prosecutor acted unfairly and was motivated, motivated and part by by some level of politics. The way that by virtue of the following there is a sense and it is clear that the manner in which the prosecutor approached the governor of Israel is different than the manner in which he has approached other governments in other investigations.

For instance, he has made efforts since he's taken office to meet with the heads of states of Venezuela when he had gone to Venezuela. In fact took a photo up with Maduro, he has met with General Heftar in Libya and would offer the opportunity to meet with senior Israeli officials in Israel.

“Turn that trip down at the very last minute and announce the the arrest warrant applications against as I mentioned Prime Minister Netanyahu independence minister galon.”

The second the second aspect of this of that that fairness critique is the the way in which the prosecutor himself is also applied rules.

It seems to be different vis of Israel versus other states. So there is currently pending litigation before the court by by Israel about the fact that the Israeli government had asked for a deferral of the investigation. It right which is permitted under the Rome statute which the prosecutor decided to unilaterally reject and failed to notify the pretrial chamber about and obviously did not suspend his investigation after receiving the deferral request.

“Contrast in relation to the investigations pertaining to Venezuela and the Philippines when in receipt of a similar deferral request the prosecutor did not unilaterally adjudicate the terms of those requests.”

The defendant's investigation notified the relevant pretrial chambers and then when he had sought to resume the investigation requested leave from the court and I would argue that that's actually the procedure that's outlined specifically in in the in the Rome statute. It's that it's that difference in both the application of the rules but also in the treatment of Israel that has raised fairness concerns not just by those who are advancing support for sanctions obviously but but also on the on the downside by those who are deeply concerned with regards to how the prosecutors conducting himself.

And I would note that that's also the concern that was explicitly noted by both President Biden and Secretary Blinken at the time in which the arrest won applications were issued.

There's the second element of this which is more institutional which is there's concern with regards to both the courts extension of jurisdiction.

Beyond the states that have consent to the Rome statute as well as the difference that it gives to. And it's that have fully functioning an independent judiciary and and the application of the principle of complementarity which is a a bedrock principle of the court which which notes that whenever that the court should only step in whenever the the state itself is unwilling or unable to to investigate and prosecute. There's a deeper sense that the court is inserting this jurisdiction well beyond the parameters that were that were identified for it at the timing in which the Rome statute was negotiated because over time what we've seen as the court using.

More advanced and involved understandings of jurisdiction to extend its authorities beyond just the states who have ratify the Rome statute but to arguably cover jurisdiction or have jurisdiction over any state around the world where there is some.

And because that cross border element occurred on the territory of Bangladesh which is a state party then the court should have jurisdiction over the matter even though the acts of coercion and the acts which cause the the population to flee occurred on the territory of a non-state party. And when we extrapolate on that and given the fact that displacement crimes have a tendency of occurring anywhere where we see conflict around the world it does really broaden the ambit of the course jurisdiction to cover a much wider swath than those territories of states which have become parties to the Rome statute.

There is a deep underwriting concern here and I don't think this is just a US concern I think there's there's concern more generally around the diplomatic circle including by our allies but the court has extended itself well beyond the limits for which it was founded.

“And going to the sovereignty concerns that I think Senator Rubio articulated during his confirmation hearing has now exceeded its authorities to the territories of states that have purposely decided not to consent to the court's jurisdiction.”

The second element of this is complementarity and I can touch upon this just very briefly but we can obviously elaborate on this more and this was highlighted in an amicus brief that the German government submitted actually at the pre trial level following the issuance of the of the arrest warrant applications which is at the court's test for complementarity which is which is it's subquite narrow it requires that at the domestic level that the investigation or prosecution concern.

The same persons and substantially the same conduct does not account for the fact that there are systems in domestic institutions which may not or choose not to go after those specific individuals.

But are inherently independent and democratic and that that fact should factor into the calculation as to whether or not we give difference to the domestic institutions.

“So the German argument was and and I think there is actually some agreement in the diplomatic circle again of this concern that there should be some element of the complementarity test that says hey listen.”

Israel which has a fully function and independent judiciary a fully function and independent attorney general's office should be given more leeway in terms of whether we defer to it.

Then other states like Russia where obviously the judicial apparatus and the prosecutorial apparatus is is controlled by the state itself and that if you don't give difference or if you don't.

“Way that as part of the complementarity analysis and something as broken in terms of the courts foundational requirement of looking towards domestic institutions before taking on cases as an institution of last resort.”

So taking these seemingly very legitimate concerns and shared among diverse parties why are sanctions not the correct tool here and what can the United States do to push for reform in lieu of sanctions. And this is I think it's a great question and this is where we see obviously division that's now playing out before Congress and before the Senate as to what the appropriate response should be because all of the issues that I just mentioned we can we could debate about them. We could we could have an argument as to whether or not the prosecutor did act fairly we can have a debate as to whether or not he has exerted himself politically we can have a debate about the jurisdiction and complementarity concerns that I mentioned.

And there are reasonable arguments I would argue on both sides considering that debate where I fundamentally disagree with with folks who want to respond to those concerns is that sanctions is an appropriate response and I fundamentally disagree not only from the standpoint that we typically reserve sanctions for criminal institutions. And we don't and should not target human rights bodies especially those which have been given a mandate to investigate and prosecute the worst crimes that mankind experiences but also as as an appropriate response from protecting US national security concerns.

If we look just narrowly at the how do we best protect Israel or how do we best protect US personnel sanctions were neither and the threat of sanctions as I should say we're neither effective the first time around in terms of mitigating those concerns and protecting our person out or protecting Israel nor are effective in in that aim this time around.

Both within the ICC but obviously with our allies who form part of the assembly of state parties which is the legislative and administrative body of the ICC and that influence that we we have and can carry.

“It is diminished the moment we assert threats against the court because a court as well as as a states who support it have a tendency of becoming very defensive when faced with existential threats or threats of force against it.”

It is purely from a how do we best protect our personnel standpoint how do we best protect Israel standpoint sanctions are not the most effective tool related to that.

And this is also won't do the thing that I would argue many members of Congress want done which is cause a reversal of the arrest warrants that have already been issued. We already filed an appeal against the arrest warrants and that appeal is pending before the appeal chamber there is a good possibility that the appeals chamber decides for many of the legal reasons that I articulated before that the prosecutor acted unlawfully.

“We are not applying the principle of compilimentarity correctly or extending jurisdiction beyond the bounds of what is legally permissible under the room statute and and chooses to reverse the arrest warrants on those grounds.”

That is that is legally and legally focused and an independent way is undermined under the threat of sanctions a because it may encourage states like Israel who are working with the court in order to get a legal remedy that is in its best interest to stop working with the court.

But it may put the judges themselves in this bind where in an effort to not be seen as capitulating to political pressures.

The issue or render a decision that goes the direction of supporting the arrest warrants as even though the legal arguments would have in in another circumstance resonated with their decision to annoy the arrest warrants. So in addition to perhaps forcing the judges and others in the institution to this defensive posture.

“Another way to get at this question is what would and have sanctions materially done to the court?”

I think that's the way that the court will work the prosecutors you have past experience working in the office of the prosecutor though not for the current prosecutor but his predecessor I believe.

And as many listeners will also know the ICC does not benefit from the protection of UN Security Council resolution for example. So what do sanctions materially do to the ICC how does it affect their work? We brought effects as I mentioned sanctions are by definition a blunt instrument and you can imagine they'll have blunt results. But Tyler before I go there let me revert back to the previous point I made and just add one issue which is I mentioned how sanctions weren't and cannot are not an effective tool for those narrow objectives that certainly members of the Senate but also the administration want.

But I would argue they're ineffective and actually clatter ability to get the more structural reforms that we but also many of our allies and many other states also think need to be undertaken in order to. During the court back with regards to the expansive jurisdictional framework that is constructed but also that narrow complementarity framework which everyone has cons or many folks and many states have concerns about since those discussions happen at the diplomatic level and by virtue of removing us from diplomatic discussions.

We have less of an ability to obviously influence the discussions in a manner that might be best for our long term interest as really to the ICC. It relates to the implications as sanctions could have there's the immediate implications concerning the individuals who are designated their properties are blocked. There's these are restrictions for both themselves but also their family members and there's also the possibility of civil and criminal penalties for individuals who provide any form of assistance towards the sanctioned individuals or towards the.

The investigations for which the sanctions are intended to target now while that may seem narrow. It does have broader implications including for US companies which is why we've seen them become more and more involved.

It's very difficult to cap in off high level officials from the day to day work of the institution on other things.

“The prosecutor has purview obviously over not just one investigation but overall investigations and on top of it, especially if you have judges being sanctioned.”

There's the implications for for the judiciary writ large over all of its matters and not just just them specifically and what we saw in the first instance when sanctions were imposed the first time around. The court tried to take remedial or mitigating measures such as cabining off the prosecutor from certain investigations or blocking or altering the accounts by which they were getting reneumeration or having other individuals in line to do briefings before the United Nations. Those were temporary measures that were being undertaken that in the long term would not have worked, and in many ways the institution was saved by the fact that the measures that were in place lasted only for about a year before President Biden revoked them.

“In this instance I think what we can see is a variety of different tactics that both the court will take and the international community may take, but none of which I would argue will be that effective in a long run.”

One is like I mentioned, cabining off the individuals who are working on the files for which Congress has targeting sanctions for.

So cabining off the individuals who are working on the Israel investigation and possibly the Afghanistan situation from working on other investigations so that the argument for who is providing material support can be limited to only a few number of individuals. They may also look to import different anti-blocking regimes aimed at encouraging financial institutions and other institutions in the EU to continue operations with the court by providing them a protective apparatus. But those again only go a short way.

Ultimately what sanctions have an impact of doing is not just directly impacting those individuals, but causing and creating difficulties and friction within the institution that causes it to slow down as operations writ large or cause private entities which work with the institution and which the institution relies upon to step away entirely.

So for instance, Microsoft is one company, Microsoft currently provides the cyber security infrastructure for the entire institution.

It is the security apparatus for protecting the court again cyber attacks as we saw two years ago by Russian affiliated organizations after the arrest warrant against flooding reporting was instituted. It is very possible that Microsoft decides no longer to cooperate with provide services to the court in light of sanctions even if there is a very narrow pathway for it to comply. Similarly other companies like meta or relativity which provides services or which respond to subpoenas for information may stop cooperating with the court entirely.

“And if you think about the knock on effects as to what they may mean, obviously what what that does is not only inhibit the ability of the court to access incredibly important information for”

have potential purposes but also arrest opportunities but also make third parties which cooperate with the court like witnesses and victims much more vulnerable to attack by institutions that are hostile to it like Russia or otherwise. So are there any other mitigating measures the ICC can take or should be taking to further sanctions proof its institution or our sanctions really something of an existential threat. The sanctions are an existential threat the the register for the court has both publicly but also in private meetings with other state parties.

It noted very explicitly that after conducting a review has to have both targeted but also obviously blood based sanctions could impact the court's operations. That they have determined that it is an existential threat to the court maybe not so much in the short term per se especially if the sanctions don't target the institution but certainly in the long term. So there is very little that the court can truly do in order to protect itself from sanctions beyond beyond what I just mentioned, which is happening off certain individuals who are designated.

So that they don't quote unquote pollute the rest of the institution and also looking for other providers which may not have significant business operations in the US and can therefore survive a circumstance where they would be prohibited from accessing accounts or business opportunities in the United States.

The sanctions can have that are existential and nature even if they in themselves are targeted and that is by the way just to just to go back to the congressional dynamics the fact that many congressional dams have been pointing out as to why even though they may agree with the more general concern that the Republican caucus has concerning the courts overstep the prosecutors.

“You know lack of fair treatment of Israel and obviously the politics that the prosecutor seems to have been engaging in that that sanctions are not the right appropriate or the or the appropriate tool for responding to those issues.”

So let's say that US government officials unfortunately do not listen to this episode and we are left with a world in which prolonged sanctions.

Under the ICC effectively ineffective or you know it essentially destroys the institution what would a world in which the ICC is absent look like especially for US national security interests. There is no and I doubt in our lifetime there will be a replacement for the ICC and by that what I mean is it is the only international court that currently exists that that can quickly. And immediately be activated to investigate and prosecute atrocity crimes and the broad span that territorial span and in in the number of incidents that are currently has jurisdiction over.

There's no replacement for that. So the question that you're asking really goes to. What kind of a world would we have and if we don't have on a longer have in institution that is readily available to investigate and prosecute international crimes that are committed. And be it in the territory of a particular state or as we've seen with Russia and Ukraine from one state against another. And the only consequence of that and in fact the consequence that led to the to the very reason why we have an international court is that we no longer have an effective deterrence against the commission of those crimes.

So we no longer have an institution that can step in to put pressure to mitigate the commission of atrocities and student no longer have an institution that can step in to put pressure on the Taliban and their mistreatment and the systematic oppression of women in their country. So we have an institution that can investigate and prosecute Vladimir Putin for the crime of aggression and the other crimes committed as part of that war of aggression including the war crimes and crimes against humanity for which there's now an open arrest warrant against it.

And the world that we will more transition to and and that's not not a world that I would I would argue any one of us want to see it's not a world that I would argue that Congress at a bipartisan level has indicated that it wants to see. And nor is that a world that is obviously aligned with our with our national security interests.

That's only a world that will result in more not less conflict and it's certainly a world that I certainly hope never materializes either.

“Neema thank you so much for taking the time this has been a really important conversation.”

Thank you so much and thank you for giving an opportunity for us to speak about this important matter. The law fair podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings institution you can get at free versions of this another law fair podcast by becoming a law fair material supporter through our website law fair media dot org slash support. You also can access to special events and other content available only to our supporters. Please rate and review us wherever you get your podcasts. Look out for other shows including rational security, chatter, allies and the aftermath.

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