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Lawfare Archive: The U.S. Bombing of Yemen and the Houthi Response

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From March 21, 2025: For today's episode, Lawfare Foreign Policy Editor Daniel Byman interviewed Gregory Johnsen, a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, D.C. Johnsen ex...

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a 155-hour Vexel bonus session. I'm Sarah Wilvich, internet welfare with an episode from the Lothar Archive for July 26th, 2020. On July 20th, the Houthi rebel grouping Yemen announced that it would blockade Bob Lundem,

a key straight on the Red Sea. The announcement comes as tensions between the Houthi's and Saudi Arabia continue to rise,

and as shipping is increasingly diverted to the Red Sea due to the uncertain status in the straight-of-war news. In a truth-social post on July 23rd, President Trump warned he would hold her on, which backs the Houthi's, responsible if any US ships were attacked by the Houthi's, and referenced the US strikes against the Houthi's last year. For today's archive, I chose an episode from March 21, 2025, in which Daniel Binman sat down with Gregory Johnson of the Arab Gulf States Institute, to discuss the 2025 strikes against the Houthi's. They talked about the Trump administration's rationale,

likely affects the strikes would have on the Houthi's, implications to the wider Middle East, and more. It's the Lothar podcast. I'm Daniel Binman, the foreign policy editor of Lothar, and I'm here with Gregory Johnson, who is a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf State Institute in Washington, D.C. and one of the countries leading experts on Yemen. The US is wary about yet one more open-ended conflict in the Middle East,

but if the US is clear-minded about its goal that the Houthi's have to stop this, then that requires a decisive military defeat of this organization, which is going to be very, very difficult. Today we're going to talk about the US bombing of Yemen, and how the Houthi's in Yemen are reacting. Gregory, I just wanted to start out with a very basic question on Saturday night.

The United States bombed Yemen. Why did it do so? Can you give us an overview of what's been going on?

Yeah, absolutely. So when the Trump administration came into power in January,

one of the first things that President Trump did was to designate the Houthi's.

This is the group that controls large portions of North and Western Yemen. He designated them as a foreign terrorist organization, which was a designation that the Trump administration had made. In its first term, right as it was leaving office, the Biden administration later reversed that policy. And so Trump reinstated that. Once he did that in January, what the Trump administration has been trying to do, basically for the past year and several months following Hamas's attack on Israel in Gaza in October of 2023.

The Houthi's have carried out a number of strikes on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. And they've been carrying out these strikes targeting a number of ships, including US naval vessels who are there to protect the shipping shipings lanes. The Biden administration has tried when it was in office a number of different approaches, including some limited air strikes. But really by the time the Biden administration left power at the end of 2024 or early 25,

the Houthis were able to basically claim victory in the Red Sea conflict that had been going on throughout much of 2024.

And I think the Trump administration has made clear that there were going to be repercussions for the Houthis.

And so what we saw on Saturday was the beginning of a number of much more extensive air strikes that the US is undertaking. They're ongoing. I think the Secretary of Defense has said that this operation is open ended. And so the Trump administration is basically trying to show the Houthis that they did not win.

That the US can basically bring them to heal, deter them from carrying out fu...

So that they're unable to carry out any of those attacks.

And I think today we're recording this on Wednesday, President Trump and a post on true social said the Houthis should expect complete annihilation.

So what did the US actually bomb? Yeah, that's a good question. So they've they bombed a number of what they call weapon sites. So any storage facilities that the Houthis have.

There's been some factories that have been bombed. I think they've also bombed the houses of some Houthi military leaders.

There's been some military leaders that the Houthis have said have died.

I think the casualty toll right now is several dozen somewhere 50, 60s, but it's very, very early. And obviously the strikes are ongoing. So that number is likely to change.

I think the key thing to take away is that while the Biden administration in 2024 largely limited itself to some of the mobile missile launchers, missile sites that the Houthis had, some of the places where they were launching amphibious operations against the United States as well as weapon storage facilities. The Trump administration has taken a much, much more expansive view. And it has a much wider targeting list. And so they're carrying out strikes across northern Yemen, across Houthi health territories with the idea of really bending the Houthis to to the US as well and making sure that the Houthis aren't in a position to carry out these strikes in the future.

This I would just add is going to be fairly difficult to do because the Houthis have been under air strikes for years now. So the war in Yemen, the regional war and perhaps we can get into this a little bit later with Saudi Arabia and the UAE started a decade ago in 2015 and Saudi Arabia and the UAE carried out extensive air strikes for a number of years against the Houthis.

So for the Houthis, well the US is more capable than the Saudi and the Emirati Air Force and is able probably to inflict more damage.

The Houthis have been down this road before and they've managed to survive and even thrive despite massive air strikes. Let me ask for a little more detail on this because to me this is a really important point. So as you noted the Biden administration was more restricted in its targeting and I think the Trump folks would say but perhaps quite reasonably look this did not work. That if you want to influence it with these you have to hit much harder and if I understand your remarks you're saying you're given the nature of the civil war it's insanity. This is unlikely to make a significant difference in Houthi decision making.

Talk me through why they seem like they would resist this especially given that his follow for example Hamas eventually did cave to some degree in the face of military pressure.

Yeah, that's a good question. I think there's two parts and so the first part that I would lay out is sort of what I see as the broadly speaking the five major options that the United States has had in Yemen over the past year.

I think those options have changed so I can walk through that and then I also talk about the the reason I think the Houthis have been baiting the United States over the past 14 or 15 months and why the Houthis really want this war with the United States and why the Houthis think a direct confrontation and conflict with the United States is in their best interest their best domestic interest. But on the US side, I think the US has had five major options one is sort of a defend only option that is to patrol the Red Sea and basically shoot down the drones and missiles that the Houthis are firing at commercial shipping.

That's with the Biden administration attempted from really November of 2023 up until January of 2024 that was option one defend almost option number two is with the Biden administration is eventually decided on in January of 2024 and this was limited military strikes this is strikes intended to sort of degrade Houthi capabilities and and deter the Houthis by punishment from carrying out future attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. But that didn't really work that is the Biden administration along it with the UK at different times carried out strikes on on Houthi as we talked about Houthi sort of weapon caches and Houthi missile launchers.

But wasn't really able to do enough damage that the Houthis were deterred or degraded from carrying out strikes on commercial shipping. This is option three which is much more extensive military strikes and this is the approach that the Trump administration has decided on and it has begun implementing as of Saturday and this is carrying out wide ranging. Massive air strikes on what remains of Houthi infrastructure targeting Houthi military leaders attempting to destroy really break the Houthis will so that they aren't there moving forward option four which the US has not.

We have to go down yet is basically involving itself in the domestic Yemeni c...

The reason this may be appealing and we'll get back to this in a second the reason this may be appealing for the Trump administration is that there's a possibility and I would say indeed perhaps a likelihood that air strikes alone are not going to be enough to defeat the Houthis.

That is you'll need some sort of a ground component now the US is not to the best of my knowledge even contemplating putting ground troops into Yemen.

Saudi Arabia and the Emirates who've had troops in Yemen are both actively looking for a way out of the conflict in Yemen.

This really only leaves sort of the anti Houthi coalition in Yemen this is a weird amalgamation of different groups groups that are fought one another previously who are basically aligned against the Houthis and so I think the temptation for the Trump administration will be that if these much more extensive air strikes don't do what the Trump administration wants and that is if the Houthis are able to survive and continue to carry out retaliatory actions. Then it may be very tempting for the Trump administration to start supporting this anti-Houthi coalition on the ground as a way of defeating the Houthis.

That's option for option five if none of those work is coming to the belief that look the Houthis are a problem but they're basically just an extension of Iran and really the major problem here is Iranian support.

And so instead of dealing with the Houthis, let's just go after Iran directly, President Trump has threatened that in some of his posts in recent days, warning Iran to cease the smuggling of ballistic missile and other ammunition components to the Houthis that has been going on now for several years. And so those are the five basic options that the US has had and what you've seen is a slow escalation by the US first the defend only didn't work, then limited strikes under the Biden administration didn't work.

And now the Trump administration is taking door number three, which is much more extensive military strikes against the Houthis, the question as I mentioned earlier is what happens if door number three doesn't work does that mean that the Trump administration then needs to find a way to put pressure on the ground. Bring pressure on the ground to bear on the Houthis. So that's on the US side for for the Houthis, I think one of the reasons in and indeed I would say the primary reason that the Houthis have been baiting the United States in over the past year and two or three months is that the war in Yemen, the war between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates by 2022 was was really winding down and so the Houthis basically think of it.

A little bit like musical chairs that is the music was coming to an end and the Houthis didn't have the chair that they wanted and in Yemen, Yemen is a very poor country.

The exports that Yemen has even though it doesn't have much are largely oil and gas and those oil and gas facilities are located in moderate, which is a province directly east of Houthi control territory in Shabwa, which is south and east of moderate, and then further out in the eastern Houthi. And then one Yemeni analyst who I respect talks about this is the triangle of power and the Houthis know that in order to survive long-term in Yemen, they need at least one of these areas that will give them an economic base to continue to survive.

So over the past several years the Houthis have been trying time and time again to move into moderate and to take those oil and gas fields. They have not been successful, but what the Houthis are betting on right now is that A) they can survive the air strikes by the United States and B) by being involved in a direct conflict with the US and Israel, they'll gain more domestic support and that domestic support will translate into being able to take moderate or Shabwa or maybe even both,

which will give them the long-term stability and the long-term hold on power through that economic base that they really need.

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The U.S. can learn from their intervention. And can you talk a little bit about what you think they're policies towards the M&R likely to be going forward?

Yeah, that's a very good and I think a very interesting question.

The answer is a little... there's a degree of irony in it.

So if we think back to 2015, this is Mohammed bin Salman, it's just starting to move up first as Defense Minister, and then as Crown Prince in Saudi Arabia, the Obama administration, which was in power in the White House at the time, Saudi Arabia said that it was going to move into Yemen. It didn't want a Hezbollah like group on its southern border. And the Obama administration really cautioned the Saudis in 2015 and said, "Look, we know what you're going to do.

We support it but you need to be very, very careful when you go into Yemen because this thing can go on much longer than you think."

And at the time, the Saudis estimated that about six weeks of air strikes would bring the Houthis to their knees and allow the international recognized government to be re-established. In the capital of Yemen, fast forward a decade, and the Biden administration is contemplating going into Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Now, the shoes on the other foot in Saudi Arabia is counseling the United States. We know you want to go in and strike the Houthis but be careful because this can last a lot longer than you think it might.

And so it's been an interesting situation for the U.S. I think one of the main lessons that the U.S. can take away from Saudi Arabia and the Emirates attempt to bring the Houthis to heal is basically that air strikes alone and air power alone are likely not going to be sufficient to bring about the goals that you want,

which is I think gets us back to sort of the original point. What happens if these strikes is expensive and is damaging is they are likely to be.

What happens if they don't bring about the political goals that the U.S. wants to see that is if the Houthis are still able to present a threat to commercial shipping in the Red Sea. How long does the U.S. continue to do this before it realizes it needs a ground component? And that's what Saudi Arabia was really reluctant to do Saudi Arabia did not want to put ground troops into what is a very rugged mountainous area in northern Yemen for what could be a bloody potentially gorilla conflict with no clear avenue for success.

And I think eventually the United States might be faced with a similar decision to make. I think the most likely option for the United States would be as we mentioned sort of lying itself with the anti-Houthi coalition. There are a number of I think potential dangers in doing so primarily many of these people in the anti-Houthi coalition. Many of them are guilty of war crimes in war that's gone on for quite some time. There's really no party in Yemen that has clean hands. Everyone has blood on its hands.

And so aligning yourself with one of these groups brings with it a number of potential costs both reputationally and otherwise. I think also one of the options that the Houthis have for potential retaliation and the Houthis have threatened this in recent months is that they could continue not just to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

But to fire missiles into Saudi Arabia and attempt to damage Saudi Arabia as well. So basically forcing Saudi to pay the price for for US actions in Yemen.

I believe this has been a pessimistic podcast where you can be very clear about the limits of US power and the problems with the Houthis and the weaknesses of various herb neighbors. I realize the Trump administration may not be listening to this podcast. But if officials were and they were open minded on what to do in Yemen, what would you recommend? Yeah, that's a great point. I mean, this is Yemen is a challenge. There are a number of these challenges where you would like to have a full range of options.

Often though, that's not the case in the real world because of decisions that were made either by previous administrations by people who are in the White House by what the US did 10 years ago or six years ago. And that's not a very satisfactory answer, but that's simply the case. So there are, you know, there was a time in which the Houthis were on the verge of extinction.

This is a group that has been fighting in Yemen since 2004. They've basically been fighting for the past two decades plus almost continually.

There have been times in which their power has waxed and waned, but they've b...

The ability of the Houthis to fire missiles into Israel and to some of US partners into Saudi Arabia and so forth. If that's what the US wants, then the only way to get that is to destroy the Houthis.

And that is to drive them out of power because if the Houthis are in power, they will continue to do this when they, as they have the capabilities, as they've shown. But that to bring about that goal is going to require a fairly high cost for the US. That is, if you buy the argument that I'm making, air strikes alone are not going to be sufficient.

That's going to require some sort of a ground element, whether US forces or other forces that that we've talked about before.

But that's going to take a while and it's going to require US involvement. And I think this was one of the reasons that the Biden administration attempted the limited air strikes because it did not want to get bogged down.

So the US has going on in Ukraine talking about Indo-Paycom. It's strategic competition with the PRC. The US is wary about yet one more open-ended conflict in the Middle East. But if the US is clear-minded about its goal, that the Houthis have to stop this, then that requires a decisive military defeat of this organization, which is going to be very, very difficult. The US has two options, I think, which is either a change your goals, reduce your goals, or b be willing to go in for the long haul haul and do everything required to decisively and definitively militarily defeat the Houthis, which is, at least in my opinion, is not going to be particularly easy and it's not going to be very quick.

Let's say that the US does reduce its goals. Is it plausible or even likely that I'll say two years from now, or several years from now, that if things flare up again between Israel and the Palestinians or some other crisis, that will also see Houthi attacks against shipping in the Red Sea and elsewhere? Yes, I think as long as they have capabilities, and I think to give the Trump administration credit, the Trump administration is trying to financially cut off the Houthis, so this was part of the foreign terrorist organization, that is, it wanted to dry up all the support, and certainly the Houthis have a weaponized humanitarian aid for years.

They have used humanitarian aid to solicit and recruit child soldiers. They have used it as a carrot to reward their supporters and something to withhold from those who are not supporting them.

I think the Trump administration, as well as the Biden administration, have both attempted to interdict military shipments that are being smuggled from Iran, but this is very, very hard to do because they're coming across in a number of different places on sort of Yemen's eastern coast across the border with Oman, as well as through the Red Sea, coming in very small shipments that are making their way to the Houthis.

So there are a number of things that the U.S. is trying to do outside of just sort of the military strikes. I think the military strikes are obviously the most sort of visible, but it's going to be again very hard to do.

I think to your question, in two years, in six months, in 18 months, if conflict breaks out between the Palestinians and the Israelis, once again, I think if the Houthis have the capacity and have the capabilities, they will absolutely continue to strike at commercial shipping in the Red Sea. I think the question is that within Yemen, the Palestinian cause, regardless of political party, regardless of where one is on the ideological or religious spectrum, the Palestinian cause is incredibly popular.

And so for the Houthis, they are not a particularly popular group. They're an authoritarian group that is carrying out a, you know, that arrests its opponents, that minds and destroys the houses of its political opponents.

By wrapping themselves basically in the Palestinian flag, the Houthis make themselves more palatable to a broader Yemeni audience than they would otherwise.

Gregory Johnson, thank you very much for joining us. Thanks so much for having me. The law fair podcast is produced in cooperation with the working's institution. You can get add free versions of this and other law fair podcasts by becoming a law fair material supporter at our website, law fairmedia.org/support. You'll also get access to special events and other content available only to our supporters. Please wait and review us wherever you get your podcasts. Look out for other podcasts including rational security, allies, the aftermath, and escalation. Our latest law fair presents podcast series about the war in Ukraine.

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