Lawfare Daily: Does the U.S. Have a Drone Defense Problem?

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“I believe you would want to have some type of optimized, low-cost, affordable interceptor system in place to deal with these”

column leakers, so those trolls that leak through the initial air defense barrier, and then to deal with them in the appropriate way, and that's something that neither the United States operates in significant numbers in the region, nor the Gulf States. It's the law fair podcast. I'm Anastasia Laupaitana, Ukraine Fellow at Laugh Fair, with Fabian Hoffman, a doctoral research fellow at the University of Oslo, and Pavlo Litofkin, a senior Ukrainian drone instructor who's been teaching foreign armies and civilians,

how to pilot and intercept drones. We need to share expertise and world-masked through the tension to us, because we passed through a lot of things, and all the truths, all of that approaches, it's built on our blood on our bones, someone's lives, and we must deliver it to the world. We're recorded two separate conversations, speaking about the Iranian Shahed drones, and what the US and its allies can learn from Ukraine, as they navigate the war against Iran.

Here is my conversation with Fabian. So, Fabian, in your latest newsletter, which is called Missile Matters with Fabian Hoffman, will link it below for our listeners. You discuss how the Iranian Shahed drone theoretically should be quite easy to defeat, but in reality they've proven to be quite tricky targets to deal with for the US and its allies. So, let's just start with that. Can you just explain the

“basic characteristics of the Shahed drone, and why intercepting it can be a challenge?”

So, in principle, it's a pretty simple airborne vehicle, it's rather large, it's not very stealthy, it flies at pretty low velocities, at least compared to cruise missiles, or especially ballistic missiles, so that's choking, sometimes if you have a radar that's suitable for picking up these things and you point it at the Shahed, it's going to light up the radar monitor, like a cruise mystery and US-EF. So, there's nothing that will stop you from picking it up on radar if you are in the

vicinity, and you have somewhat optimized gear to deal with it. And that's the problem in the Middle East that these states they invested billions and billions into missile defense, but they focused on what they perceived to be the primary threat, which was Iranian ballistic missiles, and they do not really have optimized gear optimized systems to deal with this long-rich drone threat, which in principle, right again, paradoxically, should be much easier to deal with than

the ballistic missiles, but if you don't have to ride systems in place, then it becomes a challenge. And the other factor, of course, is, and this is what we already know from Ukraine, and elsewhere,

it's just the mass. So, if I launch a critical mass of these systems, no matter how well-defended

your airspace is, there's always a probability that some of these Shahed type drones will get through and cause some level of damage, and this is exactly what we're seeing playing out in the Middle East right now. Since February 28, Iran has targeted almost a dozen countries, most of them in the Middle East, with many, many hundreds of its Shahed drones. And then, to understand, there were still working with limited data against vibrational security and other factors, but to the best of your

understanding, how are these countries coordinating their response, and what systems are they actually

“using to shut down these drones? Yeah. So, basically, I think you can conceptualize it in terms of”

two defensive barriers that they have, you know, more or less on a hot hot-hawk basis, put up to deal with

these long-range drone threats. The first one is a barrier or an air defense system consisting of

manned aircraft. So, that is, manned aircraft, either helicopters or fine jets operated by the Gulf States themselves. So, also, many by the United States, which are very active in the region, of course, and then, of course, also Israel, that are flying manned Saudis to intercept these incoming

these different mad aircraft have been demonstrated to be active in the region right now, and active

in intercepting incoming long-range drones. And they intercept by, you know, at least the numbers

“that we're seeing, and of course, we have to be a bit careful with that. But I think by a large,”

the battle damage reports also indicate that most of them are intercepted in this initial stage. So, most are intercepted by mad aircraft. They're using a range of ammunition, you know, helicopters, they can use their guns. So, this can be very cheap, maybe a couple hundred, couple thousand US dollars per intercept. They have 15s, and the F-16s also, they've been seen using sidewinder, so this would be a more expensive air to air missile, but also many are apparently

using APKWS air to air missiles. These are the redder cheap air to air missiles that are also used by, by Ukraine, and have been demonstrated in terms of their effectiveness over there. So, you know, can be more or less expensive, and most drones are intercepted at that stage. If some slip through, then you get to the stage where the Gulf states, and partially the United

“States, if it has the systems in place on the ground, has to rely on surface to air missiles.”

So, this could be patriot, this could be the self-carean system that the UAE operates, or some other type of system. And as many commentators have pointed out, if you get to that stage, it can be very expensive to intercept the long-wage drone, especially compared to the price of the drone itself, with a patriot missile costing potentially up to four million US dollars and the drone costing something around 20 to 30k. So, in that sense, right, it doesn't make perfect

sense to allocate these missiles, but, you know, if your alternative is that the drone gets through and hits the target, potentially a radar costing hundreds of millions of US dollars, as has apparently happened. In that case, right, you still probably would want to allocate your patriot interceptor. So, yes, it's not ideal doing that, but very often alternative would probably be bad. So,

in that sense, the cost effectiveness or argument is not always very straightforward,

but ideally, you would want to have some type of optimized low-cost affordable interceptor system in place to deal with these column leakers. So, those trolls that leak through the initial air defense barrier, and then to deal with them in an appropriate way, and that's something that neither the United States operates in significant numbers in the region, nor the Gulf States, which they have talked about investing in this kind of capability prior to the war,

but the procurement processes have proved too slow. So, just to make this point clear, there has been a lot of chatter in the media and on social media about the US and Gulf states using these hyper-expensive patriot missiles to shoot down these very cheap drones. It is happening, but it's very much the minority of the interceptions, right? So, it's not the go-to method, or the primary method, is that right? Exactly. It's absolutely not the go-to method.

It is an option of last resort. I mean, they will do everything in the power to avoid that, but sometimes you cannot avoid it, right? Sometimes you then probably have to choose between, okay, letting the drones slip through, or accepting that you know have to allocate a fairly expensive interceptor, and then probably most of the time they will choose, unless it's clear that

the drone is very far off any critical target, or it's clear that it's already damaged, or something

like that, that they will choose to intercept it and for good reason. Also, in your writing on this subject, you've talked about area defense and point defense. Can you just describe the difference and what it means for this context in the Gulf? So, as the name suggests, area defense is about defending large areas, large swaths of territory from incoming threats, whereas point defense, that's really about protecting a relatively small footprint of territory or an individual facility,

even. And in a context of the Gulf states, basically, this first air defense barrier, right, manned aircraft patrolling the area, sometimes traveling dozens or hundreds of kilometers to the target to intercept it, and that's really an area defense system. And that's needed because the Gulf region is so big. The territories are so large and the attack vectors, as we call them,

“from which the shy type drones can come in, are so many that really you need to have systems in place”

where you have, you know, a large protected area, and manned aircraft, they can offer that, and that's much more difficult with surface-to-air systems. So, very often, and the surface-to-air systems, also like patriot, right, is still a fairly significant range, depending on the patriot

no comparison to a fighter aircraft that can fly hundreds of kilometers to intercept the target.

“So, that is really more point defense in nature, right? So, that I'm no longer interested”

in protecting, you know, an entire country or an entire region. This is really done about protecting very specific critical facilities that need an additional redundant layer of air defense. And, you know, this is then also what we're seeing right now, play out in the ongoing conflict,

is that, okay, you have this first, I would say this first, you know, a very critical barrier

of air-air defense, but then not all possible targets in the region are protected also by a point defense system, right? So, I mean, some of the Gulf states, they are fairly small, right? So, Bahrain, and the UAE probably they can cover most of their territories with patriots, but for a state like, like Saudi Arabia, for example, that's really really difficult, same as it is for Ukraine by the way, right? And this is then another reason why, when some of these shy type

drones get through, why they will necessarily cause damage because you not always have a second redundant layer of point defense in place to defend against them. And so, basically, right, this also means

“then if you want to have an effective defense against these long-range drone threats,”

yeah, you need both, right? You need some type of area defense. Right now, we're relying broadly on manned aircraft for the task, both in Ukraine and in the Middle East. And if you try, I think it might be more elegant to rely on unmanned aircraft together with a fairly cheap air-air interceptor capability as this will bring down the costs quite significantly. And of course,

also free up, you know, the manned aircraft for other, perhaps for critical tasks. While at the

same time, you need to have a place, you know, some type of point defense system around your critical targets, where you say, okay, this is a target, I really, really cannot afford to lose, like hundreds of millions of dollar expensive radar, for example, right? So here, it would have been really appropriate to have some type of point defense system in place. And the fact that it wasn't, that's, you know, a critical operational failure on the side of the Americans and the coalition

partners. The run has also been, of course, sending ballistic missiles at the Gulf countries. And the United States and Israel have been trying to destroy the launchers that they're using to

do that. Is the US also trying to hit shahed launching sites or shahed factories? Is that a tactic

that could work? Yeah, that definitely doing that. So we, we assumed that most of the shots are launched from trucks. Those are smaller trucks than the transport or rectal launchers that launched the ballistic missiles. So they're more civilian-sized, I would say. But these are also actively being hunted. And there are, you know, several videos uploaded on social media by some comment by the Israeli Air Force that showed the destruction of these trucks, sometimes of secondary

explosions, very clearly indicating that, you know, something explosive was in there. So so that is done. We, we assume very strongly, and we also know to some extent that the US is bombing, you know, these production facilities. Some are a buff ground, many are underground. So this is when the B2 and the P1Bs, the intercontinental range bombers are flown in from the intercontinental United States all the way to the Middle East and back. And they dropped, you know, large amounts

of fairly heavy munitions on these underground facilities to penetrate deep into the mountain ranges and then cause destruction. Of course, an issue here is that given that these sites are located underground, it's not straightforward to do what we call a battle damage assessment. So it's very difficult to tell. No, it's the side actually destroyed or not. You know, even harder, of course, for us, you know, what I'm called, civilian observers of the war without access to classified

information. But even I guess for the United States or Israel, this would be very difficult, unless they have some type of human intelligence on the ground that can confirm or deny the destruction of the facility. So how do you so far assess the response of the US and its allies to these attacks? How are they handling it? Because of course, there is all of this reporting about the very problematic mathematics of it all and using very expensive systems to intercept

really cheap ones and how that doesn't make sense. But at the same time, the interception rates are quite high, right? The interception rates are, you know, up to 90% and higher. So how do you

“how do you assess what's really going on? So I believe this is the the funny thing, you know,”

if you these days, if you're on on Twitter or other social media, it's all the all the tech pros discovering the economics of of air defense and then that there's can actually be, you know,

but of course, you know, they have to reinvent it the way the same way they have to reinvent everything

just making it worse. So from from observational perspective of the public space, that's

“deeply frustrating. I mean, from a military perspective, I think the United States and Israel,”

they perform, you know, and this is really for a military perspective. So operationally, they perform as expected and of course also the coalition forces, they perform as expected, if not slightly better. So I think especially the the telehunting mission, right? Like hunting those transporter erectal launchers that has been pretty successful. Of course, a lot is what we call the the fuck of wars. So we we don't have, you know, perfect insights on what's going on in the crown.

But I think the numbers that demonstrate that there are reduced launches of both ballistic missiles and long range drones. They show a fairly significant decrease in the availability of ironian launcher capabilities for for both ballistic missiles and long range drones. That is, was of course the strategy, right? Because the United States, unlike the tech pros, they they knew long before that, you know, you can't just counter ironian ballistic missiles with

defensive capabilities. That's just not going to happen. So this was the strategy all along. And it's again, it's playing out as expected and maybe even slightly better. The the big challenge, right? And this is this is removed from the from the battlefield where the U.S. and its forces together with with Israel and others are performing very well, without exceptionally, is translating this military success into a lasting political success. And I'm not a

Middle East expert, right? So I'm not even trying to predict how this war will end on a

“political level or the the best and worst case scenarios what they could be. I think also for me,”

it's it's pretty apparent that just striking targets, right? Targeting itself, that's ideally it's a it's a means towards an end, right? It is what you do in order to achieve the political objective that you're working towards. But you cannot treat the targeting, the process of targeting as an end in itself. And this is of course a bit the the risk that I and I think many others are seeing that, you know, just because the United States may be bombing

more more targets and also bombing them more successfully does not necessarily mean this will also be a political success in yet. You've mentioned interceptor drones, which is kind of the elephant in the room here because of course these are the the technology that Ukraine and some other companies abroad have developed and that Ukraine has been using actively for the past few months and they really seem to be the most cost-effective and the most efficient way to hangrochahets

these interceptor drones. Could you talk a little bit about this technology and sort of how it differs from everything else that the US is currently using? Yeah sure so I mean these interceptor

drones that are these are one very interesting solution that Ukraine came up with and basically it's

an evolutionary design right? So Ukraine has had great success using FPV drones in general for the variety of purposes and at one point they also used them to intercept airborne vehicles first you know ISR type drones and at one point also these larger long-range drones like like Iran. And from from that point it then evolved you know moving from a man to intercept the drone system where you have a pilot that's in the loop that's manually steering the drone into the

incoming long-range drone towards an unmanned system where you have an onboard camera right in

“infrared secret for example that an autonomously guides itself or guides the interceptor drone into”

the the incoming long-range drone and for Ukraine that appears to have been you know pretty successful then now intercepting large numbers of incoming drones on a almost daily basis with these types of pretty cheap interceptor drones that you know depending on the system only cost between 1,000 to 5,000 US dollars per shot so that's of course extremely cheap right even cheaper than the the shy type drones themselves and of course these systems also have limitations right this is also

something always something I'm saying you know something is affordable for a reason

and often greater affordability comes with a lack of capability and the question is of course right the remaining capability is it enough it appears in Ukrainian context very often this appears to be the case but you know some of the issues with this interceptor drones for example are that they're pretty slow right sometimes they are as fast as the long-range drone itself or slightly faster but they do have for example have the speed of a of an interceptor missile and this

reduces the what we call the kinematics of the interceptor and that means for example that if you if you want to have a high chance of intercepting the long-range drone with the interceptor drone

you have to know from which angle because your ability to maneuver once the drone is in the air

to counter the threat that is pretty limited right so again this this does not mean that these interceptor drones are bad not at all right they they have they are proven battle tested systems that Ukraine demonstrates again on almost daily basis that they are very good but you know they're no magical silver bullet types solution that will be perfect for all types of scenarios but they could be very useful right now in the Middle East right the same way that other types

of affordable point defense systems could really bolster the Gulf state missile defense system Ukraine is actually not the only country making these interceptors that right in fact there is an American company that makes the system called marops which is being widely used in Ukraine and as far as I understand it's actually even better than the Ukrainian models or though it's also more expensive

“around $15,000 I think and so my question is how much do we know about which companies in which”

countries are developing similar technologies and sort of what's the lay of the land of of this industry of this field in the west oh it's it's super dynamic and there are very many companies that are working on this outside Ukraine so I'm in in Europe you know you have many missile start-ups you have Cambridge Aerospace you have Frank Book Technologies you have Titan you know just to name a few that are working on on some type of affordable interceptor technology not all

of them are building drone interceptors but but you know like the idea of making air defense affordable to deal with the bars of long-range drone threats that's that's obviously very prevalent right now and many companies are working on this in the United States in Europe and probably soon also elsewhere right I would be confused if there would not also be startups you know emerging potentially in

“Asia at one point so so I mean you know by no means are they the only ones whether Ukrainians”

right now and then also you know companies like marops that are using their products in Ukraine they have the big advantage right that they are the only ones that can put on their their product the label battle tested right that it's been proven under operational conditions and of course that all the other companies that all these other companies that just mentioned they of course also trying to to flood Ukraine right there they're not stupid so they're also trying to get there

and to to battle test their systems so it's very dynamic it's very competitive but yeah so I mean from a you know from a buyer's perspective this is a a pretty decent market probably in the in the coming years because you will have many companies competing for for these contracts while at the same time of course for the companies this will also be very lucrative because at the Middle East there's states for sure they will accelerate this procurement process

following this war maybe even while it's ongoing and you know many European states they also know that they have to invest in this type of capability so yes there are many companies but the size of the market is also pretty large of course many of these companies are Ukrainian startups and president Zelensky told the dinner of times recently that he's been fielding requests from many countries in the Gulf and also the United States to help with air defense and he said

that Ukraine has already sent both its experts and the actual infrastructure drones to Jordan to help protect the military bases there and then Reuters also separately reported on March 7 that the US was sending this marub system to the Middle East as far as I understand that's the

first time the US military will be using that particular system they didn't have a contract with

the Pentagon before but clearly now now they do so Fabian should we expect that this shahed type low cost long range drone will continue playing a big role in future wars and and what does that mean for sort of for NATO readiness and planning and and what systems spent it on will be procuring in the next many years yeah yeah I also don't know the details they are 100% my understanding is a was that the United States you know they were also working on

this they were having you know testing contracts and development contracts were ongoing so there was clear interest but there was no you know set winner yet that received a full-on

procurement contract and of course the United States also never operational use the system so this

might be the first time now that the United States will actually actually operational use an intercept to tap drone pretty fast but yeah so this I mean it's long range drone flight it's probably

“not going anywhere at least for the foreseeable future I think it's very difficult to predict what's”

gonna happen in the missile space more largely and then also the long range drone space you know

everyone knows that this is an an expanding threat that NATO states have to respond to both in terms

of acquiring capabilities that can deal with incoming enemy long range drones cost effectively well of course also building up these capabilities yourself because it won't them to saturate your adversaries air defense system you want them to strike deep into there's a territory and you also just want something right to respond offensively because as we said in the beginning everyone knows you know if the exception of some unfortunate European decision makers it seems

that you cannot respond to incoming long range and deep strikes persistently just with defensive

“tools that doesn't work at one point you have to strike back right so this is another reason”

why why European states most likely and I mean they are already interested right now but I think this this dynamic will also accelerate that you know European states they will also acquire these types of long range drones and large numbers and of course then you get action reactions spirals right I mean this is also something we we cannot forget so as Europe ramps up production you know Russia will probably continue also try to accelerate to the to the extent that it can

which might be much more limited for Russia right now given that they're already pretty much over mobilized in their defense industrial space but yeah so by a large this is this is something that will will not leave us for the coming years quite the quite the opposite it's going to be

“more important. Fabian thank you this was very interesting. Yeah thanks so much for having”

the right thing. And now my conversation with Pavloly Doffkin so Basha I just talked to Fabian about the threat that the Iranian head type drones are posing in the Gulf and in the broader Middle East region right now but you and I both know that in Ukraine Russia has been using

these Iranian drones for many years the first time Ukrainian intercepted a shahed drone was in the

fall of 2022 so again just walk me through how Ukraine developed an earth defense system that it has now to counter these long range drones from those early months of the war to now. Yeah thank you for this question that's looks like a big racing big competition because usually it's too team and

“everyone trying to keep the ball on their side in the gates of the enemy and shahed drone was the”

really big threat for us unacceptable because we've been prepared for the rocket missiles ballistic missiles and they started to use this tool this weapon in a really efficient way we couldn't put them down by expensive type of air defense like petrol rockets and etc because it's like trying to put down bicycle by by flat like comparable prices and it would exhaust our economy what happened next we implemented the mobile air defense group with the machine guns we trained how

to put them down we created simulators we created really good training for that and we become efficient and in some part of time some scale we had the when air sirens game we we've been relaxed because usually it meant that they will put them down after that they decided to create new solutions and they changed tactics and they started to fly higher and dive from the sky on the

series on the critical infrastructures and etc etc kind of simulating a ballistic missile in a

way right kind of and our drones our machine gunners their defense they couldn't hit them and we started to search the solution and I've been a witness how our developers in drone industry started to create interceptor drones which now is popular and steel efficient at this part and we have again this gap where we can be more relaxed against the shahya drones because now we can intercept

groups who created courses that I provide and like they have really good result and we built

an amazing system of correlation between the radar between the groups and mass producing

mass training of them allow us to cover the cities and infrastructures also wanted to add that now we're waiting for the new so we know that they have some modifications for their drones with the reactive like with the jet engines it would lead to the increasing of speed and we try to predict what would be next how to intercept the next evolution of their weapons and how often do the Russians modify shahets like what's the

what's the speed of innovation every few months or it depends I know that they already launched

the jet shahets but I don't remember their tactical technical characteristics at this moment I guess they searching for solutions and you know it's pretty dynamical it's really hard to

“spectate and the best way to do that is to come to the front line and personally ask the guys”

who's working with this direction I didn't have communication I guess for a month and that's kind of a lot yeah and that in that's fun of time a lot can happen I also wanted to ask about

tracking off shahets and the Raiders because I know that when Russia just started using shahets

it was a big problem that the Raiders steady queen had couldn't really catch them because this shahets were flying way too low and they're like very small and very slow moving targets so the Raiders could like you know pick up on a bird and think that it's a shahet and stuff so Ukraine had to develop a whole acoustic system right we had to develop a new tracking system yeah this is yes the sensors and around Ukraine we have thousands of them and they

triangulate so they have a sensor PSO and a lot of them they created in different places so they cover whole Ukraine and they triangulate the the enemy drone and inside of the system they have library sound library and AI which is detect the exact type of

“the UA enemy UAV and that's why we have all the applications with the threat where I”

aerate sirens coming and when people about the threat can you describe the basics of how the interceptor drones work how the technology works and sort of how that solution is different from every other other solution we've had this whole time so if you will open a YouTube and you will write the like high speed drone it's pretty open sourced and the main secret I guess or it's like not a secret is the system system which we build communication

efficient like high efficiency work safety because in interceptor drone usually you

“have explosive because you need to fly as close as you can and activate explosive inside to put it”

down the charge must be recommendly for sure without any fragments to not to hard the objects below so that's the big and huge work a strategic work because you need to predict a lot of stuff which can happen but the base of the drone it's like multi-copter and depends on the model so you can understand that nothing specific inside of it you don't have like maybe construction aspects aerodynamic aspects depends on the model there are now many Ukrainian

companies making these interceptor drones in testing them inside Ukraine and there is also the American interceptor drone system maros which as far as understand has been used in Ukraine for many months and has been sort of developed here and battle tested here and also as far as I know it's the

what are some of the most common systems we have right now with Ukrainian and and how it compares

“to the American one I'm not sure that it's better than Ukrainian one because in Europe's coast more”

than 20,000 or 15, 20,000 around 15 yeah yeah and if we will take sting as an example it cost 2000 that's Ukrainian one yeah but they slightly different because in Europe it's more plain that drone you launch it with this special catapult and sting it's like drone with the wear vertical lift off so it's multi-copter it's two principally practically different approaches but

you can have the same result you can hit the drone and I heard from the training that's now

we trying to implement not only show the practical aspect how to fly with that because it's require

“also some skills which is pretty narrow directed you also must know how to orient how to work with”

the radar and I heard that during the training three different accidents where cadets were training they hit the shahid without explosive part because during the training it's forbidden to use it they just got into the engine and hit it so it's really interesting how it could be now efficiency from the cheaper drones like Ukrainian one they have the same results you've been kind of dropping hints about the fact that you've been training a lot of people and I do want to

talk about that because you've been teaching foreigners both inside and outside of your crane

“how to operate and intercept drones just talk a bit about your work and what your experience has”

been and sort of how foreign armies and civilians are receiving this whole thing like usually my audience I train here that's people who don't can can stand behind the activity here so usually they an amazingly conscious to join this battle voluntarily and they have a lot of motivation to be more efficient some people without ability to continue to be in the trenches like an infantry member and they want to get something new and be integrated into the armed forces of Ukraine they

prepared themselves like usually people tells that unlike foreigners they will come steel technologies and run away but the people with who I work they fighting and using this technology this instrument because I usually tell that that's one of the instrument you can use it in this situation that situation and you can implement it in your work and everything depends on your vision and how you will use which instrument you will use to make it to accomplish it

so it's really interesting my way started in 2023 when I won't really went started to searching training for myself because I understood that war won't and in two three weeks days and it will continue and I wanted to be prepared I check my military ticket and understand that I am aviation engineer I do have a bachelor degree in this sphere but the aviation being not developed since Covid time we had a lot of specialists much better than me after

university and I understood that I need to change direction from the big aviation to something smaller and drones in the street they was pretty narrow pretty close society was involved in that like cinematographers hobbyists and etc and I've been connected to that sphere and people told me yeah we started we started to use it in the front line and you want to create FFPV school one of the first or first I didn't know who was but they invited me to the course I updated my

knowledge is in a point how to use it in the military conditions because I never been connected to

that and never expected I would and after that I started to be instructor and concentrated and

each month you create 80 people they went to the front line after that they bring to you you always

in touch you helping them to use to that condition to adopt their work to particular conditions they have and it's really really interesting experience to me and after that I concentrated only on foreigners because we had big demand they saw how we work and we helped to gather like FPV combat groups and helped them to be integrated into the armed forces or some squads they have and I also worked on the direction how to adopt how to build the communication of them with the Ukrainian

“groups to not have problems to to work effectively more efficient because the communication is the key”

especially in UAV sphere because friendly fire could be not only in the infantry with the right forces also FPV drone can be directed to the wrong direction well considering what's happening in the world right now and how Ukraine has been building requests from foreigners to help and teach other countries on road defense I'm sure you're going to be very busy in the next couple of months and yeah I'm already very busy yeah you're probably going to be more busy but thank you so much

“that you found the time for us Pasha thank you thank you so much that you are opening and”

explore this topic to people because we knew that it will be high demand and we try to communicate as well but you know people usually put attention to something when it burn and now everything when it hits their home yeah and we need to extinguish this to cut cut the fire because that's the global problem how to regulate this if you will forbid it so now sky around the European countries is closed just like our go I just get no one about that maybe it will pose the problem

but to be honest it's the second question how you will detect the pilots yeah like the terrorists

or etc because they can use optic fiber drones they can use whatever they need and we need to share expertise and world must put attention to us because we passed through a lot of things and all that rules all of that approaches it's built on our blood on our bones someone's lives and we must deliver it to the world you're right thank you so much

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