Lawfare Daily: Israel's Most Consequential Election, with Natan Sachs

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And I'm here with Natan Sox, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. So, if you think of three blocks in a sense, then at the New York, the Eisenhower block, and then the Arab Party block, the bigger the Arab Party block is, the smaller the other two would be by simple math. And so, in a sense, if they were tiny, both other blocks grow.

And since Eisenhower's block is slightly bigger, then is actually bigger. Then, if the New York's block and the polls, you'd expect them to then cross the 61 threshold. Today, we're talking about Israel's coming elections. Israel's election is scheduled for October 20, 7th.

And it is the first national election in Israel since the October 7th, 2023 terrorist attacks.

This election is, at least, if current polls are accurate, quite close with a lot of competing parties. Let's start with just a very basic question. What is this election about? Is it a referendum on Prime Minister Netyahu? Is it about October 7th, and it's legacy?

“What are voters thinking about as they go the polls?”

Yeah, so, as you said, we've done a few podcasts on law firm over the years, including on Israeli elections. And so, I'm trying to think, what has changed since the last few elections that we've covered on law theory, and you've done a lot of great work also, besides my participation. In some ways, same old.

So, this is still a referendum around Netyahu. And I say that because, when we talk about the blocks, these are not right and left, as Israelis usually define right and left. Right and left and Israel are defined mostly around the conflict with the Arab states, with the Palestinians, especially with the Palestinians.

And that is simply not the dividing line today in the blocks that everyone is counting and waiting eagerly to see who wins on October 27th. These blocks are fundamentally pro-Nethanyahu and anti-Nethanyahu. It's not just personally about him, it's about the whole package that he represents. And I'll talk about that in a second.

But in some ways, he's defining the "fisher" here. So, it's not right and left. It's certainly not economic right and left where there are differences across the both blocks. It really almost don't track the blocks. So, it's Nethanyahu, but Nethanyahu encapsulates a lot.

Nethanyahu has been Israel's longest prime minister by far now. He passed David and Gregorian several years ago. And he has been a dominant force in Israeli politics. Certainly since coming back to power in 2009, but really all the way back to 1996 when he was first selected.

But he's changed over the years. And so, the last might say seven years since 2019. Nethanyahu has included in it a dramatic destabilization of what words really norms and institutions. His supporters would, of course, say that was justified. And it was needed to shake up.

His detractors would say that especially since 2022, but already before that, this has been a reckless assault on the balance of power between institutions in Israel, even before October 7th, what he was calling his judicial reform, a dramatic overhaul of checks and balances in Israel.

within a system that is very different from the American one.

And since October 7th, it's about October 7th and his response to that. So, you asked, is it about all these things? It's all of the above, but encapsulated in Nethanyahu. One last point on this. Since October 7th, there is both unanimous rule and consensus around the need to fight,

the need to respond to Hamas, the need to incur in Tagaza, but also fundamental differences on how that was conducted, and especially the length of the breadth of this war, the relentless three years of essentially nonstop war. I was just hearing someone commented on a completely different context and they were saying, you know, it was just before, just as the war started, I was called into reserve duty.

And then they said, I don't actually remember what round it was. And this is it, people talk about a run-one, a run-two, what round and Gaza, with reserve is doing hundreds of days, and not to mention, of course, a devastation around Israel and especially in Gaza. So, this is all of the above, but very much a reference among that.

And that makes these elections, as the cliche would go, and this time it is true, the most consequential elections, probably in Israel's history, certainly in many decades, and that is felt not, it's not just a theoretical point. It's very much felt by Israeli voters who are very much attuned to this election. Well, let's pick up on that and talk about the consequences.

I realize it's hard to predict, but let's say, Godi, I some called, takes power enough to tell you, but it's some of the main rivals.

“What would change on Gaza, what would change on Iran, what would change in other important issues?”

You know, so it's clearly consequential, but what might be, we expect to be different if there is a leadership change.

So, this is a very important question, and I think the answer is a decidedly mixed one,

which is that it's a lot less than some people hope, and a lot more than some people claim. It's a lot less than people who hope that simply in the thumbnail leaving will be a wholesale change and everything as well as done in the last few years, with many people, of course, not liking it. Israel is deeply traumatized from October 7th, and not just in a way, not just in the sense of anger

or a sense of vengeance, but it's very different understanding of what a fundamental security for Israeli civilians wouldn't, wouldn't necessitate, and that is not about the change. That's not about Netanyahu, it's much much broader than him. An impatience with containing threats is prevalent in Israel today, and it's very wildly discussed. The idea of containment itself has become a dirty word,

as almost the sort of fundamental, axiomatic lesson of October 7th. And this permeates way beyond Netanyahu in its coalition. So that's not going to change, and we don't see in the opposition much appetite at all for ideas of a Palestinian state or two-state solution, very far from that, in most of the opposition. Excluding the Democrats on the left, and perhaps privately quite a few people on the center,

but there are very central forces in the opposition. You mentioned aftali Bennett, a big dual-liberman, some of the figures in Guadillaism Court's party still to emerge, the party is not yet clear. We'll be very much against it in real time.

“I said, "We're very far from that. However, a change from Netanyahu I think a profound change”

meant the less. It would be a profound change first in this attitude of endless open war. A seven-front war is Netanyahu has deemed it, and many Israelis understand it to be. A seven-front war with really one core, which is Tehran. So if they look at all the friends with Israel's been fighting, be it, of course, in Gaza and Lebanon, but also militia and Syria previously now still in Iraq,

the Houthis running activity in the West Bank. And of course, Iran itself, they're all actually part of the Iranian ring of fire. It's not been a random firing all directions.

We have not seen fighting on Israel's probably two most important borders.

The most consequential one, the border with Egypt, and the longest one, the one with Jordan. There's been no fighting with Egypt and Jordan on the Israeli side, because Iran is not present there. So this very, very broad war against an Iran kind of back to ring, as these Israelis understand it. But an endless one, and a deep change in these really doctrine of security, it's a good doctrine which is always favored short wars,

“and has changed dramatically under the Danielle. This, I think, would be very different under”

Eisenhower. Eisenhower is someone who was, of course, Chief of Staff of the Military, and was not hesitant at all to use force and overwhelming force in some cases, devastating force. But was also usually very cautious about its use. He's known, and I think with very good reason, as a very level headed, he's a cool kind of creature. Very smart. His party is known as straight, but it's really honest is what it means, honest with an exclamation mark. Yes,

and that's kind of the image is portraying, but it one that resonates with his character, which is

use of force. So I'd expect a very different approach in that, in the use of force, the number

of fronts is what wants to open. And therefore, the willingness to move towards diplomatic, not resolution of conflicts, but diplomatic arrangements that would allow the escalation,

“allow rebuilding, and that would include Gaza. I think Israel would be probably much more willing”

to work with the Trump Board of Peace, Mladen of effort in an earnest way, not in an alternative vision that many people perhaps hoped for abroad. In that context, they would be much more forthcoming, and perhaps in others, perhaps in Syria and Lebanon, and in winding down the war and Iran, but not because they have a fundamentally different view of the threat from Iran, or would be less willing to use force if they thought it was absolutely necessary, but less, much less

liberal use of force I would expect. That's very much sort of stemming from Eisenquote. There are actually big differences between Eisenquote and Benet and Lieberman in this regard, especially Benet, I think, who is a much more, he's very pragmatic in some sense. This is very, very right wing in the Palestinian issue, but so his goals are very hard-line, but in terms of what he would do and how he

“would deal with the world he likes to portray himself as pragmatic and he is actually, but he is also”

someone who is known to be more of a risk taker, whereas Eisenquote is a very steady kind of hand, Benet is entrepreneurial, a high-tech kind of person, and a risk taker, and many respects. Is there an example you can take up where that difference between Eisenquote and Benet might show up? I mean, I realize a lot of that is about future contingencies that are hard to predict, but is there something you're thinking of in particular where, you know, boy, this really

might go into a different direction depending on if which one of these wins, if either does. Yes, absolutely, so right now, right now it does not look likely that Benet will be Prime Minister,

it looks likely that it's either Eisenquote or Nathaniel, but never say never, we're getting close,

but still never say never, could be even leave him in if he or Benet just to play this politics, political cards right, and he's a master politician, so who not? If it were Benet and not Eisenquote, you may see a much more hard-line approach on some of the aspects in Gaza, for example, and less of a willingness, especially in the West Bank, to entertain, pressure for a broad, pressure for a broad given that there's a Trump administration might be quite limited,

and on some important issues such as terrorism against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank,

“which has been ramped in recent years, that is one on which Benet and Eisenquote, I think,”

would be of one mind, which is that that has to end quickly, and they'd be very eager to prove that, perhaps, for different reasons, Benet who is very much pro-segment would like to show that that is not the essence of settlements, whereas Eisenquote believes in law and order, and the military, as a sovereign there, would be able to be be ordered to end this. But you could see quite important differences, and you might see Benet more open to, you might call an adventurousism,

or more risk-taking in terms of use of force be it in Iran, or the lesser degree in Syria, or Lebanon, or elsewhere, not that Eisenquote would not use force, and that very deadly force, he would, but I would expect it would be less liberal, and in that regard, very important. And, you know, some of this, it's again, as you said, is hard to predict what what contingencies will emerge, but on the Palestinian issue, in particular, there are profound

differences between them. Eisenquote is no big lefty, but he is certainly far to the left of Benet. He does, is not an advocate of the whole state of Israel, the whole land of Israel that Benet very much subscribes to. Benet was a settler leader in the distant past, he's probably changed

somewhat, but he fundamentally has not changed his views. Eisenquote was never there, and if anything

he comes to the center from the left, not from the right. Let's go back to Netanyahu, who, as you said, you know, still has a good chance of winning this election. He's survived crisis after crisis that might have ended, other lesser politicians career. That said, the polls, at least, suggest that he'd write down his behind. What might change or have to change for him to emerge crowd-thent in October? So, we should distinguish between two so-called victories for Netanyahu. Right now,

if the polls are vaguely correct, it seems very unlikely that he would win outright. So, it seems unlikely that he'd be able to form a coalition that they offer within the current camps, at least, and then be sworn in as a prime minister for another time. But Netanyahu would be counting on other possibilities. The most obvious one would be to draw, in a sense, with the opposition.

in the opposition that it would be illegitimate politically to base an alternative coalition on

“votes of Arab parties. And in particular, in this case, Ram, which was a party, sorry for the pun,”

but it was a party to the change coalition that Bennett and LePied led. They formed that coalition

with support from Ram. Of course, it was ironically Netanyahu himself, but first negotiated with

Ram to maybe support his side. But now after October 7th and after the experience of the change coalition falling apart, there's pretty widespread belief in Israel that that cannot repeat itself. And so, above the leader of Ram is even said, he doesn't really want it in the context of war. It would be complicated. I wouldn't rule it out, nonetheless, in some form another that Ram supports a coalition in some scenarios. But that is what Netanyahu is counting on. That the opposition

without the Arab parties. So, not really Jewish opposition, because there are many Arab voters who would vote for the Jewish parties in some vice versa. But the quote unquote Jewish parties, they would not reach 50% plus one. And at the moment, they are just on the cusp of that, perhaps just below. The moment on between 58, 59, sometimes 60 seats out of 120, and they need 61 without the Arab parties to clearly have a different coalition. And then they

could get support from Ram or others after their sworn in. So, that's Netanyahu's first hope. If that happens, and no one manages to form a coalition, neither Eisencold or Netanyahu nor no one else, then in theory Israel would go to new elections in a matter of a few months. And in the meantime, the caretaker government would be the same government. The caretaker prime minister would be Netanyahu, and all the ministers remain in place.

This happened more than once, of course, between 2019 and 2022 with the series of five elections in Israel. So, not losing. And then throwing the dice again and again and again until they come out the way he wants as they did in 2022. So, that's sort of the number one hope for Netanyahu. The other is that the polls could be wrong. There's a limit to how wrong they can be, but there is certainly an effort to portray other polls. Channel 14, which is sort of the newsmax of Israel,

as consistently shown other polls. We're Netanyahu wins. They're alone in this,

“but we've seen polls get be wrong in many places before. I think we in America know something about it.”

This would be bigger than simply a small mistake, but it could happen.

Pulling also N3 days before elections, and there's always some movement in those last days when

people make up their minds. It seems unlikely because people have very clear positions already in terms of what they think of Netanyahu, but nonetheless, there are big question marks here. There are many right wingers who are polling as voting for Bennett, for Lieberman, who are very right wing themselves. And may in the last minute feel, you know, I can't vote for the left, the terrible left. And I don't want Eisenhower to go home to the Lekud, for example. This has

happened before. 1980 is famous in Israel. It is forward to the great where Lekud voters sort of said, although it's something else within the came home. You could also see part of small parties not pass the threshold. There's a minimum threshold of about four seats. It's 3.25% almost four seats. To pass if there's a surprise party that doesn't pass, that could change things. At the moment, in the opposition camp, there isn't any party that's close to that except one that is not quite

passing or one half. I'd expect that until, but by the time the final lists, the final parties are presented for elections for the ballots, which is coming up very soon, they probably will

“no longer be running. So I think the opposition may be safe in this regard, but you never know.”

Or defections. I'm always reminded, apricot law theory. I remember running into Ben Widist

in the hallway many years ago. This would have been probably 2019. This was a crisis where Netanyahu was not able to form a coalition for two reasons, one, aftali Bennett and not passed the threshold. Aftali Bennett was very much part of Netanyahu's camp. They're not passed the threshold as party stayed out, which was a big surprise on election day. And then a big door Leaveerman for some odd reason was not doing what we all thought would happen, which is join Netanyahu's

coalition as he always had. And Ben asked me, is this a serious, and I said, come on, Leaveerman's been Netanyahu forever. By the way, this is a tradition of mine telling every time I'm left, I explained how I was wrong in a different occasion. So, you know, he wasn't Netanyahu's aid in the 90s. This is all show. And I was completely wrong. Leaveerman has a personal more than grudge. You've been dead now against Netanyahu. It's personal. It's about his trials.

He also now has political and other reasons. It's very deep by now. But could Leaveerman do

something like that happen. Anything is possible. Still, the in the main, it looks like either Eisencott wins, or there's some kind of a draw. And then there's a very difficult question for the opposition. Can they form either coalition or a minority government with some kind of support or abstention from the Arab parties, could they keep together themselves? Leaveerman, Ben, Eisencott, while doing so, or couldn't Netanyahu lead to new elections, while he's

cared to get Prime Minister. In the time of first aid, like the rest of us, you are certainly

wrong from time to time. You're just less wrong than the rest of us when it comes to all things Israel. So, certainly the first person we listen to. I want to go a little farther on some of the smaller parties. In fact, we're recording and we're just in on August 26. It was recently announced that over winter, just formerly the new party, talked to us about kind of why these parties are merging and how much do they matter? Are they really just kind of background noise,

“or is this a sort of thing that, you know, in this election, could keep things one way or another?”

Yes, so they may be the deciding factor. These sort of small parties, we're still saying a whole bunch of parties floating around because we have not arrived at a judgment day, where they have to actually submit their lists and their official parties to the ballots to the central election committee. That's coming up very soon, as I said, but at the moment, this is where we are. And so we have a few parties, one is led by Benny Gans, who was former Defense Minister and

very prominent, but now is pulling consistently. Below the threshold, these sort of considered a political disaster and with good cause. There are a couple of other important parties. You mentioned Ophilvintil from the right, very much from the right, but then to another party from the right, but software right, and head led by Gila Del Dahn, former Ambassador to the UN, and Minister. And another party led by Helip Tuopil, and Yazendil doesn't matter exactly,

but they're more center, but leaning very much toward Eisencoat. And they are at the moment pulling below the threshold, and I expect they would join the last party with join Eisencoat before of the actual submission of lists. Why are they there? So they're there. All of them are trying to

“capture either what you might call the soft right, which I'm not sure exists. I think the soft”

right is already already with Bennett and Lieberman and others. Or, and this is interesting, national religious voters. So modern orthodox voters in Israel, which is not a huge community,

but is a significant one, and very powerful these days, who are disaffected by the traditional

party that would represent them, which is currently led by Bitsa de Smokeleach. He is very far to the right of some of them, and he is also much more conservative religiously, and that's important. So he is on the verge of ultra-orthodox, as well as how they lead in Israel. So between national religious and ultra-orthodox, whereas the majority of them are quite far from ultra-orthodoxy, very much modern orthodox, and sometimes liberal. And so those voters, again, they're not huge

in numbers, but they are significant, and any seat here could decide the elections. There is some floating around there. They are looking for a place to go. Bennett is an obvious choice for them. He was the leader of their traditional party, before he joined the opposition and formed the his own government, the change government. That betrayal, quote unquote, from any of them, disqualifies him, but maybe not for all of them. And so various parties are trying to capture

them, those who don't want to vote for Smokeleach, but because he himself is extreme in the way that mentioned. But also, and this is a very central point because of the non-conscription to the military of the ultra-orthodox. So modern orthodox serve in very high percentages in the military, and certainly in the last three years, this has been an enormous toll on reservists with a lot of bereavement, loss of businesses, loss of families, whereas the ultra-orthodox, who are in some

ways are close to the modern orthodox, they do not serve in these really military. And this coalition has sustained that, and is trying to push that even forward. This is a major issue in Israel, and one of the opposition, of course, is trying to hammer on. And one that has become very

“important for the modern orthodox, simply because there is a natural wedge here in the Netanyahu”

coalition to modern and ultra-orthodox. So a lot of these parties are trying to capture, soft-right, modern orthodox people who are uncomfortable with either side, middle of the road,

third-way, classic kind of independent candidates. They are having very limited success so far,

probably because most people have an opinion, if they want Eisenkult or they want Netanyahu, and it's a bit like Trump, not Trump, in the United States. Most people have a rather strong opinion on this one where the other. And so middle of the road is difficult, but if they run,

their votes go to the waste. And if Vintel, for example, runs, but does not pass. Or if he runs and therefore, Smotlich does not pass the threshold, which is quite possible. They could lose a lot of seats and give the victory to Eisenkult. If that seemed to be the scenario, it would not be surprised if Smotlich was, in fact, incorporated into the liquid in a technical kind of arrangement just for the election when Netanyahu feeling responsible for his block. And he's kept some slots

open and that he could list to do just those kinds of things if he needs that. But these are crucial.

“Both are weakness, I think, says quite a bit about the modern Israel, but we will be waiting”

until the day after the election. In fact, several days after to see the final tally of any party that did not pass a threshold, which could easily decide the fate of the elections. And last point on this, the last elections in 2022, they were not decided by this. But the strength of Netanyahu coalition was very much bolstered by the non-passing of the Middits party from the left, so the most leftist of the quote unquote Jewish parties, of course, that hadn't

represented as well. They did not pass then. And that gave Netanyahu instead of a 61 out of 120

majority gave him a 64 majority more or less, 61 62 to 64, which was very consequential, especially

after October 7. What he used to be mad is now part of the Democrats party along with labor, so that's no longer the case, but it would be very consequential. So we've been talking about a range of the major parties in the smaller Jewish parties let's switch over to the Arab side, Arab turnout was relatively low as percentage of population in 2022. If there were high Arab turnout this time, what would it mean? Our Arab party is equal to

take advantage of it, with this matter and the overall coalition politics in a significant way, or they really just to the side of the broader political system. So it's one of the in some ways tragedies of these really, because there's some that they are so much to the side, but they should

not be discarded. So first on the Arab parties, these are essentially four very different parties

from one another. They spend from what used to be a communist party and is still very much a leftist secular liberal and very left wing economic party, almost on the verge of communist, some of them are communists. That's Hadasht, that's sort of the old traditional party, all the way through a nationalist party and then a very nationalist party about it, and finally to an Islamic-based party, a party that just separated officially for them, the Israeli,

the Islamic movement of Israel, that's the wrong party, then I mentioned the four with one sore bus. So three of the parties are now running together, Hadashtal and Balad, and that is something that's very popular among Arab Israelis, Palestinians, citizens of Israel, some of them define themselves the either way. They are running together in one list, the joint list, and then Ram, which around in clays is named the United Arab list, and it will run separately.

The joint list is a popular thing. This is a popular demand among many Arab voters, and they seem to be gaining some from this union in part because Balad was still running and would not have passed a threshold on its own, so they're getting in. This could help their power, and that can be

“meaningful. Certainly if there's a change government, potentially even if not, but I think in this”

environment if there's a change government, having more seats in the Knesset can lead to tangible benefits to your population, if you know how to use it. The former leader of Hadasht was now not going to be in the Knesset, I'm an ode, was very good at using that kind of leverage, and as as one sore bus, who was really the master of it, and did so much that as the joint coalition officially, and get, of course, very meaningful and very important policy changes that, for example,

helped to fight lawlessness and real breakdown of law and order in many Arab communities in Israel, or something that the Arab community itself has been demanding, that law and order be restored there, and there were some real successes, limited, of course, within short time frame, and a real breakdown since the fall of the change government and the return of an Indian coalition.

“So their gain would be important in that regard. One of the, I think, a very lamentable”

reality is that because they are shun, effectively, there's this taboo and joining them, which not all have subscribed to, and I'll note that Asimko himself, as avoided,

Because of this, this most boycott of them, they're gain ironically could hurt the opposition.

So if you think of three blocks, in a sense, then if the Neal block, the Asimko block, and then the Arab party block, the bigger the Arab party block is, the smaller the other two would be by simple math. And so in a sense, if they were tiny, both other blocks grow, and since Asimko's block is slightly bigger than or is actually bigger, then if the Neal is block and the poles, you'd expect him to then cross the 61 threshold. So there's a real irony

here on the tragedy that if an Arab party didn't pass a threshold, which does not seem likely, although ROM is not far from the threshold, it could ironically help Asimko. Conversely,

“but just to be clear, I'm not hoping for that. Just to be clear, I think in a scenario where”

the ROM party, in particular, is able to gain real support, and with a leader who is extremely

pragmatic, especially politically, and so on, you could see them nonetheless helping Asimko than very important moments, and it's not only informing the government, if let's say Asimko gets 61 in his block, and manages to form a government, a government coalition that relies on 61 out of 120 is a very weak coalition. Unless it has the support, either official or unofficial, from other parties, and the Arab parties conserved this. They conserved as the strategic buffer

for an Asimko government, and they would, which means that a government of 61 could be actually me much more secure and long lasting than you would expect from a 61. And a last very important point here, I've spoken of Monsura Basa's very pragmatic, very smart, very attuned to these rarely population in Israel, and what he needs to do to try to better his constituency within the reality in which he lives, which is a Jewish majority state, and dominant Jewish majority

state. He speaks Hebrew very well, of course. He is now in advanced conversations, they're already public, but they've been going on for many months, with someone named Yavsega Lovic, who was a very senior police officer, one of the heads of the Israeli police, and then a deputy minister from the Ayur la Pizparti, as deputy minister of the police, essentially, and was in charge of law and order in the Arab sector, and was very successful on this. And therefore,

ironically, for someone who comes from the core of the Israeli National Security sort of establishment, is popular in the Arabes rarely street. He is in advanced conversations, and it looks like it's going to happen to be number two in Rome, which is, you know, the twilight zone. If we were not in the twilight zone in so many other ways, I would be shocked, then I'm not shocked by anything anymore. So you can have, in this our party, that until a few weeks ago, was officially associated

with the Islamist movement, Islamic movement of Israel. You will have number two, a, you know, a equivalent of a general, you have Saga Lovic. Yavsega Lovic is someone, if he supported the

“Eisenhower, that I think Eisenhower could say, you know, this guy's a general, and he would be”

candidate from Rome to be minister of the police, and try to undo what I think is horrific damage done by Thamal Ben-Vill to the police. It would take a lot for all that to happen, and for him to be a minister of Rome, all this would be hard, but it's a very interesting move, a very brave move. This is not just a Jewish candidate, which exists in other parties. Hadasha is a Jewish candidate, but he's considered completely out of these really consensus. Yavsega Lovic comes from the

center of Israeli consensus, Israeli politics, deputy minister from Yashothid, and now might be number two in Rome. This is very significant, very interesting. Let's talk about, you mentioned Ben-Villir, I was talking about smoke rich. These Q individuals have gotten a lot of attention, not only in Israel, of course, but in the United States, and as a sign that many look at the current Netanyahu government, think of it as extreme, you know, by even Cricks of Israel would say by Israeli standards.

So you have these individuals who are, you know, prominent in the government. I will

important early tonight, Yahu, what are their chances in the coming election? So first of all, they deserve

every portion of their reputation. They are extremely extreme. They are very different from one another,

“which is I think lost sometimes in the conversation. A small glitch is a very smart, able bureaucratic”

operator who comes as I said from the very conservative ideological settler movement that sees itself as elitist, again, very conservative religiously and an ultra conservative in other regards, or ultra, I'm not conservative, ultra hawkish in other regards. He's been called by many racist, and he has said many things that would justify that 100%. And as minister, he's minister of finance,

but OMB is maybe more important than these really context. So it's very important position,

“but on top of that, he has a second hat, which is an administrative defense. He's a second minister”

in the ministry of defense, and he got civilian affairs in the West Bank, meaning settlements. And he has overseen a revolution, maybe the wrong word, because it didn't change course, but it dramatically accelerated the course that we saw before with hundreds of new outposts, and also a change of the bureaucracy that'll be very hard to undo. And he has been extremely influential to his long-term trajectory in that regard, in terms of policy, of actual policy. He, as I said,

is weak politically at the moment. He's weak both because he has seen as extreme even by his national constituency, but also because of the association with the ultra orthodox and their exemption from conscription to the military, and the two sort of fit, because he is very conservative religiously, also, the fact that he is an aligned with the ultra orthodox is suspect to quite a few of the more liberal modern orthodox. Tamal Benville is a very different elk. Benville

“has been convicted many times, and accused, I think, over 30 times, of criminal offenses.”

I guess with him, I can use, he sort of was seen as a low-life criminal, and a low-life provocateur for many, many years. I grew up in Jerusalem. He would see him, so whenever there was some demonstration of some kind, he'd be with like the dozen people, if there was a left-wing demonstration, he'd be with the dozen people on the other side of the road, spitting and yelling. And that sort of the type he was, shortly before it's Huckel, Ben was assassinated in 1995,

in November, Benville was famously caught on camera, or speaking, to the camera, with the emblem, or the logo, the emblem of the car, the Prime Minister's vehicle, and saying, "We got to the car, we'll get to Abian eventually." And he's now closing four years as Minister and charge of police, so it's a very, very different reality, if you think of visual, the 90s and all the way to here. So they deserve the extremist labels and then some, and what he's done in the police also,

again, very ably, actually, is really corrupted dramatically, become extremely involved in an all-appointment, make the police really his own almost kind of body. It'll take a lot of effort to fix by someone who had a more law and law and order approach to things. They matter, now Benville is stronger politically. He's stronger than he was, and he's much stronger than smuttlege. He captures those who are looking for the most right wing thing I can find. In the context

of war, in the trauma of October 7, there are young people from all walks of, from all communities. So all sorts of orthodox, sometimes, are voting for him. Something that scares the ultra-orthodox leaders and parties who view him, Benville, who is religious, but but very relaxedly so, and as a rebel rouser, as on serious, he constantly goes up to Temple Mount, for example, to try and pray there. That is something that ultra-orthodox most of them see as an absolute

sin against the very explicit orders of the big rabbis for religious reasons you can get into. And so they are very afraid of him. Politically, Netanyahu feels, since about 2019, that since the center will now not cooperate with him, if you don't count guns, then he must secure his far right. This is also a lesson he learned all the way back from 1990s

denying when he lost the elections there and he felt that he lost the far right. So he always felt

the as the hold is flanked close, but if traditionally, he always preferred to have a center-party come into his coalition so that he could govern from the middle of his coalition. Now he's relied very much on the far right and has been beholden to them and even just these appointments of these two individuals to very, very influential roles, especially Smottage.

“Was a shocking thing in 2022 and I think is a sign of just how beholden and beholden he is to them.”

And moreover, the liquid party today is not that far from even the cahanist views of Benville and others. We've really seen a movement of the extreme certainly by the liquid. So they are very

powerful, very important. Their power though comes not from their size. They are in numbers not huge at

all. Their power comes from the weakness of Netanyahu and is his need for every last vote in his coalition. In normal times, even the Netanyahu's predecessor, the head of the liquid, its khakshamil, there would be shunt. It's khakshamil when Meil Kahana, the ideological godfather of the Tammal Benville spoke in the Knesset. He was elected once and then he was barred from being elected again. When he was elected, Prime Minister Takshamil of the liquid Netanyahu's own predecessor

vile racist words of someone like Meil Kahana. And here we have his predecessor pointing Benville

to this kind of ministry for four years. It's a very different reality. It wouldn't be a law fair podcast if we didn't talk about Dal Trump. And I can imagine two radically different scenarios. Well, let's say three. One is Trump publicly endorses Netanyahu, right? And yeah, to the point of calling that Israelis to vote for him and criticizing Netanyahu's opponents, the other would be a break with Netanyahu, Chris is some of them talking about how he's a bad

ally and he's messed up the Israeli US relationship. In my view, in a way, the least likely

“might be doing nothing. But how much would Trump matter either way in the Israeli election?”

So again, I have a sort of decidedly mixed answer a lot, but I think it's already baked in. To certain degrees. So I agree with you that it seems hard to believe that Trump would avoid the temptation of stepping into this, right? Here's an election in a country. He thinks he should be present and Prime Minister of Israel as well. And how could he stay out of it? Trump is remains popular in Israel much more popular than he is in the United States,

or in almost any other country. For many reasons, some of them stemming from his first term,

recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is really sovereignty and they go down heights. But also for many of the opposition, a Trump led ceasefire that allowed the freeing of all remaining hostages living and dead, which was very, very important emotionally resonant among the antennas

“in the Al-Kam, as well as the Netanyahu camp. So your main popular in Israel. And of course, the”

war in Iran is as extremely unpopular as it is in the United States was widely popular in Israel at least in the beginning. But Trump is also, of course, taken a very different attack in recent weeks, a few months now, with the consequences of the Iran war being as they are so far,

and a very different attitude than most Israelis or Netanyahu to what should happen there.

That means that for these really voter, it's a mixed bad. And one hand is influential, but it's not some blind following of Trump. We saw after Trump signed the MOU with Iran, for example, even the Newsmax Channel 14 that I mentioned before, which very much speaks Netanyahu's line. I mean, sort of, in a not surprising, surprising way, it's the same words that Netanyahu's people speak. You will also hear in the in, in Channel 14. They came out guns ablazing,

even at Trump himself, but especially against JDVans, which is part of why you saw JDVans responding the way he did. So there's a real, there's a real difference there. And it's not just personal. It's also, there's a fundamental difference of priorities. They may not have a difference of interest certainly, but also difference in priorities. The Iran question itself versus, for example, the states of our MOUs, global economy, these are things these Israelis care about,

but they do not care about to be the American, the American president does. They care about other things much more. All this to say, it would affect things that could help Netanyahu certainly if there was a public endorsement, but it may already be baked in. I don't know if there are many opposition voters or even middle of the road, last few people have not decided would say, you know what Trump said so. I'll do this. However, we saw Netanyahu visit the White

House just a few weeks ago and did not, he did not get a photo up. He did not get what he really wanted. That was very telling. I don't know who decided that in the White House. I'd be surprised

“if JDVans did not have a strong opinion in one direction on that. And I think it's very telling”

for Netanyahu and we do not know at the moment, at least, of the next plan visit before October 27. I would be very surprised if Netanyahu and his people are not very much hoping to have a White House meeting before October 27. Because, despite what I said, Netanyahu does have one argument that is not completely fast, which is, like me or dislike me, do you really think someone else like God the Eisencourt has my experience to play in the big leagues? You know, in these five

elections that preceded 2022, one of the slogans was a league of his own. You saw Netanyahu in big campaign ads, shaking hats with Trump and with Putin and with Modi, not because Putin is popular in Israel, he's not. But because here was the leader who can play in that league with the top leaders of the world, good and bad of any kind, who else could do it, against really do it, was kind of the subtext and that's the subtext now too. God the Eisencourt's English is mediocre,

compared to Netanyahu certainly, could he charm Trump the way Netanyahu obviously does and that is sort of subtext and sometimes the text of what Netanyahu was sort of selling. If from broke with

against the grain. So if he actually broke very clearly, I think that could be significant, that I think

would be surprising. And then to actually endorse Eisencourt, it seems a lot. And if he says things subtly, he has already said things subtly and there can be discarded easily because of who Trump is and also because his really politics don't work on subtleties. They work on sledgeheimish of the head. You've said this is an incredibly consequential election. We've talked that this is a close election Americans wake up on October 28th. What would be a surprising result, right? It's something

“that kind of goes beyond what we've discussed today. And what sort of factors might bring that about?”

So small surprise, but nonetheless surprise is a clear resounding victory for Eisencourt. It's possible. And I'm resounding, I'm using to freely, but if we saw 62, 63, 64 as a clear, there's no question that Eisencourt conformicalition without the support of Rome and then bring Rome or anyone else in officially or on officially, that would be a minor surprise. I think it's certainly in the cards. I think people may be overestimating the chances of that. I think

polymarket and cows we sometimes do, but that is a possibility, nonetheless a surprise. A much bigger surprise is an Italian victory. That would be a genuine shock given the polls. Not impossible, as I said, you could see all sorts of scenarios. And that may not be on the 28th and maybe a little bit later, when you see the machinations of different parties. But if the polls were very wrong and there's a sense of in October 28th, and it's an outdid again and outperform the polls romantically, that would be a surprise.

“A slightly different kind of surprise, I think, is there is another scenario, which is that no one wins,”

but instead of Eisencourt allowing Netanyahu to go to new elections as caretaker Prime Minister, he manages to convince the opposition, if not to form a minority government with the abstention of Rome and the joint Arab list, at least to form a minority government that then goes to elections, but it itself is the caretaker government. So you can imagine they form a coalition and say, look, we can't govern without a majority. We're calling elections, but guess who's the Prime Minister

in the meantime and who's the minister of everything else? It would be from the opposition. That would take a lot of political maneuvering, but I think in a logical sense, it makes a lot of sense, and I think that would be a surprise, but not impossible. You could also see other last minutes

“of surprises. You could see Bennett surging instead of Eisencourt, something happens last minute.”

I don't think it's impossible. Or you could see in the days after the election, some other configuration, especially in the opposition camp, say, Leaverman insisting that he needs to be Prime Minister in rotation or in another form and threatening to break with the opposition, if he doesn't, I would not completely rule that one out, actually, would be a surprise, but not a complete shock. Again, given what I said before about Leaverman. The time. Thank you very much.

Dan, thank you very much. It's always a pleasure to talk to you and to law fair, of course.

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