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...we are from the DEVK channel and people who don't want it. DEVK, Gazette, Gitton, go ahead. [MUSIC PLAYING] Hi, I'm James Pierce, former public service fellow... ...now a contributing editor at Laugh Fair.
I was honored to come to Laugh Fair after serving in government...
...because I always trusted Laugh Fair to deliver reliable, non-partisan...
...and thoughtful analysis on critical issues. We are living at a time when the rule of law is under threat. And Laugh Fair continues to provide balance... ...and silver coverage. But that work depends on continuing support from people like you.
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Think of your support to Laugh Fair as what you can do to meet the moment. Thanks for listening. (music playing) Their goal is to thwart democracy, to undermine democracy... ...the United States and all of our allies...
...particular allies in NATO.
And so my mission with the book is to undermine them... ...to expose them for the frauds they are in many ways... ...to complete frauds in competent, bungling operations they carry out... ...but also to also explain at the same time... ...they remain a formidable adversary.
It's the Laugh Fair podcast. I'm Justin Sherman, contributing editor at Laugh Fair... ...and CEO of Global Cyber Strategies... ...with Sean Wisswasser... ...author of the new book, Tradecraft, Tactics and Dirty Tricks...
“...Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War...”
...and a former senior operations officer with the CIA. And so it's dissidents and defectors... ...that are some of the greatest threats to that regime... ...that in democracy, which is a mortal threat to Putin...
...he can't have functioning democracies on his borders, of course.
It's too much of a threat to him and his hold on power... ...that's why he invaded Ukraine. Today, we're talking about Russian intelligence... ...tradecraft and operations. They're simultaneous sophistication and recklessness...
...and the future of their activity and threat to the West. Sean, let's kick off with you telling us... ...to extend your course about your career at the Central Intelligence Agency... ...and in the U.S. National Security Community. Sure, so I have over 30 years now...
...and the intelligence community started out as hard as intelligence analyst... ...did not do that very long, been 90s, but it got me kind of into the community... ...and then I was foreign service for about six years. And then the vast majority of the remaining my career as a CIA case officer... ...and the Dr. Operations.
And my focus was on Russian intelligence in particular... ...and also something we call denied area operations. I spent a lot of time and work on that... ...as I mentioned at a couple points in the book. Retired as a member of our expert cadre...
...with a focus on those two issues in particular. And then I've been contracting since... ...doing some contracting in the defense and intelligence sector. But that's a snapshot of what was a very long three decades... ...and proud of served with a lot of really great people...
...in the intelligence community, maybe some of them dialing in now... ...cross the military and intelligence community. I did a lot of joint duty assignments to... ...I did a total of five of them in my career. So, appreciate everyone that served particularly as...
...we're taping this after Memorial Day weekend. Yeah, certainly. I mean, just for a moment, do you want to... ...I mean, many listeners already know what this is as you're noting... ...but do you want to just give a sentence or two on denied area operations...
“...before we jump in here since that's of course relevant?”
Yes, sure. So, denied area operations is how to operate... ...do our intelligence and espionage work for CIA... ...in the very toughest environments of our adversaries. And that's Russia, China, of course, Iran, North Korea. So, the term denied area is kind of...
...it's interesting because I mentioned Burton Gerber... ...in the book, he's a legend of Russian operations... ...and also Mike Sulik, who is our Deputy Director of Operations... ...in from my career and he also wrote the forward to the book.
So, Gerber and Sulik are two giants in the field of denied area operations.
...and as Burton Gerber was fond of saying... ...we can't have denied areas for CIA.
“So, what it means is we want to be able to operate...”
...those very tough environments where surveillance... ...even before the days of today, you'd be curious to technical surveillance... ...which we can talk about a little more, but before the days of cameras...
...at every intersection, those were always tough places to operate...
...in China and Soviet Union, now Russia. And so, I specialize a lot in that in my career... ...and touch on a bit in the book, but I focus course mostly... ...as you know, just in the book is ten chapters on... ...the bad guys' trade craft, how the Russians do their espionage...
...and their intelligence operations. But my expertise in those areas, of course, fed directly into the book... ...and part of the reason why I wrote it. Well, let's dive right into that. So, as we heard in the intro, this new book you have out...
...is titled "Tradecraft Tactics and Dirty Tricks"... ...Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War... ...published by the US Naval Institute Press. You know, I'll give my plug, not that you need it. But, you know, as some listeners know, I read many, many, many...
...Russian Books a year, this one is absolutely excellent.
“It's interesting, I think, both because of the depth of the analysis you have in...”
...but, as you noted, also drawing on your extensive experience and expertise...
...first hand with some really interesting stories.
So, I would highly recommend that folks get a copy. One thing we're going to get into the subsence of the book in a second... ...but you alluded to kind of your motives briefly. I appreciated it and found that interesting that you were pretty forthright... ...about your reasons for writing this book and in particular the impact...
...you think it could have or you might be looking to have on... ...not just the US and its allies and partners, but also on Russia. And so, you know, do you want to talk a little bit more about that kind of... ...what compelled you to write this book and what you're hoping it might achieve? Yeah, thank you, Justin, for that endorsement. I really appreciate it.
The book's been a team effort, not only with my publisher, they want us to press, but a lot of very senior members of the intelligence community... ...that have endorsed the book and are behind me in this effort. Very honored that Keith Melton, a legend of... ...as an author and spy historian, one of the founding board members of the spy museum...
...just endorsed my book two weeks ago. So, I consider a team effort that the book is a mission. And the mission of the book is to counter our Russian adversaries... ...to, as I mentioned in the introduction of the book, to maximum amount of damage... ...to our Russian adversaries and their intelligence operations around the world. Their goal is to thwart democracy, to undermine democracy, the United States and all of our allies...
...particular allies in NATO. And so, my mission with the book is to undermine them... ...to expose them for the frauds they are in many ways. They complete frauds in competent... ...bungling operations they carry out, but also to also explain at the same time... ...they remain a formidable adversary because in their system they can do no wrong. They get replenished. They constantly get resources from President Putin, who was one of their own, of course...
...a KGB veteran, and head of the FSB himself at one point. So, when you can do no wrong... ...when you have constant unending, replinitable resources, they remain a formidable threat. In fact, I characterize them as the most professional intelligence adversaries we have in the world.
“I believe China is the most important military threat to the United States...”
...and erysing one of that, but continuing to challenge United States militarily... ...with their navy now, with more ships than our navy. But Russia is the intelligence threat that's been added to the longest... ...has a hundred years of history working in things like information operations... ...they're very, very good at it. So, that's the mission.
Yeah, so, let's start where you begin in the book, which is talking about... ...the main Russian services in their training. So, what are those core security organs... ...and what does that training look like, how has it evolved over this long arc of history that you just noted? Yeah, so, for the work in the research, I focused on the three main... ...largest Russian intelligence services that's principally the FSB, the Federal Security Service...
...which is their internal service, largely on the United exclusively. I can explain that a bit more. The GRIU, or now they call themselves just the G-U, a G-U... ...and Russian is for G-U, probably, Indiana, or the main intelligence director... ...of the general staff, the Russian military, that's their intelligence, military intelligence... ...and then the SPR, which is their foreign intelligence service, the former remnant...
...of the first chief director to the KGB, which was in charge of foreign intelligence.
So, the first two chapters of the book are the history of those services... ...an organization very briefly, just as an outline. And then I talk about their training and preparation... ...kind of how they carry that out in their services. And through it all, of course, just as you know, having read the book through it all... ...and through everything they do is the corruption that just undermines everything that they try to do...
...and the Russian system and the Russian government corruption bleeds through it all. So, but, outlining the principle of their missions again, the FSB is a vast bureaucracy.
There are no analogies to the United States with any of their intelligence se...
I think the best estimates I've read and seen in open sources is the FSB now...
...is probably about 400,000 officers in personnel across Russia... ...that includes roughly 200,000 border guards under the FSB. It is a giant monolith of a bureaucracy. They have hands and corruption bleeding into companies... ...and front companies and force coercion and corruption against all sorts of levels of state bureaucracy. So, the FSB's principle role is survival of the Putin regime and him personally in power.
And we can't forget that because everything else is secondary to that. So, brief overview of the GRU is again, there's no analogy to the DIA or military intelligence. It is a huge bureaucracy that encompasses signals intelligence, what is our NSA, our NRO... ...that runs the satellite constellations, but if the GRU has all of that...
...plus tradition and military human operations...
...as well as their tier one elements of spets nuts, which are their special operations units... ...equivalent to our Navy SEALs and Delta Force. They have 10 ground brigades and 4 naval brigades... ...I touch on brieflings, the special operations chapter of the book... ...and so that's briefly and overview of the GRU.
Very difficult to estimate their numbers, they're the one of the three... ...that's constantly reorganizing and gives the least amount of clues in the open sources. And I should say everything I'm detailing in this podcast, just like in my book... ...is from open sources, my views are mine alone. Don't represent those of the US government.
So the GRU is estimated between 75 and 100,000, probably.
And then the SVR is the smallest of the three, it's probably around 30 to 40,000.
“I think all of these services tend to grow in wartime and rush has been at war now for four years.”
The SVR is in charge of foreign intelligence. They also have the lead role, although not exclusively... ...in information operations when it concerns their foreign targets. So with the Russians called Steveniam Mitter Priyate, they have an entire intelligence director... ...called Director at MS, in the SVR devoted towards information warfare. So those are brief overview of three services.
That's helpful. Is the training just to double-click on that for a moment... ...kind of relatively similar across these organizations different... ...how would you describe how they're and we'll get into their operations in a minute... ...but how are they trained? Yeah, I think there were similarities at one time. I think one of the features I touch on...
...in chapter two of the book is that, you know, their training has suffered a lot... ...over the decades, their professionalism has gone down.
“I think some of it's been cost-saving measures, like back in the '90s...”
...they were suffering a lot, of course, from budget shortfalls after the collapse of Soviet Union. And so that this is where the lead led to them doing things on the cheap... ...deploying illegals that weren't fully trained, like the ghost stories case that I touch on in a lot of detail. So this is where the SVR developed that category of illegals... ...they called special age in illegals, trying to deploy them and brought...
...without the eight-year timeline that the leader of the illegals... ...directed of the KGB, Yuri Dinosdorf, from the 1980s, in retirement later... ...he talked about this. It takes a long time to deploy it, training the illegal properly. So at a time when budget's were constrained in the '90s... ...I think that the all-three of these services kind of try to do things on the cheap...
...and that's where you see a lot of the officers now getting caught in very bungling operations abroad. I'd show that the great illegals, for instance, are the 1930s and '40s people... ...like Rudolph Abel, the hollow nickel case. He was compromised not because it was on failures, but he was turned over by another illegal. But he was a professional, really highly trained at his craft, the illegals... ...that helped support the Manhattan Project spies that stole our atom bomb designs.
You know, these were real pros just, and these were really good intelligence officers. The recruiter of the Cambridge Five doich that I talk about in the book.
“Again, real pros, that's why they're called the "great illegals" and so it has to be not history.”
Nowadays, not so much. And so part of it is the lack of professionalism at the academy... ...and then it's the corruption. The stories I touch on, I'm happy to share one or two if you like now... ...but touch on in the book too. Yeah, I certainly want to circle back to corruption because that, among other things, was very compelling in your book. So, it's a good transition to some of the operations and trade craft that, of course, are a core focus.
You write about, of course, how surveillance, both carrying it out, and then ensuring that you lose it when you're conducting an operation is, of course, such a core part of intelligence trade craft. So, what are some of the characteristics of Russian-style, quote-unquote, "sticks and bricks" as you put it surveillance and counter surveillance? And are there areas where you think they are quite proficient versus quite deficient and, you know, or really show some of these cracks in the foundation?
Yes, so you've been a student reader of the book just and I can tell and I ap...
that. So, let's delve into some of their sticks and bricks as we call it in CIA,
what the Russians call, probably look at them, but I'd say, you know, they're trade craft, they're rules of conspiracy. You know, they do have a long intelligence history going back to the time of this ours and then the Bolshevik revolution, the check-ah, you know, Felix Georginsky, Aaron Felix, set it up. His vision for intelligence and security work was that it'd be motivated and driven by terror, his famous line is, you know, we stand for organized terror. But they were in
our very proficient at clandestine trade craft, historically they were. The problem nowadays is as I relate in my research and my work, the Russians of the current generation are not prepared for the level of ubiquitous technical surveillance that's out there in society. So, this is where you see
Russian intelligence officers deploying to do operations like like the attempt to assassinate
of Sergei Skripal in the UK, where they're all over cameras and seem to be blissfully unaware that they're being filmed for the entirety of their trip from Heathrow through to Salosbury, where they attempted the assassination, when they cast out his residence, when they cast out parts of town, all of them are cameras surveillance and they weren't very good about being
“aware of it at all. So again, that's that lack of fundamental good training and I think the”
corruption leads into it too. They don't get the training they should because as one story I relate in the book, you know, this surveillance training of the SPR at the Academy, they weren't allowed to use vehicles because as one instructor told Russian intelligence officer earlier debriefed and related it to me, well, we can't use the cars because those are reserved
for the instructors with their girlfriends on the weekends. So, we were never allowed to use the
cars. That's the corruption, that's the entitlement in their services. So, onto a little bit of the trade craft, Russians are notoriously very aggressive at their surveillance trade craft, both carrying out surveillance or what we would call counter surveillance of their operations to see if they're being covered, but also what we call surveillance detection, seeing if they're being watched or followed themselves. They're typically very aggressive. They don't mind
“running red lights, speeding on highways, trying to see if they're being followed. Why is that?”
Unfortunately, for decades in the United States and in NATO countries, they weren't getting a lot of attention paid to them. They could get away with that. Radical Islamic groups were getting a lot of heavy focus of intelligence and security services. So, the Russians got used to, they were spoiled. They could get away with being aggressive, carrying out their operations to reveal the presence or absence of surveillance. You know, one anecdote I'm relating the book, you know, if other
intelligence officers from the United States or other countries try to do that in Moscow, the Russians will let air out of our tires, tires of vehicles, you know, things like that to retaliate. So, we typically in the West weren't paying enough attention to the Russians weren't covering them enough, so they got spoiled by very aggressive tactics. Yet, if you're free, they won't end up on free app.
When the Russians recruit people whether for informing or supporting operations or something else, as you note, they still today frequently resort to tactics like coercion, compromise, the use of sex to entrap people, which many frequently dubbed sex-beenage.
“How do the Russians use these methods and why do they do it? Are they actually effective?”
Is this the kind of thing in general that a Western intelligence agency might might prefer for recruitment or is this really a Russian sort of mindset to use these tactics? The Russians definitely have a preference for the stick versus the carrot, and they're not the only ones. A lot of repressive kind of autocratic regimes, they do this at home, so, you know, the Russians for going back to the revolution, I mentioned iron Felix. You know, iron Felix is saying
of course, what we need, we stand for organized terror, and Lenin believed in it too, had somebody challenging me recently that, oh, prove that Lenin was for terror. Well, look at what he did. Look at what they carried out. They carried out the red terror. For four years, hundreds of thousands of people were killed right after the revolution. In fact, I referenced a memo that Lenin wrote to, underling, I think his name was Krasnitsky,
telling him and Georginsky, "Bring the terror, we need the terror as soon as possible so that the people are afraid of any type of counter-revolution." So when you practice terror, you practice extortion as state policy, and, turn away, it's natural that their intelligent services rely on that a lot in their work on foreign intelligence as well. So they do believe in what I mentioned the book, you know, the KGB's historical term was compromising material operations.
It means it could be sex-meanage, like you mentioned just in the case of Lont...
really. In my research, talk about Kling Lontria, the Marine Guard who was famously seduced by
“a Russian working at the embassy in Moscow, and he sadly committed, you know, betrayed his”
country for that. But it's not just that gambling. Just businesses trying to do business in Russia, businessmen are, are, are extorted all the time. Either work with us and help us or we'll run your business at a town or we'll throw you in jail. So they believe in the stick. A lot of services in that part of the world, the former Soviet Union, not including the Baltics, the Baltics, of course, fully functioning democracies integrated in New Europe and NATO. But in some of the
countries sort of called the stands, and they're very sensitive to criticism, but they deserve criticism. They're despotic regimes. They try to claim, oh yeah, we're also, for the West, at the same time, they're heavily in better with the Russians for intelligence operations. They rely heavily to on extortion, coercion, sex-beenage, the use of swallows. So yeah, it's a go-to
tactic for not just the Russians, but a lot of those regimes in that part of the world. It always
was a go-to of the KGB. You referenced corruption earlier, which I think is both a theme of the book, and then you have several deeper dives into it. You talked a little bit earlier about corruption,
“but perhaps if you want to give us more color on how this really materially impacts the”
day-to-day, and then the broader efficacy of the three-main Russian organs, their recruitment, their analysis, or anything else you want to hit on. Well, I hope your listeners will consider checking out the book. I've related a lot of these anecdotes as you know, Justin, but let's take one from, you know, chapter one of the book I talk about a day in the life of a Russian intelligence officer. And I mentioned Sergei Threatikov, who was the deputy resident of the SVR residency in New York
residency being a station, what's the idea called a station, or an office of the SVR abroad,
it's called a residency. GRU uses the same term. So Sergei Threatikov relates in his own book with Pete Early, Comrade J. I had the honor to debrief him, though, and then get a chance to work with him some. You know, he said he was tired. He was worn out as a senior officer with the entire purpose of the residency being about corruption. You know, feeding the corruption back in Moscow. Every time they had a senior visit in town to New York, where he was working and defected out of
eventually for the after he worked in New York, he relates how he'd have to constantly take them for visits to, you know, electronic stores or whatever the latest fashion stores are for their wives. And then they used the diplomatic pouch to ship all these things back to Moscow. I'm not just talking like one or two TVs. I mean, you know, 20 TVs, or I relate the example of them buying ostensibly electronics, you know, this happens around the world. The SVR will buy 50 iPhones,
claiming that they're for operational purposes. But the amount of money they were given for 50, they'll claim they could only buy 20. And then the remaining 30 are sent back via the diplomatic pouch to their buddies in Moscow to sell on the black market. And so there's constant scheming and scams. Those are lower level. But then at the higher level, you're talking scams involving millions and sometimes tens and hundreds of millions of dollars carried out by all three
of these services across Russia. So corruption is what drives those services and it's a feudal system. It works its way up to chain all the way to Putin. In fact, Lithinianko, one of the defectors who was executed, you know, not well assassinated really with Polonium in the UK, Lithianianko claims the reason why he was killed and he died a horrible death towards the end. He said it was about the corruption that he was relating the organized corruption of the FSB that
“he had tried to tell Putin about when Putin had the FSB. And he claims that's why he was killed, of course.”
So yeah, it's it's part and parcel of everything they do. It bleeds through every part of their system. And when they try to do operations, it's fruit from a poisoned tree because of the corruption. You reference assassinations. That's that's something else, part and parcel of many Russian global operations. So how does what work fit into everything we're talking about? And how with it all has Soviet and now Russian thinking on assassinations changed over time.
Yes, so the Russians do use the term "moqueradeela" what work, but they also use the term "premoliadiest" to you know, carrying out direct direct action. And they also often reference the Russians will use the term, you know, the highest measure of punishment. And so when they're carrying out assassination, at the orders of Putin, they're carrying out the Lushe Mihrin-Nakazanyan, so the highest measure of punishment. And so traditionally this has been ordered by the highest levels from Putin, I believe,
it's ordered by him against defectors and dissonance because there's such a threat to the system. So defectors like Sergei Threatykov, who uncovering or willing to reveal the levels of corruption,
The levels of incompetence in difference of the Russian intelligence services...
people, they're the greatest threat of course, that in democracy. And so that's why Putin, I believe, and also has been evidenced by European services have shown, of only was killed by the state. They used a toxin of a tree frog, you know, that's not organized crime that can't just be somebody in prison that carried it out, that's the state. And so it's dissonance and defectors that are some of the greatest threats to that regime, that in democracy, which is a mortal threat to Putin,
he can't have functioning democracies on his borders, of course, it's too much of a threat
“to him and his hold on power, that's why he invaded Ukraine. And so those assassinations have”
remained a stable of this regime, using murder as a form of state-sponsored policy and a policy of coercion. So I cite the example of the Ryan Matel CEO and Germany targeted by the GRU and the Germans have the Russians dead derights on this. They know it was a GRU, they have the evidence to show it. Trying to kill a corporate leader, you know, one of we ever seen that level of brazeness and recklessness, though, during KGB times, sure they targeted distance of defectors. As I mentioned,
that's always been a part of their, of their malign, you know, murderous statecraft. But trying to
kill a corporate leader in another country, it shows the level of, there's no accountability anymore, the level of recklessness and the level of escalation, the Russians are willing to risk right now. So yeah, I think there's been a history to it just in, but now it's escalating and now they're carrying it out in more and more reckless ways. Well, this is a really important point and you use the word "I" and others often use, which is brazen, and this is something in particular. I was
looking forward to asking you about, and I know you talk some about this in the book, but for those that are really brazen, and, of course, you mentioned the GRU, perhaps being the foremost one, although, tell me if you disagree, do you think that some of these operatives, such as with the recklessness you mentioned, or with the botched poisoning attempt of discreet balls in 2018, which of course killed other people, not the intent of targets, is that just sloppiness? Is it, they don't care
about getting caught? Is it as you're saying because these killings or whatever meant to send a message, they want to get caught? Like, what explains this sort of disregard for the fact that, you know, they're their bios and passports or on the Bellingcat website, and they just kind of keep doing
what they're doing? I think it's two things. First, I would mention, I think the FSB and GRU
are equally involved in terms of the assassination sabotage, what work abroad. It's largely those two services, although I think the SVR is also engaged. They sort of all want in the effort to
“impress the boss. Just, and that's how the intelligence service is referenced, Putin. He's the,”
he's chef. He's the boss. Much like Stalin was called the boss back in his day, and that's purposeful. You know, those illusions are purposeful. Felix Shujinsky, his statue was just put up last month at the FSB Academy. You know, they want these illusions to, to the terror and the repression of Stalin's times. They want those to help sort of keep the Russian people in line today, you know, with the war going on. I think that we're going to see more of this. The sabotage, the assassination,
the wetwork, it's all an effort to impress Putin, and to try to use again, coercion as the state policy. So European countries in the United States are helping Ukraine in the war effort. We're not directly involved, but we're selling arms. We're trying to help that democracy to, and they're fight for freedom. So Russia believes, okay, well, that makes you all fair game. So we're just going to do whatever the hell we want, and if we use teenagers or misfits of society that they're recruiting in many cases,
they believe that gives them veil deniability. The same time, Justin, where's the accountability in the West? So let's talk about brazen. Let's talk about FSB Assassin Vadim Krasikov, a former bodyguard, personal bodyguard of Putin, who in 2019 in the the most brazen of ways assassinated in broad daylight, shot a touching dissident in Germany, and he was caught immediately dead to rights. Well, for years, of course, the Russians refused to acknowledge him, although at the same time,
they were trying to get him swapped out. And finally, in 2024, they included him, and Putin insisted
Krasivkov being included in any swap of spies, and assassins like him that were swapped out along with some illegals from Slovenia. We're swapped out for innocent civilians, like Gershkovets
“and Brittany Griner, and a host of these swaps that have happened. Well, why don't I mention Krasikov?”
It's important to note that Putin greeted him with a bear hug on the tarmac at Shidamiyahtavaya airport in Moscow. He wanted his elite from the FSB and the FSB as protective service to know, hey, if you kill for me, I'm going to take care of you. And he did. He got Krasikov out after just a few years in prison. And then shortly after that piss-coff, the spokesperson acknowledged, yes,
We decorated him.
the whole world to know. Yeah, we ordered this. Krasikov was the owner of Putin's orders,
while, again, acknowledged him as an FSB officer after they got him out, greeted him with a bear hug on the tarmac. So I think there's been no accountability, though, just in until we in the West provide enough of a unified and substantive deterrent to Russia to say, hey, you don't, you don't ever try to kill our citizens on our soil. They're just going to keep doing it. They've gone away with it. They're assassins get away. In the case of the Salosbury, you know, attack on Skripal. Those assassins
“got away and we're never held to account. So that's what I think is happening. I think it is”
state ordered. I think they'll continue to do it unless we provide more of a unified response. And one that matters to the Russians, but we haven't, unfortunately. What do you think that unified response looks like? And I'm thinking both about, you know, it's states, but I'll see mention Europe, right? And I was reading something a few weeks ago where someone else had remarked, you know, we, we see whatever it is, as you alluded to, sabotage or something else
in the news in Europe, and then, you know, yet another headline saying, oh, this is a wake-up call, you know, if it's at the 80th wake-up call. And so I'm just curious for both both US and Europe, what you think, yeah, we need to be, what that should look like. Yeah, I'm going to be speaking on these topics. I was in the UK. I was very honored to be invited to both Cambridge and Oxford University since just a couple of weeks. I'm going to talk about Russian hybrid war and, and here's
what I believe. This is Sean's opinion. Again, my views on my own certainly don't represent the US government or North CIA, but, you know, during the days of the Cold War, Ronald Reagan was a great president and he was also a great deterrent to the Soviet Union. You want to carry out
escalation, the arms race, we can do things that you'll never be able to do. That was Star Wars,
at least the threat of Star Wars and SDI, many believe, help bring down the Soviet Union.
“So we have the greatest intelligence services I believe in terms of capabilities in the world.”
We have the greatest capabilities of our military. Look at what they carried out with Maduro. Look at the bin Laden rate. So here's what I believe, Justin. There's consequences and in the crane war that we could be carrying out. There's weapons systems that we've always been giving willy-nilly to the Ukrainians or selling from both Europe and the United States. Give the Ukrainians a tools they need to finish the job. What has Russian not done during this war?
What weapons systems haven't they used? They just used another hypersonic missile against civilians and Kiev. They've blown up and attacked maternity wars. Thousands and thousands of
Ukrainian children have died in this war. What has Russian not done to Ukraine? So the first thing I
believe is there's a lot we can be doing for Ukraine and we should be doing in their fight for freedom. And those are consequences for Russia, the hybrid war they're carrying out in Europe. And then the second thing I think we need to do is more of a unified response, sharing intelligence and sharing every single instance where this is happening, stop giving the Russians the benefit of the doubt. You know those drone incursions that happen in Poland, all this debate in the West,
among the different countries in Europe. Well, she's where they accidentally are not. Wow, dozens and dozens of drones in a 24-hour period going into Poland and crashing or being shot down near some key military facilities and bases. That might be by chance, of course, it wasn't by chance. What about the cable cuts in the Baltic Sea? They have more cable cuts in the Baltic Sea and I mentioned in chapter 8 of the book. They've been more cable cuts there in the past
two years than in any other place in the world. No other body of order in the world has as many cable cuts as have happened with these Russian shadow fleet tankers accidentally dragging their anchors. But again, just in every time it happens, you know, there's this benefit of the doubt, Russia gets, I was in health thinking giving a talk last ball on hybrid war, when a finished court released a crew, a Georgian captain from the country of Georgia and some other Russian and
Russian speaking crew members. Well, Jesus, there's just no evidence that that anchor drag was accidental. Arrest them every time. Seize the crew every time. Seize the ship every time. Start to target these Georgian other officials that are carrying out assassinations abroad. When I say target, I don't mean for what work like they do. We're not that low. We're not going to carry out. We're not going to target civilians ever in war like they do. We're also not going to carry out
assassinations. But they travel abroad. They go out on vacations to cypress their families do. Arrest them to tame them, render them to justice. Like we rendered terrorists suspects throughout 20 years of war against Al Qaeda. We should be more creative carrying out reprisals against Russian intelligence services and there's a variety of ways we can do it and I'll just leave it at that.
“All right. Yeah. And that's interesting because you covered, I think both the war component”
or what we would call full war. You know, kind of like with Ukraine and then as you're noting also then kind of intelligence war active measures issues kind of looking forward. Then I mean, and this is part of you answered part of my question already. But do you see the United States continuing to underestimate the Russian threat? Hopefully more accurately, size the Russian threat over time. Do you think the continued war in Ukraine has shifted that at all or how do you think we're
Looking in the United States with appropriately confronting this adversary?
question. I've had other journalists have been honored to have a number of interviews including
“with European outlets recently. I get asked a lot. Well, how can they be incompetent at the same”
time? You're saying they're formal advisers here. They're both. Okay. They do really reckless stupid incompetent at times operations and yet they're formal because again, they get so many resources. They can do no wrong in the Russian system. They're not held to account. For most of the past 20 years just and let's look at national security strategy, the unclassified versions. Russia was barely top 10, right? Literally, they were barely top 10. We had the war on terror,
we had Iraq, which some argue and not whether we should have been involved in Iraq at all. You know, I'm not taking a position on them. Just saying we were involved in a war. They're major effort. We had China, we had proliferation concerns, WMD whether existed or not or biological chemical weapons targeting United States. Russia was barely top 10. So it's no surprise then that while we
weren't focusing on them, they've never taken their eyes off of us. As I relate in my book,
you know, that Russian intelligence officer reminded me early in my career, you're the Galabni product evening. The United States, you're the main adversary for Russia and you always will be under Putin. As he said, you were, you are now, you always will be for the Russian intelligence services and for Putin. So we took our eyes off of them. They never took their eyes off of us. I believe
“they don't get enough focus and attention. That's why I wrote the book. I think it's appropriate.”
We kind of end where we started, you know. My book is trying to expose them for who they are. They're the most formidable threat to democracies that we face in the West. They're targeting our elections. They're using information warfare. They're using cognitive warfare now more than ever. Cyber operations. And so yeah, I think we have a lot of work to do, getting the message out about just what they're doing to us and how focused they are like a laser
on the United States and our allies. That's all the time we have. Sean, thanks for joining us. Thanks for having me, Justin. I'm honored to be on the podcast with you all.
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