The Lawfare Podcast
The Lawfare Podcast

Lawfare Daily: The Complicated Past and Present of Ukraine’s Relations with Poland

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In this episode, Lawfare’s Ukraine Fellow Anastasiia Lapatina sits down with Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak to discuss the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations, the controversies surrounding th...

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I heard you will have a mobile phone call, but not just come from here.

Who is with your ex ex-girls dreaming? My second baby? No, I'm going to leave you alone. [BEEPING] Just a little bit.

With mobile phone in real life, Frank, from the beginning of the "Owner Mindest" contract,

for the first time, "Monathlich-Kunpa" for "Thien-Oir-O-Emonath".

Frank, nine. Frank. [BEEPING] [BEEPING] This is Teletor, who was swarmed by the partisans. By the three fractions of Ukrainian nationalists,

a Polish army, a Soviet partisans, it was literally war or all against war. And giving the fact that it was a cut after the Holocaust. And when there was a mask killings in the territory, it's still a fair podcast.

I'm Anastasia La Patina. You can follow Ed Lafer with Ukrainian historian Yurislav Hritzak. [BEEPING] When Novrovsky said it, "Quarero-Sadne-Gator" allowed the support of the Polish SSR.

Majority. Which means that probably you cross some kind of the line,

you know, because that never happened

because there was an anti-cranion of groups of alls in the minority. Rather, it seems to be becoming a majority, which is a very much dangerous threat. We discussed the complicated history of relations

between Ukraine and Poland, the Volenian tragedy, and how grievances over historical memory may threaten Ukraine's future in Europe. So we're talking about Polish Ukrainian relations today, and we're talking about it because there were some recent scandals

between Ukrainian and Polish governments. Since the audience of Lafer is, of course, mainly American, I think there is a big lack of knowledge of history between the relationship of Ukraine and Poland. And so that's where I wanted to bring you on.

I think since 2022, when Russia's political invasion began, Poland, of course, has been an immensely important ally for Ukraine. It's taken an enormous number of Ukrainian refugees. It became a very important logistical hub during the war. And I think most people who are not following the Eastern European region

closely probably mainly associate the relationship between Ukraine and Poland with this dynamic. They view it through the slants of partnership, but actually the relationship was quite complicated and antagonistic.

And that's what I wanted to talk about today.

So can you just describe the power dynamic between Ukraine and Poland, but really between the lands and entities that made up present day, Ukraine and Poland going back centuries? And you can feel free to start it. However, deep in history you want.

But yeah, what has been the dynamic, not of partnership, but of what? It's starting point, could you regard it as the end of the tense century? And one of the oldest historical chronicles, I mentioned the 1981, the King Prince of Denver, of them are the great. He seized the lands of the Polish cities, or Polish lands,

and this was kind of beginning. So some people claim that this is the longest war in the European history, because it lasts for more than 1000 years. It's both true and false. It's true because it's really, it's a long-term conflict,

but it's false because history also shows the many cases of the Polish Ukrainian corporation, another constellation, by the way.

Because basically the fact that it must be repeated again and again,

basically Ukraine and Poland reach out to the constellation, since the fall of the communism, unlike in this rush. This is a basic fact we should not ignore. So we talk about the iteration of the relations, rather that, need to ignore the consolidation.

But the thing is pulling Ukraine very much closely related. In many levels, say, and talking about the key princes, they quite often merit the daughters and sons of the Polish things. So actually it is a kind of the family feud between the two families. And later it was replaced by the societies, which were close to each other.

So what I'm saying here is like a really could be claimed like a brotherhoods, or brotherhood wars. Which is not by the surprise because we're not quite often the most advanced violence that are aren't directly into families.

But the thing is that I believe in this kind of relations,

polls and Ukrainians, they share both responsibility for this state of relations, for good and worse, but I believe in many sense as post-recipabilities larger. Because for a variety of reasons we're going to, because we're too long-talk, Polish boys have been a stronger part. They present the dinner state, the elites, the state, which Ukraine didn't manage.

In some periods of the time, in 19th century,

it can be reduced to the nation of the prison. And peasants, as they say, and polls were very much stronger. So it's like sending family. There's a feud between two brothers. This is mostly the older and the stronger who is to blame.

So this is also could be applied to the Polish-Korean relations. Okay, I want to pause on the topic of consuls,

because I think they're very important for this discussion.

How are the consuls and the real feud and Ukraine and Poland? Some of the looks has been written about the topic, and I believe so. But the thing is that, let's start with the very simple statement that you fill in consuls. The main symbol of Ukraine identity. So for Ukrainians, it's a very important.

And they see mostly very positively. All the figure, Ukrainian, and Cosoch,

will call it the last millennia's key, or Mazda, but they always on the top.

And it's still a memory. And by the way, there's no controversy among Ukrainians. We'll talk about the cause. That's a kind of accepted fact. So this is something very important.

But then again, you should see that there is a Ukrainian cause. You have also Russian consuls, like Adonkoz, Akubankosks, or Icosks, the differences. That why you could easily write Russian exclusives out Russian consuls. You cannot write history without the Ukrainian consuls.

And the main explanation is that Ukrainian consuls are very much more related to Poland than Turasia.

In a sense, that if you look on the biographies of the Cosoch leaders, they have dedicated the Polish Catholic schools. Then you'll then, which is like a frame German unleading brick, which was at most, they have a large library. It's equal to hardly imagine in case of the Russian consuls.

So this is something very educated. It educated in a sense of education, what are the communication in the entire. And this is the idea of the simple fact. That's since they belong to the judge for political policy state.

So they had access, opened window, not at the window. The open access does the span of the education. So to let back those long story short, when you talk about West in Ukrainian case, and the Ukraine was largely a part of the Western society,

in most of the cases, West came into Ukraine in the Polish dress. So this is something very important. And what makes Ukraine very different from Russia at the disabled because of this access to the Western culture? So this is something very important.

And vice versa. I've been talking about the Polish accent. I actually noticed this to Ukraine in Kazakhstan. They very much different. For a short, when you're Ukrainian cause of profiting with the Polish,

that's when I got you. But then, in 19th century, when they lost their state, they started to look on the Ukrainian cause of their allies. And there's a merchant myth on Ukrainian cause in Polish literature. But at that time, very popular, many Polish songs,

and the music's art, this was exactly on Polish Ukrainian and Kazakhstan's allies against the Russian Empire. You may know that there is a very popular trilogy, written by a very popular Polish author, Nobel Warta author,

and said some cabbage and some cabbage, who wrote a trilogy,

which is basically on the Polish Ukrainian relations,

and Ukrainians, because they are related during the Russian narrative way. So the point is, 25 years ago or so, they did a Polish movie director, put this trilogy to the screen, made a movie.

And in this movie, he depicted presented Ukrainian cause in the most positive way. There has been such rumours saying that many Polish ladies fall in love, which this actor would like the rose to the Ukrainian cause. They were presented so sympathetically.

So what I'm saying is there was ups and downs. But most of the most interesting that you could hardly imagine Ukrainian political culture of the South Ukrainian cause, and all this kind of relations to Poland, because the cause is fucked against the Poland,

but they emulated its political system. Let's see, if I may conclude this one example.

You may know that remember that the Zelenski lost to say

this time of slogan, nothing above us. Nothing above us without us. Yes.

Which is basically this slogan of cause,

which is literally quotation from the principle of the Polish nobility. So this, have you seen it? That's fascinating. That works. It really is a very important slogan

that the Ukrainian government repeats all the time. That's a very interesting. Okay. The next important point in this hundreds of years long history

Is the territory of willing and Galisha.

I will not ask you to tell us about that territory. And again, they're all that had played for both Ukraine and Poland, and the territorial disputes that happened around it. And sort of take us a little bit through the various disputes and wars that happened until World War II.

And by then, we'll go in greater detail about the war and the aftermath.

I think it would be a continue of the kind of the perspective on cause of some

Ukrainian relations with Poland, the least in Bolinia, the following the same kind of pattern. Because those are two territories that for a long time are outside of the region of Russia. There were the most westernized territory of the Plane, both in geographical and cultural sense. And because it's occurred a close relationship to Poland,

which was at the same time, close relationship to the West. It was really kind of Ukraine, the West in many and impossible, and no many different meanings. The thing is that Bolinia didn't play that much role.

In the Polish Ukrainian relations or contests, the most important role is Galisha.

Because since the end of the 19th century, Galisha enjoys the liberal regime of the Austrian Habsburg Empire. And since Polish patriots, they failed to rebel. They were present against Russian Empire. They decided to move their center to Galisha,

and to make Galisha as a core of the future state.

But Ukrainian Russian Empire has the same kind of attitude. They have some trick. They think that they have to start the state from Galisha. This is kind of what's rivalry starts. It was basically both national moments claimed the same territory as the core of the future state.

And they emerged a conflict. And by the end of the century, in the beginning of the 20th century, they were really trying to run the state. And since the force of the Austrian Empire, and then of the former, it was in the real full-fledged war.

As well as the war. In 1918, in the very much violent war, the Jewish progress made by Poland, all the kind of things, so to make the role of a long story short. Since then, Galisha Ukrainians become part of the interwar Poland.

But like very much like Holonia,

but Poland treat them like a second-class.

Like minority that presents a danger to the state. But the way very much like a Jews. The Polish elites, they treated Ukrainians and Jews as a kind of threat to their identity. So to say.

So it was means the assimilation, pressure, all the kind of things, repressions, and to put long story short probably. But they'd be described by the words of the famous Ukrainian story, "Malaisa Krodnicki". "Malaisa Krodnicki" was a young man.

And the Polish regime who suffered himself physically. So basically put the way about the Polish politics of the Ukrainians. It was more than crime, it was as just as stupidity. So the Polish antagonized Ukraine as to the extreme. Which also could be said to Volenia, but in a sudden less extent,

because in this interwar period there was such interesting experiment. Liberal experiment. Condoling experiment to make Ukraine in their much loyal to Ukraine to a Polish state, but it failed. And since the end of the 30s closed to the war,

Polish regime embark on a very strong repressions.

Especially the most stupid and the first one, like a closing

and distracting Ukrainian churches on this territory.

And you have to take on the crown to this territory.

This local Ukrainians, there were much traditional and religious. So basically what you have there, you have already tested. It was on this tatin tutorial in top of the cap. Just a sparkle will do to turn it into a kind of explode storm. So then we get to World War II.

Of course, Ukraine and Poland suffer horrifically during the war. Can you just talk a little bit about, you know, compare their experience with the war and when the war ends, how they see themselves and what status they have and how they come out of the war. What that looks like.

So as a bow before the start of the war, there has been this pit between the Polish and Ukrainian ambassadors in Berlin. And there were fighting competing or arguing who suffered most under the war, who also Ukrainians. And I believe this largely discussion makes no sense, because Poland and Ukrainians suffer that most.

This was like what the time of the standard put it. It was a heart of the balladlands of the nations and the people that were squeezed.

The two most oppressive, ruthless regimes, like Stalin's Russia and the Nazi ...

That said, that said, there was still some kind of differences.

Without a doubt, because basically, if talking about Volenia, this kind of experience with the war,

which is now in the center of the Polish and the spute. In Poland, this massive violence starts with the beginning of the first World War, 1939. And first, the Soviets came and then Nazi. In Ukraine it's different. Because majority of Ukraine and territory was under the Soviet Russia,

and they started to feel this kind of mass violence much earlier. Since the 20s, and with the upper peak in the Stalin regime in the 30s. So that said, unlike in Poland, Ukrainians, they suffered a wave after wave of the massive violence, which is very close to genocide. Like a whole lot more, like the destruction of the Soviet prison,

and so war, like a Holocaust and Volenia and the deportation, Crimea and Tatars, the deportation of Polish from Ukraine, and Ukraine is from Poland, which means eight waves of the extreme violence, which is very close to genocide. So it's only in 15 years. So it's kind of unique experience. Therefore, many people, especially Polish, could not understand this kind of difference

why you create and feel that much different by their history. Because for them, Volenia is not the central event. They have many of them.

For them, the most important event, the territory, is still holding them all.

The great famine, that for Jews Holocaust, which is the same thing, but again, Holocaust happened also in Ukraine. So this may be too, it's a bit different. So to put a lot of story short, Volenia doesn't come at the beginning of the story. It's a end of the story, after several ways of the violence, very massive extreme violence. And the point is that there were non-group, an air-peted non-group, that was in into the violence,

which means that every group has this own victims and perpetrators. So this is something very important to understand, we're talking about all here. Right. So now we get to the crux of the conversation and also the dispute, of course, between the two countries recently. And that is the Volenian tragedy, which, you know,

it is very telling that the polls refer to it, I think, almost exclusively as the Volenian massacre or massacres,

whereas Ukraine, Ukrainian historians use the war tragedy. So the historical memory, National Memory, over what happened there during that time, is the crux of these political disputes. And I want to, you know, ask you, can you just walk us through what actually happened there? And what are these events and who were the victims and who were the perpetrators?

And what it is that the countries are giving over now.

The questions are simple. The answer is very much complicated.

But there is no way to provide a simple, different answer. And the story is far too complicated and highly contested, but if could have been both to some kind of simple fact, the fact is, it was, that on the morning of July 11, 1943, Ukraine and Nationalist and peasants, launched attack on several dozen of polar villages in Volenia and could everybody but the dirty could reach. No one was spared, not the young, the old woman of children.

And crucially, it's very important to, this kind of event took place on Sunday,

when people were heading to the cathedrals to the churches. So attacks and couldn't skirt right there. So, allowing people to be mud on the spot. There was a cruxal, cruxal, cruxal, was by the ruthless act. Basically, it was ethnic cleansing, something to say.

This is it, but now this put stance, because there is no kind of consensus on most of the dimensions. First, how many of those were attacked? Some say 180, which is maximum. So I'm saying only 10. Then, all some numbers of victims.

Ukrainian stands to say that 60,000. Posts say, 100,000, and recently, Polish President even said that 150.

So, again, the question was, was this operation ordered by the top leaders of Ukrainian-ish list?

Or was it a bottom-up in Stubo local commanders? And above all, who started first? Because Ukrainian is referred to some anti-Korean action made by the Polish underground and so far, and so forth. So, I'm saying here, it's so very hard.

To have some definitive answer, it's open space for historians to discuss and...

do they work for the last 30 years and some results are very much very much impressive.

Problem is, this problem of olinia, struggling is not left to historians only. There are politicians who don't listen to some kind of complicated answered in the very simple answers. Which could be used for the mobilizing the electorate. And there's no other way either way to mobilize the numbers that by using the historical memory. Which is very resistant.

Which explains the kind of very much complicated character of this malignant issue, both in history and nowadays present.

So the Ukrainian, of course, correct me from wrong, but I think the Ukrainian, both government and I guess mainstream historians in Ukraine,

talk about these events as sort of a joint waves of violence as then, you know,

I think Ukrainians try to not discuss who attacks, who first, but more like we all kill each other.

Let's just sort of say sorry and apologize to each other and move on. And it seems like for the Polish side, it is very, very important for them to actually get to the bottom of the question who attacked first and they seem to be saying that the Ukrainians did. And they don't like the sort of two sides argument that, you know, this was just joined waves of violence. Can you talk a little bit more about how the Ukrainian side sort of views this and talks about it and versus where this how the polls do.

Are you perfectly right? You're perfectly right. This is exactly the kind of distinction between the Polish and the Ukrainian side. But that said, I would say that there's differences between Polish and Ukraine. It transfers in each country because there's groups in Ukraine that are closed only in their list or there are one who doesn't become memorial warriors who want to country to countries to be some kind of the most exclusive, but mutually exclusive relations and they tend to probably not promote the science, but to use the standard of the political extremes. So the thing is there's white spectrum of the attitudes and then you could express by the two mutual explicit polls.

On the one, Paul is the Valdemary Gatrovic.

A young-ish historian who has been the director of the Stuttgart National Memories.

He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a historian. He raised a historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian.

He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian.

He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian.

He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian.

He raised a Ukrainian historian. He raised a Ukrainian historian.

So, relativizing, which is exactly this, because it doesn't seem to be the kind of the really kind of war, it was a kind of genocide, whatever, just kind of war, and more everything happens.

And this one is part of the sort of war, he tends to minimize the number of victims, also tends to exploit the Ukraine and National, all the kind of things, which is kind of quite expected. So, this is one poll. The opposite poll is taken by the Polish president, Navrodsky, who by the way, he's also his story. Yes, and also the director of former director of the Institute of National Memory on the Polish side, and he put on as extreme.

This is basically not a kind of war, it was a kind of the decision made by the Nazi-like Ukrainian nationalist fascist type, which meant to have this kind of action from the very beginning.

So, to say, and there is no way further, if Ukraine would not recognize that Ukraine's influence was a kind of the communist institution, which has to be put off the side of the historical member kind of things. So, this is true, large, large spectrum by the two polls. And many people go to the center. So, if you talk to him about Ukrainian historians and Polish historians, most of them, they tend to tell to talk to each other quite, say, openly. If they tend to agree, disagree, they, they, they, they still can listen to each other. And again, I say, in terms of internal historical studies, this is, I would say, let's last much less complicated than it comes to the political, political sides.

But again, I say, if the, if this matter would be left to the hands of historians, it would be no conflict, but it, it's not what it is. It would be no good to think it could be otherwise. So, we've been talking about the nationalists who, you know, who carried out all of these killings, who were these armies actually, who were these units and these groups on the Ukrainian side.

I think we have to talk about this before we get into the more recent events ...

So, again, I say, I have to, to stop this repeating this kind of the statement, don't expect a simple and simple, of course, we saw it.

They were nationalists, they were nationalists, but there were three different groups of nationalists, which fought each other and they hated each other.

All right, it seems very in our union. It's very much, but also very much Paul and look at the Paul looking America, very much human, very much human, so to say. So basically, there was originally a Ukrainian sergeant army, made by Taraz Bulba, who, by himself, was a kind of democrat and very much close to the police state.

But he used the beginner code or the opportunity to create some kind of the independent state or independent semi state in Volinka when his army could roll.

But then a 42-43, when the Ukrainian nation has been arrested and repressed by the Nazis, they moved to the Volinka, which was very much forced region, very good to hide yourself. And there were two fractions. One was led by the older nationalists, Mahmelnik and the other by the Yankanashlas, which is Bandera. In the long run, this Bandera fraction, which was very much most motivated, they integrated all to other fractions by Bulba and Mahmelnik, quite often by violence, by killing opponents, and thus created a core of the future army.

So now that the question comes, this is the issue, to what extent the decision to exterminate Paul's was really motivated by the illogical concerns, or were just a match, quite just kind of coincidence or the facts. Basically, basically there is a kind of the communists, which says that some Korean nationalists before the war, they thought about exterminations of Paul's angels from the territory.

But, and the parts were important, first of all. They don't see the primary task, because they may enemy was Stalin, Russia and Hitler and Germany.

Secondly, we never know whether this kind of the text has been accepted as a official document's program documents of this nationalist.

Also, we know that even in case of this millennia action, there has been this beautiful rivalry contestation between different kinds of groups in the Bandera movement, because some of them condemned from the very beginning. So I met many of not many, but some of this older veteran, so you can tell you the army. When I was in the United States and the beginning of the 90s, and most of them said that they have the very negative attitude to the millennia. That was just a crime or a kind of mistake, whatever, but that was the negative, they didn't talk about that match, that was the same.

But what I'm saying here, so this was the big question, Russia question. It was this absolute primitive attitude that was origins in the 30s, and the ideology of nationalism, which Navroski tends to claim as a criminal. There has become condemned by Ukraine's own, it came as a sign because of the conflicts of the factors. I myself, like a man you can understand, tend to the second solution. That without the ideology played a lot of work, but it was not important role, because the larger conflicts of the fact of which was very much complicated, because basically again again.

The millennia was territory, the only territory in the Soviet Union, a part of Belarus, which could have a partisan axis, because there was marshes, and there was forest, and neither Nazi or Soviet could do anything with that, because the tanks and the airplanes were useless. This is titled a reverse war, made by the partisans. By the three fractions of Ukrainian nationalist, a Polish army, a Soviet partisans, it was literally war or all against war. And giving the Fed, it was a cut after the Holocaust, and there was a mass killing in the territory.

And the life matter has a very low value, so could easily get this kind of deviance emerging from the territory, so to say. So I'm a rather sorry that I like what Navroski is saying, rather, it was not result of the ideology. It was rather right at the conflict of the factors that was exactly come together on the territory of the 1943.

Why can't we not use the production of our competition? Why can't we use our data when we see a Ukrainian heroine?

All the time, but the war doesn't have a war. Ka-i from AWS is so clear, and makes the security arrangements and escalations of Ka-i with one-sided agents and unwhistening Ka-i tools and services can be used on their own, or with partners to work with them.

Many things to think about more about the fact that Ka-i from AWS is a bit mo...

"Boo, you know, Koceneh was a part of your mobile room, your whole room is already dead, you know, more!" "I'm not a part of your room!" "But a part of your room!" "But a part of your room is not a part of your room, but a part of your room!" "And a part of your room is not a part of your room, but a part of your room!"

"I'm not a part of your room, but a part of your room!" "I'm not a part of your room, but a part of your room!" "Because they just wanted to cleanse the territory to establish their own state, or because they hated the polls!" "Because of some ethnic sort of thinking, like, doing what the logic was at all, is there any historical evidence there to explain?" "Thanks all the propositions and think they are true! All of them!"

"Okay!"

"But now, the real challenge, what was the major, the most important factor?"

"What played the most important role was the lands of minor, or marginal?"

"This exactly was the split theory!" "Because the result of this wouldn't happen if you pose for 30-30 cranes differently in the interwar period!" "This is what the cranes said, that this is not the relations between Nazi Germany and Jews!" "It's not one way!" "It's a both way!"

"It's a mutual violence!" "The long-protracted violence, most importantly, there's kind of the tendency, which is also confirmed by the other studies on the genocide!" "When one side, it's not repressed by the humiliated" "immediately, for the so-expect the kind of mass violence!" "It's a kind of rule!"

"It's not just repressed that we humiliated, the kind of telecasts should be humans!"

"At the second, as a second, or ready to decide!"

"I'm from the story of one side side." "So what I'm saying here, yes, in a minute sense, it was a kind of revenge!" "But again, also have some smaller stories, because there was a story of that time that, allegedly, we don't know!" "That this was the pose who started the killing of Ukrainians in 1941, a certain areas!" "We don't know if it's true, but the story was circulating!"

"What I meant to say, that in times of the war, there's no internet, there's no newspapers, there are gossips, gossip and rumours!" "And when they are circulated, and most of their provocation, they could just as a kind of push, or a start-up for this kind of law!"

"So we really don't know, we really don't know, but the fact is, the fact is, in times of the core, most likely!"

"And it could sort of claim with this kind of the responsibility that this is act initiated by the local commanders of the army in Volenia, which has no kind of confirmation of the consensus from the leaders of the Russian" "So the army that we're talking about, one of the many perpetrators here, the Ukrainian incident army, which, in Ukrainian, referred to as Opa, they play a huge role in Ukrainian history, and more importantly, for this conversation, Ukrainian national memory. "Can you explain why?"

"Because, especially since the full-scale invasion, I think all of these stories and historical legends and myths and actual history has been very much kind of reinvigorated,"

"which, of course, is why and we will get to this in a second, Zelensky, agreed to name one of these elite Ukrainian military units in honor of Opa."

"So why is Opa, why is this army so important for Ukraine?" "Let's start with the fact that Ukraine is a young state. It's a really kind of this kind of supple category, which means, it helps to build a national memory, quite often from the scratch, because Ukraine, a member, has been practically a little bit aboot in the solid, unlike in Poland, thanks to the very important." "So therefore, Ukraine has to look for the symbols." "So we're talking about the symbols that you tight your clients as a holder more, without a doubt."

"It's a central event, and there's a consensus, or we'll be playing regardless of the east or west, Ukraine's big Russian speaker, they have a kind of cross-consensual holder more, as a main tragedy, even to the history." "This is absolutely cool." "It should include, maybe, for listeners who don't know, it was a man made famine by the Soviets that go millets to the Ukrainians."

"Yeah, I think you're about around the four millets."

"So to say, it's something very important."

"Yeah, the biggest tragedy in Ukrainian history, essentially.

"So what I'm saying is that they're looking for symbols, and if hold them more, or by the way, attitude to Stalin's, which Ukrainians has a very negative light rush of to Stalin."

"And like those two issues, the Ukrainian Sergeant Army was the most divided before the war."

"If you wanted to Ukraine to see fighting each other, certainly each other, start talking about the Ukrainian Sergeant Army." "In immediately, there will just be kind of the clash." "One part would claim the bandits, the other kind of their heroes." "So this is mostly the state of our before the war." "The war changed everything."

"Because war is all a game changer."

"Since the beginning of the war, quite of a sort of the third month they will leave the war." "The son of a son is that most of the Ukrainians started to see Ukrainian Sergeant Army, but they are very positive." "Because they sold them, I was simply our anti-racist resistance." "So this is something very important." "And none of them are just few, much of minority."

"Then you see this kind of anti-polish symbol." "Because they tend to disregard and then they don't know about this millennia, what happened to the millennia, this kind of blame blame." "Oh, Ukrainian Sergeant Army for their crimes." "Because they believe this is a part of the Soviet input in propaganda." "So this also gives the kind of issue in other issues."

"There's a strong asymmetry in the Polish Ukrainian historical memory." "Why in Polish Ukrainian memory it's a central event." "You know, he has to welcome him. It's very, the millennia is very marginal event." "And why in Ukrainian Sergeant Army is exclusively anti-racist and symbol in Polish, when it's anti-polish." "And that explains a lot."

"Did the millennia tragedy, or massacres, depending on who you ask, did it have an impact on the relationship between Ukrainian and Poland?" "You know, much later, you know, the 90s onward, after Ukraine regained its independence and was sort of establishing." "New relations after the fall of the Soviet Union with Poland, was this still an issue, or did this become an issue recently?" "No, no, it was initially, as I said again, what happened? It's still a conmerical." "So I was given the spread of the long-protected record, the Polish Ukrainian conflict."

"What happened? That quite after the collapse of the Soviet Union?" "Oh, and Ukrainians reconciled immediately."

"And the fact is that Ukraine was the Polish was the first country to accept or to recognize Ukrainian independence."

"Right."

"It was a clear message, but they were very afraid that Canada will be the first."

"Because there's a many Ukrainians." "I know this, of course." "They've been by several minutes, so to say." "So there's color message, but the issue is there was smart enough, not to raise the issue within you." "This kind of the older elites, most liberal elites on the Polish party and the post-communist elites on Ukrainian parts." "And the 50s anniversary was on 1993, there's probably no discussion."

"It was deliberately done in tension and not to touch this very much contested issue because they know it could happen." "So the first, the first really kind of the discussion emerged in 2003 when Poland was about to join the European Union." "And Ukraine was afraid that when you will stay, or there will be a big mistake, or there will be a rush only." "That will be left by the Polish as a lie." "And this gave a forest a way of the discussion."

"And, importantly, exactly in this day, 2003, there was another attempt, or probably the first attempt of a consolation for a bottle of wine."

"At that time, a Polish president, President Pleschniawski, and the Ukrainian President Kuchma, they met in one of this former Polish village where there was victims." "And they shook the hands and they said this kind of feeling that we forgive, we ask for forgiveness and forgive us."

"It's very important, a simple local act, so to say."

"And because basically, because there was very much personal chemistry between Kołski and Kołski and Kołski and Kołski and Kołski and Kołski, a brother, by the way, led by Zelenski and the previous Polish president." "So personal relations felt very much." "And then again, and then again, in 2015, when the Proschenko, then President Visdot Ukraine, Mr. Poland was also, he kneeled down with toward the monument of the victims of the Polish massacre." "Which is very important, a simple dressed, he was kind of emulating this just firm as dressed, or the Friedrichsmit when he was the German council, Schmid who was the Poland in 1991, he kneeled down in front of the monument of the Jewish victims."

"So when I'm in to say, here it is something very important.

"In 2013, I believe, for the first time, the opposition came to power, which was made much opposed to the Liberals, and they first started to use the Stockholm memory to quite different effect."

"They say that post was much humiliated, before the Liberals now they have to took the position of pride." "So everything that was negative in the Polish history has to be erased, and only those events we said that post were victims has to be, so to say, put in the center."

"So this something very important and this is actually when the term has happened, and then the other crucial element is Viktor Novrodski, with the Polish president."

"Because he is a memory warrior, this something very important. He wants to verse a war against, a memory, he is paid for that, it's kind of his part of salary, when he says so, so to say."

"So this is what ignited this kind of, because basically I would say the decision of the Tsaranski to name one of this kind of the units after Upa, was not a mistake, but a musical collection."

"I should probably just say a few more words about that, that this may, so a few months ago, a president's Lenski sent a decree, naming an elite special forces unit, a unit within the Ukrainian military, after the heroes of Upa, reportedly the unit wanted that designation, and the process is that the president has to sign off on that, and it seemed like a kind of a routine Ukrainian thing, but it triggered a severe negative response from the Polish government, and it was so severe that they ended up stripping the president's Lenski of the highest Polish state order, the White Eagle, which is the most important, the highest, the highest order, the highest order,

and then a lot of drama unraveled that we'll talk about in a minute. But what do you think about the naming of the unit after Upa? You already started saying that you don't think it was a mistake, it was a miscalculation.

"It was a miscalculation, a lack of expertise, because from what I know, this decision was made by Lenski personally, one thing has to be taken account, that Lenski doesn't know history, doesn't care about history." "That's quite a question," because I know it, for effect. He is a kind of ignorant of that, it's not saying that this is nothing bad about him, but he has been raised in the Russian-speaking territory, a big industrialist, and he didn't know where the kind of history. He was the first president. This is something very important. So, when I'm saying here, most probably he didn't expect this kind of actions, and his miscalculation was that basically, when taking this kind of decision, it must be put to the expertise.

If there was the kind of expertise, yes, both of us are different, but it would make a single hand on this, to say.

This is miscalculation, or probably just mistake, whatever you would say, but this is all.

But what reaction on the Polish surface of the cryptic was a such history. It was really a kind of history, which was so extreme that some Polish politicians said that, you know, this would be a huge problem for Ukraine's path towards the European Union, and that if Ukraine sticks to all of these ideas and continues naming things, after a part, then Poland should block Ukraine's assertion. Some of the Polish politicians kept saying, one before the fact. One before it happens. But what happened then, that when Novrovsky said it, quite a sudden, the data largely support of the Polish society, majority. This is what I'm saying, respect it.

Which means that probably the cross some kind of the line here, because that never happened, because there was anti-cranion of groups was in minority.

Now, it seems to be becoming majority, which is a very much dangerous trend. But again, again, it's a typical history. I couldn't describe it in different names. And again, I'm not talking about, for my point of view, I'm talking about, for my Polish friends' historians. Like, this is really some story that my friend, Dario Storia, who is the director of the largest Polish Jewish museum in Poland, has been attacked massively. For that, he said, you can comprehend the Soviet army to some of the Polish and some of the Polish colonial organizations.

For the simple fact of comparison, the same thing, the Polish history could be compared to a power. There is such a strong reaction and hatred against him. So, to say, it's a kind of imaginable. Because the simple fact, simple fact that by historians, it's very, so I'm saying, it's something very dangerous coming today.

I, we are afraid, I'm talking about my names in my name, so names where Polis...

Which may be one of the most important lectures in the Polish history since the fall of the Communists.

Well, yes, this is what I'm saying, because it means that Poland could fall of the elite of the Orban Hungary.

Because I've had problematic territory for the future of the West and the European Union. Because the standards say they clearly, very anti-European, the other fact which is often ignored, that it's not just anti-Ukrainian fields. It's very strong anti-German fields. Anti-German fields serve as a symbol of the center state of the European Union, and the Rotsky is very much under appeal to the say.

He tries to play the role of the Vaba control that was led by Orban.

This would make specs. This is not a problem for Ukraine. This is probably for Ukraine, it's not a problem for Ukraine, it's a problem for the future of the European Union and the Europe itself. And this was a dangerous, because if this, this maybe does a risk, the Ukraine issue became a central issue in the selections. Right, this, that may be my heading to. It's very likely, yes. We talked about the Polish reaction, but of course the Ukrainian reaction to the Polish reaction was also very interesting.

Because when Zelenski was tripped of this highest Polish state award, the order of the White Eagle, I was quite surprised to see that basically every Ukrainian president before Zelenski also came out publicly and gave up their Polish state orders, several other Ukrainian officials have done so as well. And there was just sort of outpouring of support for President Zelenski and the Ukrainian government at large, and I didn't really see anyone within the Ukrainian government within that bubble kind of rolling back and maybe saying maybe we should, you know, take a step back and rethink the naming issue. So what did you make of that?

You know, it's a fact, if you've heard of this kind of war on memory, this kind of demobilization on the fact, because this is a war, luckily not if it's a memory war, it's not real war, but it's a kind of a fact. But that said, that said, I have to say that there is a community on both of Ukraine's and Polish sites of people that had the orders from other side, and they keep the orders. Because they say exactly, because they say it's they to precious for them, they could not say it's not real.

I mean, they put on the risk of Polish Ukraine to reconciliation. So then saying here, I believe it's very much emotional response, very much like a kind of response to this kind of history.

But what's said is also the opposite thing, there are two people who tried to walk for the further reconciliation. They don't want to happen, this kind of the crossing the red lines. And I know many of them, and they have an important figure, some Polish Ukrainians police sites, most importantly, they meet, they talk, they think what to do. And most importantly, the quite often they represent not themselves, but the institutions, most of the civic institutions. They want to live this kind of Polish Ukrainian relations into the sacrifice to the states only. They want to say this society has the only voice, I have to be something integrated.

Because in many cases, the relations between Polish Ukrainians, for instance, the African ... are so deep, are so intense. In many cases, so positive that people just could, that easily, so say to reach them for the kind of political profits.

I mean, the final question I have is really the most important one, I guess, which is, like, how does Ukraine move forward here in light of course, Ukraine's European aspirations?

And sort of the revival of Ukrainian history and tradition that we're seeing, especially after 2022, like, shared the Ukrainian government. Now, every time the name, anything, after anyone think about what the Polish reaction would be, what some other allies reaction might be, or is this something that has to be 100% a sovereign decision that no foreign nation can tell us what to. But what to name our streets after? Who to name our streets after and stuff like that? Again, there's, like, these two extremes here, how does Ukraine figure out what to do? What do you think?

What do you, what do you call them? The second extreme is not extreme, it's a long. It's a long, right. Also, it's also in Polish works, in case of the stroke of memory.

And by the way, there are Polish stores, they also say, they defend Ukrainian sizes, namely, exactly, that's not at this back at this point.

My friend Macyanovsky, who is director of Institute of National Memory, who w...

So, this is kind of normal. This is kind of, this is kind of, this is kind of normal.

But the important issue, it's not, I believe that history is, would be not the main core or the core of the Polish family in this piece.

History was this, the kind of precedent. There's much more important issues to say, and Ukrainian minority claim minority in Poland, to the state or the kind of things. The competition rivalry between the Polish and Ukrainian agriculture or the kind of things to decide, we're much more important issue. That set, that set. I believe that the bandit comes to Ukrainian integration into Europe, and this may be potentially problematic relations with Poland, potential investors.

So, it's anything unique in history of the unions.

Look at the position of France for the case in opposition to Britain, because they'd want to great Britain to join the opinion. For a look, they can, we have disputes within the European Union before they make an opinion, as to say.

Because again, if we have the kind of the rank expectations that Ukraine passed over the European integration would be smooth, no, it wouldn't be, because it never been to any kind of countries.

We were ready for this kind of problems, and we had to, they had to solve. The only real problem is political will, because basically the timing in the pound that we have, the common enemy, which is Russia. But then just in danger of Ukraine and then just Poland and then just rest, and there's the world. So, this much more than the state, the just political relations. This is a perfect note to end on, and it's almost like you've done a few pockets before for a person. Thank you so much. This was very interesting. Thank you for taking your time.

Thank you.

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