Lawfare Daily: Trump, Kim, and the Future of Korea

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[MUSIC] [MUSIC] It's the law fair podcast. I'm Daniel Byman, the foreign policy editor of law fair, with Andrew Yeo, who is a senior fellow

“and a career foundation chair at the Brookings Institution Center for Asia, how was he studies?”

The big concern is that Trump and Kim will just shut out South Koreans and then negotiate their own deal. That being said, I do think President Lee has placed some hope and Trump that whatever negotiations, whatever diplomacy unfolds between Trump and Kim could be helpful for inter-create relations as well. Today, we're talking about President Trump's decision to curtail exercises with South

Korea and to re-engage with negotiations with North Korea. We are here to discuss the Trump administration's, I'll say, changing policies towards both North and South Korea. President Trump recently announced that the United States would be reducing the scope of its military exercise with South Korea as it tries to improve relations with North Korea.

We're recording on August 20th and North Korea has just fired 10 short-range ballistic missiles adding to the uncertainty about the whole U.S. shift. Andrew, I want to have you talk us through the very complex issues both with our ally, South Korea, and also with North Korea. But let's begin with a little bit of history.

Trump, of course, tried to do outreach to North Korea in the past.

It did not work so well, but he first met Kim Jong-un in 2018.

Can you compare the situation today on the Korean Peninsula to the one that President Trump dealt with when he was last president? Sure, and thanks for having me on Laugh Fair, Dan, it's great to be here with you. If we think back to the Singaporean and the Hanoi Somerset took place in 2018, 2019, with Trump and Kim, I mean, the context is quite different.

At the outset, you could say that maybe not that much has changed with the peninsula, but it still tensions between North and South Korea and so still divided.

“But the geopolitical context in which the peninsula is situated, I think that's changed”

dramatically. And I'll just point to three things.

First, North Korea rejects unification and sees it to Korea as a separate state.

That wasn't the case in 2018 when North and South Korea had meetings of President, then President Moon and Kim Jong-un had two summit meetings in 2018 and April and May before Trump met him. Of course, North Korea participated in the Pyeongchang Olympics in South Korea, so there was pretty robust inter-Korean relations back then, and now there's absolutely nothing.

North Korea's completely rejected South Korea. I think the second difference between now and back in 2018 is that North Korea is a stronger and more capable country. A big part of the story, of course, is that security packed with Russia and the economic diplomatic and military benefits it's now reaping from Moscow.

That leads me to my third sort of differences with China and Russia in North Korea's corner. The importance of U.S. North Korea relations for Kim has diminished, so he just feels that he doesn't need the United States as much as he may have back in 2018. So those are some pretty big differences when you put the Korean Peninsula in a broader

Thanks.

That's a great way to begin our framing.

I want to shift the perspective to South Korea and how Seoul sees all this. Trump has described North Korea as, quote, "unthreatening and respectful," and quote, "how to Seoul hear that statement."

“Yeah, so, of course, I think just your average Korean probably did a double take or”

they're thinking what the heck, you know, we thought we were friends with the United States, but I think South Korean policy makers were very conservative or progressive. Also probably did a double take some even shot to hear Trump describe North Korea as "unthreatening." You know, this was Trump's words that North Korea is unthreatening and respectful.

And while the current South Korean government, I think, does seek to improve relations

with North Korea, it's emphasized, so this is South Korean government, they've emphasized the need for deterrence, they've expressed concern about North Korea's expanding drone and missile capabilities, not to mention its growing nuclear program. I mean, yes, if they Trump even mentioned that North Korea possesses 57 warheads. So I think this was pretty surprising for the South Koreans to hear this, that North Korea's

not threatening, because that's certainly not the way South Koreans feel about this situation. But I'll just add, though, that I think President Lee, because he does want to see engagement with North Korea, you know, he'll try to make lemonade out of lemons, so it's not what he wanted to hear from maybe President Trump, he didn't want to hear the criticism about not participating in Iran, but if you can use Trump's words to try to reopen diplomacy

“with North Korea, I think that's what the lead government is trying to focus on right now.”

I want to focus now on the more short-term immediate question of the Trump administration's declaration that the United States is going to limit it, the scope of the old G freedom shield military exercises, for some just how important are these exercises and kind of with that in mind if you reduce them, what are you losing here? Yes, so it was the reduction of joint military exercises that precipitated this whole, you know,

question about North Korea and re-engagement between Kim and Trump, but one thing that's important to understand for those that may not be familiar with the US South Korea lines is that it's an unusually integrated military. The two countries maintain a binational combined forces command, which would coordinate US and South Korea and forces in the event of a conflict with North Korea. So exercise is like the U.S. freedom shield, so that's held every August annually.

It's not just about thousands of troops practicing maneuvers. They're also about making sure that this complicated combined command structure can actually function under a crisis,

under wartime conditions. So with that in place, the fact that the exercises were basically

cut in half, they were supposed to run between August 17th to the 27th, but now they're ending

“on Friday. So from, you know, 10 to 11 days to just five days. No, it means that I think the counter”

threat drills, the life fire drills, these things are being cut back. And I think, you know, just stopping exercises one time, maybe that's on the grand scheme of things that's not going to make a huge difference in terms of, you know, US South Korea, you know, inner operability, their ability to maintain command and control. But if this is something that's done repeatedly, or if, and, you know, Trump has talked about this during his first term about joint military

exercises being a big waste of money, you know, if Trump decides not to do these exercises, you know, they do them also in the spring and March. I think that could, that could have some real implications for the US and South Korea military. Because again, they're part of this combined forces command and they do need to, they need to have these exercises to maintain readiness and deterrence posture. I want to kind of take President Trump's claim, you know, very seriously here.

Are these provocative exercises? Like is this something that really does change to repressions on the North Korean side? Yeah. Well, it's not that there's no truth to what Trump says. But again, if you're in the North Korea or China or maybe in the US, the progressive foreign policy type, you know, where US militarism is seen as the root cause of all regional instability, then yeah, maybe you could say that these massive, you know, training exercises could be

provocative. But, you know, I would counter that these exercises are done regularly. They're scheduled. They're announced and they're mostly defensive in nature. So on that front, you know, even before the exercise happened, the USFK, there was a, you know, they did a the public affairs

you see this as, you know, geared towards them. And it's, it could be very threatening. But from the

“perspective of the US and its allies, you got to remember that North Korea has nuclear weapons.”

They threatened to use them. It's in their constitution that they, that they could use them.

That first use will be permitted. And, you know, they, they constantly are savour rattling and launching

testing missiles. And so for those reasons, the US and their allies need to be prepared. They need to be ready. And that's why we have these exercises. So again, it's not that there's no truth in what Trump says. But you have to remember why we have these exercises in the first place. It's to deter North Korea and defend our allies and our, frankly, our own strategic interests as well. So one thing that has changed on the North Korean side is that it has gained real battlefield

experience in Ukraine. And this has evolved, you know, bearing the full brunt of modern warfare, a battlefield with extensive drone use. How much did that change? How the United States and South

“Korea plan? Yeah. So North Korean forces have gained something, I think, that they didn't”

have before, which is real exposure to a modern drone saturated battlefield. And I remember watching this video online where these drones, which these Ukrainian drones were chasing North Korean soldiers.

It was when they were first North Koreans were first on the Russia, you know, Ukraine front and the

curse again. They were chasing these soldiers, where scrambling and running away. And then there's one drone camera that had a close-up shot of a North Korean soldier's face. And it was a look of confusion plus terror, like all at once. And then the screen goes blank and, you know, this is the sort of warfare that the North Koreans were just thrown into. But at this point, you know, they've they've kind of figured out another adapting, you know, drone technology into their own capabilities,

“like they understand logistics, they understand dispersion. And this is going to help, I think”

North Korea's military and the law and the long run. And so for the US South Korea alliance, I think the implications going back to, you know, the point about having joint military exercise, is that they need to also adapt and prepare because the North Koreans made, you know, it's not just that they might fire missiles aimed at Seoul, but they might, you know, launch a drone attack. And they have before, they've actually been North Korean drones that have entered South

Korean airspace, actually, in Seoul, on back in 2022. So there's real learning that's taking place among the North Koreans. It's not just about the the weapons and the capabilities, but it's also the shifts in doctrine and the way they're incorporating these new technologies. Let's shift over to the negotiations question, which is, if as President Trump has announced, there are negotiations between the two leaders. And if Trump and Kim sat down tomorrow,

what would they actually be negotiating about? What's on the table? Well, you know, we've seen Trump meet other world leaders that, you know, such as Xi or Putin, and I'm not sure if there would actually be any negotiating if it would be more of just an initial meet and greet again. But, you know, what, eventually we would like to see on the table as some discussion about security guarantees about making sure that North Korea is in accelerating their

nuclear or their missile program for that matter. So, you know, I think there needs to be that sort of discussion, but what I fear is that that the security is just a hard kind of political issues aren't really going to be addressed. And instead, Trump will gravitate to what he feels is more comfortable, which is, you know, investment deals, you know, things or looking

probably investing in North Korea for credit, looking at North Korean critical minerals or, you know,

developing the Eastern coast of North Korea where Kim Jong-un has built a huge seaside resort. So, I feel like those things may come up more on the economic side, even though I think some of these security issues, such as North Korea's nuclear program, the missile program particularly, I think those are what we want to see within the discussion. But, you know, in the first meeting, you know, I think it's going to be more a meet and grade before any kind of substances

is nailed down. It's interesting to me that you said the substance would largely be about trying to, you know, limit the nuclear and missile programs. You know, for decades,

Is that done with, is that another era where the world has reluctantly accepted that North Korea

“is a permanent nuclear weapon state? Yeah. Well, I think we have to distinguish between the”

nuclearization as a long-term objective and maybe the nuclearization as a starting point for negotiations. You know, your colleague at Georgetown and a CSI's figure of China, he wrote this peace and foreign affairs, you know, the cold peace has gotten a ton of attention because it's almost seen as an admission in South Korea that even Washington has, you know, turned to a new chapter saying that's no longer about the nuclearization, but we have to look at North Korea realistically.

But I don't think it means abandoning or the nuclearization as a goal. You know, we shouldn't just

simply recognize North Korea's illegitimate nuclear weapon state and then move on because that has serious implications for South Korea, has implications for the non-proliferation regime and

“potentially for other countries in the region as well, too. So, you know, I think the consensus”

that seems to be emerging in, at least in DC, is that the objective should be the media objective should be threat reductions, arms control limitation in terms of where North Korea's nuclear program is at. So we should be asking questions like, can you get a verifiable freeze

on fizzle material production or can you constrain nuclear missile testing or further expansion

of it's nuclear arsenal? Or can you introduce risk reduction measures that lower the possibility of escalation? So these are the sorts of questions that I would want to see raised. And so you don't have to bring up the nuclearization, you know, upfront. But my concern is, is that enough for it can determine because when he says we don't, you know, we're done talking about the nuclearization

“and we're keeping our nuclear stock pile full stop. Now, there's not a whole lot more I think”

the U.S. can do or offer at that point because for us and for South Korea's inner allies, the nuclear weapons program is a serious concern. And it's also a kick-based side. And if you're now a kick-based, what's that? A kick-based is the four-hand fantasy football manager. And that's the principle. It's really a very simple thing. You're a little bit of a single-final, you can't just take a

regular-final, or you're going to have the real-life profile in your car. So let's say that you're a footballer and the other side, the counter-off-the-bundestigasy-sauce-off-tack is an August, Trump and Eureloid are together, a little bit of a single-final, and side-fond-tack-one-meter-by, the kick-base-app, just download and let's see. Good kick and fun. Let's get back to South Korea, and on the assumption that these negotiations go forward,

but they go forward as you suggest where it's, you know, photo-op and some discussions about economic opportunity, but it's not anything that is, you know, kind of deeply substantive and security front. How much should we worry about the South Korean reaction to this? How does this affect the bilateral relationship? Yeah, so what South Korea is often fearful of is, there's this term called South Korea Passen, meaning that Trump and Kim are going to negotiate, and then

Trump is going to completely forget about what South Korea's interests are in this diplomatic engagement. And, you know, one good example is, you know, I mentioned this artillery, North Korean artillery is all aimed towards Seoul, and so a big concern is short-range ballistic missiles, but if Trump says that well, the real threat is North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missiles, and so they want they want to freeze, you know, testing ICBM testing, but they don't say anything about the short-range

missiles. That would be problematic for South Korea, but but that is the big concern is that Trump and Kim will just kind of shut out South Koreans and then negotiate their own deal. That being said, I do think President Lee has, he's placed some hope and Trump that that whatever negotiations, whatever diplomacy unfolds between Trump and Kim could be helpful for inter-create

top has completely rejected South Korea in terms of South Korean overtures for engagement for aid

“for assistance. And I think Lee is hoping to perhaps write on the co-tails of Trump if he's able”

to engage with Kim that that Trump would do in a solid and also encourage him to reach out to South South Korea as well. So that when I said that Lee is trying to make lemonade out of lemons with Trump's, you know, latest truth social post, I really do think that he is trying to he's hoping that some door can open towards diplomacy or at least some environment for diplomatic dialogue can be created through a Kim Trump meeting. I want to step back

beyond the I'll say current situation and just ask more broadly, what do you think Americans and this can be, you know, people who follow the issue generally or experts, but what do you think Americans kind of systematically misunderstand about North Korea today? So for those that don't follow North Korea repeatedly, our image of North Korea is it's this, you know, isolated, periostate that's extremely poor but has lots of nuclear weapons. That's still correct, but

there have been a series of articles in the Wall Street Journal in the New York Times watching a post about just how much North Korean society is changing that, you know, Americans we shocked to know that they have mobile banking, you know, online banking mobile pay, there's some like Uber like, you know, a service and so if he just looked at the photos or if you just looked at North Korea propaganda, you would think it looks like, you know, Hong Kong or Shanghai.

Obviously this is just the capital and it's not their large part of the country, they're extremely poor, but North Korea has moved forward to head despite sanctions, despite its isolation from the West. They've been able to move forward and this is accelerated with support from Russia and China.

“So I think for most Americans, I think they would be surprised to see, you know, how,”

you know, technologically savvy the North Koreans have become. I mean, it does out there in the, you might follow this a little bit Dan, but, you know, North Korea's one of the worst actors out there when it comes to, to cyber-highs and in terms of, you know,

crypto big into crypto currency and crypto theft. I think $2 billion were stolen by my North

Korean actors, you know, between 2020 to 2024. So that's something that I think Americans may need to update that North Korea is not so isolated as it once was. It's not, I mean, it's not this poor backward country that we, we may have been thinking for for decades. So that's, that's something that we, we do need to update. I guess that folks like myself or or Victoria, but CSIS need to make that point clear. That's a different North Korea from what it was 10 or 20 years ago.

Excellent, that's fascinating. Let me again flip to South Korea. Is there a fear or concern that South Korea has that you feel is not sufficiently appreciated in Washington circles? I mean, so there's

always this question about whether South Koreans are hedging between China and between China and

United States. I'm sure we're going to hear some of this in the next week or so. Wang Yi was actually in a soul today, you know, holding meetings with South Korea's National Security Advisor. And so, you know, folks in, you know, in the Trump administration may again be asking why is why the South

“Koreans talking to the, to the Chinese? But I think something that Washington maybe doesn't sufficiently”

appreciate is that the Korean Peninsula is on the border with China. And this isn't just an issue. It's not just a hard, you know, security issue for the South Koreans. I think for South Koreans who still think about unification that think about inter-creia relations. It's, yeah, it's not just about security, but it's the issue that relates to unification. For that reason, the Koreans they like to, there's this framing where they say it's either alliance or autonomy. That you either choose

the alliance or you want to kind of go your own way and you want to choose autonomy. And this is one of the reasons why South Koreans are spending much more in the defense that they want to make sure that they're properly equipped if, you know, the US moves in a different direction. And but I think most Koreans, even the progressive league government, they'll say that it's not really a choice for us, but it's really, you know, alliance and autonomy. It's because of the strategic

neighborhood that they live in, that they have China at their border, that they're, you know,

they feel in their history, they've always been, they've been undercut by, you know, great power

politics, whether it's, at the start of the Cold War when the peninsula was divided or when it

Korean peninsula. And I think that has an impact on the way South Koreans think about their

security and their security environment. And so when it comes to things like North Korea, when it comes to, you know, it's relationship with China, they feel that there's this historical, I guess narrative, if you well, that it kind of shapes their thinking about their environment. And so that's

“something that I think sometimes watching folks in Washington don't really get. And it's kind of”

hard to explain. There's a lot of context and nuance behind it, but it's someone like President Trump, he doesn't really do nuance. So yeah, but that's something that I think South Koreans think,

so, you know, Washington doesn't sufficiently appreciate. Most of what we've talked about

has been on military exercises or negotiations, but a relatively short-term set of questions focused on the coming months. Let's fast forward five years. It's a different demonstration. And we're looking North Korea, what would constitute a successful US policy towards North Korea in those five years? Where you'd feel five years from now, hey, that actually went reasonably well. Sure. I mean, it depends how high or how low you set set the bar. I mean, five years ago from now

is like, it's like 2020, I mean, there's nothing going on. The last US North Korea official engagement was an October of 2019. It plays in Stockholm, Sweden. Since then, there's been zero engagement. There's been no inter-cria engagement. You know, it's a pretty low bar. If you say just having some

“diplomatic engagement will be a success, but that's how difficult this North Korea problem has”

been. That it's certainly, for sure, it hasn't gotten better. If anything, it's gotten worse because North Korea's capabilities continues to grow. So if you can at least get North Korea to put a hold or put a freeze that's verifiable on their nuclear program and have some diplomatic engagement between US and North Korea or even among the parties and the South Korea's talking about this for, they're talking again about a four-party discussion between Beijing, Pyongyang,

Seoul, and Washington. If there's some dialogue that's taking place without North Korea moving further, it's nuclear program. I think that would be a huge success compared to what we've seen in the previous five years. That strikes me as a realistic benchmark for success. And I'm going

“to end on that optimistic note that maybe we can, you know, if we can't move forward, at least we”

can avoid moving farther backwards. Well, it's rare to get sit here that would opt them as a men North Korea policy in the same sentence, so I'm glad you're ending on that note, Dan. Maybe I should say a less pessimistic and usual. Andrew Yield, thank you very much for joining us. Thanks for having me here. You can get ad free versions of this and other law fair podcasts by becoming a law fair material

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