Trump’s Wars are Spreading But Can They Beat Iranian Rope-a-Dope?

sub basement of the Ministry of Snark in Washington, D.C. and from other undisclosed locations across America and around the world. Hello and welcome to Deep State Radio, I am your host, David Rothkuff.

This is the second part of a two-parter we're doing today, the other, which is running

on our need to know platform, which was a conversation with Yagana Torbadi, who is the New York Times Iran correspondent. Now we're going to turn to two of our friends who are wise about all things everywhere in the world, Ed Luce of the Financial Times, Harry doing Ed. Doing great, thank you, David.

“You had any relationship to Henry Luce, the founder of the time?”

No.

He's not one of my ancestors, no.

He's not okay. And also the new Ferrari is named the Luce. I noticed. Yeah, that's definitely named after me, I was very explicit. I thought as much and just a couple letters of the alphabet away, we have Doug Luce, General

Doug Luce, Ambassador Doug Luce, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, former Army Lieutenant, General former National Security Council staffer for not one but two administrations, how are you doing today, Doug?

“Well, good to be back with you, David, good to have you here.”

As I mentioned, we started out our conversation today looking at Iran because this came

up this week for a variety of reasons, changing Iran strategy consequences of Iran actions visit of BB Netanyahu to the White House yesterday and so forth. We also have a visitor of Vladimir Zelensky to the White House yesterday, we'll get to that little later. But I want to pick up on that, then I want to go to a column that had wrote and then maybe

we'll talk a little bit about Ukraine. Doug, one of the points that came up in this discussion started with the creeping expansion of this on again, off again, war with Iran. As we discussed, there were a few days of quietude and then yesterday there was some action, including Iranian missiles launched at U.S. related targets in the region.

But also, U.S. and Saudi attacks on Iranian backed militias in Iraq. There have been other countries in the region that have provided support and been involved with the U.S. Israeli attacks on Iran thus far. But this Saudi involvement seems like an escalation. Last week, we had the Houthis going after traffic in the Red Sea, another avenue via which

oil tankers leave the region and threatening the Saudi trans Arabian pipeline. And that, in turn, raises the prospect, the perhaps there will be a little competition for control of the other side of that channel, the Horn of Africa. And so slowly, but surely this non-war, which was supposed to end overnight, is now entering its sixth month, seems to be connecting, and I'll add one other thing, a few days ago,

the Ukrainians attacked in Iranian ship in the Black Sea and the Iranians, according to reports, had some serious discussions about where to go after Ukraine.

“Sometimes when I see this kind of pattern of behavior, I think back to, I don't know,”

World War One, World War Two, how these things unintentionally start in a narrow place, but a spread, so talk me off the ledge. You know, you're right. Initially, this was very focused on the Persian Gulf region, and most recently, centered on the straight of her moves itself, but it has slowly migrated north, south, and west.

I think that was in the Caspian Sea, not the Black Sea, but nonetheless, to the north.

And meanwhile, there are also reports that Iran may be receiving more precise targeting information on US facilities in the region from Russia. And of course, predating all that by several years is the Iranian support for Russia's war in Ukraine, initially by way of the Shaheed drones, and so forth, which mostly now Russia is producing itself, but that all began with a supply line from Iran to Russia.

So this has tentacles reaching to the north, to the south.

“You mentioned the Houthis who are sitting astride the Bobo Mendeb, right?”

The southern exit of the Red Sea, and potentially controlling the Saudi diversion of oil from the Persian Gulf across the Saudi peninsula to Yanbu, and if the Houthis actually shut down of that flow, that would have a further impact on global energy prices.

Then to the west, we always had the engagement with Hezbollah and Iranian support for Hezbollah

in Lebanon, but increasingly Iran has struck US partner states in the near west Kuwait, but then beyond that, Jordan as well. So you're right. This is gradually expanding beyond the Persian Gulf region, the immediate Persian Gulf region where it started.

“Well, one of the things that makes this a little more worrisome than it is, and frankly, it's”

pretty darn worrisome. And I am not at all speaking to the lack of capability of the American leadership, which is another issue.

Is that the Iranians don't seem to be in that big of a rush to reach a settlement.

And Trump today said, oh, we're going to hit him hard now, which he says on a daily basis. But in my conversation with, yeah, I'm going to throw a body, you know, we were talking about the fact that the Iranians think they're in an okay position. They don't have elections coming up, really, that, you know, matter, they're not a democracy. And they seem pretty content to play what, I know you're a big boxing fan.

What Muhammad Ali wants called rope it up, which is where he sort of absorbs a bunch of punches, lets the other person punch themselves out. That, you know, they figure the closer we get to the election, the more pressure on Trump. And we had polls in the past 24 hours that showed that 71% of the American people oppose how Trump is managing this.

Trump's disapproval rating is close to two thirds. It's pretty dark now. Imagine where we are in a month or two higher prices, spreading war, etc.

“Yeah, I think rope adope is a really good analogy to Iran's posture right now.”

I mean, it calculates, I think correctly, and I've been fascinated to hear Doug's estimates, that, you know, every time one of its drones, whether they're heading for QA to a Jordan or wherever, are shot down, America loses, because the drone costs $50,000, and the intercept costs $3,000,000, or something, or thereabouts, and the munitions, American munitions are going to run out before Iran's highly distributed ability to produce cheap drones.

I think that's a pretty good bet. So this daily recitation by Trump, that this time he's really going to bomb the shit out of them, and squeeze every last dollar out of their economy, is just something they just don't take as remotely credible, and, you know, nor should we, because time and again throughout this war, Trump has demonstrated that he's not going to a good grasp of the picture

there in the Gulf. It keeps asserting things that turn out not to be true to the extent that journalists and diplomats tend to go to Iran for corroboration to see whether what Trump has said is true or false. That is an extraordinary indictment of this president's grasp of what's going on, but also

his credibility as the chief spokesperson, as well as the commander-in-chief of the United States is an extraordinary situation that we have so used to it, we forget how surreal it is.

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“David, I think Ed mentions two asymmetric advantages that the Iranians hold.”

First of all, they hold this asymmetry and weaponry, right? Relatively cheap offensive system, strike systems, face a much more expensive array of defensive systems. They hold an asymmetry in geography, because they set a stride the straight of her moves.

And the reality is that something like 20 or 25% of global energy supplies have to flow

through that. And I really find interesting Ed's point about this asymmetry and credibility, right? I mean, I even find myself turning to Iranian sources and comparing them to Trump's narrative and edging towards believing that the Iranians probably have our closer to being credible than the White House.

So this is a classic case of asymmetry. It's also a classic case of, I don't know, do we call this mission creep if there was never clear mission? I mean, you know, in one respect, Doug, the mission was to take away a big strategic

“threat from Iran, which was nuclear weapons, right?”

They failed at that mission, they failed last year at that mission. The centrifuges are still there, the missile material is still there. The scientists are still there. Some of the people who are more inclined to negotiate are gone. The people who are in charge to our less inclined negotiate.

But meanwhile, all this is happening and they're discovering the high costs of wanting to have some kind of nuclear capacity. We have said to them, oh no, no, no, no. You've got these strategic advantages that are asymmetrical. You've got straight or four moves.

That's better than nukes. That affects the whole world that gives you leverage without, you know, mutual assured destruction. You've got all these drones. You've got the ability to do asymmetric warfare.

You've got the US shooting itself in the foot and lying itself with a pariah state-like Israel. I think one of the byproducts of the past five months of war is the United States giving Iran more strategic weapons than it had thought it wanted. Well, look, 20 years ago when I was on the US SENCOM staff and we wargamed a potential

conflict with Iran. All of the points that you lay out that control the straight, the potential strike against a golf, a Persian golf partners and so forth, the difficulty of actually bombing away the nuclear challenge, the nuclear capability of Iran, all of those things were very apparent. And I think what's very clear today is that Iran has actually not just hypothetically

laid out what's possible by way of the straight of her moves in control of energy and so forth. It's actually demonstrated it. So there's nothing more credible than actually demonstrating a capability.

“And that's what Iran's done with regard to the straight.”

I think the bottom line here is that your previous guess, the mention of the pain and the

the ability to endure pain, it shows that today Iran has a higher threshold for enduring pain, the kind of pain that we're inflicting, then does the White House. And that's especially true with what approaches to be now, $100 a barrel oil and the roughly $100 days until the midterm election. 97 days until the midterm election from one we are from one we are counting today.

And in the past couple days, another thing happened. Trump announced that we were going to build a nuclear power for Saudi.

in the quote memorandum of understanding, but the Saudis, then he got a lot of flack.

“And he said, oh, no, but I also mean you have to sign the Abraham Accords.”

Don't know if the Saudis are willing to do that. But it's very clear that Trump did this for a reason, or at least two possibly two reasons. One is he wants Saudi to stay on side. And as this draws on, the Gulf states are getting frustrated and feeling pain. And so he wanted to be able to give something.

And perhaps he wanted to get an exchange, Saudis doing some of the military heavy lifting. Of course, the other side of it, which I found kind of interesting that it didn't get more attention near times to the good story on it, was that a lot of Trump's friends,

buddies and relatives would benefit from a Saudi nuclear deal.

So it didn't get much notice when Trump's failing media company through social or Trump media, or whatever it's called, decided announced a few months ago what's going into the nuclear business.

“Don and Eric are going into the nuclear rich business.”

Letnik kids are involved indirectly with Westing House and the companies that build all these kinds of things. And we have this bizarre example of Trump mismanaging this war. And he had tried to find a grift in the middle of it. It's really talking about walking and chewing gum at the same time.

It's amazing that he can do everything in his power to lose a war.

And yet still try to figure out the angle to make some money off of it. Yeah. I mean, it's extraordinary deal. Whether it goes ahead or not, because the Saudis were not happy to hear about this intellectual, addendum that Trump posted on social that they recognize Israel.

There was not part of the deal. And they made it clear that you don't change deals by tweet. But what does this deal represent at this point? And I mean, on objective sort of foreign policy, the primitive grounds, this bypasses the international atomic energy authority, the IAA, all the inspections, the additional

protocols so called that come the inspection rights for IAA, nuclear inspectors to go into a country at any time without appointment, spot checks to ensure that a civil nuclear program does not become a nuclear weapons program. And this is what Iran incidentally was subjected to as part of the JCPOA. Saudi Arabia will be exempt from that. It can enrich uranium on its own soil.

We are asked to trust US Saudis, two-year study into whether that will be safe and feasible. And that alone. That's the only safeguard, and it's not a safeguard. Why would Trump be doing something that would incentivize nuclear proliferation around the world?

The IAA would be essentially a dead letter that would, in further incentivize Iran, neighboring Iran against whom Trump has gone to war to prevent a nuclear program, to dash for the nuclear bomb.

“I think while the only safety safe place here is North Korea, and that is obviously driven”

by personal business interests and by this sort of cupidity towards the Saudi royal house and the deals that flow from it. What could possibly go wrong in 1974, Henry Kissinger did this with the Shah of Iran? Are they thinking through that there might be a regime change in Saudi Arabia that it could turn fundamentalist?

This is after all still a Wahhabi society? No. None of those considerations are really relevant. I think that this is the product of a president who doesn't even pretend to be pursuing America's national interest, let alone geopolitical stability, but is in this

for the grift, and I think we should be absolutely plain about what's going on. There are no objective public policy national interest grounds for such a shuddy and a reckless deal. Yeah, our friend John Wolfstall, who's a non-proliferation specialist, who is actually asked for the Biden administration to negotiate a similar deal on this, and I were talking, another

thing he mentioned, by the way, I just throw this in here dog before I turn to it, is that the way the deal with the UAE is written, is that the UAE gets whatever the best deal is in the region. So all these things about enrichment and so forth, which weren't in that deal, they kind

No, I don't think he did.

But, you know, I don't want to put you in an awkward position following Ed's statement here, but let's go inside Trump's mind. Why would he do this? Well, that is an awkward place to think, to consider. Look, I can't ascribe any motive beyond the one that you too have already mentioned, and

that is a sort of short-term transactional approach that may be benefits people in his immediate orbit and so forth.

“I think the strategic impact of this, though, first in Saudi Arabia, but I think actually”

more broadly, across the region and beyond the region, is that this is simply not a white house that is worth trusting, and we have two and a half years more of this administration at a minimum, and I think our Persian Gulf partners, certainly the Saudis, have essentially conclude will conclude that they can't trust this administration for anything, and even if there's a signed agreement, it's very transactional, and it can reverse course.

In this case, I think in the time span of 24 hours, this will eventually, this lack of trust, this lack of sort of confidence in the administration. I think we'll erode our posture in terms of basing in the region, I mean increasingly our Persian Gulf partners have to ask, so what is if we actually get from U.S. bases, and what they get is they get a target, right?

They get to be targeted, they don't get consultation, they don't get adequate defense because

our munitions and capabilities are themselves limited, and finally, they get to be targeted.

“So I think this is, it's just another shoe to fall with regard to a pattern here of lack”

of trust, less lack of confidence, and eroding commitment. Before I go back to Edlet, let me ask you a quick agenda to that, because you're our military guy here. It doesn't seem to you like the depletion of munitions associated with this protracted conflict is a much grave or matter than it seems to be, and we'll actually take, even

if they get the crazy budgets they want from the Congress, we'll actually take many years to fix. Yeah, absolutely, but look, we have the defense industrial base that we have, right? I mean, remember Rumsfeld, you know, you go to war with the army, you have not the army, you'd like to have.

Well, we go to war with the defense industrial base that we have, and that base reflects

“the investment decisions of 20 years of counter terrorism and counter insurgency.”

It turns out that Taliban didn't have an air force. So we didn't ramp up Patriot Air Defense Missile production for the last 20 years or

so, and in the first couple weeks of this conflict, during the high intensity part of this

conflict, when we were flying thousands of sordies a day, and the Iranians were shooting back. Because first several weeks, we consumed the production of the timelines that would be required to produce about two years worth of replacement stocks. So we were consuming in two weeks what will require two years to replace.

And you can't rapidly increase this production. There's capital investments, so factories, labor forces, and so forth. Most constraining are supply chains that are very tight. So this will eventually lead us, I suppose, this afternoon, to talk about the licensing agreement of the Patriot missile system for Ukraine.

Well, that's a great advance in terms of a signal, but it's not going to produce anything in the near term, useful for the defense of Ukraine. And it all goes back to the fact that we have a very constrained defense industrial base. So let's sort of make that transition. Now, yesterday, in and around the latency-gramed funeral, the President met with Zaledsky and

Netanyahu. One of the things that I thought was a little odd, and I just like your reaction to both of the meetings. One of the things I thought was a little bit odd, was we haven't heard much, usually Netanyahu comes out of a meeting in a leaks like crazy.

He tries to spin a different narrative. We didn't get that. Usually the President comes out of a meeting with Netanyahu, and he's got all sorts of big pronounce.

It was kind of quiet.

“We did get some interesting things out of the Zaledsky meeting, and we got to admit, Zelensky,”

he has become pretty deaf to this stuff.

This is a guy who trumps sort of kicked publicly, and he handled it, built relations with a lot of people. But Zelensky had the kind of savvy to say, you know, the Russians are helping the Iranians attack your people in the Gulf. He was the one that put that out there, and, I don't know, somehow he's managed to win

the affections of Laura Loomer, I don't know if that's a victory, but she, you know, she does have some sway over the President, but what did you think of those two meetings yesterday or were they pro-forma? No, they weren't pro-forma. I mean, I thought the most interesting bit is there for the Trump Zelensky meeting, there

is no vans. Vans, of course, being the chief instrument of that humiliation of Zelensky, and the chief administration skeptic about the Iranian position altogether. But there was vans for the Netanyahu meeting, and Vans says, you know, probably the most skeptical anti-Israel figure in the Trump administration.

So this is sort of a relative fortunes of Netanyahu and Zelensky can be measured by Vans' absence or presence was sort of one thing that I took from this. So if Vans is in your meeting, that's a bad sign. It is a bad sign.

“And I think we can all reasonable people kind of agree on that, you know, that was really”

interesting that Netanyahu is not trying to spin this, because he's the sort of past master at spinning. He's incredibly good at it, spinning before a meeting of the President going on Fox, addressing him through different sort of tribunes, and then in the meeting with him, there was none of that sort of open press, right? There was no risk. You know, based on what

his press statements were, you would think he was meeting with Mam Dani, America's president, right? Exactly. So, you know, I think Netanyahu, you know, realizes that Trump has got a short fuse with him nowadays, that he feels like he was sold a bridge to nowhere on February

the 28th. Now, Trump has only himself to blame, but Netanyahu, I think, was pretty critical

in persuading Trump that Operation Epic Fury would be a quick success. So, not much, Netanyahu can do to undo the past, and the past is seriously consequential. So, he would drew some troops from parts of Lebanon and other Lebanese army to replace them where the idea had been in order to secure this meeting with Trump, which he's been asking for for weeks and weeks and weeks and not getting. So, that's the sort of, that's the relatively fallen

status of Netanyahu Trump's eyes. The landscape on the other hand, you know, is a winner in Trump likes to associate himself with a winner, at least he perceives him to be a winner for the time being. And I think the Patriot, the Lockheed, Raytheon sort of talks are proceeding and that I'm sure Doug's right, there's nothing in the short term, probably not this winter that can be done to improve missile defense batteries in Ukraine, but at least that is

going ahead. Even more sort of oddly, I'm very belatedly, Whitkov and Kushner, the two envoys, will now for the first time ever visit Ukraine. Whitkov having been to Russia several

“times in extraordinary asymmetry. The only thing that could be worse is that they visited”

with that. I mean, that's like talk about, you know, second prize is two weeks and fill it out here. Yeah. Well, and third prize is a fully paid vacation with Laura Luma in Keith. He's saved by that. That's what the vice president should get. But so, I mean,

I just saw it as a tale of sort of contrasting and changing fortunes between two critical

war leaders on the world stage. I thought it was very, you know, very interesting that for neither of these oval office visits was the press in the room and part of the presentation, right, which is, you know, in many of these foreign, foreign visits, that's the thing that counts, right, from the Trump administration. I think it signals that he didn't have anything to deliver that was positive to his base with either of these visits. So they were close

whole private discreet, which is very, you know, unlike this White House. Yeah, but you know, Doug, you brought up a point that I wanted to bring up before, which is that this Patriot thing is a win that's not a win. It's a gift that's not a gift. It's like, okay, here,

missiles right now to give you the ones you need right now. And B, we're going to give you

this capability, maybe, of Lockheed and Raytheon, who actually control the IP, give it to you.

“And then if they do, you're talking, you said two years, I think that's very generous. Several”

years away before they can, they can produce this stuff. Meanwhile, you know, on, you know, the optics of yesterday's meeting, I was reading the comments of variety of people like the historian Philips O'Brien who comments a lot on, on, on Ukraine stuff. And he was like, don't be fooled by the press releases or the Laura Lubber. What is the US giving

Ukraine right now? Are they giving them anything hard and fast? Are they doing anything

to change? And as far as we can tell, they're not. Let me just interrupt. I think there's one exception. I think that the information intelligence flow from the US to the Ukrainian targeting officials remains. And that's important because the deeper Ukraine strikes into Russia, the more reliant they are on overhead targeting information and intelligence. So that element,

“which is very just very subtle, right? And it's out of the headlines is remains, I think,”

the most significant American contribution to the Ukrainian war effort. But in terms of hardware,

you're right. I mean, we basically aren't providing thing anything that they can't produce

themselves. And the Ukrainians are demonstrating that they can make pretty good headway without it. And, you know, so this gets to another theme that I do and I've talked about on the air and off there, but I'll let it be the final comment here. I think we're at an interesting moment, historically. The Donald Trump BBNet Yahoo, and Vladimir Putin are all waging wars in a kind of old-fashioned way, where they think overwhelming force being a superpower, having advanced

advanced technologies, et cetera, give them an advantage. It ties a little bit to what you were writing about your article about Trump's misunderstanding of what power is. They, you know, he can bully. He can say, "I'm the superpower." But we've gone through the list here on this show many times. The United States is a superpower. Hasn't won anything, except, you know, grenade, maybe, you know, it hasn't won any of these wars. Russia, when Hindu Afghanistan, lost. Russia has

had similar problems. These are old school guys who don't understand that when you go up against somebody who's got all the time in the world, all the political will in the world can stay there and hold their ground 60, 70, 80 years of history say they're going to have the advantage, no matter what weapon systems you bring in unless you're willing to put in super-overwhelming force. And in the case of Ukraine, even doing that has been a disaster. But interestingly,

in October there's an election, baby could lose. In November there's an election that could render Trump once and for all into being a lame duck and over. Putin is sick. I just wonder if we're coming to the end of an era and that these guys represent, not just failed ideas, but a cast that is exiting stage left. So, I would like to think, I mean, I've had too many full storms with all three of these characters to assume that they're entering stage left yet.

You know, Putin's health might be in question, it's political health. It's certainly more part of us than it's been in a long time. And Netanyahu could be defeated in October, but Netanyahu is who Dini, he keeps getting out of situations that would destroy sort of different other almost any other politician. And, you know, I don't bank too highly on the kind of person who'd replace him, we saw what NAFTAli Bennett and Yellapir have been saying. Now, they would not

face the legal sort of issues that Netanyahu has, but they have a similarly militarist view to the problems Israel is facing. Who would come after Putin? Well, we careful what you wish for.

“I mean, you know, I think he's likely to be ousted by some kind of a military coup than to”

die of natural causes, but, you know, I'm certainly not making any predictions. And as for Trump, even if he is a domestic lame duck after November, which I suspect he will be

duck. And, you know, that this kind of adventures and might be even more tempting to him and certainly

“the money making that is a corollary of Trump inserting himself into regions like the person”

Persian Gulf, that will become more tempting. And then, finally, this idea of power, the confusion of power as being about force or might. And the misquoting of, you know, ancient Greek history and usidities and so forth on this question, isn't something that Trump's going to lose a taste for it, terms of, you know, estrikes and missiles strikes. I mean, that you see in the Caribbean, you know, just just how strikes are continuing there, even though cocaine,

importance of the United States are estimated to be higher. Fentanel wasn't touched. It never

came from the Caribbean. His delusions about what constitutes power seem to be getting worse, not better. His learning curve slopes downwards. So, I just want to add a caboose to that question FBA duck. Trump's not going to learn. I don't know whether the next president will. But people in the US military, you know, periodically, they, you know, there, there was a plethora of reports after Vietnam. How do we learn from that experience? There have been a number of instances

where the US military has shown an ability to learn and adapt, but we still seem to operate along the lines of, well, if we have a trillion dollar budget, we can do anything. And as a turns out, if you have a trillion dollar budget, there are a lot of things you can't do on a regional basis, because a lot of those big, you know, fantastically expensive weapon systems aren't usable. Don't give you the leverage you want, et cetera, et cetera. Do you think our

“military is going to learn from these experiences? Well, I think that's a mixed picture. I mean,”

I think you mentioned Grenada. That's maybe the last time, you know, we won. I can actually, you know, note that we're at the 35-year mark after the Desert Shield Desert Storm experience. Right? So this is HW Bush, the liberation of Kuwait and so forth. In my mind, that's the last time we got strategy, right? And strategy and the kind of the classic sense of N's ways and means careful alignment over time, not over reaching and so forth. The assembling the right resources

required both national and international to accomplish the task at hand. We haven't done that since that. And it's not just the three world leaders that you mentioned with this late part of this conversation. It's going to come back across American presidents of both parties. So I think that there's fundamentally something to learn about our process in about our capabilities and how we put those together to actually craft a strategy that can deliver. Because frankly, we didn't deliver,

we haven't delivered in my view on a military campaign since Desert Shield Desert Storm. And that's 35 years. That's a long, that's a long after action report to reflect on.

“Maybe the military learns, but it's not just the military. It's got to learn. It's I think it's”

our national security council process, David. You've written a lot about this. Our access to expert to deep expertise on these problems before we launch in with military campaign and so forth. So there's a lot to unpack there. Probably two or three additional episodes of this podcast. Probably. As we enter year 12 of the same discussions. Yeah, probably. You guys are smart and you are wise and you are also very charming.

And it is always good to talk to. I think this is very useful. I do want to reiterate

that we had a sort of other half of this conversation, which is available in the need to know podcasts with you. I get into our body the New York Times. Iran correspondent who has provided an insight out perspective on Iran, not just on our podcast, but in a new book she is written. So I encourage you to listen to that. I encourage you to come back here because we'll see Doug and Ed again very soon. And hopefully we will see you all soon. Any of the various places you can find us on

YouTube on the places that you normally find podcasts on sub-stack, on Instagram, on TikTok, all those places. So we'll see you then. And until then, bye-bye.