Lawfare Archive: How's the Iran Deal Really Going?

Running isn't enough anymore. With PWC's managed services, your operations don't just run, they evolve continuously,

powered by AI embedded directly into your workflows. So instead of maintaining yesterday's model, you're building tomorrow's advantage. PWC's managed services, we run your operations with tech and talent, so you can run faster, scale smarter, lead stronger. Support comes from wise, the smart way to manage the currencies you need around the world.

“Your life is global, your money should be too. Some providers promise no fees on overseas transfers,”

don't be fooled, extra costs often hide in bloated exchange rates, choose wise, you can send spend and receive money in over 40 currencies. Count on the exchange rate that you'd usually see on Google, that's how millions save billions on hidden fees,

be smart, get wise, download the wise app today, tees and sees apply.

I'm Sarah Littlerich, intern at Law Fair with an episode from the Law Fair Archive for June 28th, 2020-6. On June 17th, President Trump signed a memorandum of understanding with a wrong that formalized to temporary ceasefire and began a 60-day period to negotiate a more permanent deal. A week later, the ceasefire appears to be holding, but the prospects for a long-term deal remain unclear. For today's archive, I chose an episode from June 4th, 2016. The podcast is an audio

recording of a panel discussion from the arms control and non-pilliferation initiative at the Brookings Institution, about the joint comprehensive plan of action, or JCPOA, negotiated during the Obama administration, which Trump later withdrew from in 2018. The panel is included, his excellency, useive, allotable, ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the United States. Derek Chale, Councillor and Senior Advisor for Security and Defense Policy at the German Marshall Fund,

Brookings Senior Fellow Robert Einhorn, and Brookings Law and Residents in your fellow Richard Matthew. They discussed the past, present in the future of the JCPOA. Iran, to most of the countries in the region, is a much broader threat beyond the nuclear

“fund. In fact, I think the nuclear file is probably the easiest part of the Iran threat to deal with.”

For the next 10 to 15 years, we have gotten ourselves a runway, a safety zone, to sort of speak,

that has taken off one of the most important issues. We believe that in the next 15 years,

it is going to be virtually impossible for Iran to get a nuclear weapon. Now, having said that, if we can now move to work effectively, together as an international community to address the other part of Iran's behavior, Iran's support for his brother Hamas, Shamilish as an Iraq, Houthi rebels in Yemen, creating havoc in Saudi Arabia's eastern province or Bahrain or Kuwait, then this deal will be judged as a good deal.

If, on the other hand, we now fear risking this deal by pushing hard on Iran and sort of taking our foot off the gas and looking in the other direction, this deal will be largely judged as a bad deal. I'm Benjamin Whittis, and this is the warfare podcast June 4th, 2016. That is the voice of Yoseph al-Atiba, ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the United States, speaking at an event this week at the Brookings Institution. The event was entitled

"The Around Nuclear Deal," frailude to proliferation in the Middle East, question mark. The event launched a report by Brookings Institution, scholars, Robert Einhorn, and Richard Neffin by the same name. In the report, the authors assess the current status of the Iran nuclear deal and explore the likelihood that in the wake of the agreement, regional countries will pursue their own nuclear weapons programs. Hosting the event is Iran experts, Susanne Maloney,

ambassador of Taiba, and Derek Chalette, senior advisor for security and defense policy at the German Marshall Fund, appeared on the panel to discuss the report. It's the law fair podcast episode 173. How is the Iran deal really going? Good morning, and welcome back to you all after the long and beautiful holiday weekend here in Washington. I'm Susanne Maloney, I'm deputy director of the Foreign Policy Program here at the Brookings Institution, and I'm very pleased to be here

“to help launch an important report by two of my Brookings colleagues. Senior fellow, Robert Einhorn,”

and non-residents senior fellow, Richard Neffin, the report that you have before you entitled

service, as part of the administration, particularly in the negotiations with the Iranians, Bob and Richard know this issue inside and out, and they have crafted a detailed and thoughtful examination of the deal, and its implications for non-proliferation policies across the broader

“Middle East. I urge you all to read the report, you should receive a copy on your weigh-in or on your”

weigh-out, and study the recommendations, because I think we're all going to be looking at this issue for quite a bit of time in the future. It's been nearly a year since the deal itself was signed,

and we had now almost six months of full implementation of its most important provisions,

and yet the joint comprehensive plan of action and the Obama administration's diplomacy toward Iran and the broader region has continued to provoke an intense debate here in Washington, and intense diplomatic challenges with our allies and across the Middle East. For that reason, we are especially pleased to have with us today, two discussions, who will take on various aspects of the report, Derek Schelle, Senior Counselor at the German Marshall Fund, who comes to the German

Marshall Fund after a very distinguished career in the administration at the Pentagon, the White House, and at the State Department. And his excellency, Yusevella Taba Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to Washington, who brings one of the most thoughtful and well-informed voices from the region on this particular issue, and has been a notable commentary on all of the aspects of the Iranian nuclear deal. You have their bios before you. We're going to start with presentations

by the authors of the report itself, and then we'll engage in a discussion from the podium.

We'll bring it finally to the audience and give you all a chance to contribute and ask questions

to everyone on the panel. With that, let me turn it over to Bob Einhorn. Thank you. Susanne, thank you very much, and welcome to all of you during the congressional debate

“on the joint comprehensive plan of action, the Iran nuclear deal. Last summer, a key issue in that”

debate was whether the deal would increase or decrease prospects for proliferation in the Middle East. Supporters of the deal argued that by removing the risk of the nuclear armed Iran, the deal would reduce incentives for countries in the region to acquire nuclear weapons.

Opponents, however, claim that the deal would increase those incentives because it would legitimize

Iran's enrichment program. It would allow Iran to ramp up its missile material production capabilities when key restrictions expire after ten and fifteen years, and it would boost Iran's economy. Sanctions relief would boost Iran's economic economy and give Iran the resources to devote to a nuclear weapons program. Richard Nephew and I strongly believe that the JCPOA will reduce prospects for proliferation in the Middle East. But uncertainties about the future of the JCPOA

and uncertainties about the future of the region are going to persist for quite some time. And these uncertainties could motivate regional countries to keep their nuclear weapons options open, and the countries of the region may be asking themselves a number of questions over the next

“several years. Will the JCPOA be sustainable over time? Will it unravel over questions of compliance?”

Will it withstand challenges from opponents, both in Washington and in Tehran? Will it survive leadership transitions in the United States and Iran? Will Iran ramp up missile material production capacities when key restrictions expire? Will it then break out of the JCPOA and build nuclear weapons? Will Iran continue to threaten the security of its neighbors? And will the United States maintain a strong regional military presence and be seen by its partners

as a reliable guarantor of their security? With the support of the MacArthur Foundation, the plow shares fund and the Carnegie Corporation, Richard and I studied how these and other

we evaluated the likelihood that key states will pursue nuclear weapons or at least

enrichment or reprocessing programs that could give them a latent nuclear weapons capability. We examined official statements, media accounts, and the writings of American and regional experts. We visited the region twice and conducted an extensive series of interviews with senior officials and non-governmental experts to encourage candor. These interviews were carried out on a

“not-for attribution basis. We focused on four key countries, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,”

Egypt, and Turkey. And of the four, Saudi Arabia is the most highly motivated to pursue nuclear

weapons. Turkey sees Iran as an implacable foe that is intent on destabilizing its neighbors, achieving regional hegemony and upending the kingdom's internal political order. At the same time, the Saudis have lost much confidence in the United States commitment to the security of its regional partners. In part as a result, the Saudi leadership has taken a more assertive independent role in regional conflicts, especially in waging its aggressive campaign in Yemen.

“But despite these reservations about the United States, the Saudis know that they have no”

real choice, but to rely heavily on Washington for their security. And they know that they would

place that vital relationship and jeopardy if they were to pursue nuclear weapons. The Saudis clearly have the financial resources to pursue nuclear weapons, but acquiring the necessary human and physical infrastructure to pursue an indigenous nuclear program would take many years. Richard and I try to get to the bottom of the widespread belief that Pakistan has agreed to help Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons. But the truth about this alleged Saudi Pakistani

“understanding is hard to pin down. If such a Saudi Pakistani understanding was ever reached,”

it was probably very long ago at the very senior levels of both countries and it was probably very vague with no operational detail about how it would be implemented or the circumstances in which it would be implemented. And in today's circumstances, it's very unlikely that Pakistan would agree to become Iran's nuclear accomplice. We next look at looked at the United Arab Emirates. Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE believes Iran poses a severe threat. And like the Saudis,

the Emirates have lost considerable confidence in the reliability of the United States. But also like the Saudis, the Emirates are reluctant to put their vital security ties to the United States in jeopardy. Also, the Emirates are heavily invested in an ambitious nuclear energy program with the construction of four nuclear power reactors. And the Emirates know that this program would be dead in the water if they opted for nuclear weapons. Indeed, in support of its strong

national commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the UAE has formally renounced the acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities. After the JCPOA permitted Iran to retain its enrichment program, the Emirates said they may reconsider their formal renunciation of enrichment. But Richard and I were told in Abu Dhabi that the UAE has not changed its nuclear energy plans and has no intention to pursue enrichment or reprocessing.

Next was Egypt. Egypt is on everyone's short list of potential nuclear aspirants in part

in the NASA years. But while Egypt and Iran have often been regional rivals, Egypt does not

“view Iran as a direct military threat. Egypt's main concerns today include extreme”

mastectivities in the Sinai, the fragmentation of Iraq and Syria, disarray in Libya and the adverse impact of these developments on Egypt's internal security and the Egyptians recognize that none of these threats can be satisfactorily addressed by the possession of nuclear weapons. In addition, while Egypt plans to build its first nuclear power reactor with Russia's help,

it had ambitious nuclear energy plans in the past which never materialized and given the

severe economic challenges currently facing the Egyptian government, Cairo's nuclear energy plans are unlikely to fare much better this time around. Finally Turkey. Turkey is also on everyone's

“short list of potential nuclear armed states. But Turkey has maintained reasonably good relations”

with Iran, even during the height of the sanctions campaign against Iran. Although the two countries take opposing sides in the Syrian civil war, Turkey, like Egypt, does not regard Iran as a direct military threat. Indeed, Ankara sees instability and terrorism emanating from the Syrian conflict

as its main security concerns and nuclear weapons are not viewed as relevant to dealing with

those concerns. Current tensions with Russia over Turkey's shutdown of a Russian fighter jet are another source of concern to Ankara. But the best means of addressing that concern is to rely on the security guarantee Turkey enjoys as a member of NATO, and Ankara will not want to put its

“relationship with NATO at risk by pursuing nuclear weapons. For the sake of completeness,”

Richard and I also looked at regional countries whose past nuclear weapons programs were halted by coercive means, namely Iraq, Libya, and Syria. We concluded that under current circumstances none none of these countries was in a position to pursue a sustained disciplined nuclear weapons effort. So our bottom line is that none of the Middle East countries we studied is likely to pursue nuclear weapons, or even latent nuclear weapons capabilities, at least for the foreseeable future.

Richard. Thank you, Bob, and thank you everybody for joining us here. As Bob laid out, our assessment is that the likelihood of a proliferation cascading the Middle East is fairly low, and it's certainly lower than it was prior to the inclusion of the GCPOA, which addressed an a very direct and fundamental way Iran's nuclear program and the risk that it would contribute to regional proliferation. However, the likelihood is not zero.

And if we've learned nothing else since 2000, it's that we should be in possession of a healthy sense of humility about making predictions about the future trend in future direction of events in the Middle East. There are several events that could happen that could invalidate our prediction, and much will depend on what Iran does over the course of the next 10 to 15 years. Moreover, even if we were right, there are several things that the United

States both can and should do that would decrease this possibility, and frankly, it will also have positive benefits for U.S. policy and U.S. relationships in the region. And we offered

eight specific recommendations, each of which has settlements. They are, first, to ensure that

the GCPOA is rigorously monitored, strictly enforced, and faithly implemented. Second, strengthen U.S. intelligence collection on Iranian proliferation related activities and intelligence sharing with countries in the region. Third, deter our future Iranian decision to produce nuclear weapons, including through the passage of a standing authorization to use military force, if Iran were to be detected engaging in a nuclear weapons breakout. Fourth, seek to incorporate

key monitoring and verification provisions of the JCPOA into routine international atomic energy

regime. Fifth, pursue U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with Middle East governments on terms

“that are realistic, and which serve U.S. non-proliferation in regional interests. Six, promote regional”

arrangements that refrain fuel cycle developments and build confidence in the peaceful uses of regional nuclear energy programs. seventh, strengthen security assurances to U.S. partners in the Middle East and eighth to promote a stable regional security environment. I won't go into all of these recommendations here, but I do want to stress three common themes that kind of persists throughout all of them. The first is that the central test of non-proliferation in the Middle

East will be on whether or not the GCPOA does what it sets up to do, whether it's able to constrain Iran's nuclear program as well as constraints Iran's ability to establish regional agenda. This may seem like an obvious point, but it cannot be stressed enough that the decision to pursue nuclear

weapons capabilities at the end of the day is always going to come back to an issue of security

dilemma and a sense of vulnerability. And so an inability to address that in vulnerability through conventional means will almost certainly prompt at least consideration of nuclear weapons or at least latent nuclear weapons options by countries. The history of nuclear proliferation in my view is in fact one of tit-for-tat armament in the face of overriding security imperatives and both finished and aborted nuclear weapons programs bear the hallmarks of the security dilemma

and that's no less true in the Middle East. To the extent that the overall security environment can be stabilized, then there will be less of an impetus to develop nuclear weapons or the option to pursue nuclear weapons by all states in the region, both countries outside of Iran and Iran itself. And it's for this reason that we emphasize the full implementation of the GCPOA creation of this strong sense of deterrence. The establishment of security assurances,

especially through mechanisms necessary for them to be seen as both existing and operational. Not just simply words on a piece of paper, but something that actually is living in breathing and works on a day-to-day basis. And work to promote a more stable regional environment, especially by seeking resolution of submarine conflicts. But these latter two factors also point to another resonant theme in our research, the need for the United States to be a player in the

region. In my view, after decades of involvement in the region, we've yet really to settle upon an equilibrium for how the United States ought to operate in the region. And establishing this equilibrium,

“the choice between involvement and remoteness is essential. States in the region need to have”

some sense of predictability when they are dealing with Washington. They need to have a sense of whether or not we are in it for the long haul and whether or not we will fulfill the obligations that we take on. In part for this reason, we've recommended not only deeper security relationships, but also civil nuclear cooperation with interested states throughout the region. Of course, such a relationship is not simply going to be about establishing a closer link between the

United States and partners in the region. There is also a value about discouraging the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Doing so may in fact require something different than the use of the gold standard as enshrined in the UAE/US nuclear cooperation agreement, at least in so far as the words on the page are concerned. But the practical impact and the meaning of those words has to be the same in order to create this again the sense of equilibrium and the sense of fairness,

really, in how US nuclear cooperation operates. We've also emphasized this imperative closer intelligence sharing on both sides so that countries in the region know what we know and we're in

a position to know what they know and most importantly what they think they know. And this is a critical

distinction and our ability to be able to work with one another to both dispel rumors that may be contributing to the sense of security concern that isn't even there as well as to confirm the reality of any suspicions that in fact exist. The reality is, however, that only time will tell. And even more important than how the JCPOA was negotiated and what its words say will be how we transition from its restrictions and transparency mechanism into a new world in 10 to 15 years.

“And this, I think, is the third theme of our recommendations. To put it bluntly, I think Bob and I”

believe that we should avoid this transition altogether to the extent that we can. The potentially easiest left in this regard, but I must stress it is not easy by any stretch in the imagination. We would be to try and incorporate into standard international monitoring and transparency practices, those very tools that we work so hard to put into the JCPOA. Some of these are just technical changes on the part of the IA and how it operates. For instance,

the use of online enrichment monitoring in your immigration facilities. Other parts, however, may

that have some nexus with weaponization are going to be dealt with in the future.

But it's work that must be started now and it's work that's going to take a long time to complete. A far more difficult left would be the organization of a regional approach to the nuclear fuel cycle. I'm not suggesting that we seek to establish a multinational fuel cycle in which Iran and countries and the Gulf Arab side of the Persian Gulf are able to work together on nuclear

“projects. I think that's probably something that's not terribly feasible. Instead, we recommend”

that we find ways of crafting regional agreements or filling that at least regional moratorium on aspects of the fuel cycle that others in the region would find threatening. Reprocessing is an easy one because really no one outside of Israel is suspected of even engaging these activities throughout the Middle East. Enrichment would be all together more difficult. But I think that there is a relationship that can be built between countries and Iran

about holding fast on the kinds of restrictions that are already in place. For Iran, this would involve the actual possession of enrichment, but not in a materially useful way for our nuclear weapons pursuits, and Iran agreeing to hold back the development of its enrichment capabilities. For countries in the region, it would involve holding off on enrichment and accepting at least theoretically asymmetry with Iran, but also avoiding the financial, political, and security

investment that would have to be embarked upon and accepted if in fact countries were to decide to try and match Iranian capabilities in 10 to 15 years. Frankly, all of this may prove to be impossible

“to work out, but I believe that a multi-variable approach picking up various different aspects”

of these recommendations and bringing them forward has the greatest chance of success and reinforcing what we already think is a positive direction for an application in the Middle East. And I think it's our view of the recommendations we put forward are an agenda of ambitions. That would be developed further and consider by countries in the region. The United States and our partners if we wish to actually ensure that the Middle East does not become a cascade of proliferation.

>> Thank you. >> Thanks very much to both Bob and Richard for outlining the analysis and the report, the recommendations and the report. We're going to turn now to our two discussions to say a few words and ask them to speak actually from the table here, Derek. >> Sure, thanks. Great to be with all of you this morning and first I just want to congratulate Bob and Richard for what I think is a terrific report. I had an opportunity several weeks ago to read it in draft

and really commend it to everyone here. So much has been written on the Iran nuclear deal over

the past year, much of it slanted one way or another and this report is sober, fair, self-critical

and solution oriented. So it is a real achievement and I congratulate you. I concur very much with the bottom line that Bob and Richard have talked about today that the result of the JCPOA and the nuclear deal has supported proliferation cascade in the Middle East over the next 10 to 15 years but I also very much concur that there are a lot of uncertainties here and they are right to warn that ensuring implementation presents a series of tests for the United States, for our Middle

East partners and for our European allies in the years ahead. So the question is what we can do to build on this deal and enhance it to ensure that it meets its objectives. There's a lot of very smart recommendations in this report. I'm going to focus on those related to the security and

military aspects of what we should be doing in the next 10 to 15 years and essential part of implementation

of this deal is to further deter Iran from its nuclear ambitions and reassure our allies and this is a process that is going to need constant tending and maintenance in the years ahead. Now the roots of this strategy really began eight years ago with the dual track of pressure and engagement and maintaining pressure for implementation will be important and it must be a priority for the next president and his or her administration. That's of course economic pressure but it's also

going to be maintaining the military pressure and I think there are four components of that. It's presence, it's planning, it's capabilities and it's cooperation and I'm going to quickly tick through each of those starting with presence. As Richard and Bob noted there is for better for worse fair on fair a lack of confidence right now perceived by many in the region in the United

“States so that's why presence is important. It is important. It will be important to maintain”

U.S. military presence in the region and I believe to be explicit about our intent to do so over the next 10 to 15 years during the period of the JCPI. Folks should not be guessing whether or not

do that. Now seven years ago alongside the diplomatic efforts to build the sanctions regime and the initial outreach toward Iran that Bob and Richard were instrumental to there was a concerted effort to build and maintain the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East in the wake of the withdrawal from the Iraq and at DOD where I served in the last two and a half years administration we called this set the theater to ensure that the United States had the capabilities

in place to execute all options if the president's so ordered. We need to continue to set the theater in the years ahead. We have that capability there today we still have more capability in the Middle East than the United States had prior to 9/11 but that will come under increasing pressure from demands in other regions in Europe in Asia where there is a high demand for more U.S. military presence also budget pressures here at home also the sense that the JCPI has solved the problem

and that therefore there is less of a demand for U.S. military presence in the region so we should commit to maintain that that includes ground presence aviation maritime for example like

maintaining a carrier battle group second planning making sure as Richard noted this needs to be

we need to ensure that this remains operational we must maintain the military planning for all options and a little history here is important when the Obama administration came into office the truth is the planning was not in the shape that we had expected it to be that planning had after feed in the 2000s for for many reasons secretary gates initiated a series of efforts that secretary of defense peneta and hey will continue to ensure that the U.S. military had done the

necessary planning on a variety of scenarios to execute any options that the president ordered

“and we made sure it was resourced and exercised we cannot let that atrophy again in fact I think”

it's even more important in the next 10 to 15 years to keep that planning tight critical component

of planning is of course U.S. capabilities and the development of weapons to address the unique and hardened Iranian nuclear infrastructure and a lot of resources and high-level attention over the past several years went into ensuring that the U.S. maintained the military capability to address the Iranian nuclear threat and we need to continue to the work that work on weapons design and procurement in the years ahead and a final point is on our declarative posture the

various leader summits of the last two years at Camp David and Riyadh the United States with our Gulf partners is reiterated the Carter doctrine in terms of the U.S. commitment to the security of the Gulf I think it's worth exploring as the report suggests looking at expanding the nuclear

“umbrella in the event that Iran proceeds to break out and I think that's something the next”

administration should take a close look at. I also commend the reports idea that it should seek prior authorization from Congress and AUMF if Iran violates the deal I think it's a very good idea unfortunately I do think it's unlikely given that it's hard to see Congress authorizing the war that we're currently in let alone one that's theoretical but I think it's something we should

definitely pursue third partner capabilities we need to focus on enhancing partner capabilities

in the Middle East that's something that's been a big project of the Obama administration of the last seven years working with our Gulf partners and ours Riyadh partners to ensure that they have the means to protect themselves and deter Iranian aggression there's been several record setting arm sales of the last several years and there's more on the table right now that needs to get over the finish line soon we need to implement the commitments made and the camp

David and Riyadh leaders summits especially on greater cooperation on maritime missile defense cyber security and soft and we we do need an expedited process for weapons acquisition here in the United States this is something when I was in office worked very closely with Ambassador

“Taibon it's it's a frustrating process to say the least and I think this is something a new administration”

and a new of new Congress next year should take up as one of their first hundred-day projects to come up with some new system while maintaining Q Israel's Q and Me but to ensure that our Gulf allies get the get the capabilities they need in a more timely fashion and we also need to recognize some of our best partners in here I will also point out the UAE they should get major non-NATO ally status that's something that this report suggests that that we do fourth cooperation

and over the last seven years we the US and our Gulf partners have created various for a to try to bring about a common conversation about the Iranian nuclear threat and what we are going to do together to try to address it and start at a ministers level of course has has continued

future it's very important for these summits to continue it fills a gap when you think of the US engagement with other parts of the world Europe Asian particular there are regularized leaders summits where every year sometimes more than once a year the president of the United States will meet with those regional partners we did not have that in the Middle East and I think

“that's what this process has started and it's important for the next administration to continue it”

this report recommends that in the first six months of the next presidency the there is another

one of these leaders summits I think that's a good idea I also think it's important between now in the end of the year that there's another ministerial level meeting for the foreign and defense ministers with their Gulf counterparts to talk about where we are in these various projects that we've outlined for one another and although the report also notes that it might be a bridge too far at the moment to think about some sort of more binding security alliance like a NATO I think

there's some ideas from NATO that we could import into the conversation the region for example but it could be Article 4 of the NATO 3D which is a a consultative mechanism that's built into the

alliance that if if a particular partner feels threatened in any way they can call for immediate

emergency consultations and that's something perhaps we could look at as part of some sort of regional

“security architecture um two final points first it's very important for us throughout the process”

in the next ten to fifteen years to keep the onus on a ran and to ensure that we maintain the leverage that we created together over the last seven years where Iran was seen as the partner that was the outlier was seen as the recalcitrant party whatever the United States does we cannot let our actions allow Iran to turn the tables and make the United States the recalcitrant partner in the eyes of the world and if the United States is the one that ends up isolated that's

very important secondly this is not just an American project this is a this is a common project of the United States our or Middle East partners are European allies and so it's very important throughout this process over the next ten to fifteen years where it is going to be constantly tested and there are so many uncertainties that the United States keeps the world together on this getting to this point where we are today required one of the most intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts

in our history alongside Camp David under President Carter the two plus four process on German unification date and it's going to require the same kind of energy creativity relentlessness in the next ten to fifteen years that it required to get to this point the next administration is going to have to lead on this this is not something that's just going to be about nice words it's going to have to take on a series of very tough and relentless actions and that's yet

another reason why the choice we have in front of us over the next year in terms of the new administration is so important thank you very much for your time thanks very much Derek and on that note I'd like to try to draw and master all a type into the conversation you've been one of the most articulate voices on the tension that this report gets to between the importance of the implementation of the deal and its strictest terms but the broader recognition that the deal does not

address the real challenge that Iran poses and and recently you wrote in a in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that the Iran we have long known hostile expansionist violent is alive and well and as dangerous as ever can you speak to how you see the early phase of the implementation going and the broader challenge that the region proceeds from Iran thank you Susanne and I want to thank Brookings for having me today I also want to say that I largely agree with Derek and that this

report is probably the most objective and thoughtful report on the Iran deal I have seen so far so thank you to Richard and Bob for all the hard work for putting this together Iran to most of the countries in the region are is a much broader threat beyond the nuclear

“file in fact I think the nuclear file is probably the easiest part of the Iran threat to deal with”

and I do agree with the reports conclusion in that for the next 10 to 15 years we have gotten

ourselves a runway safety zone to sort of speak that has we taken off one of the most important

issues we believe that in the next 15 years it is going to be virtually impossible for Iran to get a nuclear weapon now having said that if we can now move to work effectively together as an international community to address the other part of Iran's behavior Iran support for his balla Hamas Shamalish as a new rock healthy rebels in Yemen creating havoc in Saudi Arabia's eastern

we now fear risking this deal by pushing hard on Iran and sort of taking our foot off the gas

“and looking in the other direction this deal will be largely judged as a bad deal and I think this is not”

often taken into consideration when people discuss the deal people look at the deal and say we've prevented Iran from getting a nuclear weapon our you know our job is done no it's not I think our job is just beginning what I wrote in the article this was a easy article to write because I wrote facts I simply wrote what Iran has done in the last 10 to 12 months they have repeatedly tested missiles and violation of UN Security Council they have continued to support his balla

they have continued to support he rebels in Yemen and so what I wrote was how the how the

region sees Iran's behavior so the question remains are we in an out be able to make Iran pay a higher price for this behavior or not and the answer to that will largely reflect on how that deal is viewed and if I can maybe press you on that point are you seeing from the Obama administration at this stage the sort of pushback to Iran's behavior in the region that begins to rebuild some of the confidence that has been lost around the region about US presence and commitment I do but I also

see mixed messages I do see a desire to push back Iranian influence but at the same time I also see US officials encouraging European businesses to go to business with Iran and so there is this mixed messages that we receive on on one hand yes don't worry we have your back the US is committed to your security but at the same time we're trying to open a broader avenue into Iran despite their current bad behavior so I think if you ask anyone in the region they will tell you

that they see two sides of the same point I'm going to abuse my role as moderator for just a moment and post just a couple of questions to our panelists before I bring out to the audience and hope that at least a few of our distinguished guests sitting up front might have a few words to say when

we do that but I want to speak first to the assessments within the report and then get to what

“as Derek said the the solution oriented aspect of the report which I think is really important”

in terms of the assessment the one area that seems to be a bit of a wild card at the moment is just the internal politics of Saudi Arabia and I wondered how confident you are that the changes that we're seeing in Saudi leadership and the dynamics within the royal family will mean for the durability of the assessment that in fact the Saudis will prioritize the vital relationship between the United States and Riyadh in a way that would deter them from taking any sort of

other action in terms of proliferation. Do your current managed services really help run your operations or are they just running in circles running isn't enough anymore with PWC's managed services your operations don't just run they evolve continuously powered by AI embedded directly into your workflows so instead of maintaining yesterday's model you're building tomorrow's advantage PWC's managed services we run your operations with tech and talent so you can run

faster scale smarter lead stronger support comes from wise the smart way to manage the

“currencies you need around the world your life is global your money should be too some providers”

promise no fees on overseas transfers don't be fooled extra costs often hidden bloated exchange rates choose wise you can send spend and receive money in over 40 currencies count on the exchange rate that you'd usually see on Google that's how millions safe billions on hidden fees be smart get wise download the wise app today t's and see supply that's why it is Syrian phenomenon is true there come from the ice an enthroned get weiter up support get to sit at the

staffel house of the dragon by HBO max here findet you the ganze world from vesteros on one mort gamer frones on night of the seven kingdoms unnaturally house of the dragon drachen camp from gig drachen tigerians gig tigerians intrigue ferrat and epische slachten all that awaited you in the new stuffle also streamed yet the new stuffle house of the dragon on the other series from gamer frones noo of HBO max well it's clear in many ways that

more assertively especially this generational change we see with the defense minister

Muhammad bin saman apparently reportedly in the lead in taking a much more assertive regional role especially in the campaign in Yemen and you know in in our research Richard and I heard many regional countries concerned that the Saudis may be overreacting and may be stimulating instability and even blowback to to their own interests uh by doing this uh it's a it's a

“very delicate balance i think the u_s_ has to pursue and is trying to pursue in the Obama”

administration on the one hand uh showing our support for the security interests of our partners including uh Saudi Arabia but the at the other on the other hand uh not providing uh too much support uh for actions that the u_s_ believes uh may be going a bit too far i think the u_s_ uh knows and certainly present Obama has stated that it's going to be very important in the

long term uh to first of all but achieve a balance in the region uh between uh Iran and its uh

and its supporters and the uh the Sunni Arabs that are concerned about Iran in behavior establish this balance uh with a strong u_s_ credible military presence but there's a second part of that dual track approach after demonstrating our commitment uh it's to encourage some kind of uh regional accommodation uh it's difficult politically to do that in the u_s_ uh to seem as if uh we are mediating between our traditional partners and the country that's caused

“so much instability in the region uh but i think unless uh we can uh promote perhaps in accommodation”

a reconciliation goes too far but at least some kind of balance um so that uh both Iran and

and the Saudis feel that they can stand down a bit in terms of uh military activity uh in the region that's going to be uh very important uh the Saudis are demonstrating their independence and a number of ways not just in their campaign in Yemen and the support for uh uh elements in the Syrian civil war but also engaging in discussions with other suppliers of arms and potential security cooperation between meetings with with Russia and other countries but what

Richard and I learned and we met with very senior uh Saudi officials including in the ministry of defense was that at the end of the day uh the kingdom relies on the united states for its security uh and is going to be unwilling to jeopardize that by uh flirtation with other suppliers it knows it knows no one else is going to be both able and willing to fill in for the united states

“so that i think is stabilizing in influence but the US has to be a good security partner”

and to uh engage in activities along the lines of what Derek has emphasized. And let me just pose one additional question really to any of you who'd like to take it on um you know one of the key aspects of the deal was the sunset provisions within it key and obviously very contested on the part of uh many here in Washington and in the region um you've talked in this report about using various aspects of the deal kind of reutinizing them

and making them making the the Iran deal is sort of platform for non-proliferation activities across the region and potentially more broadly but but clearly the timeline is going to matter because the clock's already ticking on on the expiration of the various provisions in the deal what are the key steps that particularly in new administration might want to be working on um expeditiously in terms of setting the the bar high and and trying to do the best possible in terms

of ensuring that some aspects of this deal survive and endure well beyond the 810 and 15-year expiration dates and that invite any of you to to maybe tackle a few words on that. Can I tackle part I'm not going to answer that because that's a question for the administration but I'd also like to tack onto your question is what happens if it's not done? What happens if did the end of 15 years those restrictions are lifted and the exact opposite happens

are lifted off Iran is stronger economically I think that's an important question to address

too because it goes to the heart of you know the cause of the report itself. So I'll take a swing at answering both of those questions.

“I think the reality is that a lot of the steps that are part of the JCPOA are within the”

ambit of the international atomic energy agency to incorporate more generally you know things like online enrichment monitoring you know which is a technology that safeguards inspectors used to see what's going on and what's going through the pipes that that's a very straightforward way for an inspector on the ground to be able to say yes what a country's telling me they're doing is what they're doing and the degree to which the IA can scrutinize use of that sort of

technology especially with the combination of remote monitoring and transmission of information

you know that gives you a lot of confidence that what you think is going on at the plant is going on at the plant and it may seem very overly technical and a little bit too pedantic to focus on things like that but frankly those are the kinds of steps that give you confidence to know when breakout is started because you know like it or not at the end of the day Iran's nuclear weapons ambition are gonna be hamstrung or facilitated by its fuel cycle capabilities and what

it presently has and what it will have in the future if you know what they're doing in any one particular moment that gives you greater confidence that you can react quickly and I think if there's one unheralded accomplishment of the deal it's not just that it extended breakout times from two to three months to a year it made sure that entire year was usable for any administration seeking to counter it either through military force or diplomacy or through

“you know quick application of sanctions so it's an important step that it allows I think”

countries in the region of beyond to know that what's going on in that Richmond plant is still what's going to be going on you know later on and I think you could see value for bringing that technology in similar safeguards measures into the broader you know global context I think there are other things and we talked about in the report there would be useful prohibition on some activities that are directly related to weaponization you know I think that the JCPOA usefully highlights a few

key pieces of technology like you know the the systems that use to validate a nuclear explosions going to work when you you know test a warhead x-ray cameras and so forth that you could be able you know to have broader export control rules or agreements on the part of countries not to pursue those capabilities you know for the very fact that they are so destabilizing and risking again I'm not suggesting that all these things are easy but it seems to me these are fairly straightforward

technical fixes that you could bring to bear which which brings though to the question of you know let's say that we're not able to bring for it all these technical technological fixes and illegal infrastructure fixes to how nuclear programs are done yeah I don't think the Obama administration ever foreclosed the possibility of responding to an Iranian you know increased in Richmond program in 10 to 15 years in any way that I might being fit you know including use in military

force return to economic sanctions and so forth and I think the Iranians have some awareness of their vulnerabilities in that regard to some extent actually the reintroduction Iran backing to the global economy is going to only increase their vulnerability to the possibility of economic sanctions and for those who say well there's no chance it will ever get that kind of sanctions regime back against Iran I would point to the sanctions regime we have against Russia you know Russia

is by far a much more significant oil producer we still have sanctions on Russian response to Ukraine those sanctions are doing damage to the Russian economy I don't think there's any reason to believe that you couldn't reintroduce similar source of measures against Iran if you wanted to go the sanctions path and if not if military option is is what you choose to pursue then we have a better understanding of whether nuclear sites are what's in them what the capabilities are so I

think really all options do remain 10 to 15 years from now if I get it to then give me more to say

you know this is a critical matter the question of what happens after 10 to 15 years this is one of the

“the areas that have been has been focused on most by the critics I think it's important to”

recognize that sure Iran legally can ramp up its capability to produce physal material after 10 then after 15 years it legally can do that as part of the JCPOA the question is will they do that they say today that they will do that that's a committed to have an industrial scale enrichment program in order to produce fuel for their future fleet of nuclear power reactors but how realistic is that the reality is that Iran is not going to be able to produce its own nuclear reactors

you know have been and will continue to be I think their major source and the Russians insist

on providing fuel for all the reactors that they sell to Iran which eliminates any

“persuasive rationale for Iran to have an industrial scale enrichment program I think that”

needs to be pointed out there is no legitimate peaceful justification for Iran to ramp up its programs and we should be looking at further incentives to convince Iran that it doesn't need to do this also technically it's not at all clear how Iranian research and development on new centrifuges will go will it even be in a position to ramp up its capability to the extent that it says it's committed

to do we will see but we should adopt policies to try to discourage them from building up their

capability to the extent that is legally permitted also this is a kind of misperception I think of how the JCPOA works yes Iran can legally ramp up its capability after 10 and 15 years but it's not you know and let's say it decides to do that it has good R&D program it ramps up its capability is it free to go ahead and use that capability to build nuclear weapons no the JCPOA as well as the continuing Iranian adherence to the non-proliferation treaty for bids them for doing that

plus after 10 and 15 years all of the very intrusive monitoring arrangements under the JCPOA

will remain in place so that if they decided to break out of the JCPOA and BAA and NPT

and go for nuclear weapons we would be able to detect that and we would have the opportunity to intervene if necessary by the use of military force to stop them so well many critics speak as if it's virtually automatic that after 15 years we're going to have a nuclear armed Iran it's far from automatic and we have tools to intervene and stop them. If I could just very briefly build on what Bob just said because I think use of this gets to your your question about what happens

in 10 15 years and is Iran just going to flip the switch and I think it's that you use the phrase

“runway or we're in a zone now and I think it's very important to see the next 10 to 15 years that”

way because as Bob and and Richard have suggested in their report and as I firmly believe we can't be frozen in time over the next 10 to 15 years and pretend that this deal has just has done the done the job for now and will kind of punt to use another sports metaphor for for another decade plus it's really how we use this moment that we're in and a lot of what Bob and Richard have suggested what I've talked about our ways that we can build up this muscle tissue of regional cooperation,

dialogue, capabilities development so that as we get closer to the timelines as laid out in the JCPOA we can make a common judgment of where we are and what needs to come next and in the mean time we're doing a lot of things that are going to hopefully deter and influence Iranian behavior on all the issues use of the you rightly pointed out that are not addressed in the JCPOA that

“really really concern all of us and I think that that the key to that is not taking really any option”

off the table if Iran breaks out or if Iran chooses the next 10 to 15 years hence to take some steps that we would deem is in our in our security interests. I think that brings me to my earlier point which is the the absolute what will determine a lot of these questions we're debating up here is simply how this deal gets implemented over the next 10 to 15 years. If this deal is implemented as strictly as it is written I think it will give everyone the comfort and reassurance that they

seek and there will be less worry what happens at the end of 15 years but again if we say oh no this is a really good deal we don't want to risk it we don't want to upset them they might walk out then no we're going to have a problem so I think how we address it how we deal with it is crucially important for the sake of the deal and for the sake of the countries outlined how they will react throughout the deal.

Okay we're going to open it up to the audience in just a moment to begin with if we could get a microphone up front I have at least one hand that was raised even before we began that of his excellency Havi or Solana who is both a Brookings Distinguished Fellow and has an enormous amount of direct experience in negotiating with the Iranians as the lead European Union diplomat during the

fantastic explanation thank you very much for the report so I have not been dying to read it

completely I think it's a very fundamental piece for everybody to read and if possible to agree on I think that the report with all the details that you are given I think it's a good ground trial that the situation very likely will develop in the right direction. Of course they are doubtful but let me say that we have to repeat it in repeat many times that this agreement is not an American agreement to resolve a problem it's an agreement by the international community as a whole

to maintain that to my mind is absolutely different from it. Visa agreement was signed in a very

difficult moment the tension among the big power was already there and it was possible to do it because

“proliferation is an important issue for everybody and I think that should be read like that and I think”

also should be read what we're going to involve in this arrangement and time to get the agreement. We thought that to get resolved at least for a long period of time the nuclear issue it will basic element to have serious negotiations for security arrangements in the region with the threat of the Iran with nuclear weapons it would be absolutely impossible to have an agreement region of it. Now we have the agreement we have and everybody has agreed that we have

20 years in which we can be safe if all the things have been done but nothing is nothing that has been said within here 20 years is tracked is just to be with open eyes and etc but I wonder how we are not going to be able the international community in 20 years what in 15 years to get an

“agreement to region. I think that we are going to learn a lot after 3D etc but everybody is going to”

be so exhausted they will be possible probably we put enough energy to get an agreement regionally and for that it's very important to maintain the Chinese and to maintain the Russia's on board and the Chinese are very interested in the peace in the region and the Russian would like to be part of the deal but they are very interested in me part of the deal. So I get after this conversation with debate much more relaxed about the component nuclear

let's relax about what the ambassador has said to the behaviour of it but I think we have to put all our energy politically diplomatically also to get this arrangement that will guarantee security in this region and that is going to be necessary after 3D therefore let's get to work on that direction as much as we can. Thank you. Ambassador would you like to speak to the viability of any kind of regional security

“dialogue that would actually incorporate you around? I think it's it's inevitable at some point”

we are going to have to sit down and discuss these issues and I think we've had as a GCC and even as the UAE alone we've had these discussions in the past we cannot continue to live in this

kind of environment without hopes or at least a path for a solution. The problem is we see absolutely

no desire from the part of the Iranians do that. The conversations we always have with our friends here in the US is you know how are we going to sit down and why how are we going to send signals for Iran to sit down and have discussions on Syria and on Yemen and my question to them is why is the burden solely on us to send a signal? What has Iran done to send a signal that they are willing to sit with us? What positive collaborative friendly message have they sent to us?

That says yeah part of the responsibility falls on them. We've seen nothing but more support for terrorism. We've seen nothing but more interference in our internal affairs. We've seen nothing but more missile tests and I'm not even mentioning the rhetoric, the tweets and the statements by the supreme leader. So while we recognize there's a desire it's also important to know that there's another side of these equation and they have to display a willingness to sit down and talk

to us about resolving Syria and resolving Yemen and resolving all the challenges that we face in our part of the world and like I said I don't see any of that at the moment. Thank you. We have about a half an hour for questions. I'd like to take perhaps three at a time just so that we can

I think two on the other side of the road there and then one up front.

You're excellency, you wouldn't mind standing and just introducing yourself. Yes, you're excellency. I'm Cyrus Tribarium here with my class from USC. We're taking a six week course studying nuclear non-proliferation. It's an honor to see you. Iranians all but increased its export of militarism in the region. Do you believe any measures beyond a policy of behavior modification must be taken to address the other parts of their behavior? So if your question is what should policy be towards Iran

“going forward? It's a very difficult question to answer but I think the short version is”

we need to see a combination of carrots and sticks. We need to see carrots when there is good

behavior and we need to see six when there is bad behavior. But as long as any country and not

just Iran feels that they can continue to behave a certain way and when there's no price associated with this bad behavior, it's going to be very difficult to work in a collaborative approach. I have two young kids and if one of my kids does something wrong and I don't punish them, guess what? They're going to keep doing it. And so I think we're at a point where now that this nuclear deal is behind us, I think we need to rethink what our approach towards Iran should be.

I understand that there is a moderate side in Iran and that there is a desire to work with that moderate element and believe me, we have that desire as well. Let me be clear. There's no country in the region that will benefit or be better positioned to work with Iran if Iran behaves responsibly than the UAE. Just imagine the economic cooperation, the investments, the energy, the cultural exchanges that we can have. But again, I don't see that moderate side in Syria policy.

I don't see that moderate side in Iraq policy. I don't see that moderate side in Yemen. I only see that moderate side of Iran on this deal. The moderate side came negotiated to deal on the nuclear program and exchange for sanctions relief. I would love to see that type of moderate deal making approach in Iran in Yemen and Syria and the regional problems that we are still dealing with. So I am not in a position to sort of advise what U.S. policy should be,

“but that's how I would look at it. Thank you. I'm Professor Wayne Glass with the University of”

Southern California with these incredibly brilliant students from the University of Southern California in six week course on nuclear and non-proliferation. Mr. Ambassador, good to see you again, it's a pleasure to be here. I'm going to follow up on that question exactly from what you just said. Is there room for the U.S. government to engage in the region using soft power tools or smart power tools to sort of move the iceberg given all of the ambiance that you just described

with a lot of posturing and a lot of leverage and a lot of military preparedness that are all part of the toolbox. Are there other tools in that box for the U.S. government to pursue with respect to the region? Since I am the only non-American on the panel, I would like to defer that

“question to my American colleagues. And we'll just take, I think, two other questions”

are trying to group them together. So if we can get a mic up here to Shibli tell Hami and perhaps in the back. I am Shibli tell Hami Brookings and University of Maryland. My question is to Derek. Derek, you said that the U.S. should make it clear up front that the U.S. wants to maintain what you call the robust military presence in the region. So I'm just wondering two questions about that. So what are the elements of that robust military presence? Just keeping

the configuration forces that we now have at the right at the same levels, expanding,

we're configuring. And second is that principally aimed at was a perceived Iranian threat,

or are the threats at play here when you're thinking about what is the robust military presence? Thank you, Elise Labat with CNN. I'd like to follow up on Bob's comments about the accommodation in the region ambassador. I'm wondering what you think of that. I think this follows on what the president was saying in his interview with the Atlantic about Saudi Arabia and Iran having to share the region. Given what you were talking about about the fact that eventually

you'll need to sit down with Iran. How do you see those comments and how do you see that playing out in a way that is there any point or any possibility that that could ever happen? And when you

such a move and do you think this portends a possible military coalition against Iran

“if there was a violation and a breakout capacity? I think any policy question you need one”

needs to address really looks different depending on where you sit. If you are sitting in Washington, your economy is doing well, your military is strong. You know, Iran is not a threat. If you are sitting 7,000 miles away, I think it looks vastly different when you're sitting in Abu Dhabi or Rio. And so I think presidents comments in terms of sitting down and actually engaging Iran, they're not unreasonable. But I think if you are in the region today and you are witnessing

current Iranian behavior in your own neck of the woods, it's very difficult to see a conversation where that takes place in the current environment. And again, if we are to engage Iran, Iran

has a responsibility to also engage with us and I don't see any behavior that indicates that.

So in theory, it is a good position to have and it's not unreasonable, but I think given the current climate and the environment we are dealing with, I think it's very unlikely. On the AUMF question,

“I don't think I'm the right person to answer to that. I think that's a domestic U.S. question,”

I get out deferred to my American colleagues up here. So just picking up on the question about soft power tools and things that we can do to move the iceberg here. I mean, I actually think that's where a lot of our effort ought to go in the next administration. It's the simple stuff, but it's the non-flashy stuff that we're going to spend a lot of time on. Do rebuilding relationships and senses of trust in the United States of our Gulf Arab, you know, friends and partners. So that

way they believe us when we say that we are going to stand with you and they trust that they can

rely on that assurance. It's simple. You can say those words very easily, but actually getting back to a sense of real trust and a sense of real commitment on the part of the United States is going to take a lot of effort. It's going to take a lot of commitment of resources. Derek, I think spoke very well to the four different prongs of that on the military side, but it's also going to take more people to people interactions. It's going to take refreshed diplomatic interactions. And again,

to sense that, you know, between the United States and our partners in the region, you know, there may be differences of you, but those are healthy differences of you, not shadow points for the relationship. Part of that will also come in the, frankly, sweeping economic reforms we're seeing in Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent in other places to try and reform really. What a lot of the societies and economies look like in the region. I think, frankly, the UAE is a good

light to follow for a lot of folks in the region in terms of developing non-oil sources of income, developing ways in which, you know, your population can have, you know, useful productive employment and feel like they're part of the system and help push the system forward and help push the country forward. Those are the things that we're seeing really in Saudi Arabia now.

“And the success of that vision, I think, is going to be really important to the United States”

and to our relationships more generally, to ensure really that Saudi Arabia in particular, feels confident both externally and internally as it moves forward. And I think that there is a corollary really to the Iran case. I agree completely with the ambassador that Iran needs to be challenged and confronted in all the various different aspects of its, its hostile policies in the region and our report, you know, speaks to that. And that includes the use of economic sanctions, we're

necessary in the way appropriate. The flip side of that, and this goes to the question of how you encourage the moderates to take the wheels of the policy and Syrian Yemen and so forth. They need to be able to demonstrate at home that the JCPOA was worthwhile, that it delivered the results that they had paid for and that they had made these nuclear concessions for. I think there's a fundamental tension there. And this goes to this nervousness and maybe even hesitation that even some people

in support of the deal had when they see the Secretary of State spend a lot of time in Europe saying European banks do a lot of business inside of Iran. But it speaks really to the desire and the imperative on the part of the United States to ensure that Iran gets what it pays for so that those moderates in the regime can say when we strike deals with the United States and with the broader international community, we see results and we don't see results when the security hardliners go

ape in Syria and Yemen and so forth. That's a complicated tension to reach and I'm not suggesting that there isn't going to be time where we're going to over-correct and be too hawkish and over-correct and sometimes be too dovish in terms of giving around what it paid for. But struggling with that tension is something we have to do and it's something that we're going to have to keep doing for the next 10 to 15 years so that we do what it enforce the position of people in the system we want change.

here with a different focus but let me turn it now to Derek who is specifically asked several questions. Sure, but if I could just a pile on Richard said this gets to the point I ended with which was ensuring that we keep the onus on Iran throughout this process and this actually gets to what Havir Asalana was talking about and that if we come to a point where in the course of the next 10 to 15 years we judge that Iran is violating the deal we need to be in the best possible position

“when I say we the United States are partners to make the case that that's why we need to reimpose”

sanctions and that's why we need to take certain steps that the U.S. was out of position I would argue eight years ago to make that case internationally we weren't getting much cooperation from European partners because they didn't believe we really wanted a deal and now they got the world needs to believe that we want this deal to work on the terms that it was negotiated but therefore we can't be seen as the party trying to undermine the deal because therefore it's going to be it's going to

leave us alone and isolate it on the and I should just second my endorsement of the smart power soft power elements of this not just on the GCPI specifically but overall when it comes to

influencing the Iranian regime I absolutely agree that that's critical U.S. tools are not what they

should be in that in that department despite the fact we've worked mightily on it for the last decade plus to try to improve our capabilities there therefore now I'm going to pivot to the military

“side again because I was asked directly about that and I think certainly you know what a robust”

presence means there's not a magic number that I want to outline I mean certainly part of that is is symbolic it's it's a reassurance it's a show it's a show of of U.S. presence I should note though that for some in the region there's a paradox because even though they want the U.S. presence and they want that reassurance they don't want to advertise it too much there are still some places where journalists when the U.S. Secretary defense has to visit a certain U.S. military facility

in the region the journalists needs to write the byline somewhere in southwest Asia even though there are hundreds thousands of American service men and women there helping to protect the region I think so we've got it we got to get that right for supporters but I also think it's more than just optics and the sense of psychological reassurance we need to be able to execute on options

“we need to have the the force presence in place should the president decide that Iran is is”

breaking out that there's cheating going on the kind of cheating that we saw the you know Bob and others helped uncover in in 2009 that we could we could take action if necessary and that that's not just going to happen by inertia or or just kind of routines I mean as I said that that force presence is going to get pulled in different directions because European allies are going to want more of it to reassure them on Russia Asian allies are going to more of it for the South China Sea

budget cutters here in the United States are going to want more of it for savings elsewhere or for spending elsewhere so it's going to take a lot of effort to maintain that in the next 10 to 15 years particularly if in this is the kind of ironic thing if if the agreement is seen is going well there will be an impulse here in Washington say well look this is succeeding so why should we make the sacrifice to keep this force presence in the region let the open up to one more round of questions

we've about 15 minutes left I can get a couple of microphone up here I'd like to ensure we have

a balance in terms of speakers from both front and back right up here sorry gentleman the second row

third row here yeah correct jiles say I see a question for Bob and rich in your meetings in reod for example what were you hearing from the Saudis about possible next steps in US Saudi civil nuclear cooperation I'm Russia I lost the Washington correspondent for the air we claim my question is for the authors of the report and a second question for you your excellency my question is about the international thermo nuclear reactor experimental reactor in France

and I understand that it's part of the agreement that Iran will have the opportunity to get involved in projects like that and I know they're pushing to become involved so what are what's your perspective on on how this might solidify or undermine the agreement and my question to you with the United Arab Emirates consider becoming a partner in this project I know

they're always looking for new funding I'm David David's in no affiliation in light of the

economic and political situations in Pakistan are there any disincentives for them to not cooperate with Saudi Arabia in moving forward in nuclear development

discussions have taken place on and off for a number of years and they're they're still made it

“for the moment you know the Saudis are prepared to meet all most of the critical requirements”

US requirements for civil nuclear agreement and it has incentives to conclude agreement with the United States the Saudis have an ambitious nuclear energy plan they want to have 16 big power reactors they'd like to get started as soon as they can but the US has at least for the time being been adhering to the so-called gold standard Richard alluded to it before

this the gold standard is was reached in the US Emirati civil nuclear agreement in which the

UAE agreed to force where all enrichment and repressing permanently essentially not just enrichment of US origin material but throughout the country it did so because it's so I know particular need

“for enrichment or repressing in civil nuclear energy program and it realized that if it pursued”

enrichment or repressing this could stimulate others in the region to follow suit we thought it was very responsible approach so the US administration has been trying to emulate that positive outcome including with Saudi Arabia but the Saudis are reluctant to foreclosed legally all of its fuel cycle options not really because you know the determined to have enrichment or repressing when Richard and I were in a real and spoke to senior Saudi civil nuclear energy officials they told us

that they have no current plans for enrichment or repressing they didn't want to foreclose the option altogether and part because perhaps sometime in the distant future they

“would see a need to do that but largely for political reasons they didn't want to see as”

see themselves foregoing an option they believe was available to them under the non-proliferation treaty so so far there's been a stalemate there in our report and take a look at one of the recommendations but we say the US with its civil nuclear cooperation partners should try to get the strongest possible constraints on indigenous enrichment or repressing but when that's not possible for a variety of reasons including political reasons the US can afford to step back a bit and settle for something

less but something that gives us confidence that our partner won't pursue enrichment repressing one idea was to you know concluded agreement that legally would allow them to in which a reprocess but it would allow the United States to withdraw from the agreement and stop nuclear cooperation with them if they elected to go that route and this would be a strong disincentive of them to do that there are a number of ways you can you can you can go ahead with this but our view is take a

little more flexible approach and still have confidence that our partner will not pursue these destabilizing fuel cycle capabilities yeah I mean we we really try to get at the ground truth on this and it's impossible to get you get some Saudi officials outside of government saying yeah that there was this understanding

you have others saying no there was never understanding you have the Pakistani government officials

at very high level say there is no such understanding we think they're already strong a disincentives for Pakistan to cooperate Pakistan is very eager to be seen as a responsible non-proliferation supporting country they want to get into the so-called non-proliferation mainstream they've got a lot to live down they have the history of the acucon black market network and you know this is was really quite a blemish on their on their copybook

but in order to get out from the we call it the doghouse in our in our in our paper they really have to demonstrate responsible behavior and any indication that Pakistan was

from being seen as a mainstream non-proliferation country and achieving some of the benefits

that that would that would entail also Pakistan wants better relations with Iran it's a had a number of high level conversations with the Iranians and they're not prepared to do anything with Saudi that would totally harm any prospect of better relations with Iran

“so I think they're already important disincentives but I wouldn't be surprised if American”

officials from time to time would warn the Pakistanis that they really must not think about you know sharing technology sharing equipment or anything else that would move the Saudis closer to a nuclear weapons capability and just on the issue of Eter and Iranian interest in being a participant in Eter and and some of that work you know I think the Iranians told us very clearly negotiations that they wanted to be able to have advanced civil nuclear energy capabilities

and they want to be part of the international scientific community in this regard you know we looked at the issue of Eter and we were able to demonstrate to our satisfaction that from a proliferation perspective Iranian involvement was not a problem and certainly if you you know think back over the course last you know 10 years or so of U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Iran it's been civil nuclear energy sure particularly if it

doesn't require the use of the fuel cycle inside of Iran the Bush administration even accepted the idea of Bush here you know being completed because it had you know material being delivered in material being taken back from the reactor so from the perspective of Iran pursuing civil nuclear energy possibilities and advanced technology that would give them the possibility at some point

“of having energy without requiring the fuel cycle I think that's something that we don't see as”

a negative we see that as is frankly a positive it speaks to one of the the points of Bobby just a moment ago about what will happen at that 10 to 15 year mark if Iran is still trying to fuel you know 10 1000 megawatt reactors on its own that's potentially a problem so far as the fuel cycle is concerned if instead they're looking at advanced technologies it don't require that then I think that's that's to our collective benefit but the project itself was vetted from the perspective of

U.S. non-proliferation concerns and the fact that it's in the GCPOA I think is conscious of the fact that we didn't see the same sorts of concerns there I'll have to defer to the ambassadors speak to U.A. I apologize I'm not familiar with the project so I don't I'm not sure what our position on it is but I will look into it and come back to you I'm going to give one last wild card

questions since we have just a few moments left to the young woman second in midway through the room

Hi it's Emily Meredith I'm with energy intelligence and I just have a point of clarification for Ambassador Alotiba and that is could you please go into what your view is of your obligations under the one-to-three agreement with the U.S. now in light of the JCPOA not your intentions but you're your obligations no obligations is not changed as as Bob mentioned we created a gold standard for a reason we like the gold standard we like being associated with the gold standard and so despite

you know what has been said in the media repeatedly we have not planning to change our position in fact we adopted this gold standard particularly to be used as a model going forward it's unfortunate we haven't been able to replicate it anywhere so far but that intention and the regulations and commitments we've made and supported has not is no plans to be changed with that will you all join me in thanking Ambassador Alotiba the authors of the report Bob and Richard and Dara Chileg

the law fair podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings Institution thanks this week

“to Brookings for the audio of this event you need to do your part to promote the law fair podcast”

so if you haven't yet tweeted about it rated and reviewed it on iTunes and Stitcher and shared it on every social media platform you've ever heard of please get on it right away people we need

your help our music as always is performed by Sophia Jan thanks for listening

do your current managed services really help run your operations or are they just running in circles running isn't enough anymore with PWC's managed services your operations don't just run they evolve continuously powered by AI embedded directly into your workflows so instead of

we run your operations with tech and talent so you can run faster scale smarter lead stronger