Lawfare Daily: How Escalations in Lebanon May Prolong the Iran War, with Joel Braunold

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Master indeed, I'll just do it.

The political incentives for these railies is to prevent a deal at least until the election. And, you know, whether they're in the room or not, the Israelis and the Iranians are extremely skilled at making sure that each of them are the worst versions of themselves when it comes to trying to sign a deal. So I have no doubt that using the Lebanese as an excuse or as a way to be able to continue to do that.

It's the law fair podcast.

I'm senior editor Scott R. Anderson.

Joel Brommel, the Managing Director of the Center Project and the law fair contributing editor.

“I think the Israelis is no incentive for them to move forward on the Gaza, face to approach with Hamas at this point.”

And I think that we move forward with legitimate Hamas because you'd have to decide on them and put them in the Palestinian polity. And so I think that the Israelis are slow playing at giving as many obstacles as possible to get Hamas to say yes. Today, we were talking about recent escalations in Lebanon and what they mean for the broader war with Iran. So Joel, we have seen a real cycle of escalation, a kind of familiar cycle of escalation happened in the Middle East in particular around between Israel and Lebanon in the past two weeks or so.

A cycle of violence that in particular has a direct bearing on, we're a number of broader regional questions among them, including the US Israel Iran war, which is in some sort of negotiations process for the White House. Keep saying we are close to an agreement to reopening the straight and reaching some sort of resolution, but one has not manifested despite several weeks of the White House saying that. And that makes this Lebanon conflict really a major consideration even more so than it might be on its own merits because it's so tied in to this broader regional conflict.

So talk to us about what this most recent cycle of escalation is, what kicked it off, how we saw the different parties respond on where it leaves this very important kind of keystone element of the rip broader regional conflict. Scott, it's great to be with you in North Oregon. Now, what's the Lebanon of it all is sort of a big question and an important one. So I think let's start the story, you could start the story, you know, decades ago, years ago, weeks ago, days ago, but I think just for the listeners to understand, with his bullet has been seen mainly as the most important Iranian proxy in the region.

It has been the strongest proxy, it has been the one that the majority of Israeli military planners had been worried about for more than Hamas.

“That's why there was so many technical, strategic, you know, technical brilliant operations like the Pedro operation and others that had managed to decapitate Hamas.”

There'd been a lot of planning and execution for sort of trying to deal with what they thought the Israeli spell could have been an existential threat from the North, given the strength of his bullet. It's missile array and everything else. On the latest part of the Iran war that sort of kicked off in February as Israel and the US were bombing Iran, there was a sense in Israel would his bullet take part. His bullet had been pretty decimated from the previous round between Israel and his bullet that it started off with the pages and everything else.

And so there was a question whether his bullet had reconstituted enough to really participate in this and that, you know, the original Israeli planners of having tens of thousands of missiles taking out skyscrapers and Tel Aviv would happen. And the hope was that they had degraded his bullet enough that that would prevent. Early on in I think in day three of the war there was sort of one or two rockets that were for shot from his bullet and in many ways Israel saw that as the opportunity to once again now go in and sort of take his bullet out.

And say look we now have a pretext they shot at us we said if you shoot at us we're going to come in with overwhelming force whether it was his bullet or whether it was an errand IRGC commander it's unclear either way that was the context the Israelis needed and so alongside the Israeli Iran front. There was an Israel seven Lebanon front where Israel started to attack pretty viciously in the north and and his bullet responded in kind and rockets were following on northern communities. So as.

As well one of the most important things strategically was to ensure that there was no linkages of the fronts that what happened in Lebanon between Lebanon and Israel was about bailout and what happened with Tehran and DC and Tehran and Jerusalem was about that. But that Tehran could not dictate what was happening in Lebanon because if they could it was a unity of France and strengthen the proxy network which was one of the objectives that Israel wanted to make sure that didn't happen that it didn't want this ring of fire around them.

So as DC was negotiating through the Pakistanis at one point and now the Qataris sort of what a ceasefire would look like the Israelis equities were like you cannot was strain our action when it come to Lebanese.

“And if you remember you know we've been in this never ending is a ceasefire is it not a ceasefire with Iran but sort of I think it was like 90 to get days ago when we started off this ceasefire.”

It was unclear that was Lebanon included or was it not? It seemed like the Grand Field Marshal of Pakistan said it was included but very quickly the Israelis kept firing and it sort of seemed like you could continue firing backwards and forwards. It was ring feds because if you remember very quickly after the ceasefire on April 8th Israel had more in in Bayroot was called Black Monday where they hit so many targets in Bayroot very quickly flattened a lot of office blocks which people are this was straight after the ceasefire and there was a sense that this whole thing could spiral out of control.

But I think the European administration did and I think I mentioned this on law for at the time something that I thought was very smart which was that they created a direct Bayroot to Jerusalem track which is kind of historic to try and say look if if we're empowering the government of Lebanon and we're empowering the LAF you can work at a ceasefire there and then you know that's what you're dealing with and if that's a ceasefire it's not the IRGC and it's not Tehran dealing with your ceasefire it's buried.

So there's this there's been rounds of ceasefire talks that have been happening between Lebanon and Israel hosted in Washington trying to work out could this ceasefire be stable and while it's been going on you know President Trump says a ceasefire in the region is just firing more moderately. It seemed like as long as Bayroot was ring-fenced off there could be sort of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah but it would be going backwards and forwards. Now at different times there was a question of who was party to the ceasefire was Hezbollah party for it.

“So every time this ceasefire really shook to its core they got back into Washington and the aim was to re-strengthen the ceasefire and you know President Trump said we're talking to Hezbollah and Hezbollah is agreed.”

They were using the speaker of the parliament as we compare it to sort of do that, but it was very unclear if Hezbollah was agreeing and is that Tehran Tehran has built a degree.

But what basically happened is that Hezbollah has been starting to attack different Israeli positions both in the north and Israeli soldiers who have taken over the southern of Lebanon.

These Israeli position on southern Lebanon is that they are actually just decimating in the first 10 kilometers, the villages and towns in south Lebanon south of the Latini trying to give themselves a buffer zone to prevent Hezbollah coming back there. The Lebanese like this is crazy, but in many ways that was the majority of that of their restraint that they were going up to there.

“But there's been a push from the Israeli military to say listen we can't just push Hezbollah further north and they can still fire rockets that would hit our towns.”

And our positions we can't be restrained like if we see Hezbollah target in Tehran we see them in Dacharya, which is like a village in a section in south by route.

We should be able to go after them and we can't be restrained by these diplomatic niceties. It has been a big domestic push on the Israelis to push forward. The Trump administration have been clear though the bay roots of limits because that would affect the Iranian discourse. So I know this is a lot, but this is sort of like the complexities of what's going on. So what happened it seems last week was that Hezbollah after another ceasefire where I like there was like what all cease firing and everyone's doing it.

Hezbollah says we're not linked to this ceasefire.

They shot some drones that hit into Israel and the Israelis were like okay we'll hit an empty target in Dacharya in Bay Route, basically hezbollah sort of headquarters that doesn't have a lot of people there. But we'll hit them there to show that we can and so they did that and the Iranians like great if you did that now we're going to bomb Israel and they shot rockets and missiles over to Israel. So direct Iran to Israel and that's when you have President Trump said Israel don't you dare respond. You know like you've all shot your rockets you hit Bay Route and they hit you and as I said we can't do that we have to hit back.

They then shot back and President Trump looked kind of silly after saying not and he got back on the phone with Prime Minister Netanyahu and apparently the the pilots were on the tarmac they're ready to do massive infrastructure damage to Iran and President Trump taught them often said you cannot do that and sort of restrain them from that.

That seems to have satisfied the Iranians with Bay Route soft limits that's okay and it's it's very uncomfortable as we go into the domestic politics of Israel about why that's the case.

“But fundamentally Scott from all of that just to try and understand it.”

The Israelis want to make sure that if they negotiate a compromise with the Lebanese so right now the compromises that the Lebanese armed forces will have. Bubble areas where they take out has below and that they're in charge right if we want to do that that is negotiated between us and the Lebanese and if they can't train because below from attacking us we will attack as below wherever it is the Iranians are saying to the Americans and to the other mediators on that if the Israelis attack Bay Route we will attack them.

We're not willing to and that is the fundamental strategic disagreement between Jerusalem and DC Jerusalem cannot afford for there to be a linkage of the fronts DC doesn't really care and that they've got this diplomatic process between Bay Route and Jerusalem and that should be enough. That you know if we need to keep the Iranians from stopping because bullet from shooting that's okay if we need to keep that calm down and for the Israelis that linkage is unforgivable.

“So in the last week we've seen this exchange of fire between these really is the Iranians you know Iranians hitting Israel Israel hitting the Iranians Israeli is kidding the Lebanese has balla.”

In the midst of this the part of this has gotten the most attention here in the United States isn't actually the violence that's been involved. It's been a notable phone call between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu one by an account that appears be leaked by the White House itself. I guess I don't know who else we can position to confirm this and I don't think the Israelis are going to be leaking it.

And which President Trump basically told that you know you're crazy what are you doing you know I saved you from going to jail.

We need you to stop this and then Trump later in public remarks into the media said as you look I call the shots maybe doesn't call any of the shots on this this all took place. Before the last round of Israeli strikes on Iran as I recall. So almost a direct kind of response arguably or at least the timing did not look great. But after in response to the Trump's the claims of calling the shots and having directed Netanyahu not to reciprocate not to follow up on additional cycle violence. What we make of this conversation and the apparent decision of the Trump administration or someone in the Trump administration to leak it to make a public case about it.

And what does it tell us about that strategic tension between the United States and Israel who are of course the two that we're working hand in hand when when they started the conflict with Iran on February 28. It's confusing because there's multiple different conversations some that were leaked in some that were public. So it appears that last week there was a conversation between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump where there were expletives and all of these different things that you know Barack revied report from people say no it's not true.

And then basically Trump confirms it to the New York Post and everyone else in terms of like you know you're crazy you're doing this stuff. And then separately after Netanyahu orders the idea have to strike as I said by route and then the Iranians attack Tel Aviv and the North there's another phone call but these phone calls are very interesting. These weren't secret phone calls, President Trump calls Barack revied and also calls Channel 11 a different channel in Israel. And basically says I'm about to call Prime Minister Netanyahu and tell him not to respond.

So all these people who say always playing 5D chats and this and that I don't think there's any way the President Trump wants to look weak domestically.

And if he's publicly saying in two of the Israeli press I am going to tell your Prime Minister not to strike he as in President Trump will look weak if Prime Minister Netanyahu defies him.

“So you once he's made these calls and this was at the earlier this week so today is the 10th of June so I think this was on Monday.”

There was a or over the weekend like time has no meaning anymore. There's a there's a question about whether Prime Minister Netanyahu has to respond. The entire political system is saying he has to respond right the opposition's killing him his coalition's killing him you can't you know Prime Minister Netanyahu has famously said the most important thing that Prime Minister has on these to do is to be able to say no to an American president when it's when it's our interests.

And he basically goes forward and an issue strikes against Iran. They were against a petrochemical plant that they claim was utilized for ballistic missile production.

But these aren't sort of attacks on the oil fields or on the power plants or anything else. Explicely avoided those targets with with some people read as a nod towards Trump. So many ways that shows you the limits of even President Trump ability to restrain these rallies like when it comes to like we have been fired upon by Iran.

But it seems that President Trump had a second phone call with Prime Minister Netanyahu the next day and basically said look.

And apparently, according to reports, it was a lot karma and said, you do you. But if you go by yourself now, you're on your own. We are close to a deal and you'll wreck it. And that was enough for Prime Minister Netanyahu to call back the planes that are we're going to go apparently and hit major infrastructure sites. But later, you know, Prime Minister Netanyahu sometimes briefs the media by saying a senior Israeli official, you know, it was brief to the Israelis in the cabinet. Basically Netanyahu said, we might reach a situation where we're going to have to deal with the Iranians completely alone without the Americans.

And that will come with a lot of international isolation and potentially weapons restrictions.

“But if that's what we need to do, that's what we need to do. And so what I take from the calls this week is that the Israelis don't want to see a bad deal.”

And they're very well that there's going to be a bad deal, that they will not allow Tehran to dictate the escalation ladder towards them.

And yet the Lebanese problem remains, right? That you, you can't live in a situation where you're completely restrained from attacking his bullet. But it does appear at least right now that the ring fencing around Beirut still exists, that they're not going to strike Beirut and then Iran won't strike Israel. And in many ways that's a strategic failure for the Israelis, because that is a relinquage of the fronts in a way that they feel uncomfortable. However, it is a victory in the sense that the Iranians did say in their statements when they were willing to stop firing on Israel,

that Israel must also stop their operations in South Lebanon, as well as not stop their operations in South Lebanon, and Iran is not responded. Which demonstrates that the sort of when you toss out all of the rhetoric and the face-saving stuff, it seems like the status quo is. The Israelis and the Lebanese can continue to try and figure out how they can deal with the problem of his bullet. Israel can't attack Beirut without they're being an Iranian response, but everything else weren't threatening at least the deal as such.

Though given US Iranian currently responding on strikes to each other, I don't know if we're going to get to a deal if we're not going to get to a deal who knows. But for the Israelis, no deal is better than a bad deal, and the longer it moves away from a deal the better strategically is for them, and I don't, you politically ask for that in your eyes as well. So let's dig into what a bad deal would look like to the Israelis. The main issue you've hit on is this front linkage. They are concerned about Lebanon, because it's approximate, it's a real threat.

“As Bola has was traditionally, I think, before October 7, seen as the greatest most direct threat to Israel, still a very real threat to spiking substantially diminished by Israeli military operation for the last few years.”

But there's obviously nexus of other issues implicated by the Iran conflict, and particularly the nuclear file. This is the focus of the Trump administration. It's the focus of the American political scene for a variety of reasons, at least in part, because of Trump's personal involvement in breaking down the JCPOA deal that a decade ago was supposed to. For stall and Iranian nuclear program. Traditionally, if that is an issue set that has been framed in substantial part, not just in terms of US interests, but in terms of Israeli security interests.

Israel was always seen as the most proximate realistic target of Iranian nuclear attack, if there was one.

And that's something we've heard, I think even Prime Minister Netanyahu invoke as a possibility just this past week in justifying some of the actions. So how does that fit into this picture in terms of Israeli concerns?

“Like, what do they want to see out of this deal? Or is the nuclear file a little bit of a red herring in terms of where they see their most proximate real security interests?”

Are they more concerned about proximate works breaking down his ball on Lebanon? Perhaps limiting around stability to back other proxies that are regional problem for Israel and Gaza and elsewhere? And then also part of this is the economic pressure. Obviously, that's the big drive around the United States, and frankly, most of the global economy is the straight of hormones being shut down. How real are those economic pressures for Israelis, how insulate are from them relatively compared to the American Europeans, others that have kind of a vote in this picture?

And what does that tell us about the timelines that they have in the increasing war of attrition that's happening between Iran and the United States, and now, frankly, Israel and his ball into some extent as well? So, some big question. Right, so firstly, the Israeli strategic and the ideological readers align that the number one thing that a deal has to deal with is the nuclear file. There's no differentiation there. I think the warriors is that the Iranians will play the Americans, right? The reason that they were very upset, the Israelis with the JCPOA,

was they felt the sunset provisions and for the gals, the Iranians would cheat on the deal, and even if they didn't, they'd be in such a strong position posed to some sets of the deal, they could raise towards a nuclear bomb. You know, one of the Trump insane says, you know, no dust, no cash. Great, get rid of the nuclear dust that's under the sides, get rid of all of the enrichment in rich uranium, get it all out, and then fight.

For the Israelis, the threat of the straits of her moves being closed is not that relevant for them. Like, their economy is not as dependent on, you know, their world comes from Azerbaijan, and others they've got their own natural gas fields in the eastern med, like they're not sort of like massively exporting through the straits of her moves. That's not, that's not their problem, right? That's a red, that's a golf problem. That's not their problem. So, you know, if the Iranians choose to threaten the region through the straits of her moves and give up their nuclear program,

“from the Israelis perspective, it's great. You can work around that through a different regional, intuitive model of pipelines and other things, and you have to worry about nukes.”

So, the nuclear file is definitely the biggest issue, and I think there's a big worry as there has always been with the Trump administration that Trump's desire to get a deal will be a bad deal.

You know, we're already going to timeline 10 years, 20 years, what does that look like? What is given to the Iranians and return? You know, there's the sort of like sell, sell that, this isn't going to be the JCPO, because I think Vance went on Fox News over the weekend and said, "We will have a real inspections regime in the JCPO, I didn't have a real inspections regime." I mean, I think that the authors of the JCPO would push back pretty hard on that, but whatever. There's an attempt to sell that this is going to be a different better deal, and even the very big skeptics of the deal, when you look at sort of the FDD types and others who are speaking online,

they're still saying, "Look, you know, we have deteriorated and we've sort of disassembled a lot of the Iranian military might." But yeah, if that's true, how is it that America's hitting still radar array and anti-aircraft?

I thought we got rid of all of that anti-aircraft and radar's before.

Like every time that we think that we've been hold, all of this stuff has been destroyed, suddenly it's back again and we're destroying it again. So it seems very confusing about what really has been deteriorated in terms of Iranian assets and what hasn't been. So the Israelis are primarily concerned about that. But what there was a concern about, you know, for them it's a three-part thing, it's newx, it's proxies and it's ballistic missiles. Because the proxies is the way that Iran threatens the region and the ballistic missiles is how they directly gain strength in order to threaten people.

“And so these Israelis would want to see a weakened Iran that will eventually lead to regime change, right?”

That the ultimate desire of the Israeli policy is to force regime change and have a different regime. And if that forces Iran to splinter into separate factors, they don't care, right? It's not their part of the region. It takes out a regional actor. If you're Saudi or you're the Gulf GCC cases, you know, having a failed state of Iran is terrible for you. Like in terms of what that would mean in terms of your own domestic security and others.

So I think that the GCC are trying, even the UAE, you know, trying to work out how they can have like a counterbalance. Like if Iran's going to stay, how can we have an equilibrium with them so that they don't threaten our core domestic interests? And then at the same time, how do we have an equilibrium with the Israelis so that they threaten our core domestic interests? So like, you know, there's going to be a regional rebalancing. The Israelis and I think that leaves the Iranian regime standing is bad.

“But if you have to rank the badness, nuclear file is definitely A, B, and C, and then the other things go under that.”

And so I think there's a big worry about what's being developed on the nuclear file. And again, when you listen to J.D. Bound to statements, over the weekend, where he says, "We could have a deal that's in the best interests for America, even if it's not the same interests for Israel." That that perks up Israelis is in terms of what that's worrying about. You've got the DIA report about Israeli spying on America going up, and all this sort of, you know, the general atmospherics of America that, you know, are Israeli and US interests aligned when it comes to this and what does that mean?

So I think there's a lot of, there's a lot of worry in Jerusalem because in many ways, 16 years of policy since 2006 or longer than that. So 20 years of policy from Netanyahu about putting a target on a nuclear run, and then it needs a military solution. Okay, so it's been tried. So right now, the question is, "Do we double down on that strategy? And do we try even harder?" Or has it run out of course? And if it's run out of course, what's the next strategy? And these are the debates that are happening.

But I'd say Scott, there's some more worrying stuff that's going on outside of just the proxies.

You know, you heard President Trump last week throwing the Abraham Accords, basically saying to the Saudis, you know, "Join the Abraham Accords."

And everyone else, Qatar, and Pakistan, and Turkey, who already has diplomatic relations with this, you know, like, "Join the Abraham Accords." You know, if I'm going to do all this work for you, and in many ways that's a very worrying thing. It's not because you can be pro against the Abraham Accords. It's because if you assume that the military strategy has run its course, and let's assume that Saudi doesn't join the Abraham Accords because Trump just told them to. And let's assume that the war restarts, right? And let's assume that Iran hits something in Saudi that's valuable to them.

You could imagine the headlines the next day in Jerusalem and D.C. saying, "Well, if you were just agreed to the Abraham Accords, then this wouldn't have happened to you." And what's your average Saudi going to think like, "You're going to not only are you trying to force us to be humiliated, but we've now had our core assets being destroyed?"

So you're taking one potential optimistic thing in the region and throwing it onto the all-implial of, like, military strategy on Iran, and that's a very risky proposition.

So for the Israelis, you know, the Abraham Accords needs to be more strategic than just a political win, right, to sort of get out of the current quiet mind. I think that's one of the reasons they've been pushing it.

“So that's a lot of like unpacking, but I think for the Israelis, the nuclear file is the most important file, but it needs to be solved in a way that Iran does not control and get to have its enriched uranium and it can't enrich on its stuff.”

And again, we're going back to all the traditional arguments to be had throughout the Obama years. You know, can you get a deal that the Iranians will agree to that is that harsh? I don't know the Iranians won't reparations from the war damages, strades of Hamurs or this stuff. And so the Israelis equities on the economic pressure is not the same as the Americans and America's allies, because that doesn't hurt the economy in the same way.

And in terms of timelines, the most important timeline in it as well as the election. So Israel will go to the polls sometime between September 15th and the 27th.

Prime Minister Netanyahu is promised total victory. There has not been total victory on any front, because below still standing, Hamurs is still in Gaza, the regime in Tehran still exists. So how does he sell what he's doing? I think that what's important is that you can't get to a perspective where there's a deal with the Iranian regime that strengthens it during this time. So the political incentives for the Israelis is to prevent a deal at least until the election, and whether they're in the room or not, the Israelis and the Iranians are extremely skilled at making sure that each of them are the worst versions of themselves when it comes to trying to sign a deal.

So I have no doubt that using the Lebanese as an excuse or as a way to be able to continue to do that.

“Support comes from wise, the smart way to manage the currencies you need around the world, your life is global, your money should be too.”

Some providers promise no fees on overseas transfers, don't be fooled, extra costs often hide in bloated exchange rates, choose wise, you can send spend and receive money in over 40 currencies. Count on the exchange rate that you'd usually see on Google, that's how millions safe billions on hidden fees. Be smart, get wise, download the wise app today, tease and seize apply. So I want to circle back to these really domestic politics, which clearly is a big part of this picture. Before I do though, I want to spend a little bit more time of this use as really relationship because these dynamics are odd.

“You hit, I think the nail on the head with a couple of data points that are worth noting, the JD Vance comments, the decision to leak this call with Netanyahu.”

And we know this is occurring against a backdrop where you have a substantial voices in the Republican Party. And particularly in the kind of mega wing or at least the restraint oriented corners that often affiliate with the mega wing of the Republican Party.

That have been openly skeptical and critical of the US relationship with Israel, and up to an including participation in this conflict.

I'm different stripes, different people of different limits, but that's kind of a generally tender kind of associated with Tucker Carlson and kind of increasing kind of element of that corridor of the Republican Party. At the same time, we're also seeing shifts, strong shifts on the Democratic side about views towards the United States relationship with Israel, particularly driven by the concerns over the Gaza conflict, the handling of the Gaza conflict with the Biden administration, which is a huge internal schism in the party leading up to the last presidential election.

You know, all around, you're just seeing that the US is really relationship is in a state of flux and political contestation in a way that I don't think I'd seen in my adult lifetime. I don't think many people have had this point that are still with us at this point, you know, because of some of our oldest relatives and friends. So, you know, what does this tell us about the type of leverage Trump has over Netanyahu and vice versa? I mean, a Trump administration that has historically worked hand in glove in a lot of different contexts, particularly during the first Trump administration.

I mean, you know, Netanyahu got to announce the recognition of Israeli claims over the Go on Heights, right? Like that's the degree to which we saw a lot of coordination. Early in this administration, it seems like leaning that same direction in part, you saw, you know, the Trump administration make cracking down on speech in support of Palestinians of major pillar early pillar of its immigration policies and a very controversial, constitutionally questionable way. I mean, a lot of engagement yet you saw tension and push back against these railways around Gaza and effort to get in the Gaza deals you and I have discussed. So what does this just all tell us about what this dynamic of this relationship is likely to be? Because if it comes down to these railways and the Americans just have fundamentally different interests.

It is either going to have to dictate to the other or the other is going to be able to be a spoiler for what they want to accomplish. Israel is going to stop the Trump administration, we're getting the deal at once or the Trump administration is going to get the deal at once and either cut the Israelis out. Ignore them or somehow force them to concede and play along with some version, at least of what they're trying to get out of it.

That's currently being kind of debated in the house and soon in the Senate. So, you know, is this like a really representative experience that tells us something about where this whole relationship is at it? He's talking about us because there's a lot to unpack. Look, I will remind avid listeners of our conversations. If you go back to the podcast we recorded just before after President Trump was elected but before he was inaugurated. We spoke about this and we said, he'll do everything for the prayers, our camp domestically and he will undercut Israel strategic interests in the region because he's a deal maker.

And in many ways, that wasn't prophetic, it was just one of the options it seems to be the one that's come out. Right, that ultimately he gives you everything you want domestically and strategically in the region like he's friends with a lot of the people that the Israelis find very frustrating. From the categories to the tags to now trying you know saying we're going to be rebuilding half of Iran if we get half the oil like what does that mean then you can't bomb anyone because you could be bombing like US contractors like you know all of these different things and I think from the Israelis like as we said at the time.

With the Trump administration it's like going to the casino you could win everything or you could lose your house and like in many ways that's a very uncomfortable way to be.

“I think that when you look at the broader context of the US's relationship you're seeing a paradigmatic shift in both parties for different reasons. I think on the on the democratic side you sort of seeing the death of the values based relationship.”

I think the Democrats don't understand what Israel wants. The Democrats are very clear about what they're against against settlements, home demolitions against the compact and Gaza that they don't they want peace but they they don't know what is our ones is I hasn't defined post up you know even pre October 7 you know there was something on normalization and some bone to the Palestinians but post up to 7 is I isn't defined what it wants and till it says what it is for Democrats don't know what to do with it as well.

That's just I think we're seeing that in primary after primary we're seeing that as debates in the party because the party wants to have a values based foreign policy in some regards yes of course is interest. But if we can't speak to our values and if Israel doesn't tell us what it's for. How can we before it like I don't know what it is if Israel turns into Iran I don't think it's going to be but if it does why should we before it like there's no reason and like when you look at some of the trends and what's going on in the West Bank and what's going on in Gaza and like the voices that are hard and the impunity of action.

And sort of the the the horror share of lots of different things I'm not for that so tell me what I should be for right that's on the democratic side.

“On the Republican side I think it's always been an interest based conversation I think there has been a religious element among some of the evangelical community.”

I think that's a generational shift I think that. It's very difficult I think in Republican world that if you are not for Netanyahu do you have a place in the party of people who have traditionally dealt with this issue. Now in the democratic politics you've got everything from like a pack to JVP George voice for peace and everything in between. In the Republican side that it doesn't really exist right you've got the the moderate position is like BB's okay. I'd like the extreme position is like bang there's great and like what in between and like who do you go to.

“So I think it has been a very interesting growth and sort of Palestinian Christian advocacy and I think that when you listen to JD Vans like.”

The Patriarch of Jerusalem was just in the White House this week last week meeting with Trump and speaking about the plight of basically probably Palestinian Christians directly to him.

And like you know there's a different angle tonight we have an evangelical ambassador who of course is very praise well but we've got like a. A Catholic by President and there's a lot of Chris and him like in this stuff and and I think that change of the relationship and I and I didn't think that the Israelis and I've said this before. I think the right in Israel misunderstands the right in America. I think they think that they hate Palestinians and I don't think that's correct. I think that the right in America is very skeptical about the Palestinian Authority but she doesn't hate Palestinians at all.

And when they they perceive that the Israelis are behaving in a supremacist way towards specifically Palestinian Christians or Christians in the region. And we've seen images of that sadly quite a few times over the past few months that really offense them and then that makes them. Request them the relationship and then when it comes to interest the Iran war in many ways got is pushing that to the edge like the Iran war is not popular in America. I mean the Trump base will do what Trump wants but it doesn't mean that the Iran war is popular with them.

It's just because Trump said it right and I think that's really challenging as this goes on and on and on and to extend that this can be blamed on someone else.

I think President Trump has always been very happy if there's been a bad situation to blame someone else for that situation.

And in many ways the phone calls are this past week can be laying the groundwork if he wants to. Though I wouldn't say that there's a massive schism between Trump and Netanyahu.

This Trump start hedging and looking at other candidates. Does he strongly you know back Netanyahu what does that look like because Trump likes backing winners and you know I don't think looks that's there.

“I think that when we look at both the next two or half years of the Trump administration the region sees as well as America's responsibility.”

So Trump is going to need to restrain as a really action if he doesn't want them to play spoiler and he's going to have to find a way to do that and we've seen some limits and some non limits but.

You know for him it's not about threatening aid relationships or MOUs he just basically dictates and screams at them because people don't want to get on the wrong side of Trump because what could he possibly do if you do get on the wrong side of Trump. And there's so many different factors of what that could do if you do like there was a CBS report that you said that he was going to turn off missiles defense to Israel. Against Iranian missiles should they go by themselves. I could seem doing that if he's like go by yourself. I'm telling sent contest stand out. What does that do? What's it do if he stops allowing them to tap on like.

The weapon stores the cash deposits that exist in Israel that they're allowed to tap on. Like there are there are things that can be done that can really challenge that and also just politically he doesn't really care about the U.M. but it's a single to the region if he starts really investing in Turkish modalities rather than Israeli ones and so I think that there are things so I think what entering into. opening up what are U.S. as well interests and when you open up that Pandora's box.

Scott, there's a lot of things that are sacred cows that are put on the table. So we've seen Castro talk about as well as nuclear deterrence.

You know publicly representative Castro and ask Mark and we'll be about that. We've seen Tim Kaine and others ask his sent com obeying and working with Israeli evacuation orders and Lebanon. There's a lot of like interoperability questions around section two to four of the NDA. Does that really create a dependency and procurement? Does it not? I think that Quincy was a little bit overblown in their analysis, but you know this is stuff that has been going on quite quietly and now it's becoming a political issue for people.

And as we move from the MAU to like join from aid to sort of co-investment what does that look like and how can there be restraints on that. So that is a long way of saying I think the Iran war has been an accelerant in the Republican party to really question things from an interest level. In the same ways that Democrats have got there because of a lack of what they see as shared values at this point. And both of the parties are coming to the same conclusion that we need to examine this.

“I don't think they're going to land in the same spot, but if you're in Israeli strategist, it is an urgent blinking red light that you need to repair your relationships.”

Not just in the Democratic party, but I'd argue in the non-marker rubio parts of the Republican party as well. So we've got a tense of the domestic position here in the United States. Let's go back to the Israeli domestic conversation. We know we have an election forthcoming. Talk to us about how this issue, the Lebanon convict that brought Iran conflict fits into the electoral dynamics, how the opposition is handling it. And how it integrates with the other two outstanding issues, which were we should touch on while we're here, which are Gaza, of course, where we're still in theory, have a peace process ongoing, although it's hit lots of rocks recently.

And then the West Bank, the area that has traditionally been a huge flash point, I think that a lot of little thought was going to be the big flash point, the Biden administration day when it came into office. And yet has somehow of the different fronts Israel's face and kind of fallen in a little more quiet, at least in terms of Western media attention. But has huge implications, has huge changes in policy implemented by this administration, and has been a huge source of tensions there as well. So, talk to us about those issues as well, how this Lebanon issue fits with all of those.

So, let's start with Lebanon. You know, it was interesting over the past two, three months, and it's become ever more apparent.

“There has been a feeling amongst the Israeli population that were reaching the limits of just military power, which is interesting, right?”

And in some ways, Trump forced that by forcing a ceasefire between the Lebanese and the Israelis, and Netanyahu therefore needing to own it. And so, then you've got sort of different veins in the Israeli policy saying, "Well, maybe we also need a diplomatic horizon with the Lebanese that can deal with his boulevard because the Israeli so far we can bomb them." And in many ways, sort of a few weeks ago, the Israelis moved the positions up and took over the castle of Bufont. And that has a very emotive place in Israel's heart. They've literally, literally have seen this movie before.

There's a movie called Bufont, that Joseph Seedav made it, one in Oscar, that was about the pointlessness of the occupation of southern Lebanon between 1982 and when he had Barack evacuated in 2000. Just soldiers dying for no reason, because Buddha growing, you know, famously like it looks like heaven, but it feels like hell.

Like all this stuff. And so, you've got Israeli-grandparents who saw their children die, or like very threatened there who are now watching their grandchildren, basically make the same mistake.

And even, you know, there's a lobby in the north of Israel called 1701 named after the Iran Resolution that represents 100,000 people in the north, and they'd been very hawkish.

They can't just live by the sort forever, the communities when we're covered, and that there has to be something."

So I think that on the Lebanese Father is this desire for this to work, and yet, for this to work, his bullying needs to not upset the apocarp, because you're going to need enough time for the ally to get strong enough to do its work. And to give that time, you're going to need Tehran to also agree to that, which strengthens the very thing you're trying to weaken. So the Israelis are stuck in a gaudy or not, where if you want the diplomacy to work with, you know, the Lebanese state, it needs to be strong enough that it can take on his bullet.

“And you need to not be humiliating it, like when Israel last week had a strike that killed some members of the LAA, that just humiliates the LAA.”

And makes people feel like, "Well, his bullet are the only defenders of Lebanon." So how do you do this without, you know, creating a civil war in Lebanon is a very complicated situation. You know, you need to show you're not at war with the Shiites, you're just at war with his bullet, and it's a very delicate dance that a military hammer alone doesn't do. So I think it's a complicated diplomatic thing to do during an election where the north has felt completely abandoned, and the incentive structure for the opposition is to say, "Let's go stronger and harder and not be restrained by the Americans."

It's a perverse incentive structure that doesn't, you know, you can keep on hammering away in northern Lebanon and occupying it. It's not going to deal with this bullet, and so what do you do? I think that's a real difficult policy question, and political question and domestic. As I said earlier, you know, promised in Netanyahu promised total victory in all these fronts, and there's no total victory in any of these fronts.

You know, he's now talking about taking 70 percent of Gaza going down to Gaza, you know, up from 51 percent.

And you know, Mark Rubio was asked about that in the Senate, he's like, "Well, that's not our plan." And the Senate is like, "Well, how are you asserting it in the arms with?" Like, I don't say, not very positive. I think the Israelis does no incentive for them to move forward on the Gaza phase two approach with Hamas at this point. And I think that would move forward with legitimate Hamas, because you'd have to disarm them and put them in the Palestinian polity. And so I think that the Israelis are so playing it, giving as many obstacles as possible to get Hamas to say, "Yes."

“And just saying, "You need to disarm, you need to disarm, and Hamas is like, "Well, you have obligations as well."”

And the Israelis are like, "You need to disarm before we even talk about those obligations." You know, Niklai Malad and Arthur is the high representative of his cork between these. And I personally don't see any productive momentum moving forward between now and an election day. I think the Americans are, it's ironic the Trump administration's in the same position as the Biden administration was, which is just forcing as well to keep the lines of humanitarian aid open to go through.

And that sort of the limits of what they seem to be able to do or are willing to do. You know, everyone's talking part, you know, they were additional conversations today in Cairo around disarmament. Until the Israelis also want to put some of their commitments on the table, I just don't see how it moves forward. And that also then looks, links to the West Bank. You know, you've got maltrich and Bengueh, who represent, and maybe like 7 or 8% of the country, running 70% of the policy in the West Bank,

where there's a clear push to try and collapse the Palestinian Authority and use this opportunity to do it. So it's not pressure to reform it, it's pressure to collapse it. And as long as the pressure is to collapse, there's nothing really to talk about. There's nothing the PA can do. So, you know, they'll try and reform President payments and they'll be told nothing you do is good enough. They'll try and work on different things and it's like, you know, no.

And at the same time, you've got marauding gangs of settler violence that continues going. You've got a far more lacks open fire policy from the IDF itself. It doesn't seem that there are that many consequences when there are tragic horrendous incidents happen. Just yesterday, a seven-month-old baby was killed in Chevron and the videos of it are horrific.

“And it's like, what will be the consequences and no one's sure, right?”

And, you know, despite there have been pushers and marauders being said this again on Capitol Hill, you know, these rallies have made some steps to try and have new policing units and others to try and police, you know, some of the settler violence that's coming out and that some of it's from the settlement, some of it's gangs coming from Tel Aviv. Whatever it is, the Israeli state is either unwilling or unable to deal with this. And, you know, when you have a police minister who's very, okay with it,

when you've got a minister within the defense in Smokkrich, who sees this as a nationalistic fight to the death, it's very hard when the states outlawed itself about how do you deal with this. And there's a lot of pressure. And in many ways, when Israel can't demonstrate to the region or even to itself, that it can be rational towards the Palestinians. That instead, it has to just liquidate the Palestinian national aspirations, the region listens, right?

And the region understands. So what does that actually mean, Scott? So everyone's waiting for, you know, will there be regional integration with the Saudis? And, you know, what would that look like? Well, fundamentally, that's about Bimek, right? This Indian Middle East corridor that goes from India through the UAE through Saudi, all the way through Israel to sort of ship things out.

Well, yesterday, the Turks and the Saudis signed a rail agreement that basically creates their version of Bimek,

And so the region is basically, I think, saying, like, if you can't get, if you can't demonstrate that you're rational to the Palestinians,

if you can't even get a credible pathway, not a Palestinian state's mark, a credible pathway to a Palestinian state, which, by the way, is point 19 of the Trump agreement that Israel is a signature of, right? If you can't even get that, then there's nothing to talk about, and we will find a way to move on without you.

“I think that the next government of Israel in four months is going to be, it's going to have a very tough decision on its hand,”

that it's going to have to be able to demonstrate both in the West Bank and in Gaza a policy that demonstrates to the region that it can be rational towards the Palestinians and that this pressure that is being applied is to reform the PA, not to collapse it. Because without that, the region will not integrate with it. It just won't. And to claim, well, you know, what then happens? Well, that's when the Turks can steal a march on them, and Scott, I go back to what we're seeing right now between Ankara and Jerusalem is a disaster.

What we're speaking today on Wednesday, the 10th. Today you've had pot shots again between Erdogan and Netanyahu, both very extreme, the both rhetorical attacks on each other. The Turks, basically saying, Israeli strikes on Syria and Lebanon are hurting Turkish interests, and then accusing Netanyahu being Hitler and everything under the sun. And then Netanyahu, I respond saying, you know, the Turks, the entire minister of the day before said, you're going to try and take over Jerusalem, screw you Turkish Ottomans, you committed a genocide against the Kurds,

and against the Armenians, and like, you know, we will make sure that you're in part, you know, you've got a NATO member and a KUS ally, basically, rhetorically ever increasing with no seemingly ability to de-escalate this relationship. And you've got the administration sort of vulcanized in their approach in terms of how they look at Turkey and how they look at Israel. And that's very problematic long-term as well. So it's a mess, right? But the Israeli population, just to finish this off, is even a more difficult situation than what I've already put out. Because the popular sentiment when you pull it,

basically, says 80% of Israeli sort that the US is well-war with Iran, went very well for US as our relations, like 80%, 60% think they improve their relationships in the region, and I know 20% thought that they have to do something with the Palestinians to improve their relationships.

“And yet when you step outside of Israel, every one of those polling is reversed, right?”

And so how does the leader hear all of that, and then has to confront that population that is completely on the opposite side of each one of those dynamics? It's very complicated, and Netanyahu is setting up a dynamic as I said earlier on, where he's like, if we have to go by ourselves on our own and face international isolation, we'll do it. And so that's part of the problem set on the Israeli domestic space, of how can you make an argument that Netanyahu is mistandled to the US relationship,

that the regional picture is bad, that we need to have a different policy, when the opposition in many ways just, they criticize Netanyahu often from his right when it comes from the regional policies. And yet Netanyahu is probably at the most right edge flag that you could do without truly creating regional configuration when it comes to Israel. And so there isn't that sort of lane in Israeli domestic thinking,

maybe with the exception of Lebanon, as I mentioned before, about a different pathway forward.

And it's going to be essential, they create one.

Otherwise, I don't see how when Jared Kushner and Steve Wittkov and the press of the president come to the next Israeli prime minister, and say, hey guys, we want to move on with the Gaza process and regional integration. Here's a deal of a century part two on the Palestinians, what's your response, what are you for? I don't know what they're going to respond, and they're going to have to respond something.

“So before we go, I think we have to talk about the one other big actor that's a key element all that's in that is the Lebanese government.”

You know, we, of course, had a ceasefire on June 3rd, negotiate it on June 3rd, or they're about that and goes June 3rd, between Israel and the Lebanese government, that kind of precipitated or predated this latest cycle of escalation between the two sides. Has ballad didn't buy into that agreement, but in theory had this idea that Lebanese forces were going to start taking some responsibility for pocket of South-level autonomy of Southern Lebanon.

Never implemented, we don't really know where it's going now.

And meanwhile, the Lebanese government is stuck in this very difficult position, where he is trying to negotiate with the Israelis, but doesn't have control over his book. And in some ways, this is a really, I mean, it is fundamentally a three-party, if not more, negotiation at a minimum between Israel, they root, address and pay root, and his ballad. What does this all mean for Lebanon's stability, security, politically, from humanitarian perspective?

We know Lebanon's economy has tanked over the last 10 years, less than 10 years, particularly since the huge port explosion just a few years ago. It was in bad strates before hostilities with Israel kicked back off in earnest a few years ago. Now you see this massive occupation in the south, potentially long-term, depending on where these really are ultimately feel about it. What does this all leave the Lebanese state and its prospects for the future?

And where does it fit in this political work, and it look for support, is regional support enough that it be able to stay afloat?

Is it the endangered actor and all that we may not be paying enough attention to?

It's a really interesting question, I want to be cautious, I'm not a Lebanese expert, so I can tell you from what I'm reading and from other parts of the region. So if the Lebanese experts listen and I say something well, I apologize in advance, but right me and we'll do a podcast with you and we'll do a podcast with you and we'll do a podcast with you. So the first thing to say is I think it's very interesting that President and Nun basically found himself in the same position I'd argue as President Abbas, where you just need to be useful to the Americans if you want to have any semblance of help from the Americans when it comes to the Israelis.

Right, Abbas hasn't managed to sort of get the Israelis off his neck, but President Nun, you know, and it was said, you know, he's chosen the path of diplomacy and bastard Michael Issa, our American ambassador there and said, because he've chosen the path of diplomacy with the Israelis and that you do want to try and create a piece of quotes, the Trump administration is with you and that you know, they'll be there to try and push a ceasefire on the Israelis. And you've heard Marka Rubio say directly, you know, the Israelis have no territorial ambitions on Lebanon, they don't want to occupy things permanently, they don't want to annex the land.

And that's very important because there are definitely voices in Israel that do want to have permanent occupation and potentially do want to annex fun parts of the land. You know, it's like sort of not from a biblical perspective, but from a security perspective, so having the US be very clear that the borders of Lebanon are Lebanese is a big diplomatic win even to start with.

“But yet, I think going into the Trump casino and sitting at the table also has a risk and we saw big pushes to try and push the Lebanese president to meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu and DC.”

And there was a huge pushback, not just domestically, but regionly to prevent him from doing that.

Because if he does that one, you basically enable normalization to move forward with no progress on the Palestinian issue.

And be, you know, the Saudis want to lead whatever regional integration process happens, they don't want another country to jump first. So I think you have also been seeing Saudi really start getting involved in Lebanon and trying to push you see meetings with both the speak of the parliament and with the Lebanese president and others having meetings in Saudi Arabia trying to reinforce the, you know, the terror agreement that was negotiated in Saudi Arabia that, you know, ended the civil war and saying, look, part of that agreement is, you know, one army, one gun and, you know, we need to find a way to get that.

The latest ceasefire between the Lebanese and the Israelis spoke about the L.A.F. having, you know, these bubble zones where they disarm her is below in the L.A.F.S. They're not using UN peacekeepers that the Israelis just fed up of and everything else, but that we're going to reinforce the L.A.F. By the way, at the same time, the Trump administration is cutting aid to the L.A.F.S., I don't understand, like the various cross-cutting currents of how many of this works.

“But I think the, the problem about Lebanon is like, how far do you push like the Trump, the Trump approach is pressure pressure pressure pressure pressure pressure and the Lebanese state is fragile, right?”

It's fragile because of how it's built in terms of the different ethnic minorities. If the Israelis look like they're at war with the part of the ethnic minority in Lebanon, where at war with the Shiites, you could topple over the, the, the, the capital balance that exists there. And we've seen that with Christian, you know, there's been reports of Christians and Sunnis throwing Shiite refugees from the South out of their homes, because they're one of the Israelis are going to bomb them. What does that do to the careful sort of mosaic of Lebanese, the Lebanese state? How does any of that work?

I think of Lebanon's going to be for Lebanon, it needs to make sure that it kicks out Iranian influence. But do you do that by instantaneously, like, you need to normalize relations with Israel, you need to get ready for anti-normalization laws, you do everything now, now, now, now to show it. And what does that do to a fragile state? Like, look, I don't think that the anti-normalization laws in Lebanon are good, right? And I think anyone who's involved in peace building, think they're good.

“But you need to disappoint your community at a rate they can accept, you need to get there carefully.”

And one of my biggest critiques of Israeli strategic thinking often is that they don't understand that other people have politics too. Like if the Lebanese turned around to the Israelis and said, you need to evacuate the settlements. You need to start dealing with satellite violence in a significant way before we do this. And you need to do that right now. You know, even if an Israeli government was willing, they'll say, look, it could cause a civil war in our country. If we did that right now, evacuating 500,000 people, the what that would do.

And they'd say, like, we have politics. And in many ways, the Lebanese are saying that to them, they're like, you're asking us to do things that are touching some of our core parts of our compact. And we could fall into civil war. Like we can't just jump. And I think that that's a real tension about like, yes, there are barriers to like normalizing relations with Israel.

But when you separate it from any semblance of a Palestinian cause, you take what is a one in a thousand shot, it's like a one in a million.

And like the risks of failure are so tremendous on the Lebanese state. And yet, they can't be dominated by take on. It's not viable. So they need other regional actors, golf actors to come and support them and strengthen them, both to protect them from Iran and to strengthen their state capacity.

If they want to go that, they just can't move at warp speed. It has to be like slowly, but surely get there. I think that the tensions of that are exacerbated when the Israelis are tactically brilliant, but strategically predictable.

And because bullet knows exactly how to get Israel to bomb parts of the country, that will strengthen Khezbollah in the long term, and we can the Lebanese state.

And it seems like Israel takes the cheese every time, right? And for their own domestic, for Israel's own domestic. Because bullet are in many ways is controlling the escalation ladder, which is exactly what you don't want them to do.

“I think that Lebanon is stuck. That's why the Lebanese president did this huge public plea on CNN to the Israeli population, saying,”

"We want to have peace with you eventually. This can't be through a military solution. It has to be through diplomacy." And today you had President Hartsok of Israel respond. Basically, I want to be able to drive to Beirut. I want to have peace with you, but you need to throw the Iranians and his bullet out of your midst.

So everyone agrees with what the problem is, but how you get there when you've got an armed actor, also there who's still taking dictats from Tehran, is very complicated.

And just saying Lebanon do a better job, clearly isn't sure, great, but how. And so it needs that regional support and some strategic patience. At the same time, the Israeli domestic environment doesn't allow a government that's going to elections to give that strategic patience. So the Lebanese politics is becoming subservient to the Israeli dictats and demands, which is very dangerous.

“I think that that's part of the, again, complexity. And I think that Israeli strategic decision makers understand this.”

They don't want to collapse the Lebanese state. So I think that, like, in everything, there's a push and pull between policy and politics. And how do you find that careful balance to do that? I do think that the Israelis are trying to invest into the diplomatic process. I don't think it's a shell game for them, but they are also captured by their own domestic challenges, as other Lebanese. And I think that the Trump administration is trying to work out, and, you know, I will absolutely give credit to the Trump administration trying to find a diplomatic solution here.

With Marco Rubio and with, like, very senior leveling engagement about how they can do that with regional allies to get that. But, you know, this, this, it's not obsession with this desire to quickly run to the end and to get to normalization with this, well, is something that is very threatening to a very fragile process that's hard enough as it is. There is a lot to digest and to think about this, and this is a little bit conversational. A lot of things to watch for the moment we are out of time, which will probably thank you for joining us here today on the Law Fair podcast.

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