[MUSIC]
Mr. May thank you very much for doing this.
“So in the United States, I think most people to the extent they're paying attention”
are watching what's happening in Iran and have a sense that what's happening between Russia and NATO, Ukraine, the United States, the festering of war in eastern Europe is kind of a stalemate and nothing really is happening there. I don't know if that's true, assess what you think is happening between Russia and Ukraine and its proxies right now.
>> Yeah, I think you're right, I don't think it is true, Tucker, I think that the general sense in the West is that you'll hear from some people that Russia is losing on the battlefield and that the Russian economy is about to fall apart. I mean, I've heard it time and time again and there's no evidence to support even those things.
“The battlefield issue is poorly understood and I think the reason is that people don't”
understand Russia's motivations and they don't understand what the strategy is. In an article I read recently on the coming war with Russia, I said that
Plasrich, who was the great political philosopher of war, so that the most important decision
that a military man and a politician can make is to understand the nature of the war. I don't think that the West is understood the nature of the war of Russia north for that matter or with Iran, but what they haven't understood with Russia is that as far as Russia is concerned as an existential war, they're fighting to make sure that Russia is preserved and when you get people like Kayakalis saying that Russia must be broken up who can blame them.
I think we understood that, I think that would be a start. I'm unfortunately where we're approaching the war it seems to me as a negotiation and a negotiation with arms. If we increase a bit of pressure on Russia, then they'll eventually come back
“to the negotiating table. What they've missed though is that Russia, I think, has a clear strategy”
and I can't, I can't be sure about it. I'm not in the Russian general staff, but I think it's got about five key phases, I mean we know that the run-up to the special mantra of Russian Tucker was, it was clear that there were so many warnings going back as far as 1996 and yet unfortunately we've ignored them all. Notwithstanding the warnings not only came from Russia, but from some of our very best strategic thinkers from George Kiemann, back as far as 1996
from John Meshheimer in 2014. But when you act at the start of the war, then it seemed to me as the war kicked off and I have to say I did not see the war coming. I was involved in the offshore industry sector, but as I got to understand it, then the first thing that became obvious to me that this was not a war to or a special mantra operation to invade Ukraine. And the answer, the reason was simple. The words and attributes, you know, Ukraine is about the size of half
of Europe, and you're not going to do that with 190,000 trips. I cannot for a moment think that the
Russian general staff advised Putin that they had enough trips to invade Ukraine. This was always
about the Donbass, and I think the first phase of the stretch, he was really the use of military force to support a diplomatic engagement. And indeed that diplomatic engagement actually went quite well. The Russians had opened again sessions with the Ukrainians after day one. And, you know, as we arrived in March, then there was ready to sign, as both sides were an agreement which would have stopped the war. It was no NATO, a neutrality for Ukraine, a softer termination for the Donbass.
But that was ready to sign, and it would have been signed on almost certain, if it hadn't been for Boris Johnson, and no doubt with Biden's support, actually going across and persuading Zelensky to fight Russian that he would have all the support he needed. So that's phase one. I think at phase two, when it becomes clear to Russia that they are in a going to have to fight. And I like you to have to fight NATO because of what are they hearing. What you then see is what I would call
militaryist, a withdrawing contact. So essentially what the Russians were doing, we're recognising that actually the Kiev attack and the actions in the Donbass were all diplomatic. They would now need to withdraw to a line. And what they did was they withdrew back to what's known as a sort of a kind line, which was a defensive line, constructed by the general who was the expert in Russia and defensive lines. And that from about September onwards, they then moved into three
of phase three after withdrawal, which is what I call a "traditional defense". And what that essentially
Means was meeting there to objective.
both of which were operational objectives. And the strategic objective though, Turkey was clear,
it was to preserve Russia's security. And what offensive or what defensive attrition means is is wearing down the men and material of the Ukrainian army. And goodness me, we helped them a lot in that because we persuaded them to to expand not one army, but two armies against that defensive
“line for not a single penetration. So you get to leap 2023 and at that stage. I think what Russia”
does is they've started to, as the war got going, they started to mobilize and increase the force of they need the industrial capacity. And so by late 2023, they were ready to move into phase three. Phase three was what I call offensive attrition. Not necessarily secure in territory, but really going on and starting to continue with what we continue wearing down the men and material of the
Ukrainian army. Don't forget in the Ukrainian army, I had no superiority, none other things that you
want fighting an offensive or or indeed a defensive war. And moving slowly forward. I think as well, they were probably starting to clarify what would be their ultimate objectives. I remember saying, I think to Danny Davis about a year and a half ago, I thought their minimalist objectives will be to secure the dumbass and the four eastern or blasts from here. And then maximum objectives might be to go further, might be to go to secure the whole of northern Russia, which is the
Odessa and the next four or blasts to the west. I wasn't sure which way they would go, but I've heard Putin say quite recently that they actually he's talking about northern Russia. And the logic behind that is about security, it's about establishing what they believe to be as secure buffer, protecting the Russian people within it. And the question really is, how long it takes them to
“get there, if indeed they keep going in that way. So I think when you start to understand that,”
and all of the stuff that we've heard well, the rush is against slowly, it misses the objective, it misses what they're trying to achieve. And when you understand what they're doing, what I think is a clear strategy, then I think what that does is to actually help you work out what they're doing, why they're doing, why they're doing it, and how the west should be thinking, because at the moment we sort of see, on the one hand, Russian army is not doing very well,
it's not securing much, much territory, that's not true, it's actually increasing, it's been securing territory for at least the last 30 or so months. But they're not securing, they weren't securing territory initially, it's simply to secure the territory. They were doing it to actually to wear down and attract the Ukrainian army with the high degree of success as we know from the casualties. So I think when you get that cup, I think it's much easier to understand
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That has always made sense to me if foreign leaders gave speeches calling for the breakup of the
United States, I would, of course, do everything I could to support the defense of the United States. I would see that as existential, if someone said we're going to break up the UK, you'd probably take up arms and its defense, of course. So I've understood that since the first day, what I have never understood is the West's motive. Why would the United States and its, whatever you call them, but it's partners in NATO, give this, why would they want to war with Russia
and a war that has hurt them? What is the motive there? It's a really, really good question. I have said for quite a long time now that the Russian operation is being guided by military strategy and the Western operation is a big guided by political narrative and with
“objectives that change quite a lot. I think the initial objective, and it depends,”
which particular party on the NATO side you're talking to, but the initial objectives were
Possibly to break up Russia.
which is called Extending Russia. The Russian intelligentship would end off actually in a on YouTube
video, which is on YouTube, talked about the need to actually have a war with Russia,
“to actually help them get into NATO. I think there's also what I would call lag in thinking,”
because a lot of the people who were proposing the extension later without thinking through the consequences did not anticipate this. I'm certain they didn't anticipate it, because they weren't ready. You know, another great failure of NATO, I'm afraid, say they were not ready for the war. I mean, if they had had thought it through and said that if we keep doing this, then Russia will respond, then actually they would either have made
a defensive preparation or they wouldn't have done it. I think we can say with the high degree
of certainty that they did not think it through. So I think there's some lag in there, and I think there's also, I'm afraid to say, and I think this is probably more European than the United States. Well, you will know better than the United States. There's a high degree of Russia failure, which I find it very, very difficult to understand. I think it's in part our press. It's in part the narrative that we built. It's in part the nature of spin in modern western
politics where an event kicks off and have people spin to help those parties that are in power, stay in power. And what that means is that the population generally starts speaking start to get
deceived. I don't think they're live to, but they're deceived because they're presented with one
“side of the story. Now that really matters in war, because in war you need to be able to look”
at all sides of the story, which is why I paned the article of the coming war, the Russia, because nobody seemed to think what that war might like. It's very difficult to be understand fully though the motivations, but I think within those factors, like are you probably got the answer. I understand whether European populations are Russophobic because the propaganda has played upon their best qualities. Russia is seen as the aggressor. Ukraine is the underdog. I think Europeans
in general root for the underdog. That's a sign of their decency. It's also allowed. You're allowed to hate Russians because they're white, so you don't have to feel guilty about painting them as animals. You're not racist when you do that. I understand all of that. And they just don't know any better because Europe is a bias fear in its media, like there's no outside information comes in, right? Of course, the same in the United States. What I don't understand is the motive
of the liars, like why do European leaders seek a war with Russia? Why do American leaders seek a war with Russia? I mean, these are not stupid people, and yet they are hell bent on destroying their own countries in the service of this war against a country that doesn't need to be our enemy and it doesn't make any sense. If I had to answer the question in one phrase, it's the lack of the ability to think strategically. There is a wonderful American general who has studied when I was
writing on stretch, they called on dribbler for her. And he said that in war the loser deserved to lose because his defeat will be a consequence of in adequate strategic thinking either before or during
“the conflict. I think that the institutional lag in entity as such as NATO, which had done badly”
in Afghanistan, I was in Afghanistan and let's face it, NATO lost. So the idea that NATO could prevail over Russia, having lost against the Taliban, it's just extraordinary thinking, but it's in NATO. I think as well that the advice within the establishment, I used to call it call them the elites, but I've now realized that they're not elite because it needs about high performance whereas we're not seeing that within the establishment. So I think the establishments have
what I can best to score as described as a sort of institutional lag and sort of blink of thinking. And we see that in many ways. And when you look across the broad nature of the strategic context in which we're operating, and if you can be bothered to listen to what the Russians have been saying, then the logic that they present is, I find it sort of unequivocal. I may have listened of course to your interview with Vladimir Putin and of course a lever off. And there was almost nothing
like I think of that I disagree with. The problem though, the West is not interested in listening it seems to me. And so I think this is more about incompetence and it must be incompetence
On the Europeans.
near-con-like establishment in the West and the E3 in Britain, Germany and France that is
determined to break up Russia. But it's obviously impossible that seems to me that the only of it can I call that thing that. Well, can I ask you, I was at a dinner with her not long ago in a foreign country with a lot of foreign diplomats who are not mediocre at all. And she got up to speak and the feeling of contempt for her and bewilderment that someone this stupid could have a leadership position in Europe. People were shocked by just how unimpressive, how uninformed she
was, how childish, how girlish she was. Everything was a kind of grotesque and dumb moral generalization, Hitler versus Churchill kind of level stuff. How does someone like that, how does the structure like the EU of continent with the smartest people in the world, in my opinion, promote someone like call us to a position of leadership, like how does that happen? It's a very good question. Could you could ask the exact other same question about Vondalaine? Yes. Vondalaine, when I was
serving with Nitoris for being the worst minister to defend that Germany had ever had. And suddenly we find that she is in charge of all the, you know, has a leadership role in the EU. You could also say it about Ruta as well. And I thought the last next high secretary general was bad,
“but my goodness me, he's got very good competition now. I think it also goes across the”
Western leadership as well, generally, in my experience, you know, I'm sort of, I'm, you know, started in my naval crew and back in 76. And this is the worst set of leaders that I think we've got collectively for as long as I've been alive, I think. So I can't answer your question,
other to say that it's, it's a very difficult position to be, but also it's an incredible weakness
that we have in the Western explains so much of what's going wrong in the West is the lack of high quality leadership. And I used to teach leadership and I look at some of the ways that these leaders are operating and it's extraordinarily, well, that the issue is competent and then make sure some of these decent people, they're doing what they think, but they're obviously not competent.
“And I say that strategically, that for a strategic operation, the measure of success is was the”
operation effective, was it enduring, whether results enduring and was it, was it efficient? Now, on all of the, the intervention to this century starting Afghanistan Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and now Iran, we failed at every one of those, I would say, some people argue about Syria, although if you think for a re-creating a caliphate within Syria is a good idea, and that's I can question, it looks to me like Iran is being lost, it looks to me like Russia is being lost,
so we've got a consistently in terms of capacity to think and act strategically. I think this isn't just though about the politicians, I think it's also about senior military officers, about senior diplomats, about senior intelligence officers, so this isn't, I wouldn't want to blame the politicians entirely, I've operated the top of British government as the executive assistant to our chief of defense staff, so I watch people operating in part of that.
“But strategy thinking is the key shortfall, and it's caused us a lot of harm, and I think it”
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So, at the point we're at right now, it seems more dangerous in the West War against Russia
“than it has been ever. Can you describe where you think we are and where this is going?”
Yeah, let me let me to show you the tool, Tucker of the article I wrote on the coming war with Russia. And the reason I wrote it was now hearing a lot of people here saying we're we're getting ready for war with Russia will be ready to fight in 2030. I don't think that's true because we can't afford to be, but anyway that's the narrative that's being sold to the European
publics and the problem is that of course the Russians will be listening to this of course they'll
be listening to it. So, I thought it would be good ideas. So, okay, well if I'm going to be ready to fight a war with Russia, what's it going to be like? And the first thing about the article was I said that let's not assume that Russia is going to wait and do nothing until 2030 into a ready. So, let's assume that because of the way that we're starting to promote attacks deep into Russia by the E3 that's Germany Brickland of France providing weapons and weapons has been significant
warheads as well, 250 kilograms and significant range deep into Russia. Let's not assume that the Russians are just going to sit back and let this happen. So, my starting point was to say, okay, well let's assume that Russia attacks Europe or attacks 7 elements of Europe and what the Russians have said that they have not taken these attacks off the agenda which is a warring and it's a warring
which we seem to be ignoring. So, let's assume that the first attacks happen in September of this year
and my scenario and I should emphasize it's a scenario not a forecast. So, it's trying to make people think about what could happen. So, let's assume that these attacks happen in September of this year and the Russians destroyed with hypersonic missile for factories that are making drones and
“missiles in Britain and France and in Germany. And the question that is what does Europe do?”
And of course, the first thing Europe does is it says, okay, we're now going to invoke article five and it's all of a sudden people realize what article five really means. I mean, you've got NATO which when I was serving a NATO and the standing NATO force Mediterranean, we used to say that NATO is still for no ability to organize slightly unfair. But actually NATO isn't this great on nippittent coalition people say. This strongest coalition since the since it in history. I mean,
that obviously isn't true. The strongest coalition history is rise I can see with the allied
coalition the Second World, the United States, Britain, the Commonwealth, Russia and China. That
is the strongest coalition by far. So, NATO invokes article five and the three countries that have been attacked in the vertical five. And they realize it's suddenly that actually what article five means is that an attack on one is an attack on all, but it doesn't mean that actually those the whole of the NATO forces have to respond and people decide to respond as they think best. And in the article I propose that Hungary says, no, we're not getting engaged. Spain says,
“no, we're not getting engaged. We don't think this is our interests. I think other countries might”
equivocate, you know, if difficult to say, but, you know, countries like Hungary, for example, obviously won't. So, at that stage, we suddenly see that this isn't all it means, but the big issue of the Tucker is what is the United States do. Now, because we know that Rubio has been looking as if the United States are shifting back into support these operations. But at that moment, I think there's no question about what United States do. If it does, if it says sees attacks
into Russia, especially if those have been warned, the attacks of war, and we may know, no response to them. And my guess is that the miracle will not want to commit troops into mainland Europe to fight in a line at war against Russia on Europe and so on and for the for US troops to fight and die on the European so on. I wouldn't, if I were in the United States. So you're then in the situation, well, now to what the Europeans do. And again, just to
develop the scenario, I assume that Europeans do anything they can do, because their land forces are not ready, is that they use air forces to respond to Russia, and that that doesn't go very well. That actually, they find that they're up against Russia, which got a lot of experience in air defense in one of my jobs and the Navy was to be the captain of air defense destroyer.
I was what was known as the anti-air warfare commander.
poor shape in Europe, in terms of being able to defend our skies. We would struggle to respond
“to saturation, drone attacks. We've got extremely limited responses to ballistic missiles.”
I'm a great fan of Ted Postal, who isn't MIT professor on this. He thinks that the they picture up back three systems of possibly looking about 3% effectiveness. And when it comes to hypersonic missiles, we've got no response whatsoever. So suddenly, we're making a text that aren't very successful. But in return, I say that because the E3 have decided to respond to Russia's attacks that they then take the gloves off and use hypersonic missiles, probably with conventional
missiles to do more damage. And the thing that I would go after, especially as an energy expert, would be to do the same thing that they're done in care and in Ukraine, which is to surgically start to undermine our energy infrastructure. And I can tell you that a resonant missile
“landing in a liquid national gas terminal or an oil terminal in Milford Haven, or Rotterdam,”
would do extensive damage. That would be bad enough. But unfortunately, of course, because of the sanctions we placed on Russia in the first place about 48 or 44 years ago, we've switched ourselves off from Russian oil, switched ourselves off from Russian gas. And that's 40% of our gas. We've also of the particular products we've switched ourselves off to Russian diesel, who used to provide us with 40% of Europe's diesel. Now, as an end-use expert, if you can explain to me how you
can run a modern industrial society without diesel, then I'm all ears, but I don't know how to do it.
It's disrespectful. Diesel is critical for farming, for fishing, for food logistics, for construction,
for running the other two primary energy sources. That's renewable energy and nuclear energy. I could go on and on. It is really as the critical field, and we've switched ourselves off to it, and of course, having switched ourselves off and increased our prices, indeed, in Europe, which, of course, is having an effect on our economies, especially Germans economy. Whenever the situation is straight, it's almost as closed. And so we've got a second way,
on top of the first way. So, talk about being in a very, very fragile position. It's an extremely weak position, not least, because we import about 12 million barrels a day into oil into the European region. Norway's reasonably self-sufficient, but Norway's completely self-sufficient. And we get about 45% or so of our age carbons from the North Sea, although that's reducing, but Europe, generally, is extremely vulnerable. So, what's got a situation, which is that our
energy infrastructure is being written down as a time when we have no chance of defending our skies against it. And again, this is why I was trying to actually make the point to people who prepared to think about this, what this will, might look like, because the economic consequences of this would be profound. Mathematically, there's a really close relationship between the use of energy and GDP. It's extremely close. It's a, but it's close to one, it's perhaps sort of 0.99 or
some, yes. So, what that means is when you take energy out of the system, then you are going to have a constant fact, which is similar in rough order of magnitude on your economy. So, if we take 10% of the world's energy away, then surprise, surprise, don't be surprised if we get a global reduction in GDP of 10%. Now, that's getting close to a depression, indeed, it's on the borderline of the depression. We're going back to Europe. It wouldn't surprise me at all if we were in a situation
“where worse such an attack happened, then we would be in deep economic trouble. And I think that”
would lead steep political trouble as well. But again, it is a scenario, and the point of the scenario was to help people really think about what such a war might mean and really make sure that we've done the risk assessment. Now, I developed this as a scenario, because what I wanted people to think about was doing the risk assessment. At the moment, the European's risk assessment of what they're doing is, as far as I can see, is based on a gas. And the gas is, we're going to keep firing a long-range
weapons into Russia, and we're going to gas that the Russians aren't going to respond. And I think that's a very dangerous gas. I mean, people say the Russian don't have red lines, and I keep saying
to the world just a second. The Russian told us that if we tried to expand nature into Georgia,
or to Ukraine, and it would result in a war. And indeed, all our clever thinkers told us the
Same thing, and surprised surprised when we did do that a war happened.
So I think it's wrong to have that gas. And the way that risk management works,
I'm not a great fan of risk management, I can choose by the financial sector to do risk analysis, as far as I can see it doesn't work for them. But what they do do, they say, if you're thinking about a risk, have a think about the impact and the probability. Now, even if the probability is low of Russia doing what I've said, the impact is profound. So to me, that's a risk which you really need to work very, very hard to think through, and to make sure that the population who you're
exposing to that risk have been taken on board rather than just crack on without really thinking about it.
“So I think there needs to be in Europe, a political debate about this, and whether we're prepared”
to let our politicians lead us into a situation where they were exposed to this risk. And we've been here before, in Europe, it's 2014, and 1914, I should say, you know, the run the famous Barbara Tuckman's famous book, you know, The Guns of August, where we all know
we fell into the First World War. People thought it would be over in four months and four years
later, Europe's devastated. So let's at least try to do the thinking this time around and decide that if we are going to do these things and to poke the bear before ready for a war which we would lose anyway, let's at least have a public debate about that and see how the country feel about it under the country's feel about it. Because I'm strongly of the view that actually, if the country were exposed to what I'm talking about, the difference in terms of political support for it
“would be profound. I think the political support for it would fall away. It doesn't matter what”
the moral issue is. I happen to think that the moral background lies with Russia. What happens is the issue of power. And Russia has the balance of power here and overwhelming me. So my specialist if we were able to have that debate and I think we should have that debate then I don't think Europeans would continue to feel quite so much less of it because they do.
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“I think one disadvantage that the Europeans have is they don't understand how hated they are”
by the people planning these wars. I think it's true of all the wars the last 100 years. I think at least in my country the foreign policy strategists, the neocons who are driving all of this, truly hate Europe and would like to see and destroy these railies hate Europe and Europeans can't seem to admit that to themselves. It's very obvious by the effects. So let's say that the Russians did lob a hypersonic missile into Rotterdam or into the UK. Everyone knows it's very obvious that
Europe can't mount a conventional war against Russia. They would lose instantly. The one thing they do have, however, is nuclear weapons. So how much incentive would there be to use a nuclear weapon in response? It's a six-wheel-sized dollar question and I actually cover that in the article. I think what we're talking about is that if either Britain or France, the two nations with nuclear weapons chose to respond with nuclear weapons, that essentially is committing national suicide.
Yes. I would expect the Russians to respond. Let's forget that they've got nearly 5,500 nuclear weapons, just shorter that. I think Britain's got sort of more, I think there might be 200 as those sorts of figures. I think that the, that a prime minister of president of France, who was prepared to use nuclear weapons to support conventional war, which we would likely
To lose in the first place.
see it. I cannot see it happening. Really, it's interesting. They cheered the destruction of their
own energy by blind. They abetted the invasion of their country by, you know, north and, and
“sub-Saharan Africa, like their suicide, that's what it seems as a observer. So yeah. I think it's”
it's suicidal by incompetence, but I would like to think that within the establishment, there were enough people who would, by this stage, especially if we were starting to go to war, I really started to think this through. I would also like to think that, and I'd be interested in your view on this, that there were Americans who were saying, this isn't very good. This isn't what we're, you know, we were thinking that we could help with a breakup of Russia. It's not happening.
This war has started to kick off. We need to get this to a close, and I don't know if that would happen, but I would like to think that actually there would be some voices in America. You know, the sorts of people who were spent to my, for me, were people like JD events, and Tossicabas, no longer there, but the voices of reason within the White House, I'm curious to see what Donald Trump's view as well, but I'm sure that America's would not want to be doing anything which
opened them to the possibility of a nuclear exchange with Russia. So you know, my sense is that Trump's views are irrelevant. I don't think he was for this war with Iran. He did it anyway. He's utterly controlled. So so there's that. JD events is the only person I'm aware of in American national politics with any power at all to send he has power who would oppose this, but I don't see anyone other than JD events. I'm wrong. Yeah. Yeah. I hope you are too.
I mean, there's no doubt that the voices of the independent media are starting to be heard.
“We've got a long, long way to go, but we're starting to be heard. But again, this is why I think”
this debate needs to happen now, run later. I mean, Europeans haven't thought about this a lot. I mean, when the attacks were conducted on the rushing strategic bombing force,
I thought that was an act of incredible strategic recklessness because those bombers were out
on the airfields on the pan, so they could be seen by satellites as part of the start treaty. That was part of the treaty. And a rushing nuclear doctrine is such that if they were if they're nuclear triad, an element of the nuclear triad is attached, then their response is to respond with nuclear weapons. They chose not to do it. I think goodness. But we're playing with fire here. And I think that the issue, I think, is not the nuclear response. And I think it's
a very open question. There's no question not only for us, but for the Russians as well. If I could imagine the Russians saying, yeah, actually, we've got people who are so incompetent in Western capitals. We perhaps don't want to respond this way, or they might do it in a more measured way. I mean, here's a very good question. What if the responses were not against Germany, France, and Britain, but against Germany? What if the responses were such that they took
out Germany's drone factories and Poland's drone factories? Would then Britain and Russia and France be prepared to sacrifice their nations and tens of millions of deaths to support Germany
in that situation? Very, very good question. And I don't know what the answer is. But I mean,
to me, the answer is, let's at least think carefully about what we're trying to do with these long-range weapons and attacks into Russia. And let's also think about diplomacy. I mean, the fact that we can have, you know, have meetings where the West is talking about solutions to the Russia Ukraine war, and triumphantly exclude one of the belligerents, and it's diplomatic incompetence of the highest order I can see. Yeah, we, in the very difficult British and Irish relationships,
during the the troubles in Ireland, maintained diplomatic, very, very subtle diplomatic engagement
“threat that almost the whole of that war. And thank goodness we did. What we need, I think,”
is to at least think about this alternative pathway to peace. I'm sure it's there. I've often thought that one of the biggest problems is NATO, you know, NATO at the moment is a bit of a self-leafing dialogue. But what I want to say, NATO exists to confront a threat, which is created by its own existence. It doesn't have the power to confront the threat that is existence has created.
I think NATO to my mind is to keep us the problem here.
that is NATO exists to confront the opposition. It's created, but doesn't have the power to successfully
“resist that up. I mean, that's, that's the first thing I've heard today. Yes, it was in a real,”
it was in a, um, one of the Quincy Institute's, a responsible State Crafting Foundation months ago. I mean, it's so obvious, you know, um, and yet people think that NATO is omnipotent. So I think that, um, understanding that actually the NATO guarantee is, as I wouldn't say, it's a little as paper, but it is much less, um, comprehensive than people think, because it relies on military forces, which are, to my mind, nowhere near as battleharmed as Russians are.
You know, the, the second best army in the world I was said at the moment in terms of battleharmed,
is the Ukrainian army. Yes, you know, the first is the Russian army. The Chinese will be watching extremely closely. So the idea that NATO, um, you know, can, with a desperate group of, um, countries with different levels of force forces, with different levels of, um, equipment capabilities, can actually be brought together into coalition to defeat the most battleharmed army in the world.
“You know, it doesn't stack up, does it? You know, you need to be a military man and trying to stand”
there. It doesn't stack up. Unfortunately, a lot of the military people don't understand this. They, they're not really, um, interested as far as I can see in, um, understanding Russia.
Well, I just find it, um, profound, um, I've been listening to a couple of, I was listening,
recently, to one of our former Chief of Defense staff, and I said in a, um, meeting in which we are, I said, what, what do you think about talking to Russia? And his responsibility, I think we, probably, should do that, but he said, but not Putin. I thought, well, that's just astonishing, that anybody could say that, and it shows you the degree of rust of failure. I mean, I was, you know, I, in my service career, I spent a lot of the time my service career prepared to
fight the Russians, but when the Cold War came and partnership for peace was kicked off, and we started to engage with the Russians. Nobody, you know, we were, most of us in my experience were delighted that we could be in that position. So quite how we've got back to this situation of, um, seeing Russia with the enemy. It's a good question. A lot of it is to do with not listening to Russia and not hearing Russia, because when you listen to them and hear them, it's fairly
obvious what they want, but people just don't seem to feel to do it. It's a bit like, and I'm not a soccer player, but it's a bit like, um, getting your team ready for a, um, a match, and, um, not bothering to study the opposition. Yes. I mean, how many football coaches would do that? How many of you remarkable football coaches do? How many, you know, everybody would be studying the opposition, and if we were studying the opposition, and that would be good stock, we would then
realize the challenge really quickly, but we would also be in a much position to understand the opposition. Well, there are much more serious than we are, and much more, it's not close, and so that right there gives you pause. Why would you ever get into a conflict with people who are at least as smart as you and much more committed? Um, you wouldn't. So where, you after your military service spent 15 years in the energy sector, where's your qualified answer this question? Where is the West,
“the US, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, uh, with energy right now? I think, um, it's a very”
good question, and I, I, my strong sense, um, this is intuitive with some analysis to, to support it, but my strong sense is that we're, um, on the edge of a crisis. And the reason I say that is if you take, uh, it's not 20 million barrels per day, and let's just stay with oil for the moment,
not, not natural gas. But just taking oil, which is the critical resource for almost all of the
others, um, you take 20 million barrels of oil out of the such, out of the, um, straight one mode, just in fact, it's 13. Then, um, sooner or later, then has to show up. Now, what, um, I was surprised with is how long it's taken. And of course, and when you start to see what's going on, you start to see what's happening, it takes, um, from the closure of the straight four modes. It takes about two months for the ships, uh, which are traveling at 12 knots, which is about the same speed as the bicycle.
You know, to get to the United States and to places like Kushing, it takes about a month or so to get to Europe. So firstly, you've got all the ships, which had left, were still moving. Uh, the inventories, of course, were significant. There was a bit of an old lot at the time. So those have been largely drawn down, as far as I can see. Uh, this strategic procurement reserves as well,
Uh, have largely been drawn down.
me. So if I think it's pretty low, figure I have in my mind, you, you may know this better than me as about 20%. That's right. Again, when you get to start to get to the drags, um, you've got to think carefully about it. Um, even when they will move through pipelines. So from Kushing up to this up to, um, to New England, it's traveling at between three and five free and eight miles an hour. So that of course takes time. And of course, the all in the pipeline needs to start
“you need to have all in the pipeline for the pipeline to work. Right. So the all in the pipeline isn't”
working. Uh, it's not working in midtrend. Last but my name is Lisa's China. And while I don't think any of us understood was how China would respond to this. And I think we completely understand,
but China and I've reduced its, um, it's tomorrow by about five million barrels per day, which is
significant reduction. It's also home to the largest strategic programme reserve in the world. I think the figure I've got is 1.3 billion rounds per day. So that's a very significant reserve. Um, I also suspect I don't know. I suspect one of the ways that China was thinking about this was not just about self interest. But I suspect the Chinese were thinking that as an exporting nation, they were thinking long and hard about the impact that these trade for most closure would have
on the rest of the Far East, with the other nations in the Far East, which are much more vulnerable. Japan had a very, um, big, um, or a reserve. The places like Taiwan, you know, the, the, um, 90% of the semiconductor is a main Taiwan. So place like Taiwan, we're much more, much more vulnerable. So I suspect one of the reasons China may have done that is not just, um, um, not not just for tactical reasons, but also for thinking about their export markets, because, um, reduction in oil
in these other places could have a significant significant impact. Um, I don't think anybody really knows. Um, but one of the, the other things to think about is that, sorry, I'll just finish
“about that. I think I would, would be surprised if we would not see consequences of this in August.”
Uh, and I've certainly had some very, um, good analysts who I, I follow, um, talking about September as well. I'm a great fan of an American chair for a chair for, um, uh, chair physicists called our, um, who's an exceptional, um, exceptional analyst. The other thing though, of course, is that even when the stretch for those open, then there is a lag, there's a lag on actually those, um, um, the whole system getting going against, but like,
sort of closing off your plumbing and your pipe and your gaps at home and then expect it to function perfectly. Now, one of the interesting things is that when the, um, um, what the ship's name was, a ship like the container ship, um, um, blocked the Suez Canal. And for every one day that that container ship blocked Suez Canal, um, um, um, um, there's, there's a, there's a, there's a, there's a very good, uh, much Navy analyst who all Sam McCoy would be on it, who said it was about six days
for the whole logistics system to recover. So even if it's three days, you could be talking for, um, you know, as a minimum, it would be the amount of time that the stretch has been close, it will take to recover, but it could be twice that, or it could be three times that. So I'm expecting and forecasting that we'll be what looking at a significant recession, starting in the autumn, and that could tip into recession in the new year.
Quite where that recession will play in the globe as an open question. I mean, the country that's most insulated from it, surprise, surprise, is Russia, you know, Russia's no target nation.
“It's well understand the consequences of, um, you know, of, um, of what's going on, I think,”
although Putin's first degree is in law, his past graduate work was in resource economics. So
I'm, we'll be astonished if they don't understand this. I know that the, um, Chinese have been looking at their own energy situation for decades. Um, there's good evidence to say that in 2003, when the Americans with allies went into Iraq, that the Chinese thought that that was about oil, and they began, um, increasing their, um, their own reserves. So, but as for places like Europe, you know, we're incredibly vulnerable. So there's a lot of the Far East, um, so I'm afraid
to say our places like Africa, and as an open question about United States as well, that the Trump line that, um, that United States is a, um, as an exporter of oil is true and as much as an exporter of fine products, but when it comes to, to, um, cruise, it's an important
of cruise. In tune of about 6.5 million barrels per day, and even if you've got access, you know,
through, for example, Venezuela or Canada, oils of fundible commodity. So you may have access,
The prices really want to go up.
the moment, um, in terms of, you know, cross-pug back per barrel, it's up here. Um, but if those costs were to increase significantly, um, in the next two to three months, um, I would imagine that would not be the sorts of run you'd want into the mid-terms, and I would be surprised that they don't increase significantly. And even if you open the straight or foremost, I would be surprised if the lag in the system is such that you're still not suffering from the consequences that
is well into the mid-terms and probably into the new year. So oil, bread crude was like price
“and dollars, I think 71 last week, um, if you'd told me almost four months after the closure of”
the straight that it would be 71, I would never have believed that. What, how did that happen? Were
you surprised by it that it's so well? Yes, very, very. I was just a surprised at you and I think most of the analysts were, but I think a lot of it is to do the lag. It's also, um, this distinction between the futures markets and the actual delivery. I was talking to a Singaporean colleague last month, and he said that I don't know whether it's still the case that not was standing what Brent was at or what WTI was at, but in Singapore, they were buying crude for $200
a barrel. So, you know, the difference, the difference is, is the interesting one. It's what what people actually paying for it. I mean, there may be a short-term lag who knows, but that's that's the different question, the so-called cracks spread between, um, you know, what you're
paying, what, or what you're forecasting to pay in the futures markets and what you're actually
paying on the day. How does a country exist at $200 a barrel? Yeah, well, fortunately, um, Singapore's an extremely efficient country. Yes. So, you know, but that must be having political effects. I guess as well, it's quite a small country. I didn't, uh, I was so surprised when I had $200 a barrel. I didn't ask as much more. But again, if we, um, get up to those sorts of figures, you know, I think back to, to 2007 and 2008, the great global financial crisis,
yeah, it was happened to be in Houston at part of that. I remember vividly seeing the start market
“red all over. I'll never forget it. I remember talking in to an American who was working in”
the British consulate in Houston. It lost half his half his retirement savings and that crash. And again, it seems to me that, that if you were to get up to those sorts of figures under 50 and if you've got a global economy, which is already, um, it's not in trouble, but already, very precarious. And it wouldn't surprise me if we have another great financial crash. I mean, you know, is, you know, we might say it. It, it was $150 an old barrel, or a function of that,
to me, it seems impossible that it wasn't a function of that. People would talk about, um, people would talk about, um, synthetic, uh, cash-wise debt obligations and the housing market. I think a lot of it's to do with the year of dollar areas, action, how, how funding in the year of dollar areas are actually tightening. But it seems impossible to me that actually that, that oil works as the primary resource wasn't playing into that. I mean, it's playing into things like
lift hands so I can cancel 20,000 flights, um, about a couple of months ago. Um, I don't know what bunk of yours are like. That's the fuel, useful share spent. Um, when I was talking to somebody recently about those, those were doubled. So again, it's what people are actually paying rather than the future's market. And it's when those two come back into alignment, they will know probably more what's happening. The, the, the, the problem I said this before is well, but I'll
“talk to her is that when somebody Danny Davis, so I think you know, Daniel Davis said to me,”
he said, if you were the czar of the world, um, what would you do about solving the energy crisis?
I said the problem is that the energy crisis, no reason chart, the whole of the energy market,
so I've run up by the market. So there is no single entity. And so well, we need to x, y and z to sort this out. You know, you can't just say where we need to actually run more tankers few of the straights for most. If the shipping company, so we don't know, look at that, thanks. I will wait until it's ready. Um, so there are whole load of issues here, which are really run by the market. And there, I think there's nobody who really understands the thing itself.
And even if they did understand the, nobody who can actually press a button and press five or six buttons to make the whole thing work again properly. That's right. And I'm here in the same thing from other analysts. You know, I listen to this like a book. And I don't say that I've got the answers, but what I do say is that you take this amount of energy out of the system. It's bound how economic consequences. It's a mathematical and possibility that it won't.
And in a globalized economy, no nation can have real sovereignty. Of course, you can act independently
On behalf of your country, because you're not in control of your country, bec...
its economy. So yeah, no one kind of thought about that, obviously, in the post-war era.
“So let me ask you a final question, which is how long are these two conflicts likely to continue?”
Do you see hope of resolution in Eastern Europe or in the Middle East?
Um, I think if I take the Middle East first, I've got a strong suspicion, and I can't say
for sure that as the continued clothes or the straits comes home to the United States, and that as the midterms go, as I think it's almost impossible to avoid now badly, and I suspect that will create a very different political atmosphere in the United States. If you've got very significant pricing creases, and you're seeing lots of damage being done to the globally economy. So my suspicion is that that's the thing which might bring the Iran war to a close. I can't say for sure.
That the interesting thing as well will be to see the extent to which, if whether situation to be improved between the United States, on the one hand, and China and Russia, on the other hand, both China and Russia could actually have a hand in helping to bring that war to a close. What's for sure is that unless the United States is able willing to deploy the significant land troops, when I say significant, we're talking tens hundreds of thousands, because nothing
else is going to make it different. Then the war cannot be mumbled at already. Yeah, and we know, I mean, I don't think I'm over guessing to say that there's no political appetite in the United
“States to deploy land forces into their own war. I think as regards the Russia, Ukraine,”
well, that's the more difficult one to call. My guess is that what Putin will be thinking about will be about the coming economic crisis in Europe, because one of the things that he could be saying himself is, okay, I could respond by, as the European start to ratchet up pressure on me, but actually I can see what's coming. So by the time this economic crisis hits Europe,
and at that stage, the Europeans will be recognised, finally, that they simply can't afford
the weapons, and they're actually, because they're actually tipping into recession. I mean, arguably, Germany's already in recession. I think both Britain and France probably are on the edge of it. Suddenly, they're in deep economic trouble, and the last thing they want to do is to actually invite their countries to invest 5% of their GDP in fighting a war, which by this stage, they'll hopefully rise, cannot be one. If that happens, then I would
like to think that it could be, it could be, and brought to a close by the end of the year, if the recession hits, it's likely sort of weird way to think about it perhaps. If it were to be diplomacy,
“a lot will depend, I think, on again, it might depend on the big terms. It might depend on how”
the near-conseared. It might depend on the E3 and their policies, but sooner or later, people I'm sure are going to recognise that the war cannot be one. The one other thing that could have bring it to a close would be a change in policy by Russia, because the alternative to striking Europe, and I've still did something, do not think that's off the table, even though it's the snidey alternative, could be a move on Kev, an other move on Kev, and I think that would be
done not for military reasons, but for political reasons. And if Kev, the Kev government were
to collapse, then I think at that stage, I think it would be game over. So I would Russia have never
mentioned it, but I wouldn't be surprised if it's been something they thought through as a possible causality. Putin has got to be under domestic pressure. He doesn't rule as an absolute dictator. He's got constituencies, then GRU, the military. Lots of people would like his job. I mean, how much pressure is he under to respond with force, greater force? Do you think? I think he's under significant pressure, but I actually took the time when the
the war kicked off to listen to all of the stone's interviews with Putin to get to know the man. And I also took the time to actually refill it short, biography of him. And then you at the I came out of that thinking, this is a man who's extremely strategic, and whatever you think about him, do you see what you heard in the press? This is a person who deserves significant respect. Yes, so if I had been thinking about this, I would say we need to think very carefully,
because this is a strategic leader who deserves significant respect. I think he is under pressure,
Equally I think he's the sort of man who will be able to resist this pressure...
thinks best, which is what I think he's been doing until now. So although I have people say,
"Oh, why hasn't Putin, I have forecasters," and people in the alternative media saying that Putin not being affected, he should have responded by now. I have a strong intuition that's supported by the general staff, and when I went to Afghanistan before I went there, I read the general Russian general staff's analysis of their Afghan campaign. They did a 10-year campaign and got out
in good order after 10 years, and the structures that they left there took two years before
actually things started to become again, we got out after 20 years, much more money expanded, and things were collecting around, I was really impressed by what the Russian general staff. So I would think that actually he's going to be very well advised as well by the Russian general staff.
“I would think he's the sort of man who will be able to hold his nerve, and I think he's the”
sort of man who will do what he thinks right strategically. So again, although I've pushed that scenario as want to think about, and I would think that he will have that on the table, and it wouldn't surprise me if that one way in which if I were to forecast how that scenario would play out rather than to put a sort of worst case. I'd say if he were going to use weapons, he would do as he would ring up the White House and say, "We are going to use weapons against the E3." Then
having done that, he would then say ring up Merckron and Burnham as it will be and say, "We are going to use weapons against production facilities, unless we have a clear response from you saying
“that you will stop providing Ukraine with these sorts of weapons." So that's what I would guess he would do,”
because he would escalate. So it's a different type of escalation, but in terms of how he's now, I would think he will hold his note for a bit, and I think a lot will depend on firstly how the world continues to play out. Secondly, the economic conditions, and sadly, the extent to which the Russians become nervous that they are going to find large weapons fired into the middle of Russia, which have been built in France, Germany, or Britain. And if they do start to think that is
that is going to happen, then I would expect Putin to respond, but in a very measured way. It sounds exactly right to me. What what a wise analysis. Thank you for taking the time to do this.
“It's a pleasure to talk around. I think keep up the good work. I think we in the independent”
media, it's important. I get so often I get to the podcast and I'm with Daniel Gendys and others, people saying, "Thank goodness, at last in common sense, and we really need this common sense, because the danger otherwise is that we'll do a 1914, which is the last thing we need to do."
Yeah, I spent 35 years in traditional media and the second I went to independent media. I thought
this is where all the smart people are. I wondered where they were. They're not in traditional media. So thank you and you're a perfect example. So thank you for doing this.
