Lawfare Archive: Stephanie Leutert on Violence in Mexico and Central America

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In the past year and a half, the Mexican government has launched its most aggressive offensive

against domestic drug cartels and organized crime groups in more than a decade. As part of this campaign, on February 23rd, Mexican security forces killed Mexico's most wanted crime boss, the Missio Oceguera Serrantez, or El Mensho, the leader of the Helisco New Generation cartel. In response to El Mensho's killing, the cartel launched a campaign of violence, including the burning of cars, buses, and businesses.

At least 74 people were killed as a result of the operation and the subsequent cartel violence according to Mexican authorities. For today's archive, I chose an episode from October 8, 2016, in which Stephanie Loiter joined Benjamin Wittis to discuss the state of violence in Mexico

“and Central America. How cartels and organized crime groups have contributed to this crisis?”

How it affects US national security and more. So, let's start with the Mexico Security Initiative, which readers of law fair will have seen associated with your column. What is it and what are you doing with it? What's your role in it? The Mexico Security Initiative is a new program out of the Strauss Center at UT Austin.

It was created to fill the void that we were seeing in terms of policy, relevant research for Mexico, for the Mexican government, and also for the US government related to the security challenges. And it has a few components. So, the main one is a year-long class at the LBJ school, sir at UT, and we also have a speaker series where we're bringing in practitioners and scholars who are working on these issues and spring conference that we're in the process of planning

in Mexico City. And of course, the column beyond the border with law fair.

“So, when you describe a void in scholarship, I think most law fair readers are aware that”

there is a lot of violence in particularly northern Mexico, though it has certainly spread beyond the north. But how would you describe the void of scholarship with respect to that constellation of violence and security threats relative to say other ones? Like, what's the void that you guys are trying to fill?

Yeah, so, first of all, I'll tell you why I think the void exists and then the void that

we're trying to fill. There certainly is a void in the US national security establishment. When it comes to hard security questions in Mexico, really in Latin America, generally, we're focusing on Mexico. And it's not really clear why given that this is our neighbor, it's a country we share a 2,000 mile border with, it's our second largest export markets, so we really should be concerned about stability. So, kind of why this isn't headlining

a lot of our national security conversations or at least making it on to the top 10 priorities, it's certainly a question. And I think there's a few reasons for it. You know, I think

and where it comes from. And we've all seen narcos or a lot of us have seen narcos, and so we're thinking of these kind of mid-aging cartel Pablo Escobar groups that are out there in Mexico, moving drugs, you kind of El Chapo is reinforcing this stereotype of the big king's hand in charge of a big organization. But a lot of times that's no longer the reality, so that's number one. Number two, we're less interested in violent groups when they're not kind of espousing some

extremist ideology when they're not trying to take down the United States, so they don't have extreme political objectives. These are fundamentally profit-motivated organizations, and so they don't seem to capture our imagination in the same way as other groups that are ideologically oriented. Let's talk about the nature and scope of the violence. Both in Mexico and in Central America more generally, which is pretty extreme relative to a lot

of conflicts that the national security community spends a lot of time on. So what's the scope of this thing? How bad is it? And how does it stack up against, say, Islamist terrorism in your up in the Middle East? To preface this whole conversation, before we get to how bad is it,

“and it is pretty bad, I think it's worth taking a step back and reminding everyone that,”

as we talk about these really bad security challenges, Mexico is also the world's 15th largest

economy and it tracks almost $30 billion a year in foreign investment and is a world-class producer

of engineers and scholars and companies, etc. Now with that said, because often these conversations quickly go into his Mexico field state, which it's not. But with that said, along the margins or in these remote areas or in states that are far away from Mexico City, you have an enormous security crisis. The data is hard to come by, but it seems that since 2005, there are at least 150,000 Mexicans who have been murdered. And that's an astonishing number, so like that's a

according to whom and what? So this is according to the Mexican government's own data and this includes

“all murders. So you have to take that with the grain of salt, how many of those are cartel murders,”

versus how many of them are kind of your regular, I guess, run of the no murders if we can say that. But on top of that, it's also worth mentioning there at least another 25 to 30,000 disappeared Mexicans that we know about. So this is a total of 180,000 Mexicans since 2005, who are either

have been murdered or who are disappeared. And there are likely many more, whose families has never

reported them as missing, because there are often mass graves that they find in various crews or Morelos or in Michelle Can, or in Guerrero, holding 40 bodies, and then those get counted into that year's homicide data. So this is a really, you know, perhaps 180,000, perhaps even higher closer to 200,000 Mexicans being murdered over the past 10, 11 years. And what's the baseline against which to measure that? I mean, do we have a sense of, I assume that's a sharp escalation

“over previous years. But what would the normal 10 year period of body count look like?”

Certainly not that high, and it's hard to now know what a normal year would look like. There were much lower rates in the years from, say, 2000 to 2005. And then when Calderon came in, President Calderon, and he declared a very aggressive strategy against the cartels. And you saw these numbers of homicides that were increasing very quickly. Now, in 2012, when the crime president came in, he came in on a platform that he was going to reduce the number of homicides. The number

of murders happening in Mexico. And you did see in 2012, 2013, 2014, he's decreasing numbers slowly. And they kind of flattened out, and we thought that that was perhaps, you know, they weren't as low as before, but we thought that was perhaps the new norm. Now, since January of this year, we have 14,000 Mexicans who have been killed. So that's an increase in the violence. That's 18

percent more than last year, and that's 24 percent more than 2014. So we're on the upswing again.

So it's hard to know with this, you know, this level of, say around 2000 Mexicans being killed a month, or a little less than that is the new norm. Or if it'll ever go back to being closer to perhaps 1,000 for a country of 113 million people, 1,000 Mexicans being murdered a month, maybe that,

And what about in the other countries that you look at? I mean, I think some of them have rates of

“homicide that's even higher than Mexico. It is. So I'll give you a few numbers to help”

put it into perspective. These are, you know, for Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, these countries are much smaller. Guatemala is a country of 15 million. Honduras is a country of 8 million. El Salvador is from 6 million. But when you look at it per race of 100,000 people and how many are murdered per 100,000, in United States, it's 5. In Mexico is 13. In Guatemala, it's 30. And Honduras is 57. And Salvador is 103. Talking about the most dangerous countries in the region and in the world,

that's, you're looking at Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador always making it into the top five.

So these are, you know, just astonishing levels of violence. And as you said at the beginning, the kind of escapes the notice of the national security community. I mean, people are generically aware that there's cartel violence and, you know, periodically large numbers of people fleeing it end up as migrants and we, you know, talk about, you know, whether we should build a wall or what we should do about the migrant crisis. But the sense of this as a sort of major set of conflicts

that are right on our border, doesn't really enter into the US national security conversation

in any sustained or serious way. You've given some reasons for that. I'm interested in the case

for the idea that we should think of this a national security terms and b as sort of like a major conflict that, you know, is worth more attention than we give it given the proximity to us. I

“mean, are we understanding this underthinking it under under reporting it? Absolutely. And I think the”

problem is because it's so close to the United States. I think that's actually one of the reasons why we have a hard time focusing and understanding these issues. Why? Because so much of this touches are most sensitive policy nerds in terms of domestic policy. We see migrants arriving at our southern border and we think illegal immigration. We don't think anywhere here the same terms of serious, you know, fleeing violence and, you know, fleeing violence and arising in Europe

they're refugees. And when you have central Americans fleeing and arriving at the southern border they're undocumented illegal immigrants and they need to get out. Or, you know, it's also touching border security, kind of a big hot button national security issue. So these are often our most challenging, our most sensitive, domestic issues and because central Americans end Mexicans and they're in the issues in these countries are so deeply intertwined with our own kind of

sensibilities I guess. It's hard for us to often separate it out. It's not as easy as looking into a faraway country and, you know, making these judgments when your own opinions and perspectives are so wrapped up in it. In one of your pieces you sort of broke down the list of the list of actors like who's producing these body counts. And your basic argument is it's a lot of different actors. It's not, you know, it's not like sort of ISIS v, you know, the Syrian government or

but there's, you know, these are many different levels of actors involved in this and it's fundamentally different in character from, you know, what we think of as, you know, the sort of narco violence from from the late '80s and early '90s. So break this down for us. Who is killing people in Mexico and Central America and what are the different groups that are responsible for the

“violence? So I think I ended that piece by saying everyone is killing everyone. So I'll start”

with that premise. In Mexico, you have a lot of different organized criminal groups. You have the big kind of traditional cartels. You have the Sinaloa cartel and that was the one that El Chapo is the head of. And they tend to be overall or they used to be kind of less violence for violence say, although that certainly has changed. And then you have other groups that are kind of upstarts like the cartel, helisco kind of new generation and they're expanding really rapidly

collie to Sinaloa's Medellín cartel? I mean, are these basically the same sort of

“entities or is there something different about the younger generation of cartels? When kind of 2005”

or when you have the Zetas really coming up they change the entire structure and that they really embrace the use of violence and they glorified it and they took videos and they put it online.

And this was a game changer in the sense of other cartels began doing the same types of activities.

So you do have this kind of divide of people looking at the old cartels of the Sinaloa, which were not as violent or they were, but there was more, it was less of violent for violence sake. And the new generation of the Zetas of the cartel helisco new generation, who are really hyper violent and they're not really trying in a lot of ways to make any inroads with the communities where they're operating. They're more extorting or kind of taking part in other very damaging

activities. I wrote in another piece about how the cartel helisco new generation, it's expanding very

“quickly and this is kind of a case of the Zetas where we're playing this role only a few years ago.”

But as these, you know, one criminal group expands very quickly. It of course encroaches on

the territory of other groups causing a lot of violence kind of along those fault lines as these groups fight over territory, over very lucrative trafficking territory reports or highways. And so you see that and then you see the the Mexican policy and the U.S. policy of kind of going after the top leaders of these different groups. And as you kind of slice off a few of the heads, you often get if it's not in a very hierarchical organization with a long kind of chain of

of command that has already been outlined, you get a lot of infighting and these ruptures within groups, including the splintering of groups really creates a lot of uncertainty, a lot of blood chip between former colleagues and everyone's kind of trying to maneuver to get their own piece of of the territory. So you have all this going on at the cartel level and of course, all these groups are fighting also with the police and with the military to continue to be able

to engage in these activities. Now that's just kind of on the macro level of the largest groups. Within a lot of these communities, there's also smaller street gangs or smaller level crime. So what do you do? I want to stop you there because I've sort of wondered this in some of your pieces. What is the difference between an international gang like the types that you've described and a cartel? Often the line is very murky. A lot of times you see these small

criminal groups that are operating in a city and you'll have a group like this, it does come in.

And they'll basically say you're either working for us or you are all dead, the plato or

you know, we're plomo kind of thing. So you end up having these these small groups of kind of your local criminals and they're backed by these, you know, big international cartels or organized criminal groups. And to be a big transnational organization that's moving drugs or other kind of

“illicit goods or moving people, you have to have a very large international network of contacts”

to be able to have suppliers and Columbia, for example, to have groups working on your behalf in Guatemala to move this all and then in the U.S. to distribute. And a lot of these local gangs don't have that, but they might have the backing or, you know, kind of their franchise per say of these larger groups. So it can be difficult to know, you know, whose actually is it that, whose actually, you know, has the contacts that go all the way up to the top and who are these,

you know, smaller groups that may have their name, but are really operating, you know, under their own commands, just with the kind of implicit backing in name of the larger group. Do you think you can see the real film or the real series of things or do you see a story about your health? If you're happy with your wife, we'll hear you. Then we'll go back, then you'll be happy with your life. This time in your tent, you won't be able to, then we'll be able to, we'll bring in a very high place,

then the freedom and your life to think. To bring your time together, with HBO Max, streamer-gashichten, like Game of Thrones, a night of the 7 Kingdoms Superman and vielen more. Up yet, HBO Max. And when you describe these gangs, some of them you describe as very local, you know, controlling a few blocks of territory in a given city. And some of them you describe as fascinating,

like having their origins in U.S. cities and sort of exported back to El Salvador and elsewhere.

Absolutely. It is an interesting story of how a lot of times Central American El Salvadoran migrants

“they fled this of a wars in their countries back in the 80s or early 90s you had a lot of these El Salvadoran”

migrants living often as poor and documented migrants in the U.S. And they were vulnerable to game recruitment or to game violence, living in many of the same neighborhoods where there were kind of long established, you know, LA gangs that being the city where a lot of El Salvadorans were living and which had a large game presence at this time. So you saw these groups kind of forming their own many gangs to protect themselves or, you know, to kind of fit in. And over time, a lot

of these gang members, you know, changing policies, getting tough on gangs, and they actually

ended up going to jail and learning kind of from all of the most established gangs of that time,

specifically the Mexican Mafia. These gangs, particularly the Medeselva Church of the MS-13 gang,

“were then as immigration policies changed and kind of got very tough on non-citizens who had”

committed violent crimes. That kind of policy push took a lot of these people out of the jails, a lot of these El Salvadoran migrants who had now not only formed their own gangs, but I become even more violent or more established through these ties with larger gangs, it exported them all back to El Salvador. This happened around the same time that El Salvador was coming out of its Civil War. It was a fertile place for these gang members who were violent, who had weapons. There was not

a strong state presence. There were a lot of very traumatized individuals who, you know, had

just experiences of a war and had histories of violence. And it was the perfect ground for a lot of these gang members to really set up their operations, which have been steadily growing ever since.

“And now you have, you know, you have small local, I mean, the gangs are transnational at this point.”

And they are really controlling a lot of neighborhoods, but how does it break down? It's also in it's called Clicks, which is kind of groups of these gang members. And they might control a city or a town, a small town. But they're all being controlled at the top by the top gang members. So it's a more diffuse network, but they're operating, and they all have their kind of local identities and local members. But they're operating under this large, kind of transnational

criminal umbrella. Okay. So you've got the traditional cartels. You've got the new generation ultra-violent cartel types. You've got highly local street gangs reflecting franchises from from other organizations. And you have the originally US-based, particularly in El Salvador, street gangs that have been exported or deported back to El Salvador. What else? What are the other major sources of killing? You have the police and the military themselves. These are bodies

that are, you know, in Mexico and in Central America that are authorized to fight against all these groups, but then are accused of committing their own as one report put at crimes against humanity. And each kind of force is a little different. It's in Mexico's police and military are pretty professionalized, but they still are blamed for pretty egregious violations of human rights of killing, you know, 22 or up to 40 cartel members. Many of whom apparently tried to surrender.

That was a recent case. Or in El Salvador where you kind of repeatedly hear cases of the kind of shoe before asking questions or over 100 gang members have been killed, not arrested killed by police in the last few years. So this, or I'm sorry, the last year. So this type of constant confrontation between these criminal groups and the police in the military, even perhaps many much of it justified, is also another source for a lot of human rights violations,

or for a lot of the violence in general. And it also creates kind of deep divides between these communities and the state, which makes reporting crime more difficult, which makes stopping these groups at all more difficult. So it's kind of a vicious circle that the continues. So I want to return to the question of how bad it is. So you hear different things about these different countries, and sometimes different things about the same country. I mean,

you know, often hear people say that Mexico is turning into a failed state, or particularly about Honduras, you know, that these, some of the Central American countries are really approaching governance failure. On the other hand, I've heard lots of people say Mexico is a quite effective

your sense of how we should assess these states relative to other states in the world that have, you know, large numbers of murders or killings, or non-state actor violence. It's a hard question to answer because in a lot of ways it's all of the above.

Mexico is a world-class economy. It has a amazing aerospace sector, world-class aerospace

sector. It has an unbelievable automotive industry. It has all of these incredible world-class industries. If you go to Mexico City and you walk around, it's cosmopolitan. It's an amazing place. If you'll save, there's boutiques, there's cafes, there's people walking their dogs. But if you went up to Dumolibus, or if you went to a small town in Veracru, or in Machuacan, these kind of more remote states, you would probably get a lot of opposite answers that

that these areas have been overlooked by the government, that there isn't much employment, that there's been brutal kind of grotesque killings on a regular basis.

So you have a Mexico, it kind of a state structure that's incredibly sturdy,

and these pockets where you have unbelievable violence going on. And what about the Central American states? I mean, it should we think about, you know, Honduras, and El Salvador, as states that are on the verge of failure, or threatened with sort of

“basic governance failure, or do they have more staying power and resilience than that?”

I don't think that these are states that are going to be failing anytime soon. But I would say I think the, I mean, they're much smaller in size, and so if you have a few towns in Mexico, or a handful, or quite a few towns in Mexico, that are extremely violent, or it's extremely unsafe, you also have large swath of the country that are fine. When you have that same thing in a country like El Salvador, which is very small, that really

is the entire country. I think I'm safe in saying that the situation in Honduras and El Salvador on a kind of larger scale is much worse. You really do have kind of an emptying out of the region, you have thousands, tens of thousands of Central Americans who are fleeing of El Salvadorans

is a country of six million, and you have tens of thousands of people who are fleeing every month,

or more, because that's only the people who are making it to the United States. It's, you know, they're fleeing a lot of different things. They're fleeing the gangs. Incredible kind of gang violence, extortion, someone shows up and slips a note, you know, under your front door, says to pay this person at this time, and if you don't, they're going to

“kill you, and you know that's what happened to your neighbor down the street and so you're terrified,”

so you pay, and then you can't make that last payment, and you're worried they're actually going to kill you, and so you flee, or they were harassing your daughter. So you have this as well, but I'll also say I spent time working with a lot of these Central Americans who have made it to the United States, and there are other epidemics going on as well that are often tied to the gangs, but of domestic violence, and it's kind of this breakdown of the social fabric that's occurring right now through

our Salvadoran Honduras, and parts of Guatemala that I think is going to become, it is a dire challenge already, and it's going to continue to become an even worse one. So you have, as have others, but you've really insisted that the violence in these countries, it is what's driving this massive migration, including of kids to the United States. Now this migration was big news a few years ago, and it's largely out of the news now. To what extent is it continued, and to what extent,

“and people just don't care anymore, and to what extent has it really been curtailed?”

It's still continuing. I think one of the reasons why it's out of the news is because we've just gotten better at absorbing these numbers of people. Just last month, just families, there were about 9,000 families who showed up at the border from Central America, but we now have a much better system for processing them, and we have family detention centers that are already established, so it's not as much of a breaking news story. And when you say absorbing and processing,

so what is happening to the X number of tens of thousands of people? How many people have come over this whole wave, and what's tended to happen to them? I'm not sure of the exact number of people who have come, but you're looking at upwards of, I think it's over 100,000 people,

make it here, and I also want to go back to not all of these people are fleeing violence. There are

“some who are coming for economic opportunity, and there are some who are coming to reunite with”

family members who are living here, but I do think that in a statistic's back it up, that or service statistics, that a large majority are fleeing violence of some form. Now, when they come to the United States, there's three pathways. There's, there's unaccompanied children, which is the one that made the most news, and those numbers have actually stayed stable around 5,000 unaccompanied children have been arriving over the past, like about two years, from Central America every month.

And then you also have the families that come, and then you also have just adults. And each of those three categories is processed a little differently, with the children going into a kind of more the department of health and human services. And their process is on a very kind of different timeline. There are families, which many of them go to family detention center, and they have

“an entire process of how to leave those centers. And then there's the adults, which are again on”

a entirely different pathway, and they're the least likely to have the chance to stay in the United States. So in your perception and the aggregate are most people getting sent back, or are we absorbing at, I don't want to, you know, make Donald Trump reach for the smelling salts, but are, you know, are we absorbing a large number of people, or is this largely a processing in terms of, you know, an orderly system for sending people back? We, it is an orderly system for sending

people back, and that was really the initial intent of the Obama administration's response,

or kind of first response to the Central American migrants, was how can we process them quickly

to send them back quickly so that more realize they cannot stay? Now, each of those three groups that I mentioned on the company children, family detention, just plain adults, each of them I'd say it's probably a little different statistics. If you're an unaccompanied child, your chances of staying in the United States are much higher than if you are a 20 year old male from El Salvador. Just based on asylum law, protections that we offer to children here in the United States,

and similarly for parents with children, it is easier to stay. Although, with that said, these types of asylum cases are often quite difficult to win, because gangs usually aren't the, you know, asylum law wasn't written for individuals fleeing gangs, so it's often difficult to prove that type of persecution back in their home country. You mean, because the gangs aren't fundamentally political and exactly. And because these countries are taking efforts in a lot of places to try to

stop the gangs, so there isn't, they're not fleeing the state per se. It's, you know, to kind of go back though, you do have a lot of people who are entering the country right now on asylum proceedings, and those are long and often they're shelved over kind of administrative reasons after, especially for children after they've reached a certain length of time. But it also depends where in the country, these individuals are applying for asylum. There are places, there are different districts that are

much, that have judges that are more lenient to these cases and others that are not, so it's, it really depends geographically, you know, where they're actually filing the cases. So when you look at this, I mean, this is a really complex tapestry of policy problems

and second order of facts. And when you look at it, do you say there's an obvious set of policy

interventions that a reasonable US government would make that we are not making? Or do you look at this and say, this is kind of an inevitable consequence of a dramatic standard of living difference across one border, and then another dramatic standard of living difference across that country is Southern border. You're going to get some violence, you're going to get net migration both as people sort of, you know, produce drugs to sell across those respective

borders and as people flee. How much of this is sort of inevitable and how much of this is bad policy in the country's in question, including ours. So these are the exact questions that the Mexican Security Initiative is trying to, to take on here at UT. And it's complicated, a lot of it is what looks like good policy then creates very bad consequences. So what's an

“example of that? You know, I think that the, you know, going back to the one that we talked about”

quickly of deporting criminals in jails, that might have seemed like a very good policy from the US perspective of lowering violence rates in major cities. And that created an enormous,

Or perhaps a good policy that still creates bad consequences is going after the heads of gangs.

“I'm sorry, of gangs and of cartels. Because every time you take off as stable head like El”

Japo, you often create splintering or vulnerabilities that other organized criminal groups try to exploit. So that might be a good policy. It's probably a good thing to try to get these leaders, but it also creates perhaps more violent. When you look at the general landscape, is there one aspect of US policy that you say, okay, reasonable minds can disagree

about x, y, and z, but this is insane. The first thing that comes to mind is something I know Ben,

we've talked about something that I hope to be writing about soon, which is the conditions in short-term detention centers once migrants cross into the United States. And this is, you know, this is a, it's not a small problem, but it isn't a, you know, it's a big of a problem of how do you take on criminal organizations in Al Salvador, but it seems like such an easy fix that it's, to me, it's the low-hanging fruit of, of how do you kind of just one policy that would improve a lot of

people's lives. And so that is that when migrants are apprehended along the border as they're

trying to cross, they put into these short-term processing centers, which they call las yeletas,

which means the ice box or ice boxes. And the temperatures in these places are, they report them to be quite low, and they report not having adequate food or medical care. Now, the reason for this,

“I believe, is not that the border patrol are being incredibly malicious by any means. It's that”

these were meant to be short-term processing centers of a few hours. And so the resources that they have to offer to these migrants are made for that timeline or that timeframe. But often these migrants because there's so many, and they're now staying in these processing centers, which imagine it's kind of like a concrete cell. They're staying there for about 72 hours, which is for small children for older migrants. That is a long time to be sleeping on a concrete floor or only eating kind of

bread or ham, which is what they report to eat. So to me, this is, this is just where a situation evolved in the infrastructure remain the same. So I imagine there could be very small changes

“in terms of providing just three meals a day of good food or making sure that all migrants have”

a small mattress. It's not a real mattress, but kind of a fold-out mattress to sleep on or blankets, and making sure the temperatures are adequate for small children. And that would make a huge difference in the quality of life, because when you talk to my conseary, they'll tell you the horrors of their home country, the size of the horrors of the journey. And then they also tell you the horrors of those first few days. And a lot of these people go on to win a silent cases, and it just

seems like there isn't really a reason why we couldn't just ensure those conditions kind of meet industry standards for individuals who many of whom will go on to become legal U.S. residents. Steph Loiter, thank you very much for joining us. Thank you, Erin. The Law Fair Podcast is producing cooperation with the Brookings Institution. Our music is

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